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Executive Summary 
This deliverable of Work Package 5 presents the outcome of the analysis and critical assessment of EU 
human rights engagement with other European regional organisations. 
Cooperation between the European Union and the Council of Europe has become more systematic, in 
particular in the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2007. This document 
inter alia identifies shared priorities and focal areas of cooperation among which are listed human 
rights and fundamental freedoms; rule of law and legal co-operation; democracy and good 
governance; democratic stability; intercultural dialogue and cultural diversity; education, youth and 
promotion of human contacts; and social cohesion. In the light of the Lisbon Treaty, including the new 
legal status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the commitment to ratify the European 
Convention on Human Rights, cooperation between the EU and the system of human rights protection 
established within the CoE should be significantly enhanced. However, the road leading up to the 
accession to the European Convention may be more difficult than expected as has been indicated by 
the Opinion 2/13 of the CJEU on the Draft Accession Agreement, adopted on 18 December 2014.  
In the case of the OSCE, although the role of the EU has never been formally defined in details, the EU 
participation in the work of OSCE bodies has been recognized by the established practice and 
formalised by the Rules of Procedure of the organisation adopted in 2006. The EU attaches particular 
importance to co-operation with the OSCE on security-related matters and conflict prevention in 
Europe. 
The report consists of four chapters.  
The first chapter presents the aims of the report as well as methodology of the research. It also 
explains the basic conceptual framework of the deliverable. 
The second chapter is devoted to the cooperation of the European Union with the Council of Europe. 
In particular, the authors of the report analyse the Memorandum of Understanding between the 
European Union and the Council of Europe, EU’s policy documents and the issue of the rapprochement 
of the human rights protection systems of these two organisations. It also tackles the issue of common 
human rights standards.  
The third chapter presents the issue of the European Union’s cooperation with the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe. It explains the position of the EU vis-à-vis the OSCE and it presents 
the EU’s substantive human rights goals and objectives. The authors of the report have also analysed 
the issue of common human rights standards and the EU’s engagement in and support for the OSCE 
human rights activities.  
The report is supplemented by four case studies related to: 1. The role of Venice Commission 
’Democracy through Law‘ and its cooperation with the European Union; 2. The legal influence of the 
ECHR on the EU in case of the right to an effective remedy and right to fair trial; 3. Joint Programme – 
Peer to Peer II, and 4. The EU’s external human rights policy in view of crisis at the EU’s doorstep: 
towards a gradual division of labour between EU-OSCE in Ukraine. 
The fourth and final chapter presents the conclusions of the research. The report seeks not only to 
advance existing scholarship on the topic, but also to create a broad knowledge base for future 
research.  
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I. Introduction 
A. Aim 
The purpose of this report is to analyse the EU’s engagement with other European regional 
organisations acting in the area of human rights. Europe is a continent with the most complex set up 
of regional systems of the protection of human rights, which is a result of historical developments. 
The oldest one was established by the Council of Europe which in its Statute, adopted in 1949, 
declared that it will pursue the aim of greater unity of its members based on their common heritage 
of ideals and principles ’in the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.’1 Initially, this system covered only Western European countries which were joined by 
Central and Eastern European members only after the end of the Cold War. It has developed a human 
rights treaty framework with a variety of implementation mechanisms. Chronologically, the next 
system was a product of the evolving Helsinki process launched in 1975 that led to the establishment 
of the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1995. Despite its mainly European 
character, it also reaches out to USA and Canada, as well as to some countries of Central Asia which 
emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Its ’Human Dimension‘2 is focused on various 
aspects of human rights and democratisation. Finally, the European Union as an international 
organisation sui generis has also established its own system of the protection of human (fundamental) 
rights which could be seen as sub-regional. In addition, members of the EU are members of the other 
organisations and their protection systems and, moreover, according to the Lisbon Treaty the EU itself 
is on its way to become a party of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights concluded under 
the Council of Europe.  
This complex organisational and, as a consequence, institutional set-up in Europe3 creates several 
challenges to the EU policies which will be subject to a detailed analysis in this report. They are related 
inter alia to the need for an all-European approach to human rights, which is unquestionable if an 
equal enjoyment of human rights by people across the continent should be achieved. The report 
should serve a better understanding of the role of the EU as an essential human rights actor at the 
European scene, allow for the identification of major factors which shape the EU policies, provide a 
basis for the assessment of these policies from the point of view of their coherence, consistency and 
effectiveness, and finally offer a general outlook of and proposals for their further development. 
 
  
                                                          
1 Statute of the Council of Europe, 5 May 1949, CETS no. 1. 
2 This is the so called Third Dimension of the OSCE while the two others are dedicated to security issues (First Dimension) 
and economic and environmental cooperation (Second Dimension).  
3 Compare also: Monika Mayrhofer, Carmela Chavez, Venkatachala Hegde, Magnus Killander, Joris Larik, Bright Nkrumah, 
Elizabeth Salmón, Kristine Yigen, ‘Report on the mapping study on relevant actors in human rights protection’ (2015) FP7-
FRAME Work Package No. 4 – Deliverable No. 4.1. 
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B. Conceptual framework 
1. General considerations4 
 
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted at the Second World Conference on Human 
Rights in 1993 states that ’Regional arrangements play a fundamental role in promoting and protecting 
human rights. They should reinforce universal human rights standards, as contained in international 
human rights instruments, and their protection. The World Conference on Human Rights endorses 
efforts under way to strengthen these arrangements and to increase their effectiveness, while at the 
same time stressing the importance of cooperation with the United Nations human rights activities.’5 
This assessment of the role of such regional arrangements (systems of protection) has been regularly 
reiterated in the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly, Commission on Human Rights and 
subsequently Human Rights Council.6  
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights also underlines that regional human rights 
systems:  
 assist ’national governments with the implementation of their international human rights 
obligations; for example, assisting with the implementation of the recommendations of treaty 
bodies, special procedures and the Universal Periodic Review;’ 
 provide ’people with more accessible mechanisms for the protection of their human rights, once 
national remedies have been exhausted;’ 
 help ’to raise peoples awareness of their human rights, placing them in a more localized context 
and reflecting their particular human rights concerns;’ 
 provide ’regional input to the development of international human rights standards and the 
improvement of international human rights mechanisms;’ 
 help ’national governments to better address regional human rights concerns that cross national 
borders; for example, human rights concerns related to migration, transnational crime and 
environmental disasters.7’ 
According to art. 21 (1) of TEU, the European Union is committed to ’develop relations and 
partnerships with (...) regional organisations which share [its] principles‘. In a study for the European 
Parliament on the regional human rights mechanisms one can read that ’Regional human rights 
protection mechanisms constitute important pillars of the international system for the promotion and 
protection of human rights.’8 Indeed, considerable attention is paid to these mechanisms at the 
international level. They are considered as the most desirable complementary mechanisms to the 
                                                          
4 This sub-chapter is applicable, mutatis mutandi, to all FP7-FRAME Work Package No. 5 deliverables on the EU engagement 
with Regional Multilateral Organisations.  
5 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action Adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna, 25 June 1993, para 37. 
6 For example, the General Assembly underlined that ‘regional arrangements play a fundamental role inpromoting and 
protecting human rights and should reinforce universal human rights standards, as contained in international human rights 
instruments, and their protection’, see above, para 5. 
7 UN OHCHR, ‘An Overview of Regional Human Rights Systems’, <http://bangkok.ohchr.org/programme/regional-
systems.aspx>, last accessed odn 26 April 2016. 
8 Wolfgang Benedek, Jean P. Jacque, Zdzisław Kędzia, Felipe Gomez Isa, Renate Kicker, Gerd Oberleitner, Clara M. Raventos, 
Lisa Heschl, Sarah Kumar, Kerstin Wonish, ‘The Role of Regional Human Rights Systems’ (European Parliament 2010) 1. 
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universal system working under the auspices of the United Nations. From a local perspective, 
however, they are perceived as the primary supra-state source of protection, in particular if they offer 
judicial safeguards as it is the case in Europe, Latin America and Africa.  
The development of regional human rights mechanisms is asymmetric. Regional systems of the human 
rights protection established under the Council of Europe and the Organisations of American States 
are advanced in the territorial coverage of legal commitments, regional standard-setting, 
development of implementation mechanisms, including judicial protection, and regarding the follow 
up procedures serving enforceability of the adopted commitments. The regional system established 
within the African Union does not differ in its basic set-up from the other two. However, significant 
differences are visible as far as the capacities and output are concerned. The AU system suffers from 
some weaknesses in the institutional framework; insufficient political will on the part of some AU 
Member States to cooperate with the regional system in a constructive manner; inadequate domestic 
capacities to respond to the requirements of the regional system.9 
Finally, two other regions, namely Arab countries (in the framework of the Arab League and the 
Organisation of Islamic States) and Asia (de facto ASEAN, since elsewhere in Asia there have been no 
significant movements) are still at an initial stage of setting-up regional protection systems. Their 
imminent perspectives are not very clear, either. After the adoption of the Arab Human Rights Charter 
in 2004 and the establishment of the Arab Commission on Human Rights, there were indications that 
the Arab League would be able to energetically continue on this path but there is little evidence that 
this hope was justified. The situation within ASEAN seems to be similar. Also here the Member States 
were able to produce a Declaration of Human Rights and to set up an ASEAN Commission on Human 
Rights but further institutional developments towards a full-fledged regional protection system are 
still missing.  
Accordingly, the aforementioned study for the European Parliament distinguishes between four basic 
types of situations of regional human rights protection systems:  
1) An advanced regional system (Europe and America), 
2) A regional system requiring further consolidation (Africa), 
3) An emerging regional system – at the initial stage of standard setting and implementation 
machinery (Arab Countries and ASEAN),  
4) A region without a regional system of the human rights protection (remaining part of Asia and 
Pacific).10 
Essentially, from the EU perspective the systems in Europe and Latin America can be seen as partners 
in cooperative efforts but not as addressees of bilateral support. Other from the aforementioned 
systems can be considered as both partners of cooperation and potential recipients of EU support.  
This assessment provides the overall conceptual framework for the analysis of the EU policies towards 
the systems of the human rights protection established by the Council of Europe and the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Some specific elements of this framework are presented 
below.  
                                                          
9 Supra 12. 
10 Supra 11. The presentation in this report includes adjustments of points 3) and 4) of the original presentation. 
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 Coherence, consistency, effectiveness 
The clarification of the concepts ’coherence‘, ’consistency‘ and ’effectiveness‘ of the EU human rights 
policies has been elaborated in greater details in the ’Report on the analysis and critical assessment 
of EU engagement in UN bodies‘. The findings contained therein are mutatis mutandis applicable to 
EU cooperation with regional systems of human rights protection.11 
Accordingly, coherent/consistent EU policymaking is defined as ’policymaking that seeks to achieve 
common, identifiable goals that are devised and implemented in an environment of collaboration, 
coordination and cooperative planning among and within the EU Institutions, among the EU 
Institutions and Member States, as well as among EU Member States.’12 Three dimensions of 
coherence/ consistency need to be diversified: 
 ’Internal-external‘ dimension captures ’the degree to which the EU applies internally what it 
promotes externally.’ It embraces the conduct of both the EU institutions and individual 
Member States. The latter aspect should be underlined in particular in the European context 
since EU Member States are also members of the CoE and the OSCE. 
 ’External-external‘ dimension refers to the degree of uniformity in which the EU articulates 
and follows its policies in relation to the non-EU partners. In the European context, it may be 
especially important to ensure the necessary correlation between the policies implemented 
in cooperation with the CoE and the OSCE.  
 ’Internal-internal‘ dimension ’captures the degree to which all representatives of EU 
institutions and EU Member States convey a uniform message about a particular country-
specific or thematic human rights issue in the entirety of EU external action.’13 
Lack of coherence/consistency may undermine credibility of the EU as a human rights actor with all 
the consequences in terms of authority and effectiveness of action and impair the EU ability to achieve 
its goals.  
The concept of ’effectiveness’ refers in this report to the EU ability to attain its policy goals in 
cooperation with the CoE and OSCE. It should help assessing the EU action vis-à-vis both organisations, 
as well as the impact of actions undertaken jointly by the EU - CoE and/or OSCE in Member States and 
third countries.  
The EU Action Plan for 2015 – 2019 places great emphasis on the regional systems. Thus, it can play 
an important role in ensuring EU coherence/consistence and effectiveness. The general task of 
strengthening cooperation with regional Human Rights and Democracy mechanisms ’in particular by 
pursuing synergies and common initiatives on key thematic issues and at important multilateral 
events‘ has been entrusted to the EEAS and the Commission. These two actors and Member States 
are also called upon to promote ’peer-to-peer capacity building initiatives between Regional HR and 
                                                          
11 Grazyna Baranowska, Anna-Luise Chané, David D’Hollander, Agata Hauser, Jakub Jaraczewski, Zdzisław Kędzia, Mariusz 
Lewicki, Anna Połczyńska, ‘Report on the Analysis and Critical Assessment of EU Engagement in UN Bodies’ (2015) FP7-FRAME 
Work Package No. 5 – Deliverable No. 5.1 3-5. 
12 See supra, ch. I.B.1. and referred to there: FP-7 FRAME ‘Coherence (and consistency)’, FRAME Internal Fact Sheet, 2014 1; 
see also Tamara Lewis, Wolfgang Benedek and Anna Müller-Funk, ‘Report on coherence of human rights policymaking in EU 
Institutions and other EU agencies and bodies’, (2015) FP7-FRAME Deliverable 8.1. 
13 Supra (fn 8) 1. 
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Democracy support mechanisms.’14 References to regional systems are made throughout the Action 
Plan under various thematic activities.  
While underscoring the EU engagement in multilateral and regional fora, the European Commission 
and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy placed in their Joint 
Communication a particular emphasis on the United Nations and the Council of Europe.15 The Council 
of Europe and OSCE are specifically mentioned in the Action Plan in the context of cooperation on the 
right to privacy and exchange of good practices. The latter is also referred to as partner in election 
monitoring.  
 
 Leadership and mutual influence 
In 2011 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council ’Human Rights and 
Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action – towards a More Effective Approach‘ , the European 
Commission together with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy have stated that ’The European Union has both the will and the means to be a leader 
when it comes to protecting human rights and supporting democracy worldwide‘.16 Indeed, its 
partners see the EU as a global human rights champion. Nobel Peace Prize for advancing the causes 
of peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe awarded to the EU in 2012 illustrates, 
in a way, this perception.  
What could the concept of the EU human rights leadership mean in the European context? Again, like 
in the previous sub-chapter, the response may be based on the findings of the ’Report on the analysis 
and critical assessment of EU engagement in UN bodies‘17 which provides some applicable 
clarifications. Hence, the EU leadership in the discussed context should not be perceived as aspiration 
leading up to an usurpation to be a leader. Leadership in this context is primarily a matter of 
responsibility, understood as a derivative of the EU commitment to the values protected by human 
rights and of the international and regional weight of the Union. Therefore, the EU should not aspire 
’to be a leader‘ vis-à-vis the CoE or the OSCE but rather be guided by the principle of responsibility 
offering the lead, if needed and requested in agreed areas of cooperation. Such an approach reflects 
the spirit of cooperation, recognition of the status, role and autonomy of partners without EU 
abdicating from its responsibility. It also takes into account the Janus face with which the EU appears 
within these organisations. On the one hand, it is one of the key partners to them. On the other hand, 
the EU is present in these organisations through Member States thanks to their double-membership. 
Such a position is featured by a high degree of desirable flexibility. At the same time, however, it may 
pose considerable challenges regarding the previously discussed coherence/consistency of action. 
These questions will be discussed in more details in the subsequent parts of this report.  
                                                          
14 European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint 
Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019) 
“Keeping human rights at the heart of the EU agenda’”’ JOIN(2015)16 final, 28 April 2015 5. 
15 See supra.  
16 European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint 
Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External 
Action –Towards a More Effective Approach’, COM(2011) 886, 12 December 2011. 
17 See supra (fn 8), I.B.2.  
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The relations based on partnership and cooperation, as well as double-membership of EU Member 
States enhance the potential of mutual influence between the EU and both the CoE and the OSCE. 
There are three channels of such an impact: 
 firstly – the EU, the CoE, and the OSCE interact through cooperation on policy issues and 
specific programmes and projects,  
 secondly – the EU contributes to decision making within the CoE and the OSCE through action 
taken by its Member States as members of both organisations,  
 thirdly – policies and decisions adopted by the CoE and the OSCE and their mechanisms 
influence the developments in the EU Member States, and thus, may eventually (indirectly) 
have some impact on policy making within the EU.  
In some aspects, the mutual influence between the EU and two others European actors has been 
formalized (e.g. the understanding of fundamental rights under the EU Charter in the light of the 
European Convention on Human Rights). A detailed analysis of such measures is presented in the 
subsequent parts of the report.  
 
C. Methodology 
 
The research for this report has been primarily based the analysis of primary and secondary sources. 
Primary sources include legal sources and jurisprudence, policy documents, official programmes, plans 
and decisions. Secondary sources used for this report include published academic articles and books, 
and working papers. They were collected through surveys of various databases and library catalogues. 
The report also benefits from several semi-structured interviews with policy-makers, experts and 
other stakeholders. The main purpose of these interviews was to obtain insights, commentaries and 
assessments of policy-making and practical experience, otherwise not accessible.  
EU, CoE and OSCE are different in many aspects, including their goals, membership and territorial 
coverage, organisational nature and structures. As a consequence, the systems of the human rights 
protection established under their umbrellas also bear specific characteristics. Nevertheless, they are 
interlinked through overlapping memberships, comparable general objectives and approaches, as well 
as in some cases they are also linked with each other legally or by mutual agreements. Bearing this in 
mind, searching for commonalities and distinctions between these systems, the report looks at them 
from the perspective of four features marking an effective regional protection mechanism, notably (a) 
inclusiveness, (b) independence, (c) access to justiciability, and (d) follow-up mechanisms.18  
 
  
                                                          
18 Supra (fn 5) 14. 
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D. Structure 
 
The report consists of four chapters.  
The first one presents the aims of the report as well as methodology of the research. It also explains 
the basic conceptual framework of the deliverable. 
The second chapter is devoted to the cooperation of the European Union with the Council of Europe. 
In particular, the authors of the report analyse the Memorandum of Understanding between the 
European Union and the Council of Europe, EU’s policy documents and the issue of the rapprochement 
of the human rights protection systems of these two organisations. It also tackles the issue of common 
human rights standards.  
The third chapter presents the issue of the European Union’s cooperation with the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe. It explains the placements of the EU vis-à-vis the OSCE and it 
presents the EU’s substantive human rights goals and objectives. The authors of the report have also 
analysed the issue of common human rights standards and the EU’s engagement in and support for 
the OSCE human rights activities.  
The final chapter presents the conclusions of the research. 
The report is supplemented by four case studies related to: 1. The role of Venice Commission 
’Democracy through Law‘ and its cooperation with the European Union; 2. The legal influence of the 
ECHR on the EU in case of the right to an effective remedy and right to fair trial; 3. Joint Programme – 
Peer to Peer II, and 4. The EU’s external human rights policy in view of crisis at the EU’s doorstep: 
towards a gradual division of labour between EU-OSCE in Ukraine. 
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II. Cooperation with the Council of Europe 
 
A. Mapping the CoE 
 Introduction 
Europe is undoubtedly the continent with the densest and most developed network of 
intergovernmental organisations dedicated solely to protecting and promoting human rights or whose 
work relate to human rights to a significant degree.19 The Council of Europe is first and foremost an 
organisation devoted to safeguarding protection and furthering promotion of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law in Europe and beyond. The relatively narrow focus of the CoE has a 
profound impact on how it interacts with other actors, including the EU. On one hand, the common 
aims of the CoE and the EU invite and encourage greater mutual understanding and deeper 
cooperation. On the other hand, the overlaps result in tensions and contradictions in the areas where 
both organisations pursue differing agendas regarding human rights, or step on each other’s toes as 
far as methods and objectives are concerned. The specific focus of the CoE invites a closer look at 
primary bodies, agencies and venues of the organisation in order to shed light on the scope and 
complexity of its operations. The concept of an array of bodies with an intergovernmental decisive 
body, an advisory parliamentary body and a judicial body first introduced by the CoE was later 
emulated by several organisations, including the EU. An attempt to map and analyse the entirety of 
CoE’s work related to human rights goes well beyond the scope of this report. For the sake of both 
relevance and brevity, the analysis focuses on an array of critical bodies and mechanisms which have 
the biggest influence on shaping the CoE’s human rights protection system and where the EU is 
present in a meaningful capacity. 
 
 Council of Europe – General Information20 
The Council of Europe is a regional intergovernmental organisation established in 1949 by 10 
European states21 in order to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of 
safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles, which are their common heritage and facilitating 
their economic and social progress. The Council of Europe was the first of many organisations set up 
by Western European countries who sought to avoid a repetition of horrors of WW2 and foster 
intergovernmental dialogue and cooperation. The principal foundational legal instrument which 
establishes the CoE, outlines its goals and aims as well as provides basic organisational structure and 
core bodies is the Statue of the Council of Europe, also known as the Treaty of London.22 Currently, 
the CoE has 47 full members (including all EU Member States), which include all European23 states 
                                                          
19 Monika Mayrhofer, Carmela Chavez, Venkatachala Hegde, Magnus Killander, Joris Larik, Bright Nkrumah, Elizabeth Salmón, 
Kristine Yigen, ‘Report on the mapping study on relevant actors in human rights protection’, (2015) FP7-FRAME Work Package 
No. 4 – Deliverable No. 4.1, 47. 
20 Supra 48-54. 
21 Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
22 Statute of the Council of Europe, 5 May 1949, CETS no. 1. 
23 This assumes the commonly used geographic boundary of between Europe and Asia set along the Ural Mountains, Ural 
River, Caspian Sea, the Greater Caucasus range and the Black Sea, thus considering Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia 
and Turkey as transcontinental states. 
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except Belarus, the Holy See, Kazakhstan and Kosovo.24 Several states enjoy observer status with the 
CoE. Canada, Japan, Mexico, the US and the Holy See have observer status and can participate in the 
CoE Committee of Ministers (CoM) and all intergovernmental committees. Notably, these observers 
may contribute financially to the CoE budget on voluntary basis. Additionally, the national parliaments 
of Canada, Israel and Mexico have observer status with the CoE Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) and 
their delegations can participate in the works of PACE. Finally, the Palestinian Legislative Council 
participates in PACE debates on the Middle East and the Northern Cyprus’ Assembly of the Republic 
participates in PACE discussions on the island of Cyprus. Notably, no international or regional 
organisations currently enjoy observer status with the CoE, and therefore the EU has no formal 
standing with the Council. The full members enjoy full rights to participate in works of the CoE with 
voting rights in accordance with the Statute of the Council of Europe, while observers are free to 
participate to a limited degree. The exact status of observers is highly formalised, unlike it is the case 
of the UN, with the principles set in the Committee of Ministers Statutory Resolution (93) 26 on 
Observer Status25 and the detailed rules adopted in several resolutions and decisions on observer 
status. Above the matters related to membership and observer status it bears to mention that over 
45 other countries throughout the world are parties to various CoE conventions and engage in CoE 
activities related to these acts.  
The principal legal foundation of the CoE, as indicated above, is the Statue of the Council of Europe, 
an international treaty, which outlines the purposes and principles of the CoE, the rules concerning 
membership, core bodies of the CoE, their competences and powers, basic organisation and 
procedure rules as well as budgetary and technical matters. The primary purpose of the CoE, as noted 
above, was initially outlined as being a vehicle for achieving unity between Member States and 
protecting their common heritage while supporting economic and social progress. As the Statute of 
the CoE provides:  
’This aim shall be pursued through the organs of the Council by discussion of questions of 
common concern and by agreements and common action in economic, social, cultural, 
scientific, legal and administrative matters and in the maintenance and further realisation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.’26 
These aims are realised through the work of several bodies, agencies, programmes and actions 
undertaken within the CoE structure. Administrative functions of the CoE are handled by the General 
Secretariat of the Council, with the Secretary-General (SG) as its head. The SG is the de facto the 
spokesperson of the CoE and is responsible for the strategic management of the CoE. Interestingly, 
very little in the way of his or her competences and powers are clearly defined in CoE law, and instead 
have evolved over the decades of practice and precedent. The Secretariat handles day-to-day 
management of various activities of the CoE, including external relations and contact with other 
organisations, including the EU. The finances of the CoE are split into four major areas: the so-called 
                                                          
24 Belarus applied for CoE membership in 1993 and its parliament held special guest status with PACE until 1997, but the 
status and the country’s application were suspended in 1997. Kazakhstan applied for special guest status with PACE in 1999 
and is currently undergoing dialogue and cooperation with CoE with a view towards full membership. The Holy See has not 
sought CoE membership insofar. Kosovo has indicated its desire to apply for full CoE Membership, but no action has been 
undertaken in this regard so far. All references to Kosovo, whether the territory, institutions or population, in this text shall 
be understood to be in full compliance with United Nation's Security Council Resolution 1244 and without prejudice to the 
status of Kosovo. 
25 CoE Committee of Ministers, Statutory Regulation (93) 26 on Observer Status, 14 May 1993. 
26 Supra (fn 1), art. 1 (b). 
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ordinary CoE budget, the Partial Agreements budget (covering, among others, the budget of the 
Venice Commission), extra-budgetary receipts and the budget for CoE-EU Joint Programmes. For 2016, 
the CoE budget was set at 401m Euro (with 260m Euro of ordinary budget and 141m Euro Partial 
Agreements budget) with 52m Euro extra-budgetary receipts and the ongoing (multiannual) budget 
of JPs at 112m Euro. The CoE budget is financed from obligatory contributions by Member States and 
voluntary contributions from both CoE Member States and other states which seek to support the 
aims and works of the CoE.27  
 
 Legal instruments of the CoE human rights system 
The Statute of the Council of Europe, as recalled above, provides the legal foundations of the CoE. It 
makes several direct references to human rights apart from setting their realisation as one of CoE 
policy areas in art. 1 (b). Acceptance of principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons 
within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms is one of prerequisites for CoE 
membership, as outlined in art. 3 of the Statute.28 The Statute does not provide a bill of human rights 
and does not refer to any other international human rights instruments. From the very onset, the 
intention of the CoE was to draft and adopt its own core human rights act, which would serve as the 
bill of rights for Europe and the cornerstone of the CoE human rights system. This document, the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (commonly known as and 
referred in this report as the European Convention on Human Rights or ECHR) is one of the crowning 
achievements of the CoE and European legal culture as a whole.29 The work on drafting the ECHR 
commenced during the 1948 Hague Congress and the final text was made open for signature in 1950, 
with sufficient ratifications and entry into the force achieved in 1953. The Convention was ratified by 
all full Member States of the CoE, and thus by all Member States of the EU. The ECHR enshrines the 
CoE bill of rights and has had a tremendous impact beyond the CoE itself, becoming a vital influence 
on human rights law in states throughout the world as well as other international organisations, not 
the least the EU itself. The ECHR contains provisions related to civil and political rights and freedoms, 
thus reflecting the human rights paradigm common to drafting countries, where development of 
standards and practice related to economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights was far less homogenised 
and extensive.  
The ECHR guarantees, among others, the right to life30, freedom from torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment31, freedom from slavery or servitude32, the right to liberty and 
personal security33, the right to respect for family and private life34, freedom of thought, conscience, 
                                                          
27 In the 2016 CoE budget, contributions from the following non-CoE state are included: Algeria, Belarus, Brazil, Cape Verde, 
Chile, The Holy See, Israel, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Tunisia and 
United States. The contribution by United States, budgeted at 436.000 Euro is by far the largest, with contributions from 
Brazil (98.000 Euro) and Morocco (84.000 Euro) the second and the third respectively.  
28 The exact same requirement is set out for potential observer states, as outlined in the Statutory Resolution (93) 26 on 
observer status. 
29 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by 
Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5. 
30 Supra, art. 1. 
31 Supra, art. 3. 
32 Supra, art. 4. 
33 Supra, art. 5. 
34 Supra, art. 8. 
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and religion35 and freedom of expression36 and association37. It also guarantees the right to fair trial38, 
forbids retroactive criminalisation39, safeguards the right for women and men to marry40, and forbids 
discrimination on any grounds, yet only with respect to rights and freedoms enshrined in ECHR41.  
The Convention was expanded by means of Optional Protocols (OP), which were open to ratification 
by CoE Member States. The Optional Protocols serve several purposes. Some of them enshrine new 
rights and freedoms or expand the scope of existing ones. Other OP reform the procedures and 
modalities of the European Court for Human Rights (ECtHR). The following table illustrates the level 
of ratification of the OP which provide new substantive human rights provisions by EU Member States: 
 
Table 1 Optional Protocols to the ECHR - ratification 
Optional Protocol Ratification Status within the EU 
no. 1 (property rights, right to education, 
electoral rights) 
all EU Member States 
no. 4 (civil imprisonment, freedom of 
movement, expulsion of nationals and 
foreigners) 
all EU Member States except Greece and 
United Kingdom 
no. 6 (restriction of death penalty) all EU Member States 
no. 7 (procedural rights of expulsed foreigners, 
right to appeal in criminal matters, prohibition of 
double jeopardy, spousal equality) 
all EU Member States except Germany, 
Netherlands and United Kingdom 
no. 12 (prohibition of discrimination applying to 
any law) 
Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, Spain 
no. 13 (absolute abolition of death penalty) all EU Member States 
 
The topic of EU’s accession to the ECHR and its current state is covered extensively in chapter II.E of 
this report. The European Court for Human Rights is tasked with judicial enforcement of the ECHR. A 
brief outline of the Court and its competences follows later in this chapter.  
While some provisions of ECHR and its OP relate to ESC rights, the bulk of rights and freedoms of 
economic and social nature are enshrined in a separate act, the European Social Charter (ESC). The 
ESC was adopted in 196142 and its provisions were largely revised by means of a new treaty adopted 
1999, leading to the term ’Revised Charter‘ being used to refer to the latter version.43 Both Charters 
coexist and while all EU Member States have ratified the 1961 treaty, the level of ratification of the 
                                                          
35 Supra, art. 9. 
36 Supra, art. 10. 
37 Supra, art. 11. 
38 Supra, art. 6. 
39 Supra, art. 7. 
40 Supra, art. 12. 
41 Supra, art. 14. The Optional Protocol no. 12 extends the prohibition of discrimination to any human right or freedom 
recognised by the Member State, see below. 
42 Council of Europe, European Social Charter, 18 October 1961, ETS 35. 
43 Council of Europe, European Social Charter (Revised), 3 May 1996, ETS 163. 
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1999 treaty is far less uniform. To this date, it has been ratified by Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. Both charters provide for a range of rights and freedoms in 
various areas, including labour, health, education, social security, housing, rights of migrant workers, 
freedom of movement, parental leave and rights of persons with disabilities. The Revised Charter 
provides a much broader and extended list of rights and freedoms compared to the 1961 Charter. In 
1995, an Additional Protocol to the ESC was adopted, providing a mechanism of collective complaints. 
The mechanism allows NGOs,44 national organisations of employers and trade unions to lodge 
complaints with the European Committee of Social Rights (ESCR), a body of independent experts 
tasked with monitoring Member State compliance with the Charter.45 The applicants may request the 
ESCR to declare that certain laws and policies of the States parties are incompatible with their 
commitments under the Charter, without having to exhaust any domestic remedies which may be 
available. Insofar, 14 EU Member States have adopted the Additional Protocol.46 
The third major element of the CoE human rights law are various international treaties ratified under 
the auspices of the CoE. Despite various titles (‘agreement‘, ’convention‘, ’arrangement‘, ’charter‘, 
’code‘, etc.), all these texts are international treaties in the sense of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. The drafting, negotiations and signatures of those treaties are facilitated by the 
CoE, with the Committee of Ministers adopting decisions on the formal adoption of the final text as a 
CoE treaty. As indicated earlier, participation in most treaties is not limited to CoE Member States, 
and the treaties are open to signature by non-Member States, insofar as they are invited to accede by 
the CoM. Over 210 treaties have been concluded under the aegis of CoE. Some of the most important 
treaties of the CoE system related to human rights are: 
 Convention on Cybercrime,47 
 Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism,48 
 Convention against Corruption,49 
 Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings,50 
 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine,51 
 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,52 
 European Charter of Local Self-Government,53 
 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.54 
                                                          
44 International NGOs and national NGOs when the country in question explicitly accepts it, which is the case of Finland. 
45 Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter providing for a System of Collective Complaints, 9 
November 1995, ETS 158. 
46 Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Sweden. 
47 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, CETS 185. 
48 Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 16 May 2005, CETS No. 196. 
49 Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, 27 January 1999, CETS 173. 
50 Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings, 16 May 2005, CETS 197. 
51 Council of Europe, Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, 1 December 1999, CETS 164. 
52 Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1 February 1995, ETS 157. 
53 Council of Europe, European Charter of Local Self-Government, 1 September 1988, CETS 122. 
54 Council of Europe, European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 12 June 1962, CETS 030. 
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The EU, as an international organisation, has signed or ratified 14 CoE treaties. Some of these 
treaties feature provisions related to human rights, such as the European Convention relating to 
questions on Copyright Law and Neighbouring Rights in the Framework of Transfrontier Broadcasting 
by Satellite, the Convention on Information and Legal Co-operation concerning ’Information Society 
Services‘,55 and the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism.56 
 
 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
The principal deliberative body of the CoE is the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE), based in Strasbourg. The Parliamentary Assembly is composed of 324 parliamentarians from 
national parliaments of CoE Member States. PACE members are not elected by popular vote; they are 
delegated by national legislative bodies with each CoE Member State receiving a number of seats 
based on country size.57 The majority of PACE members join one of five existing organised political 
groups within the Assembly.58 The Assembly's work is prepared by 10 committees and by the Bureau 
comprising the President of the Assembly, the 20 Vice-Presidents, the chairs of the five political groups 
and the committee Chairpersons. The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (AS/Jur) with its 
subordinate body the Sub-Committee on Human Rights is chiefly entrusted with work related to 
human rights, however, all other PACE committees deal with human rights topic to a significant 
degree. The PACE meets for four week-long sessions in a year.  
The PACE has no legislative competences, its powers are limited to deliberative, investigative, advisory 
and creation (election) roles. Despite lack of legislative competences, PACE has several powers which 
are relevant to shaping the CoE human rights system. It may pass recommendations which demand 
action from CoE Member States, who are obliged to formally reply to the notions of PACE. The 
Assembly may conduct probes into human right violations, a tool which it has employed efficiently on 
several occasions, with the 2005 Dick Marty investigation into CIA extraordinary rendition activities in 
Europe often highlighted as a major achievement of PACE and CoE as a whole.59 The PACE may also 
question the CoE Committee of Ministers as well as national heads of government and state regarding 
their activities in the field of human rights, democratisation and rule of law. The PACE passes approval 
for candidate states for CoE membership, and has employed this power on several occasions during 
the CoE enlargement wave after 1989 in order to commit prospecting members to reforms, in 
particular abolishment of death penalty. While PACE does not draft or approve CoE human rights 
conventions, it nevertheless takes part in the process of their adoption with a consultative role. The 
PACE can request the Venice Commission to give an opinion on legal developments in a Member State, 
and in case of gross violations of CoE standards by a Member State, it may suspend national 
                                                          
55 Council of Europe, European Convention relating to questions on Copyright Law and Neighbouring Rights in the Framework 
of Transfrontier Broadcasting by Satellite, 11 May 1994, CETS 153. Signed and ratified but not yet in force. 
56 Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from 
Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, 16 May 2005, CETS 198. Signed but not ratified. 
57 The number of seats does not correspond directly to the land mass of the country. Instead, countries are grouped into 
tiers based on relative size. For example, the largest tier corresponds to 18 seats in the PACE and currently consists of France, 
Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey and United Kingdom.  
58 The current groups are, in order of size: Socialist Group (social democracy, democratic socialism), European People’s Party 
(Christian democracy, liberal conservatism), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (liberalism), European 
Conservatives Group (conservatism) and United European Left Group (socialism, communism). 
59 Marta A. Orpiszewska, ‘El Masri v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Implications for the CIA Extraordinary 
Rendition Program’ (2013) 39 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 1189. 
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delegations, deprive them of voting rights or recommend to the Committee of Ministers for a Member 
State to be expelled from the CoE. The Assembly has employed these powers against Russia in 2014 
on grounds of Russian military involvement in Ukrainian crisis.60 Finally, the PACE has the competence 
to elect the judges of the ECtHR and the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as the CoE 
Secretary General and PACE’s own Secretary General. 
In the context of the CoE architecture, the PACE fulfils a role not unlike that of the European 
Parliament. It is the popular element of the organisation, aspiring to the role of ’voice and conscience 
of 800 million citizens of Europe‘.61 These aspirations can be, naturally, fulfilled only to the degree the 
PACE powers allow, nevertheless despite not having legislative competences equivalent to the 
aforementioned European Parliament or the UN General Assembly, PACE has used its powers to sound 
effect in the field of human rights. In particular, its wide mandate for investigation and scrutiny of 
Member State activities is widely recognised and serves as an example on how a body of this type may 
impact human rights protection among Member States and beyond. The aforementioned 2005 CIA 
extraordinary rendition investigation has had major implications not only for judgments of the 
ECtHR,62 but also on domestic proceedings and other international human rights systems.63 
 
 The Committee of Ministers 
The Committee of Ministers (CoM) is the inter-governmental decision-making body of the CoE. It is 
comprised of Foreign Affairs Ministers from each CoE Member State, with every minister appointing 
a deputy, usually the country’s Permanent Representative to the CoE. This effectively means that at 
any given time, the membership of CoE CoM overlaps with that of the Council of the EU in its Foreign 
Affairs Council (FAC) configuration. Each CoE Member State chairs the Committee in turn for six-
months with a handover of the chairpersonship (in English alphabetical order of Member States) in 
May and November. The rotating CoM chairpersonship has implications not unlike the ones the EU 
rotating presidency has had prior to the Lisbon Treaty reforms, with the Member State currently 
holding the CoE chairpersonship having major, if temporary, influence on shaping the CoE’s political 
agenda. The impact of the rotating chairpersonship on relations with other organisations could be 
best witnessed during the negotiations on the CoE-EU Memorandum of Understanding, where the 
Russian chairpersonship was effectively able to freeze the process for six months.64 
The CoM meets at ministerial level once a year and at Deputy level usually four times a month. Three 
of the Deputies’ meetings are devoted to all issues while one is held as a so-called ’DH meetings‘ and 
concerns solely with the execution and implementation of ECtHR judgments by Member States. 
Additionally, the CoM maintains currently seven Rapporteur Groups (RG), comprised of Permanent 
                                                          
60 The Guardian, ‘Russia delegation suspended from Council of Europe over Crimea’, 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/10/russia-suspended-council-europe-crimea-ukraine> last accessed on 12 
April 2016. 
61 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, ‘In brief. The democratic conscience of Greater Europe’  <http://website-
pace.net/web/apce/in-brief> last accessed on 21 January 2016. 
62 Cases El-Masri v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (App no 39630/09) judgment of 13 December 2012; Al-
Nashiri v Poland (App. No. 28761/11) judgment of 24 July 2014, Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland (App. No. 7511/13) 
judgment of 24 July 2014. 
63 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson. Framework Principles for securing the accountability of 
public officials for gross or systematic human rights violations committed in the context of State counter-terrorism 
initiatives.’ A/HRC/22/52, 1 March 2013, 11. 
64 See chapter II.C for information on the MoU negotiations. 
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Representatives, which meet with various frequency, depending on the RG. The meetings of RGs are 
open to delegates from observer states and the European Union. Two RGs are of specific concern for 
this report: GR-H (Human Rights) and GR-EXT (External Relations) which deals among others with 
relationships between the CoE and the EU. The CoM has also the power to establish ad hoc working 
groups, though currently no such groups function. 
The CoM has three principal roles: it serves as an emanation of CoE Member State governments, as a 
vehicle for intergovernmental tackling issues relevant to the CoE mandate and, jointly with PACE, as 
guardians of CoE values and Member States’ respect towards those. In practice, it sets the CoE policies 
and considers actions to be taken on recommendations from other CoE bodies and Member States. It 
also determines the CoE budget, and undertakes strategic decisions regarding various areas of CoE’s 
activity, such as its external relations with other organisations or various forms of inter-institutional 
cooperation such as the Joint Programmes (JP), which the CoE carries out jointly with the EU. Most 
importantly, as mentioned above, the CoM supervises the execution of ECtHR judgments, examining 
the outcome of every final judgment and following up on how the Member States execute and 
implement the decisions of ECtHR. The CoM has the principal role in facilitating the process of new 
Member States joining the CoE. It may also suspend or terminate membership on grounds of severe 
violations of CoE principles and values. The CoM drafts the CoE treaties, endorses the final text as an 
official CoE instruments, and facilitates negotiations towards their signature or ratification. It may also 
adopt non-binding declarations and resolutions on current issues relevant to the CoE. Finally, it may 
launch specific projects as so-called ’partial agreements‘ in the situation where a given goal is not 
pursued by all CoE Member States. One such partial agreement with particular importance to human 
rights is the European Commission for Democracy through Law, commonly referred to as the Venice 
Commission (VC). 
 
 The European Court of Human Rights 
The Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights is one of the most successful and ground-
breaking international bodies tasked with judicial oversight over human rights law. Its case law vastly 
outnumbers that of any other regional or international human rights instrument and it continues to 
serve as an example of influence and impact on unprecedented scale. 65 One can quote the Deputy 
Registrar of the Court, Mr. Michael O’Boyle: 
’There seems to be unanimous agreement in Europe today that the European Convention on 
Human Rights (…) is one of the major developments in European legal history and the 
crowning achievement of the Council of Europe. The emergence of the authority of the 
European Court of Human Rights has been described as one of the most remarkable 
phenomena in the history of international law, perhaps in the history of all law.’66 
The Court was initially established in 1959, however for close to the 30 years it did not operate as a 
permanent institution, as cases were brought before it indirectly through the now defunct European 
Commission of Human Rights. In 1998 the Protocol 11 to the ECHR established the Court as a 
                                                          
65 Andreas Follesdal, Birgit Peters, Geir Ulfdtein, ‘Introduction’ in Andreaas Follesdal, Birgit Peters, Geir Ulfdtein (eds) 
Constituting Europe. The European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context (Cambridge University 
Press 2013) 1. 
66 Michael O’Boyle, ‘On Reforming the Operation of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 1 European Human Rights 
Law Review 4. 
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permanent body and abolished the mechanism of indirect application, opening the access to ECtHR 
to anyone whose case meets the admissibility criteria. The Court is composed of 47 judges, one from 
each CoE Member State. The judges are elected by the PACE through a majority vote from three 
candidates proposed by a Member State for a non-renewable nine-year term. The ECHR sets the 
criteria for judges who ’shall be of high moral character and must either possess the qualifications 
required for appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults67 of recognised competence.’68 The 
Court has extensive autonomy as to organising its own work, as the plenary court comprised of all the 
Court’s judges elects the court’s president, vice-president, registrar, deputy registrar, establishes 
chambers of the Court and adopts the Rules of the Court. 
The Courts’ jurisdiction extends to four types of jurisdiction. The first type are interstate cases, in 
which one or more Member States may allege breaches of the ECHR by another state party. A unique 
feature of these cases is that, unlike the traditional approach to state responsibility for injury or 
damage to aliens, the applicant state(s) need not to allege that human rights of their own nationals 
were violated.69 Though interstate cases are considerably rare compared to individual applications, 
the few interstate judgments by ECtHR have had major implications for development of human rights 
protection standards in conflicts.70 The second type of jurisdiction is advisory opinions regarding 
interpretation of the ECHR delivered on notion from the CoM. These opinions may only relate to 
content and scope which has not been subject of prior ECtHR judgements. The third type of jurisdiction 
concerns cases related to the execution of the ECtHR’s judgments. If the CoM considers that the 
supervision of the execution of a final judgment is hindered by a problem of interpretation of the 
judgment, it may refer the matter to the Court for a ruling on the question of interpretation. If the 
CoM considers that a state refuses to abide by a final judgment in a case to which it is a party, it may 
refer to the Court the question whether that Party has failed to fulfil its obligation. 
The fourth and by far most frequent type of jurisdiction are individual complaints, where persons, 
organisations or groups of individuals allege violation of ECHR by a Member State. On one hand, the 
general requirements of ratione materiae, ratione temporis or ratione personae for individual 
applications are broadly interpreted and universal, the Court has in the past heard cases where non-
CoE nationals applied against alleged violations of ECHR by agents of CoE Member States acting in 
non-CoE Member State territory,71 or held CoE Member States responsible for actions of agents of 
non-CoE Member States conducted on the territory of a CoE Member State.72 On the other hand, the 
application must meet several criteria of admissibility, such as exhaustion of domestic remedies, lapse 
of maximum six months from the final domestic decision, non-anonymity, lack of substantial identity 
with a matter already submitted to the Court, or with another procedure of international investigation 
and existence of a significant disadvantage suffered by the applicant.73 Additionally, the applicants 
                                                          
67 Experienced lawyers, legal scholars and other experts in the field. 
68 Supra (fn 29), art. 26. 
69 Philip Alston, Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights (Oxford 2013) 902. 
70 These cases include i.a. Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) 5310/71 ECHR 1, regarding use of torture in interrogation during 
the conflict in Northern Ireland, Cyprus v Turkey (2001) 25781/94 ECHR 331, regarding human rights violations during Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the pending case Georgia vs. Russia (II), regarding human rights violations during the 2008 
Russo-Georgian war. 
71 Al-Skeini and Others and Al Jedda v The United Kingdom, 5721/07 [2010] ECHR 858 (09 June 2010). 
72 Cases El-Masri v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (App No. 39630/09) judgment of 13 December 2012; Al-
Nashiri v Poland (App No. 28761/11) judgment of 24 July 2014, Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland (App No. 7511/13) judgment 
of 24 July 2014. 
73 Unless respect for human rights as defined in ECHR requires an examination of the application on the merits despite the 
objective lack of significant disadvantage on applicants’ part. 
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may request for the Court to grant a so-called interim measures, whereas the Court instructs the 
Member State to immediately take an urgent action required to prevent harm to the applicants. In 
practice, interim measures are usually used to halt extradition or deportation of applicants.  
Providing that all criteria are met and the case is not declared as inadmissible at the pre-judicial stage, 
the Court hears representations of both parties as well as any third party interveners. The provisions 
of ECHR and ECtHR case law regarding third party intervention are markedly liberal, for they allow 
interventions by other Member States (both in regards to case concerning their nationals74 as well as 
in regard to situations where States consider their legal systems will be affected by the outcome of a 
case75), other international institutions (including European Commission intervening on the behalf of 
EU in the case Bosphorus v. Ireland)76, NHRIs77, NGOs78, bar associations,79 and academic human rights 
litigation research projects.80 The Court decides both issues concerning admissibility and merits of the 
case. The Court may find that the Member State has violated the ECHR in respect to some or all 
instances brought up in the applications. The most immediate effect of ECtHR judgments are material 
and/or moral damages as well as compensation of legal costs which the State may be ordered to pay 
to the applicants. This feature is unique among international judicial instruments of human rights 
protection. Secondly, the ECtHR judgement may oblige the State to implement legal or institutional 
measures in order to prevent further human rights violations in relation to merits of the case. The 
ECtHR cannot annul national laws or declare them void on grounds of violating the ECHR, but in 
practice its judgments frequently are an impulse for major changes in domestic legislation. The 
implementation of both aspects of ECtHR decisions is entrusted in the CoM, which oversees changes 
to national law and adjustments to institutional solutions which are supposed to implement the 
judgments. Any of the parties may appeal from Chamber’s judgments to a Grand Chamber of 17 
judges. The decisions of Grand Chamber are final. 
The ECtHR is undoubtedly a major success of the CoE system and, by all means, an instrument of 
tremendous impact not only on CoE itself and its Member States, but also on other human rights 
system. The judgments of ECtHR are the primary source for interpretation of the Convention and 
several landmark decisions of the Court have established vital elements of ECHR standards. Among 
others, the Court has identified several key concepts such as the concept of ’margin of appreciation‘ 
and the principle of subsidiarity. Its jurisprudence has had, as elaborated in chapter II.F of this report, 
profound influence on EU law.  
However, the success and relative popularity of ECtHR is both a blessing and a curse of the Court, for 
it continues to face major challenges related to case overload. The combination of two factors: 
establishing the court as a permanent institution with direct access for individuals and the expansion 
                                                          
74 While interventions by states are a rare occurrence, one such intervention by Germany has had a major impact on the 
outcome of a landmark case regarding standards of non-refoulement, see case Soering v United Kingdom 14038/88 [1989] 
ECHR 14, judgment of 7 July 1989. 
75 E.g. the intervention by ten Member States in the case Lautsi v. Italy 30814/06 [2011] ECHR 2412, judgment of 18 March 
2011. 
76 Other notable interventions by international organisations include: the OSCE in case Blecic v Croatia 59532/00 [2006] ECHR 
207 judgment of 8 March 2006, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in cases El-Masri, Al-Nashiri and Husayn (Abu 
Zubaydah). 
77 E.g. Equality and Human Rights Commission for England and Wales in case Al-Saadoon, Mufdhi v the United Kingdom 
[2010] ECHR 279 judgment of 02 March 2010. 
78 Both international, such as Amnesty International, FIDH and Interrights as well as domestic. 
79 E.g. The Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe in case Staroszczyk v Poland 59519/00 [2007] ECHR 222 judgment of 
22 March 2007. 
80 E.g. Human Rights Centre of Ghent University in case S.A.S. v France 43835/11 [2014] ECHR 695 judgment of 01 July 2014. 
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of CoE post-1989 has led to a sudden spike in incoming applications, which soon overwhelmed the 
Court. The CoE has invested considerable energy and resources into reforming the Court towards 
alleviating the issue of overload. The process of reforming the Court has met obstacles of both political 
and legal nature, but ultimately culminated in 2010 with the adoption of Protocol no. 14, which 
introduced several provisions aimed at regulating the influx of cases into judiciary consideration by 
the Court. This included the introduction of new admissibility criteria and adjustments to existing 
ones. The overarching goal of alleviating the burden upon the Court is steadily being met with 
decrease in cases applications allocated to a judicial formation,81 yet at the same the new criteria of 
admissibility which give ECtHR more flexibility in rejecting cases have been with criticisms from both 
academics and the civil society.82 Just over 60% of currently pending applications originate from four 
CoE Member States: Ukraine (21.4%), Russia (14,2%), Turkey (13%) and Italy (11.6%).83 Apart from 
Italy, other EU Member States with significant amount of pending applications are: Hungary (7.1%), 
Romania (5.5%), Poland (2.6%) and Slovenia (2.5%).84 
 
 The Commissioner for Human Rights 
The CoE Commissioner for Human Rights was established by the CoM in 1999 as an independent and 
impartial non-judicial institution set to promote awareness of and respect for human rights in CoE 
Member States. The Commissioner is elected by PACE from a list of three candidates put forth by CoM 
for a non-renewable term of six years. The idea behind creating the post of the Commissioner 
originated from an initiative by Finland taken up during the Second CoE Summit in 1997.85 The concept 
was to provide the CoE with an institution akin to a NHRI, complementary to but separate from ECtHR, 
acting as a human rights monitoring body and point of reference for all European citizens. The 
fundamental objectives of the Commissioner for Human Rights are laid out in Resolution (99) 50 on 
the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights.86 According to this resolution, the 
Commissioner is mandated to: 
 foster the effective observance of human rights, and assist Member States in the 
implementation of Council of Europe human rights standards; 
 promote education in and awareness of human rights in Council of Europe Member States; 
 identify possible shortcomings in the law and practice concerning human rights; 
 facilitate the activities of national ombudsperson institutions and other human rights 
structures; 
 provide advice and information regarding the protection of human rights across the region. 
The primary areas of Commissioner’s work are: country monitoring, thematic work and human rights 
awareness-raising. The aspect of country work is realised through visits to CoE Member States towards 
                                                          
81 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Annual Report 2015. Provisional Version.’ (ECthR 2016) 5. 
82 Helen Keller, Andreas Fischer and Daniela Kühne, ‘Debating the Future of the European Court of Human Rights after the 
Interlaken Conference: Two Innovative Proposals’ (2011) 20 European Journal of International Law 1 1037-1039. 
83 Supra (fn 81), 191. 
84 Supra (fn 81), 191. 
85 Council of Europe, ‘Second Summit of Heads of State and Government (Strasbourg, 10 – 11 October 1997) Final Declaration 
and Action Plan’ 11 October 1997. 
86 CoE Committee of Ministers, Resolution (99) 50 on the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 7 May 1999. 
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assessing human rights situation on the ground. The Commissioner engages with a wide variety of 
stakeholders, including NHRIs and civil society as well as both general population and specific groups 
towards establishing the state of human rights protection. The thematic areas of Commissioner’s work 
are centred around select areas deemed vital to human rights. Currently, these topics include: 
children’s rights, counter-terrorism, economic crisis, LGBTI rights, freedom of media, migrants’ rights, 
persons with disabilities, post-conflict justice, Roma and Travellers, systematic issues, women’s rights, 
gender equality and human rights defenders. The Commissioner does not consider individual 
complaints, however, he or she may intervene in a proceeding before the ECtHR and in the event of 
Optional Protocol no. 16 to the ECHR coming into force, he or she will also have the competence to 
partake in advisory opinion proceedings before the Court. Insofar, the Commissioner has used his 
competence to intervene before ECtHR sparingly, and has not yet developed a practical set of criteria 
for doing so. 
 
 Other CoE institutions and structures 
Beyond the core bodies and instruments of the CoE, protection and promotion of human rights is 
present in majority of CoE work and is the primary or secondary focus of great deal of institutions and 
structures formed within the CoE. An exhaustive review of all CoE human rights mechanisms is beyond 
the scope of this report, however, a few specialised entities within the CoE sphere warrant 
mentioning: 
 
a) The European Commission for Democracy through Law 
(Venice Commission) 
The Venice Commission came into existence in May 1990 as one of partial arrangements of the CoE, 
wherein a new structure is established by the CoM despite some not all CoE members electing to 
participate in it.87 The Venice Commission is unique among partial agreements of the CoE, due to the 
fact that while initially it was founded with participation of 18 CoE Member States,88 eventually the 
remaining 29 Member States joined the Commission. It is also notable for a sizeable contingent of full 
members which are not CoE Member States89 as well as several observer members90 and a single 
associate member (Belarus). Three entities enjoy the so-called ’special status‘, which is for most part 
equivalent to that of an observer: The European Union (represented by the European Commission), 
the Palestinian National Authority and South Africa. Additionally, the EU Committee of Region, the 
OSCE (via ODIHR) and IACL91 may participate in the plenary sessions of the Venice Commission. The 
Commission is made up of individual members (one member and one substitute per state), usually 
university professors of constitutional and international law, supreme and constitutional court judges, 
members of national parliaments and civil servants who are designated by the agreeing states for 
four-year terms. The individual members act in individual and independent capacity.  
                                                          
87 CoE Committee of Ministers, Resolution (90)6, on a Partial Agreement Establishing the European Commission for 
Democracy through Law, 10 May 1990. 
88 The founder states are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey. 
89 Kyrgyzstan, Chile, Republic of Korea, Morocco, Algeria, Israel, Brazil, Peru, Tunisia, Mexico, Kazakhstan, United States and 
Kosovo. 
90 Argentina, Canada, Holy See, Japan, Uruguay. 
91 The International Association of Constitutional Law. 
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The Venice Commissions’ role is to provide legal advice with particular focus on states who seek to 
bring their legal and institutional framework into line with regional and international standards in the 
fields of human rights, democracy and rule of law. The opinions may be requested by Member States, 
the CoE and other international organisations, including both the EU and the OSCE. Opinions are 
prepared by working groups of rapporteur over the course of an inclusive and participatory process 
which engages national authorities, civil society, NHRIs and other stakeholders. Apart from serving as 
guidance to the Member States, opinions of the Venice Commission are referred to in judgments of 
the ECtHR. Apart from its primary role as an advisory body, the Venice Commission facilitates the 
Council for Democratic Elections, which is a joint institution with PACE and the Congress of Local and 
Regional Authorities dedicated to enhancing the cooperation and promotion of common values and 
standards in the field of electoral law. The third element of Venice Commission’s primary activities is 
the cooperation with Member State constitutional courts, ordinary courts and ombudspersons in the 
field of constitutional justice. For an analysis on the Venice Commission with a particular focus on the 
role which the European Union has in its works, see appendix I of this report. 
 
b) European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) 
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance is an independent monitoring body 
established by the CoM in 1993.92 The ECRI deals with combating racism, discrimination, xenophobia, 
antisemitism and intolerance. The Commission consists of 47 experts, one nominated by every CoE 
Member State. The PACE, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, the 
European Union (represented by European Commission via DG JUST), Mexico and Holy See are 
represented in ECRI as observers without the right to vote. The three main fields of ECRI activity are: 
country monitoring, general thematic work and relations with NGOs, NHRIs and other national 
specialised bodies. The ECRI publishes regular reports on situation in CoE Member States and issues 
general policy recommendations. 
 
c) The Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) 
The Steering Committee for Human Rights is an intergovernmental body set up by the CoM in order 
to facilitate coordination of CoE multiple efforts to promote and protect human rights. The CDDH is 
made up of representatives of the Member State, and under the supervision of CoM it oversees 
coherency and synergy between varied bodies and mechanisms of the CoE which deal with human 
rights. The CDDH holds plenary meetings as well as meetings in the framework of more specialised 
and smaller sub-committees, which it supervises and whose work it directs. These sub-committees 
can be committees of experts or ad hoc working groups. Their terms of reference are elaborated by 
the Steering Committee, with those of the committees of experts then being adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers. Sub-committees are of a non-permanent nature and are dissolved once they 
have completed their specific function, linked to a particular issue of the Steering Committee’s work. 
Examples of areas of specialised work by the CDDH include: protection of human rights, social rights, 
fight against terrorism, fight against impunity for human rights violations and selection of candidates 
                                                          
92 CoE, Committee of Ministers Resolution, Res(2002)8 on the statute of the European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance, 13 June 2002, amended by CoE CoM Resolutions CM/Res(2013)12 and CM/Res(2014)2 adopted, respectively, 
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for the ECtHR. In 2010, the CDDH was given an ad-hoc mandate to elaborate, in cooperation with the 
European Commission, the adequate legal instrument for EU accession to the ECHR. The CDDH was 
further entrusted with carrying out negotiations with the EU in the ’47+1‘ format towards finalising 
the accession modalities. 
 
 Conclusions 
The two most striking differences between the EU and the CoE are the narrower focus of the latter 
and the discrepancy in available resources. The CoE seeks to preserve, protect, uphold and promote 
standards related to human rights, democracy and rule of law by means of a highly varied array of 
instruments and structures. It has achieved several major accomplishments in these fields, from the 
adoption of the ECHR and introduction of ECtHR to the works of the Venice Commission and the 
constantly expanding list of CoE treaties whose reach extends well beyond CoE Member States. On 
the first glance, the EU appears as a natural partner for the CoE, but historical developments have led 
to parallel designs and tensions resulting from overlapping aspirations of the two organisations.93 The 
EU is present in various aspects in works of the CoE, varying from being the defining presence in the 
Joint Programmes to engaging in various capacity and capability in other CoE activities. The interface 
between the organisations is heavily influenced by the current status and state of fundamental rights 
protection within the law and internal policies of the EU.  
A factor which merits remembering throughout the analysis of the relationship between both 
organisations is the issue of finances. The budget of the EU for the year 2016 is set at 155b Euro, 
compared to the total budget of the CoE set at 422m Euro. In 2015, contributions by the EU to the 
Joint Programmes alone were greater than the combined contributions of 37 (out of 47) CoE Member 
States to the CoE budget and roughly equal to the entire 2015 CoE ordinary budget for the Governing 
Bodies and General Services of the Council of Europe.94 The CoE budget was frequently criticised as 
insufficient, with Member State contributions failing to grow over time to meet the expanding needs 
of the organisation.95 Naturally, the difference in the scope of both organisations’ activities must be 
taken into the account when making such comparisons, but the difference in available resources for 
protection and promotion of human rights is a factor, which heavily influences the dynamic of co-
operation between the EU and the CoE. 
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B. Mapping the EU: Major EU Human Rights Stakeholders involved 
directly or indirectly with the Council of Europe  
 Introduction 
The following section will map EU institutions, agencies and other bodies or stakeholders which are 
involved directly or indirectly in the cooperation with the Council of Europe. It aims to provide a first 
brief overview of the EU’s institutional framework for multilateral human rights cooperation after the 
Lisbon Treaty.  
 
 European Council 
The European Council is the primary agenda setter of the EU, tasked with providing the EU with 
’impetus‘, ’political directions‘ and ’priorities‘.96 In the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(‘CFSP‘), the European Council shall ’identify the Union’s strategic interests, determine the objectives 
[…] and define general guidelines‘.97 In practice the European Council does not have the capacities to 
address every aspect of EU foreign policy, leaving it to the Council of the EU to fill the void. The few 
Council Conclusions which referred to the Council of Europe expressed the importance of ’fruitful‘ and 
the need for strengthened cooperation.98 In recent years the European Council has not addressed the 
matter. The President of the European Council, however, actively engages in the high-level political 
dialogue with the Council of Europe. 
 
 Council of the European Union 
The Council of the EU is mandated with policy-making, coordinating and legislative functions.99 Of the 
different configurations of the Council, the Foreign Affairs Council (‘FAC‘) is responsible for the 
definition and implementation of EU foreign policy. The Council is supported by a Secretariat, the 
Permanent Representatives Committee (‘COREPER‘), the Political and Security Committee (‘PSC‘) and 
more than 150 working parties, 38 of which are subordinate to the Foreign Affairs Council.100  
The FAC ’shall elaborate the Union’s external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by 
the European Council and ensure that the Union’s action is consistent‘.101 In line with this mandate, 
the FAC is responsible for defining the Union’s strategies and priorities in its engagement with the 
Council of Europe. Since 2012, the FAC has adopted biannual strategic priorities, which identify the 
Union’s geographic and thematic priorities for the next two years. They increase the transparency of 
EU action and enable EU and EU Member States representatives to ensure more focused, proactive, 
and coordinated action.  
Among the various working groups in the Council, the Working Party on Human Rights (COHOM) and 
the Working Party on OSCE and the Council of Europe (COSCE) are responsible for the EU’s human 
rights cooperation with the Council of Europe. They prepare and coordinate the EU’s action in the 
                                                          
96 TEU art. 15(1). 
97 TEU art. 26(1). 
98 European Council 15/16 June 2006, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, 17 July 2006, Doc No 10633/1/06 REV 1, para 58; European 
Council 19/20 June 2008, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, 17 July 2008, Doc No 11018/1/08 REV 1.  
99 TEU art. 16(1). 
100 See for an overview Council of the EU, ‘List of Council preparatory bodies’, 18 January 2016, Doc No 5183/16. 
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Council of Europe102 and exchange with representatives of the Council of Europe, for example the 
Commissioner for Human Rights.103 
 
 EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice 
President of the Commission 
The double-hatted High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the 
Commission (‘HR/VP‘) combines the two posts of the former High Representative for CFSP and of the 
former EU Commissioner for External Relations. As High Representative she is responsible for 
conducting the Union’s CFSP,104 representing the EU externally, chairing the FAC105 and coordinating 
the EU Member States’ positions in international organisations and conferences.106 As Vice President 
of the Commission, the HR/VP is responsible ’within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on 
it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action‘.107 The HR/VP 
engages in high-level political dialogue with representatives of the Council of Europe, in particular the 
Secretary General and the Commissioner for Human Rights.108 She participates in the tripartite 
dialogue meetings with the Secretary General and the Chair of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe. She also regularly issues joint statements with the Secretary General of the Council 
of Europe on the occasion of the Day against the Death Penalty.109  
 
 European External Action Service 
The European External Action Service (‘EEAS‘) assists the HR/VP110 and represents the Union 
externally.111 At headquarters level, the division for human rights and multilateral diplomacy is 
responsible for mainstreaming human rights in the work of the EEAS. On the ground the EU Delegation 
to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, which was opened in 2011, is responsible for promoting 
cooperation with the Council of Europe and coordinating EU action. Members of the Delegation 
participate in Ministerial sessions, meetings of the Ministers’ Deputies and its rapporteur groups.112  
 
                                                          
102 Council of the EU, ‘EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe in 2016-2017’, 18 January 2016, Doc No 
5339/16. 
103 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 2013, 23 June 2014, Doc No 11107/14, p 41. 
104 TEU art. 18(2). 
105 TEU art. 18(3), 27(1). 
106 TEU art. 34(1). 
107 TEU art. 18(4). 
108 Council of Europe, Directorate of External Relations, ‘Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Council of Europe and the European Union: Overview of activities (1 January-31 December 2011)’, 14 June 2012, Doc No 
DER/INF(2012)3 REV. 
109 See for the latest statement: ‘Joint Declaration by the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Federica Mogherini, on behalf of the EU, and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn Jagland, on 
the European and World Day against the Death Penalty, 10 October 2015’, 9 October 2015, available at 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/151009_02_en.htm>. 
110 TEU art 27(3). 
111 TFEU art 221(2).  
112 Council of Europe, Directorate of External Relations, ‘Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Council of Europe and the European Union: Overview of activities (1 January-31 December 2011)’, 14 June 2012, Doc No 
DER/INF(2012)3 REV 25, 38. 
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 EU Special Representative for Human Rights 
The EU Special Representative for Human Rights (‘EUSR‘) is mandated among others with improving 
the coherence and mainstreaming of human rights in EU external action, and with enhancing the 
human rights dialogue with regional organisations.113 He works under the authority of the HR/VP,114 
and receives ‘strategic guidance and political direction’ from the Political and Security Committee 
(‘PSC‘).115 He coordinates with the EEAS116 and reports to the HR/VP and the PSC on a six monthly 
basis.117 He contributes to the high-level political dialogue between the EU and the Council of Europe 
through his meetings with the Secretary-General,118 the Commissioner for Human Rights,119 
representatives of the monitoring bodies, or the European Court of Human Rights.120  
 
 European Commission 
As the EU’s executive body, the European Commission shall ’promote the general interest of the Union 
and take appropriate initiatives to that end‘, and ensure and oversee the application of EU primary 
and secondary law.121 Members of the Commission, both the President and line Commissioners, 
engage in high-level political dialogue with representatives of the Council of Europe. The Commission 
furthermore negotiates the EU’s accession to the ECHR and cooperates with the Council of Europe 
through Joint Programmes (for further detail see below, chapter II.G.). Cooperation between the 
European Commission and the Council of Europe is particularly close in the areas of EU enlargement 
and neighbourhood policy, where the EU takes into account the results of Council of Europe 
monitoring bodies to assess the human rights records of candidate and partner countries. The 
European Commission also ensures coherence of EU legislation with Council of Europe standards. 
 
 European Parliament 
In line with Rule 213 of its Rules of Procedure, the European Parliament engages in interparliamentary 
dialogue with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (‘PACE‘).122 The 2007 MoU 
encouraged both bodies to strengthen their cooperation.123 In the same year, both institutions signed 
a cooperation agreement in which they agreed to reinforce their cooperation, coordinate with each 
                                                          
113 Council Decision 2012/440/CFSP of 25 July 2012 appointing the European Union Special Representative for Human Rights, 
OJ [2012] L 200/21, art 3(c). 
114 See supra, art. 4(1). 
115 See supra, art. 4(2). 
116 See supra, art. 4(3). 
117 See supra, art. 10; Interview under Chatham House Rules, September 2014. 
118 See Delegation of the EU to the Council of Europe, ‘EU Special Representative Lambrinidis visits Strasbourg (10/12/2012)’, 
available at <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/council_europe/press_corner/all_news/news/2012/20121210_en.htm>. 
119 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 2014, 22 June 2015, Doc No 10152/15. 
120 See Delegation of the EU to the Council of Europe, ‘EU Special Representative Lambrinidis visits Strasbourg (10/12/2012)’, 
available at <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/council_europe/press_corner/all_news/news/2012/20121210_en.htm>. 
121 TEU ar.t 17(1), 27(2). 
122 EP Rules of Procedure, rule 213: ‘1. Parliament's bodies, particularly the committees, shall cooperate with their 
counterparts at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in fields of mutual interest, with the aim in particular 
of improving the efficiency of their work and avoiding duplication of effort. 2. The Conference of Presidents, in agreement 
with the competent authorities of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, shall decide on the arrangements 
for implementing these provisions.’ 
123 Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union, 11/23 May 2007, para 46. 
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other, take into consideration their respective achievements, and promote complementarity.124 The 
catalogue of measures to be taken includes in particular meetings at the level of the Presidents, the 
Presidential Committee and Conference of Presidents, the Committees and their Chairpersons, and 
the Secretariats. Cooperation should be particularly close at Committee level, in order to avoid overlap 
and ensure complementarity. In addition, both institutions agree to refer to the achievements and 
activities of each other in their documents and work, to extend invitations to each other for 
conferences or other events, and to reinforce their cooperation in joint electoral observation 
missions.125  
In light of the EU’s envisaged accession to the ECHR, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in 
May 2010, in which it stressed ’that it is important to have an informal body in order to coordinate 
information sharing between the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe‘.126 This joint informal body, consisting of members of the European Parliament and of the 
PACE, developed over the course of three meetings held in 2011 and 2012 the modalities for the 
participation of members of the European Parliament in the election of judges of the ECtHR.127 The 
outcomes of these meetings fed into the draft Accession Agreement. 
 
 Court of Justice of the European Union  
The European Court of Justice has referred to the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR since the 1960s, 
when it first began to grant fundamental rights protection at the EU level. Today, the role of the ECHR 
is firmly enshrined in EU primary law (art. 6(3) TEU; art. 52(3) and 53 CFREU). Since the CFREU became 
legally binding, it appears that the European Court of Justice has begun to refer less frequently to the 
ECHR, although it still enjoys ’special relevance‘ in the case law of the Court.128 For more detail see 
below, chapter II.F. 
 
 Fundamental Rights Agency 
The creation of the Fundamental Rights Agency (‘FRA‘)129 initially raised concerns that the new 
institution might ’duplicate‘ the work of the Council of Europe.130 In 2008, an agreement on 
cooperation between the FRA and the Council of Europe was adopted, with the goal to ’avoid 
duplication and ensure complementarity and added value‘.131 It provides among others for regular 
contacts between both institutions, the appointment of contact persons, reciprocal invitations to 
                                                          
124 Agreement on the strengthening of cooperation between the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the 
European Parliament, 28 November 2007, para 1. 
125 See supra, para 2. 
126 European Parliament resolution of 19 May 2010 on the institutional aspects of the accession of the European Union to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (2009/2241(INI)), para 34. 
127 Andrew Drzemczewski, ‘Election of EU Judge onto the Strasbourg Court’, in Vasiliki Kosta, Nikos Skoutaris and Vassilis 
Tzevelekos (eds) The EU Accession to the ECHR (Hart 2014) 70. 
128 Allan Rosas, ‘Five Years of Charter Case Law: Some Observations’, in Sybe de Vries, Ulf Bernitz and Stephen Weatherill 
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participate in meetings, exchange of information, and joint activities. In the past, joint activities have 
for example been carried out with the Commissioner for Human Rights and with the European Court 
of Human Rights.132 
 
 Committee of the Regions 
The Committee of the Regions has its counterpart in the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of 
the Council of Europe. Both institutions concluded a cooperation agreement in 2005,133 which was 
subsequently revised in 2009.134 Cooperation happens at different levels. The Presidents of both 
institutions define the thematic and political priorities for cooperation in their annual meetings. In 
February 2016, they met for the first time in the format of a High Level Group ’3+3‘, bringing together 
the President of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, the President of the Congress 
Chamber of Local Authorities and the President of the Congress Chamber of Regions on the one side, 
and the President of the Committee of the Regions, the first Vice-President and the Chair of the CIVEX 
Commission on the other side.135 Based on these strategic objectives, the Contact Group, which is 
composed of six members of each institution, develops a work programme, which is subsequently 
implemented by the responsible commissions, committees and working groups of the Committee of 
the Regions and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. The 2005 
cooperation agreement explicitly recognized the ’primary importance [of] bringing politics closer to 
the citizens, in favour of the respect of human rights and of a sustainable quality of life for the 
citizens‘.136 This passage was dropped in the 2009 revised agreement.  
 
C. The CoE-EU Memorandum of Understanding 
 Introduction 
The 2007 Memorandum of Understanding between the European Union and the Council of Europe 
(MoU)137 represents a critical step towards shaping the current state of relations between the two 
organisations. It is also a document of major importance for the European landscape of human rights, 
democracy and rule of law, as it represents a joint commitment of both organisations to reinforce 
these values and strengthen the existing modes of co-operation between the EU and the CoE as well 
as to introduce new mechanisms and modalities. The inter-organisational relations aspect of the MoU 
as well as the genesis and history of the document were recently extensively covered in an excellent 
contribution by M. Kolb.138 Therefore the following subchapter will briefly outline these aspects while 
                                                          
132 ‘Co-operation between the Council of Europe and the European Union – Report for the 120th Ministerial Session’, 6 May 
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providing an analysis of the MoU from the point of view of its relevance for protection and promotion 
of human rights in Europe and beyond. 
 
 History of the MoU 
The origins of the MoU can be traced to the Third Summit of Heads of State on Government of the 
CoE, which took place in Warsaw in May 2005.139 Several factors influenced the CoE’s undertaking to 
establish a new framework for cooperation with the EU. One year earlier, the EU underwent its biggest 
enlargement to date, both in geographical and political terms. Since 2004 the EU is no longer an 
organisation made up exclusively of long-standing Western democracies, for it has welcomed into its 
fold the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Human rights issues present in the 
region, such as the situation of Roma or the systematic shortcomings in justice systems, became 
internal matters of concern for the EU. The close neighbourhood of the EU (consisting of partner, 
associated and candidate states), where it cooperated with the CoE via Joint Programmes140, shrunk 
considerably. And the EU itself was undergoing major shifts in its areas of concern and policy, for it 
was steadily moving away from being primarily an organisation of economic cooperation and saw its 
focus expand to other areas, including fundamental rights. Within the CoE there was an emerging 
concern, voiced most strongly by Member States who remained outside the EU and the European 
Economic Area (EEA), about the possible overlap between the two organisations and their continued 
co-existence. These concerns were not unfounded from the CoE’s perspective, for in 2005 the EU has 
initiated the process of establishing its own human rights agency, the Fundamental Rights Agency, 
envisioned to monitor and analyse the compliance of EU Member States with their obligations 
regarding fundamental rights as enshrined in the EU legal framework.141 These factors led the CoE 
Member States to declare their determination to create a new framework for enhanced co-operation 
with the EU with particular focus on human rights, democracy and rule of law.142 From the onset, the 
CoE has set out to conclude an agreement in the form of a memorandum of understanding, yet initially 
it has envisioned it as a legally binding document.143 In order to establish the priorities for the new 
arrangement and to benchmark the areas where a strengthened framework would be needed the 
most, the CoE has commissioned the then Primer Minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker, to 
prepare in his personal capacity a report on the state of the relationship between the CoE and the EU. 
The report was delivered in 2006 and played a vital role in shaping the final text of the MoU.144 Juncker 
produced a critical assessment of the relationship between the organisations, referring to them as ’at 
best a shaky team‘ which was prone to waste resources on rivalry instead of focusing on synergy.145 
In particular, the report included 15 recommendations which the author saw as measures necessary 
in order to strengthen the partnership between both organisations. These recommendations served 
                                                          
139 Council of Europe. ‘Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe (Warsaw, 16–17 May 2005) 
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minister of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg’ 11 April 2006. 
145 Supra, 2. 
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as background for negotiating the final text of the MoU. Among the recommendations one can identify 
several items which relate directly to human rights, including suggestions for: 
 Immediate initiation of the EU’s accession to the ECHR, 
 Recognition of the CoE as Europe-wide reference source for human rights, 
 Establishing the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights as a reference point for the EU, 
 Limiting the future FRA’s mandate solely to matters related to EU law. 
The negotiations regarding the MoU were protracted and difficult, owing to several factors.146 First 
and foremost, a different philosophy and vision regarding the role of the MoU became quickly 
apparent, as the CoE sought to conclude a document which would confirm its status and role as a 
human rights benchmark in Europe, while the EU saw the agreement as an instrument of improving 
the existing cooperation and alleviating political tension within the CoE. At the same time, the ongoing 
process of creation of the FRA quickly became a major issue in the relationship with CoE, and the 
tensions resulting from disagreements as to FRA’s role and mandate reflected on the process of 
drafting the MoU. Moreover, the complicated structure of both organisations hampered the 
negotiation process, with multiple actors on both sides involved. One of these structural issues was 
the problem of the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU and the rotating chairpersonship of 
the CoE Committee of Ministers. The negotiation process coincided with Russia assuming the CoE 
presidency, which resulted in a virtual standstill for half a year until the CoE presidency passed on, due 
to Russian scepticism of the EU and their apparent disinterest in furthering any major advances in CoE-
EU relations. Ultimately, the MoU was signed in May 2007, first by the CoE Secretary General and the 
San Marino’s Minister for Foreign Affairs acting in his capacity as the rotating presidency of the EU, 
and two weeks later by the Presidency of the Council of the EU and the head of DG RELEX on behalf 
of the Commission. The final text of the MoU includes a provision for follow-up procedures, including 
regular evaluation of implementation and eventual decision on amendments which was to be 
undertaken no later than 2013. The evaluations have been published annually by the CoM during the 
years 2008-2012,147 while from the year 2012 on they were included in the annual CoM summary 
reports on cooperation between the CoE and the EU.148 The assessment of the MoU towards 
establishing the eventual need to revise the document was carried out in 2013 during high-level 
dialogue meetings between CoE and EU, and resulted in a decision not to amend the MoU.149 
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 Nature of the MoU 
The term ’Memorandum of Understanding‘ is frequently used as a title of international agreements, 
including inter-institutional arrangements. For the most part, the term ’MoU‘ refers to instruments of 
non-legally binding nature. However, calling the instrument a MoU does not determine its legal 
character, and some legally binding treaties are also given that name.150 Therefore, establishing the 
actual character of the MoU requires an analysis of its content from the perspective of international 
law. As outlined above, the CoE initially sought for the MoU to be a legally binding instrument. 
However, the EU rejected the idea during negotiations, for two major reasons. One was the EU’s desire 
to stay short of binding itself and creating obligations, while the second was the potentially 
complicated and prolonged ratification process which would require all EU Member States to ratify 
the treaty, as well as involve the CJEU.151 Ultimately, a consensus was reached to sign a non-legally 
binding agreement. The semantics of the final text of the MoU include phrases and expressions typical 
to MoUs which do not impose legal obligation on the signatories, such as the use of phrases ’will‘ and 
’signed‘ instead of ’shall‘ and ’done‘. Nevertheless, despite its nature as a soft law instrument, the 
MoU is an instrument of significant value and importance. As Aust points out, the lack of a legally 
binding character should not lead to MoUs not being treated seriously. The political commitments 
contained therein are expressions of good faith of both organisations, and while they will not suffer 
legal consequences for failure in carrying out the MoU, the states are not free to disregard them and 
doing so could seriously damage their reputation and provoke a major political response.152  
 
 The MoU from the perspective of human rights 
The MoU opens with a preamble, which establishes the background and context of its provisions. The 
preamble outlines the joint goal of ’seeking to achieve greater unity between the states of Europe 
through respect for the shared values of pluralist democracy, the rule of law and human rights and 
fundamental freedoms‘.153 In the next paragraph, the preamble recognises the ’unique contribution‘ 
of the ECHR, ECtHR and other CoE standards and instruments and ’takes into account‘ the importance 
of the CFREU and Art. 6.2 of TEU, which enshrines the obligation for the EU to accede to the ECHR.154 
The Preamble goes on to recall the genesis of the MoU155 and establish that both organisations seek 
to intensify co-operation and co-ordination of action on issues of mutual interest156, taking into 
consideration their comparative advantages and specific characteristics as well as good relations 
insofar.157 Significantly, and characteristically for non-legally binding documents, the Preamble ends 
with the phrase ’have reached the following understanding‘ as opposed to the language of 
’undertakings‘ more frequently found in treaties.158 
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The MoU contains four substantive chapters: Purposes and Principles of Cooperation, Shared Priorities 
and Focal Areas for Cooperation, Arrangements for Cooperation and Visibility of the Partnership. The 
first chapter, Purposes and Principles of Cooperation, opens with an outline of the cooperation, stating 
that the CoE and the EU will develop their relationship in all areas of common interest, i.a. the respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms.159 Notably, the MoU refers to the CoE Action Plan 
adopted during the 2005 Warsaw Summit, recalling the Guidelines on the Relations between the 
Council of Europe and the European Union which were included as an appendix to the Action Plan as 
principles to be followed in the CoE-EU cooperation.160  
Paragraph 10 of the MoU contains an item which was one of the most controversial elements of 
Juncker’s report and subject to long negotiations. Its full text is: ’The Council of Europe will remain the 
benchmark for human rights, the rule of law and democracy in Europe.’161 Following the aspirations 
laid out in the final documents of the Warsaw Summit and later in the Juncker Report, during the 
negotiation process the CoE expressed its desire to firmly establish within the MoU that its legal and 
institutional framework provides the reference point for both organisations in the field of human 
rights, the rule of law and democracy. This was seen within the CoE as the critical item, as inclusion of 
it in the MoU was expected to lay to rest the CoE’s concerns regarding the EU establishing its own 
human rights framework and eventually either drifting away from CoE standards or establishing itself 
as a human rights benchmark and thus undermining the very foundations of CoE’s existence. Apart 
from those political undercurrents, there were arguably several substantial grounds for such 
declaration. The ECHR has already had a special place within the EU fundamental rights law (see 
chapters II.E and II.F) and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR bore significant importance for the 
development of ECJ’s case law. Finally, the timing of the negotiations was in favour of the CoE’s 
position, as the EU was at that time recovering from the failure to adopt the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, and it was only one month after the signing of the MoU that the Action 
Committee for European Democracy (also known as the ‘Amato Group’) presented its proposal to 
rewrite the Constitutional Treaty into what became the Treaty of Lisbon and to give legal force to the 
CFREU. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the MoU provide for basic concepts of partnership, complementarity, 
exchange of views, preparing common strategies and utilising comparative advantages, respective 
competencies and expertise of the CoE and the EU while having both organisations ‘acknowledge each 
other’s experience and standard-setting work’162 and extend their co-operation to all areas where it is 
likely to bring added value to their action.’163. 
The chapter Shared Priorities and Focal Areas for Cooperation includes a subchapter ’Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms’, which opens with an affirmation of indivisibility and universality of 
human rights as basis for co-operations and refers to the human rights standards of both the UN and 
the CoE, with particular attention to the ECHR.164 The reference to the UN standards is significant. If 
we assume that the drafters understood the term ’fundamental texts‘ in the context of the UN as the 
core conventions and treaties, this means that the scope includes the UDHR as well as ICCPR and 
ICESCR, both with their respective optional protocols. Paragraph 17 reinforces the concept of the EU 
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holding the CoE in regard as the (emphasis JJ) Europe-wide reference source for human rights.165 
Furthermore, it states that the relevant CoE human rights norms will be cited as references in EU 
documents, the decisions and conclusions of its monitoring activities will be taken into account by the 
EU institutions and that the EU will develop cooperation with the CoE Commissioner for Human 
Rights.166 The link between the CoE and EU human rights system is further expanded in par. 19, which 
states that coherence between EU law and the relevant CoE conventions will be ensured. The 
paragraph does not clarify, whether this pertains to conventions which the EU is a party of, or to any 
CoE conventions.167 The MoU goes on to state that the early accession of the EU to the ECHR ’would 
greatly contribute to coherence in the field of human rights in Europe‘.168 It does not, however, state 
any deadlines, parameters or procedures towards this aim. Paragraph 21 of the MoU has particular 
importance for policy goals in CoE-EU engagement, as it provides a list of focus areas for both 
organisations to cooperate on. The list includes: protection of persons belonging to national 
minorities, the fight against discrimination, racism, xenophobia and intolerance, the fight against 
torture and ill-treatment, the fight against trafficking in human beings, the protection of the rights of 
the child, the promotion of human rights education and freedom of expression and information.169 
Paragraph 22 of the MoU contains the perhaps most striking element of the document after the clause 
on the ’benchmark status‘ of CoE human rights law. It deals with the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, 
whose creation, status and competences were subject to major disagreements between the CoE and 
the EU (see chapter II.B.10 of this report). The CoE sought to enshrine limitations on FRA’s mandate 
in the MoU towards ensuring that the new agency will not supersede or overlap with its own 
institutions. Towards these objectives, the paragraph 22 limits the scope of FRA’s mandate to 
strengthening ’the European Union's efforts to ensure respect for fundamental rights within the 
framework of the European Union and Community law.’170 It goes on to state that FRA respects the 
unity, validity and effectiveness of the instruments of CoE’s monitoring mechanisms and that concrete 
details on cooperation between the FRA and the CoE will be the subject of a bilateral agreement 
between the CoE and the EU.171 
The further paragraphs of the chapter ‘Shared Priorities and Focal Areas for Cooperation' refer to 
areas of rule of law, legal cooperation, democracy, good governance, democratic stability, 
intercultural dialogue, cultural diversity, education, youth and social cohesion. Several paragraphs of 
these subchapters have relevance for the subject matter of this report. In paragraphs 23 to 25 the 
desire to ensure greater coherence in law-making is repeated and reinforced with the clause on CoE-
EU consultations in early stages of standard-setting. Paragraph 27 refers to fostering gender equality 
and greater participation of women in decision-making processes.172 Paragraph 28 briefly refers to the 
Venice Commission. In paragraphs 30 and 31, the CoE and the EU elaborate their desire to increase 
common efforts towards enhanced pan-European relations, including specifically cooperation with 
EU’s Neighbourhood and Enlargement areas, as well as in states aspiring for membership of the CoE.173 
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Paragraphs 39 and 40 deal with the operationalisation of the CoE’s concept of ’social cohesion’174 with 
provisions for cooperation between the CoE and the EU based on the ESC and relevant EU laws and 
policies.175 Notably, both organisations set out to support efforts by Member States in exchanging 
good practices and developing ’more efficient policies in this field.176 
The chapter Arrangements for Co-operation’ contains procedural and technical provisions, some of 
which have major implications for the subject matter of this report. Paragraph 45 calls for more 
frequent consultations and political dialogue between the Chairpersonship of the CoM and Secretary 
General on one side and the Presidency/Troika on the other.177 Since the institution of then-Troika 
(MoFA of the Presidency State, the Secretary General of the Council of the EU [who under pre-Lisbon 
arrangements acted as a High Representative of the CFSP] and the head of DG RELEX) became defunct 
with the Lisbon Treaty, it is assumed that this competence passed on to the HR/VP. Such meetings are 
to take place on an informal basis at the Minister’s Deputies level and at formal basis at the level of 
the Political and Security Committee of the Council of the EU. This paragraph is notable in involving 
the Council of the EU in the CoE-EU relations, as previously the dialogue was carried out exclusively 
by the Commission. Paragraphs 46 to 50 deal with inter-institutional cooperation between other 
institutions and bodies of the CoE and the EU, including the European Parliament (EP) and the 
Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE)178, the CoE Human Rights Commissioner, the 
Committee for Prevention of Torture (CPT), the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 
(ECRI)179, the Committee of Regions (CoR)180 with the overarching aim of encouraging the contribution 
from civil society.181 
Paragraph 52 refers to the Joint Programmes. It recalls the 2001 Joint Declaration on co-operation and 
partnership between the Council of Europe and the European Commission and goes on to declare 
reinforcement of the ongoing cooperation ‘which could include regional thematic programmes’. 
182The same paragraph provides for consultations involving the European Commission, the CoE SG and 
’as a general’ rule the CoE Member States concerned regarding the priorities of Joint Programmes.183 
Joint Programmes are additionally referred to in paragraph 54, in which the CoE and the EU resolve to 
increase the visibility of their joint activities, including the JPs, with emphasis on beneficiary 
countries.184 
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 Conclusions 
The tenth anniversary of the MoU is approaching rapidly and undoubtedly the year 2017 will bring a 
number of retrospectives on its relevance, impact and importance today. There is little doubt that the 
MoU has had a profound impact on the relationship between the CoE and the EU. Looking at the 
political dialogue between both organisations, at the ongoing reform and advancement of the JP 
framework and the progress made on EU’s accession to the ECHR up to the CJEU Opinion 2/13, one 
can quote the CoE CoM assessment of the impact of the MoU: 
’Since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, there has been an unprecedented 
qualitative change in mutual relations, which have been transformed into a true, strategic 
partnership in the areas of political dialogue, legal co-operation and concrete cooperation 
activities (…)’185 
Looking from the CoE’s perspective, the MoU helped alleviate the greatest fears in Strasbourg – those 
that the EU will eclipse the CoE and take over its role as Europe’s premier human rights organisation. 
The reference to the CoE as a human rights benchmark organisation in Europe and the limitation on 
FRA’s mandate served as sufficient means of ensuring that tensions resulting from EU’s expansion in 
the field of human rights are resolved. However, not all elements of the Juncker report were ultimately 
included in the MoU. The perhaps most ambitious of his recommendations, the concept of the EU 
becoming a full member of the CoE by the year 2015, was not included in the final text of the MoU 
and was not picked up in any other form. On a less dramatic note, the concept of joint budget planning 
between the CoE and the EU was dropped as well, although given the discrepancies in budget 
structure, planning and adoption procedures between both organisations the concept was joint 
financial strategy was a little too optimistic. 
From the EU’s perspective interests and goals, the MoU can too be considered a relative success. It 
ultimately became a non-legally binding document, meaning that the potentially risky process of 
seeking consent from Member States within the EU and engaging actors such as Russia within the CoE 
was circumvented. On a general level, the EU was able to achieve its goals of lessening the tensions 
with the CoE while avoiding major commitments and obligations. The MoU provided the EU with an 
entrenchment of cooperation with the CoE in a single high-level document, instead of the previous 
array of informal and formal arrangements scattered all over the complicated structure of both 
organisations. It also outlined substantive priorities and key policy areas for future engagement. As 
outlined in chapter II.D of this report, these proprieties serve as a foundation for the biannual EU 
priorities for cooperation with the CoE. The MoU paved the way towards a reform and reinforcement 
of Joint Programmes, where the EU was at the time increasingly dissatisfied with the state of things.186 
Notwithstanding these achievements, there are also shortcomings of the MoU. From the perspective 
of the protection and promotion of human rights in Europe, the limitation on FRA’s mandate imposed 
in the MoU can only be seen as a major misstep. Limiting the FRA to ensuring respect for fundamental 
rights solely within the framework of the EU policies and law was an adequate fulfilment of CoE’s 
desire to keep the new EU human rights agency delineated from its own policies and institutions and 
to avoid duplication of competences and marginalisation of the CoE. However, it is rather striking that 
an organisation so heavily invested in the protection of human rights in Europe as the CoE saw the 
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newcomer institution not as an opportunity to synergise and increase the respect for human rights 
within the EU, but as a threat that must be at very best contained and prevented from stepping on 
CoE’s toes. The EU on the other hand, was arguably all too willing to sacrifice FRA’s mandate as a way 
to placate the CoE and keep it from increasing tensions While the FRA and the CoE established their 
own cooperation agreement one year later and were able to work together effectively towards joint 
goals,187 the way both organisations resolved the issue falls far from a sincere undertaking of joint 
responsibility for human rights in Europe. 
Another criticism to the MoU itself and its implementation concerns the scope of rights and freedoms 
in relation to which both organisations undertook to cooperate on. The MoU makes a welcome 
reference to the international human rights system, including a mention of the fundamental texts of 
the UN. If we understand these fundamental texts as the UN Bill of Rights and thus look at the MoU 
from the perspective of UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR, the attention given to economic, social and cultural 
rights is markedly lower than the focus on civil and political rights or general issues. The MoU mentions 
several specific explicit human rights concerns such as rights of minorities, discrimination, intolerance, 
racism, torture, rights of child or freedom of expression. It refers to the concepts of cultural diversity, 
intercultural dialogue, education and social cohesion, but it stops short of referring directly to core 
ESC rights, such as labour rights, right to health, right to adequate standards of living or right to social 
security. The sole provision of the MoU dealing with the concept of ’social cohesion’ is far from 
exhaustive when it comes to concerns related to ESC rights. Naturally, this does not preclude 
cooperation in the field of ESC rights between the CoE and the EU, and many elements of safeguarding 
these rights have been touched upon in Joint Programmes, but the fact that the EU’s overarching 
reference framework for cooperation with the CoE does not explicitly mention ESC rights as an area 
of concern is a shortcoming. The impact of MoU’s deficiency in addressing ESC rights is clearly visible 
in the biannual EU priorities for the cooperation with the CoE, which, as chapter II.D of this report 
observers, have insofar not referred to ESC rights at all since their first introduction in 2012. 
 
D. Substantive Human Rights goals and objectives of the EU vis-à-
vis the CoE  
 Introduction 
The EU has identified human rights in general as a policy area on which it intends to cooperate with 
the Council of Europe.188 The 2007 MoU between the EU and the Council of Europe lists human rights 
as one of the areas of common interest in which both organisations seek to develop their 
relationship.189 Similarly, the EU’s 2012 Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy affirms 
the Union’s commitment to ’continue its engagement with the invaluable human rights work of the 
Council of Europe’,190 while the 2015 Action Plan commits the EEAS, the European Commission and 
the EU Member States to engage with Council of Europe on best practices for human rights.191 
Apart from this general commitment to human rights cooperation, the EU’s substantive goals and 
objectives for its cooperation with the Council of Europe have been specified in a number of policy 
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documents. The first and primary source is the MoU, concluded between the EU and the Council of 
Europe in 2007,192 which identifies seven thematic human rights issues on which the EU and the 
Council of Europe will cooperate.193 In addition to that, the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU biannually 
adopts strategic priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe.194 They identify non-exclusive 
geographic and thematic priorities for the upcoming two years as well as a number of transversal 
issues that apply to EU-Council of Europe relations in general. Beyond that, a number of general 
human rights strategic documents of the EU identify the Council of Europe as a partner for 
cooperation. They include primarily the 2012 Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy, 
the 2012 and the updated 2015 Action Plan195 as well as the EU human rights guidelines for selected 
human rights issues. 
 
 Thematic priorities 
The MoU identifies the following primary areas of human rights cooperation between the EU and the 
Council of Europe: 
Co-operation between the Council of Europe and the European Union will include the 
protection of persons belonging to national minorities, the fight against discrimination, 
racism, xenophobia and intolerance, the fight against torture and ill-treatment, the fight 
against trafficking in human beings, the protection of the rights of the child, the promotion of 
human rights education and freedom of expression and information.196 
The listed human rights issues reflect core areas of activity of the Council of Europe and correspond 
to central human rights priorities of the EU. The biannual EU priorities for cooperation with the Council 
of Europe take up most of these priorities. Together with the Action Plans and the EU human rights 
guidelines they provide details on possible thematic and geographic focal areas and concrete 
strategies to operationalize them.  
Table 2 Overview of EU thematic priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe 
 MoU 2012-13 
priorities 
2014-15 
priorities 
2016-17 
priorities 
2012 
Action 
Plan  
2015 
Action 
Plan  
EU 
Guidelines 
Children ● ● ● ●   ● 
Death penalty    ●    
Racism, xenophobia 
& intolerance 
●   ●   --- 
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No 5339/16. 
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Freedom of 
expression 
● ● ● ●   ● 
LGBTI  (●) ● ● ●  ● 
National minorities 
(Roma, FoRB) 
● ● ● ● ● (●) ●197 
Respect for European 
HR standards 
 ● ● ● ● (●) ●198 
Socio-economic 
rights 
   ●  (●)199 --- 
Torture and ill-
treatment 
●   ● ● (●) ● 
Trafficking in human 
beings 
●  ● ●  (●) --- 
Women   ● ●    
 (brackets indicate that a thematic issue is not expressly declared a priority or that the document only 
generally refers to regional organisations without explicitly mentioning the Council of Europe) 
 
 
a) Respect of European human rights standards 
All three biannual priority documents list ’strengthening the respect of European human rights 
standards‘ as the first priority for cooperation between the EU and the Council of Europe. The exact 
contours of this priority were however not immediately defined. Initially, the 2012-2013 document 
only referred in very brief terms to ‘[c]ontinued support to enforcing the ECHR system in Council of 
Europe member countries‘. This goal was subsequently fleshed out in the 2014-2015 and 2016-2017 
priorities. They firstly highlight the importance of cooperating with Human Rights Defenders and with 
the Commissioner for Human Rights towards achieving this goal. The 2014-2015 priorities additionally 
put a focus on economic and social inclusion, which the 2016-2017 priorities replaced with a focus on 
torture, ill-treatment and the death penalty. Both will be discussed in more detail below. Beyond the 
biannual priorities, the 2012 and the 2015 Action Plan also commit the EU to strengthening regional 
human rights mechanisms, although only the former refers to the Council of Europe explicitly. In 
addition, the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders identify the Commissioner for Human Rights 
of the Council of Europe as one of the regional mechanisms for the protection of human rights 
defenders, which the EU should support.200 
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b) Freedom of expression 
Freedom of expression and in particular media freedom are a shared priority of the EU and the Council 
of Europe. Media freedom, independence and diversity is one of the main aspects of the thematic 
work of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe. In line with the MoU, the EU 
has consistently identified freedom of expression as a priority area of cooperation since 2012. The 
focus of this priority has however shifted over time. In 2012-2013 the EU placed a thematic focus on 
media freedom and a geographic focus on the situation of journalists in Russia, Turkey and the South 
Caucasus (in particular Azerbaijan). Subsequently, in 2014-2015 two thematic priorities on 
information society and intolerance/hate speech were added. The geographic focus was dropped in 
2016-2017, instead a thematic focus on terrorist content online and in social media was added.  
In 2013 the EU adopted a set of Guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline.201 They, too, 
identify the Council of Europe as one of the regional organisations with which the EU should cooperate 
on freedom of expression. In addition, the Guidelines outline the form that this cooperation should 
take. For example, they commit the EU to ’step up its engagement‘ with the Council of Europe, in 
particular by undertaking joint activities with the Commissioner for Human Rights and to support the 
work of the Council of Europe in its bilateral relations by encouraging third states to implement 
recommendations of the Council of Europe, to comply with judgments of the ECtHR, and to cooperate 
with the Steering Committee on Media and Information Society (CDMSI). 
 
c) National minorities (Roma/religious minorities/freedom of 
religion or belief) 
The protection of national minorities takes a central position in the work of the Council of Europe. Its 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is the first general and legally binding 
international instrument for the protection of national minorities. On the EU side, the fact that the 
Treaty on the European Union enshrines the respect for minority rights as one of the founding values 
of the EU would indicate a similarly strong commitment.202 Nevertheless, the EU has sometimes been 
criticized for an alleged double-standard in its promotion and protection of minorities. It has been 
observed that whereas minority rights are actively promoted externally, for example through their 
inclusion in the Copenhagen criteria for accession candidates,203 internally their protection is mostly 
limited to the prohibition of discrimination.204 For example the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights, 
while progressive in many respects, does not contain provisions on minority rights other than in the 
context of non-discrimination.205 The controversies surrounding minority rights protection are also 
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illustrated by the fact that not all EU Member States have ratified the Council of Europe’s Framework 
Convention so far.206  
Nevertheless, the MoU lists the ’protection of persons belonging to national minorities‘ as one of the 
core areas of cooperation between the EU and the Council of Europe.207 This was translated into a 
thematic focus on Roma and religious minorities in the biannual priority documents. Protection of 
Roma focused initially particularly on socio-economic integration but since 2014 the EU also identifies 
a focus on women and children and on local action, and gives ’special attention‘ to access to education, 
the labour market and social protection.208 The focus on religious minorities and freedom of religion 
or belief was not further detailed in the 2012-2013 priorities. Since 2014 the biannual priority 
documents refer to the implementation of the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of 
freedom of religion or belief, which were adopted in June 2013. They commit the Union to ’promote 
initiatives at the level of […] the Council of Europe‘ and to foster regular exchanges. Beyond that, the 
2015 Action Plan obliges the EEAS, the European Commission and the EU Member States more 
generally to support initiatives on minority rights of regional organisations, however without explicitly 
referring to the Council of Europe.209 
 
d) Rights of the child 
The protection of the rights of the child is a joint priority of the EU and the Council of Europe. The 
Council of Europe works towards the protection of children’s rights, focusing in particular on child-
friendly justice and on the fight against sexual exploitation and abuse. The Council of Europe 
Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse entered into 
force in 2010, however, five EU Member States have not yet ratified it.210 It follows in a long succession 
of Council of Europe conventions addressing children’s rights issues. In the EU, Art 3(3) and 3(5) TEU 
commit the EU to promote the protection of children’s rights internally and to contribute to the 
protection of children’s rights externally. The rights of the child are a core priority of the EU, as 
evidenced by the adoption of two sets of guidelines211 and by the traditional tabling of EU resolutions 
on the rights of the child in UN human rights fora.  
In line with this joint commitment, children’s rights have been identified as a priority area of 
cooperation in the MoU and in the biannual priorities since 2012. Initially, a particular focus was placed 
on human rights education and training. In the period 2014-2015, the EU added a focus on combating 
violence against children and child labour. This was dropped in 2016-2017, instead the priorities now 
refer explicitly to ’cooperation in context of the Convention on the Protection of Children against 
                                                          
206 Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg signed the Framework Convention but did not ratify. France has neither signed nor 
ratified the Framework Convention, see http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
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Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse with a view to the EU joining the Convention‘. The latter is a 
reaction to the difficulties in the accession process of the EU to the ECHR after Opinion 2/13 of the 
CJEU. Highlighting that accession to the ECHR remains a treaty obligation of the EU, and that the EU’s 
’political commitment to the CoE’s convention system is strong’, the 2016-2017 priorities declare that 
the EU should ’strengthen its commitment to accede to a number of selected conventions‘, the 
abovementioned being one of them.  
In addition, the EU Guidelines on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Child contain a 
number of references to the Council of Europe. They identify the Council of Europe as one of the 
regional organisations with which the EU will seek to work in partnership and coordinate its activities. 
More specifically the Guidelines provide: ’the EU will strengthen existing partnerships, in particular 
with […] the Council of Europe […], particularly around research and systematic data collection, 
analysis and dissemination and in designing appropriate country response strategies‘. The Guidelines 
also commit the EU to support the Council of Europe in its bilateral relations with third states, among 
others by urging states to cooperate with the Council of Europe and to adhere to ECtHR decisions. 
 
e) Rights of LGBTI persons 
The rights of LGBTI persons were not included as an area of cooperation in the MoU. Three years 
later, however, they moved high up on the agenda of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe, when it adopted Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity. This signified the first commitment of the 
Committee of Ministers in this respect.212 Today, LGBTI rights have been prioritized as one of the 
thematic areas for the Commissioner for Human Rights. The Council of the EU identified LGBT rights 
as ’other key issue‘ in its priorities for the years 2012 and 2013, stating that ’LGBT is a theme which 
deserves EU’s attention in the CoE as well as in other (UN) multilateral fora‘. In the successor 
documents for 2014-2015 and 2016-2017, the rights of LGBTI persons were included in the canon of 
priorities, committing the EU to support and to cooperate with the Council of Europe in the fight 
against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. In addition, the EU Guidelines 
to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of All Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender 
and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons provide a framework of how the EU should promote LGBTI rights in its 
bilateral and multilateral relations.213 They provide that the EU raises LGBTI concerns in statements 
and questions at the Council of Europe, and also that the EU takes into consideration the work of the 
Council of Europe on LGBTI rights. 
 
f) Women’s rights 
Similarly, the MoU was also silent on violence against women or women’s rights in general. 
Nevertheless, the EU prioritized these issues in 2014 after the Council of Europe’s Convention on 
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention) 
entered into force. The focus shifted slightly for the years 2016-2017 from violence against women to 
’gender equality, women and girls' rights, their empowerment and participation‘. At the same time, 
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the Union’s commitment to the Istanbul Convention has been strengthened by including a reference 
to the Union’s potential accession to the Convention. The EU Guidelines on violence against women 
and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them state that the EU will ’regularly raise‘ 
the issue of violence against women in regional organisations, without however specifically referring 
to the Council of Europe.214 
 
g) Trafficking in human beings 
Human trafficking is one of the Council of Europe’s core areas of activity. In 2008 the Convention on 
Action against Trafficking in Human Beings entered into force, which has been ratified by all but one 
European Union Member State.215 An independent expert body, the Group of Experts on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) was tasked with monitoring the implementation of the 
Convention. Similarly, the EU has a dense legal and policy framework on trafficking in human beings.216 
The EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator is tasked with coordinating EU action, developing new and 
monitoring the implementation of existing policies.217  
Although the MoU explicitly listed trafficking in human beings as one of the areas of cooperation 
between the EU and the Council of Europe, this has only been reflected in the EU’s priorities since 
2014. The 2014-2015 priorities merely comprised a brief reference to cooperation in the context of 
the Council of Europe’s Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. For 2016-2017 this 
thematic focus has been considerably strengthened. Not only does it now declare the Union’s 
accession to the Convention to be a ’long-term objective‘, it also explicitly encourages dialogue 
between the EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator and the Council of Europe, as well as an exchange of 
information and best practices between both organisations. It is also noteworthy that the EU Strategy 
towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings (2012-2016) explicitly recognizes the 
’important work‘ of the Council of Europe and urges the EU Member States to ratify the Council of 
Europe Convention on Actions against Trafficking in Human Beings.218 
 
h) Torture and ill-treatment; death penalty 
The fight against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is among the priorities of the Council 
of Europe. The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment has been ratified by all Member States of the Council of Europe. The 
Convention provided the basis for the creation of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), 
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which has the authority to conduct unannounced visits to detention facilities in the State Parties in 
order to monitor the treatment of prisoners. The prohibition of torture is also a central element in EU 
human rights policy, as evidenced by the adoption of EU Guidelines on torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.219  
In line with this dual commitment, the MoU identified the fight against torture and ill-treatment as 
one of the areas of cooperation between both organisations. Nevertheless, the biannual priorities of 
the EU were initially silent on this issue. At first it was only the 2012 Action Plan which committed the 
EEAS and the EU Member States to ‘[a]ctively and continuously support and implement […] Council of 
Europe anti-torture efforts‘, referring explicitly to the Committee for the Prevention of Torture.220 It 
was however not specified, which form this support should take. Similarly, the 2015 Action Plan 
commits the EEAS, the European Commission and the EU Member States to ’undertake joint actions‘ 
for the eradication of torture in close cooperation with regional organisations, though not explicitly 
mentioning the Council of Europe.221 At the same time the Guidelines to EU Policy towards third 
countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (adopted in 
2001, revised in 2008 and 2012) set out a framework for the promotion of the prohibition of torture 
in EU external relations. They focus mostly on bilateral relations with third states, through which the 
EU seeks to strengthen the relevant Council of Europe actors and instruments, e.g. by urging third 
countries to implement ECtHR decisions and CPT recommendations, and to consent to the publication 
of reports or to country visits. It was only 2016, that torture, ill-treatment and the death penalty were 
added to the EU’s biannual priorities for the Council of Europe. No further details are provided; the 
issue is not even treated as an independent priority but listed as a bullet point under ’strengthening 
respect of European human rights standards’. 
 
i) Socio-economic rights 
The silence of most policy documents on socio-economic rights reflects the fact that they sometimes 
appear to take second place in the work of both the EU and the Council of Europe. They are not 
mentioned in the MoU, neither in the 2012-2013 or 2014-2015 annual priorities. There are no EU 
Guidelines dealing specifically with socio-economic rights, and the 2012 and 2015 Action Plan do not 
link EU action on economic or social rights to the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, the 2014-2015 
priorities included a brief bullet point on economic and social inclusion under ’strengthening respect 
of European human rights standards‘. This was expanded in the 2016-2017 document, which for the 
first time identified social and economic rights as a thematic priority for EU cooperation with the 
Council of Europe. Specifically, it focuses on three different aspects: (1) fundamental socio-economic 
rights and business and human rights, (2) interaction between the European Social Charter and EU law 
and policies,222 (3) education of disadvantaged children and youth. It is noteworthy, that the 2015 
Action Plan also commits the EU to raise awareness of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights and corporate social responsibility in its cooperation with regional organisations. 
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j) Discrimination, racism, xenophobia and intolerance 
In the Council of Europe, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) monitors 
instances of racism, xenophobia, intolerance and discrimination on racial grounds. At the EU level, a 
dense legal and policy framework has been adopted.223 Consequently, the MoU listed the ’fight against 
discrimination, racism, xenophobia and intolerance‘ as an area of cooperation between both 
organisations. Initially however, these issues only partially found entry into the biannual priority 
documents. In particular discrimination against LGBTI persons, national or religious minorities, and 
women were singled out, while a more overarching EU focus also on racism and xenophobia was 
missing. Only the most recent biannual priorities explicitly refer to the work of ECRI and commit the 
EU to promote awareness of its activities and the implementation of its recommendations.  
 
 Country-specific priorities 
In 2012 and in 2014 the Council of the EU identified the same group of countries on which the EU 
intends to focus its cooperation with the Council of Europe, namely Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. In addition, the EU placed a geographic focus on 
Russia, Turkey and the South Caucasus (with Azerbaijan ’in particular‘) in its thematic prioritisation of 
media freedom and the protection of journalists. For 2016-2017 the EU no longer refers to specific 
focal countries, but merely to its candidate and potential candidate countries, Eastern and Southern 
partner countries under the ENP, and to Russia and Central Asia. 
 
 Conclusions 
The EU’s selection of thematic goals and objectives reflects the core areas of work of the Council of 
Europe. This includes a stronger focus on civil and political rights than on economic, social and cultural 
rights. Over time the EU has expanded its priorities in order to mirror developments at the level of the 
Council of Europe, namely in the field of LGBTI rights and violence against women. Socio-economic 
rights and the fight against the death penalty were added in the most recent biannual priorities. The 
former corresponds to one of the primary human rights objectives of the EU, the latter may be an 
indication of EU efforts to move economic, social and cultural rights higher up on its agenda. As the 
overview in table 2 shows, not all relevant EU policy documents are consistent. Most noticeably, the 
2012-2013 and the 2014-2015 biannual priorities omitted some of the core areas of cooperation that 
were identified in the MoU, namely torture and ill-treatment, as well as racism, xenophobia and 
intolerance. The 2012-2013 priorities were furthermore silent on the issue of trafficking in human 
beings. The most recent biannual priorities for 2016-2017 are the first that include the entire range of 
human rights issues listed in the MoU. Similarly, the 2012 Action Plan only identified the Council of 
Europe as a regional organisation with which the EU should cooperate in the areas of freedom of 
religion, the rights of LGBTI persons, and torture and ill-treatment. It thereby omitted other core areas 
such as violence against women, trafficking, children’s rights and freedom of expression – although all 
of them are explicitly addressed in the Action Plan. Furthermore, none of the mentioned policy 
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documents reflect the Council of Europe’s active engagement with regard to the rights of migrants 
and the rights of people with disabilities. Both of these should play a significant role in EU human 
rights policy, in light of the migrant crisis on the one hand, and the EU’s accession to the UN Disability 
Convention on the other hand. These gaps and inconsistencies are unfortunate. All of the examined 
policy documents are supposed to substantiate EU human rights policies and to provide guidance to 
those EU and EU Member States officials who are tasked with their implementation. If these 
documents do not identify potential regional partners or omit human rights issues which belong to 
the particular expertise of these partners, they risk that certain avenues of cooperation will be 
overlooked. Avoiding these blind spots could enable the EU to realize untapped potential for 
cooperation and ultimately strengthen EU external human rights policy. 
The geographic priorities of the EU on the contrary are very broad. They encompass virtually all Council 
of Europe members and some observers, with the exception of the EU Member States, the members 
of the European Economic Area, and the microstates Andorra, Monaco and San Marino. Here it should 
be examined, whether a stronger country-specific focus, linking thematic issues to countries where 
violations are particularly prevalent, may be a useful strategy. 
 
E. Rapprochement of the human rights protection systems of the 
CoE and the EU  
 The impact of the Council of Europe on EU human rights law and 
policy 
a) Introduction 
Scholarly attention often focuses on the EU’s actual or potential impact at the multilateral level. In 
light of the EU’s commitment to effective multilateralism, a score of researchers have examined the 
ways in which the EU can promote its agenda through or in partnership with other international 
organisations. Studies have focused on the ways in which the EU can engage in state-centric 
multilateral settings, how it can enhance its participation rights, how it can ensure that its Member 
States ’speak with one voice‘, how it can increase policy coherence and which goals and objectives it 
should pursue.224 The EU’s unique nature and ensuing challenges, paired with its perceived 
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ineffectiveness in multilateral fora, prompted researchers to examine how the EU could ’punch its 
weight‘ on the international scene.225  
The relationship between the EU and the Council of Europe is no exception in this respect. Scholars 
have tended to focus on the influence of the EU on the Council of Europe rather than the other way 
around, particularly in light of the Lisbon reform and potential accession to the ECHR.226 This comes 
as no surprise. Although the Council of Europe predates the EU, the latter quickly acquired a more 
prominent position through a rapid expansion of its competences and its membership. Areas which 
used to fall under the exclusive remit of the Council of Europe gradually moved within the sphere of 
the EU. This includes the area of human rights, which was originally absent from EU treaty law but 
which has since acquired a central position in the EU framework, but also for example the area of 
democratic reform, in which EU conditionality – in the framework of its enlargement and 
neighbourhood policies – began to trump commitments which Central or Eastern European countries 
might have had towards the Council of Europe.227 The EU’s thematic and geographic growth gave rise 
to speculations about whether the Council of Europe might ultimately be rendered obsolete. Indeed, 
the Council of Europe has sometimes been dubbed as a mere ’antechamber‘ for accession to the EU.228  
This predominant focus on the EU’s actual or potential impact, however, risks overlooking that its 
relationship with other international organisations is by no means a one-way street. On the contrary, 
by engaging at the multilateral level, the EU creates opportunities to influence but also to be 
influenced in turn. This chapter aims to shed some light on this generally understudied aspect of the 
EU’s engagement with multilateral institutions, by exploring the ways in which the Council of Europe 
impacts or could potentially impact on the coherence of EU human rights law and policy. The scope of 
the chapter does not allow for a comprehensive assessment of all possible channels of influence. It 
will consequently have to focus on a few selected examples. Other chapters in this report will further 
explore the impact of the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR (chapters II.E.1 and II.F.) the impact of 
the Joint Programmes (chapters II.G. and Appendix I) and of the Venice Commission (Appendix I). 
 
b) Assessing inter-institutional impact 
The relationship between the EU and the Council of Europe has grown increasingly close over the past 
decades. Nevertheless, the EU is still not a member of the Council of Europe and has only ratified a 
small fraction of its Conventions. It is neither subjected to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, nor can it be 
monitored by any of the other treaty or resolution based monitoring mechanisms. It thereby remains 
largely outside of the institutional framework of the Council of Europe and the inter-institutional 
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relations between the EU and the Council of Europe are mostly reduced to cooperation and 
coordination. How then, can the Council of Europe impact on the EU’s approach to human rights? 
Generally speaking, international institutions will remain uninfluential if they are not supported at the 
domestic level. In order to realize its goals and objectives, an international organisation consequently 
has to find a way to build domestic majorities which support its policies. In practice this means that it 
needs to engage with supportive domestic policy-makers and ’improv[e their] chances for success‘.229 
This can take many different forms, including for example the provision of resources (e.g. information, 
expertise, capacity, tools or money) or the creation of legal norms and rules.  
The latter is particularly relevant in the case of the Council of Europe. Since its inception, the Council 
of Europe has adopted 219 treaties, agreements, conventions and protocols, dealing with a range of 
issues that fall under the broad mandate of the organisation.230 They deal with issues as diverse as 
biomedicine, culture, the environment, education, animal protection, sports and all sorts of matters 
of legal cooperation, but also particularly with human rights. By adopting these legal instruments, the 
Council of Europe has created a dense framework of legal norms which enjoys considerable authority. 
Not only do they provide domestic actors with a ready-made legal framework to which they can resort, 
the overall high acceptance of Council of Europe conventions also makes it more difficult for states to 
opt for deviating national solutions. The effect of these legal instruments is strongest if they are 
ratified and integrated into national law. However, even in case of non-ratification, they can serve as 
a source of inspiration and guidance which may influence domestic legal frameworks. These factors 
contribute to strengthening the coherence of the approaches to human rights across the continent.  
Secondly, throughout its history, the Council of Europe has gathered a wealth of expertise and 
information on various policy issues. A variety of treaty- and resolution-based bodies monitor 
developments in the Member States in the areas of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.231 
A range of field offices, particularly in Eastern European and Central Asian Member States, provide 
capacity and expertise on the ground.232 The Council of Europe has been closely engaged in the 
democratic reform processes in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War and has thus acquired 
particular capacities in this policy area.233 The Council of Europe can use this expertise and information 
to feed into domestic policy-processes and thereby impact on the outcomes. Relying on the authority 
of the Council of Europe will often be unavoidable for domestic policy-makers – not only because of 
the costs involved with gathering the required information independently, but also because of the 
legitimacy that the Council of Europe provides.234  
It has been rightly observed, that the EU with its complex institutional framework and manifold human 
rights relevant bodies provides for ’an unusual abundance of access points to the policy-making 
process for interested actors‘.235 While there is a multitude of potentially supportive policy 
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entrepreneurs in the EU with whom the Council of Europe could engage, it must not be overlooked 
that this complex institutional framework also makes majority building more difficult. As Costa and 
Jørgensen have stated: ’The EU system is a chain of institutions that act not only as access points, but 
also as veto points‘.236 They argue that international institutions will be most successful if they engage 
with what they call the ’meso-level‘ of the EU, meaning technical and expert bodies, such as 
Commission Directorates, Council Working Parties, special agencies etc. The stability and technical 
approaches of these bodies appear to make them more conducive to building majorities than purely 
political bodies.237 
When studying the impact of the Council of Europe on the EU, two important factors may not be 
overlooked. Firstly, attention needs to be paid to the fact that influence can occur through direct 
channels (between the Council of Europe and the EU) and through indirect channels (from the Council 
of Europe to the Member States, to the EU). All EU Member States are simultaneously members of 
the Council of Europe. By impacting on these Member States (e.g. through legal instruments, 
adjudication and monitoring, and the provision of expertise and capacities) the Council of Europe may 
indirectly also impact on the EU. When EU Member States engage in policy-making in the EU, they 
may do this against the backdrop of the Council of Europe conventions which they have ratified, and 
the recommendations they have received from monitoring bodies. It can be challenging to identify 
these indirect influences.  
Secondly, attention needs to be paid to the problem of circularity. As stated above, influence between 
the Council of Europe and the EU is not a one-way street. The Council of Europe may be impacting on 
the human rights approaches of the EU and its Member States. But at the same time, the EU and its 
Member States participate actively in the policy-setting of the Council of Europe. Policy proposals may 
originate in a bottom-up process in the EU and its Member States and come back again top-down 
through the Council of Europe. Distinguishing the origin of a policy and isolating the top-down from 
the bottom-up dimension can be challenging.  
Figure 3 illustrates the different dimensions of inter-organisational impact of the Council of Europe on 
the EU in the area of human rights, indicating direct (blue) and indirect (grey) channels of influence. It 
only shows half of the picture, as in reality all arrows will be double-headed to indicate the influence 
of the EU and its Member States on the Council of Europe. 
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Figure 1 Channels of influence of the CoE on EU human rights law and policy 
 
In the following, we will examine more closely how the Council of Europe can impact on the EU by 
providing legal standards, information and expertise. Given that the scope of this subchapter does not 
allow for a comprehensive analysis, these examples aim to illustrate the different channels of 
influence and point out areas where additional research is needed.  
 
c) Legal instruments  
(1) The impact of Council of Europe human rights 
instruments on the EU 
As indicated above, since 1949 the Council of Europe has adopted 219 individual instruments covering 
a broad a range of legal areas.238 35 of these Conventions and Protocols address primarily human 
rights issues.239 The oldest and most prominent of these treaties is the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which was adopted in 1950 and entered into 
force in 1953.240 Since then, 16 additional protocols to the Convention have been adopted, adding 
new fundamental rights or revising the competences of the ECtHR. The ECHR, which focuses on civil 
and political rights, was joined in 1961 by the European Social Charter, which deals with socio-
economic rights.241 However, the European Social Charter never reached the same level of acceptance 
as the ECHR. It did not acquire the same number of ratifications, nor has it been endowed with a 
similarly strong enforcement mechanism. Other major human rights treaties of the Council of Europe 
deal with torture and inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment,242 the rights of minorities,243 
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racism and xenophobia,244 trafficking in human beings,245 violence against women and domestic 
violence.246  
The effect of a legal instrument of the Council of Europe on the EU is strongest, if the EU signs and 
ratifies it. According to art. 216(2) TFEU, agreements concluded by the EU bind its institutions and the 
EU Member States. They become part of Union law, subsidiary to EU primary law but hierarchically 
higher than EU secondary law.247 In line with the primacy of EU law, they trump the national law of 
the EU Member States.248 Upon entering into force they are directly applicable in the EU Member 
States and may under certain conditions also have direct effect.  
Even if the EU does not ratify a treaty, it may nevertheless have certain effects on EU law and policy. 
This will occur in particular if a Council of Europe convention has been ratified by all EU Member 
States. In the 1960s, the European Court of Justice began to grant fundamental rights protection at 
the European level in its case law. Arguing that the ’law‘, whose observance the Court has to ensure,249 
also includes ’general principles of law‘ as they result from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, the Court began to draw on human rights conventions which had been ratified by 
all EU Member States as indicators of the scope of these general principles. The Court relied 
particularly on the ECHR,250 which has over time – through the case law of the ECJ – considerably 
contributed to the development of fundamental rights protection in the EU.251 Art. 6(3) TEU today 
provides that:  
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law. 
As will be examined in more detail in chapter II.F, the ECHR has a strong influence on the coherence 
of EU human rights law and policy. It is noteworthy that the CFREU in its preamble acknowledges the 
impact of the ECHR, and provides in art. 53 that the interpretation of the Charter shall be in line with 
the ECHR.  
Beyond the ECHR, other legal instruments of the Council of Europe have provided inspiration and 
guidance for the interpretation or design of EU law, and informed EU policy-processes. For example, 
Cornu has identified such an impact in the case of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.252 Despite not having acceded to the 
Convention, the EU modelled its 1995 Data Protection Directive after the Convention and integrated 
its standards into the data protection laws for Europol and the Schengen system.253 
                                                          
244 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic 
nature committed through computer systems, CETS No.189. 
245 Council of Europe, Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, CETS No.197. 
246 Council of Europe, Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, CETS No.210. 
247 Case C-344/04 The Queen Ex parte International Air Transport Association, European Low Fares Airline Association v 
Department for Transport [2006] ECR I-403, para 35. 
248 See Case 6/64 Costa v Enel [1964] ECR I-585; Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR I-1125. 
249 TEU art 19(1). 
250 Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR I-3727. 
251 For more detail see below ch II.F. 
252 Elise Cornu, ‘The Impact of Council of Europe Standards on the European Union’, in Ramses A. Wessel and Steven 
Blockmans (eds) Between Autonomy and Dependence: The EU Legal Order Under the Influence of International Organisations 
(Asser 2013) 125. 
253 Supra. 
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The ratification of international conventions entails a number of legal challenges for the EU. Under EU 
law, the Union must meet the requirements of Title V TFEU. This means that the EU must not only 
observe the ratification procedure set out in art. 218 TFEU but also that it must have the competence 
to conclude the agreement. In line with art. 216(1) TFEU the EU can only conclude international 
agreements if: 
1. the Treaties so provide  
2. the conclusion of the agreement is necessary in order to achieve an objective referred to in 
the Treaties,  
3. is provided for in secondary EU law or  
4. is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope. 
In addition, the international agreement must be open to the participation of the European Union. 
Originally, Council of Europe Conventions could only be ratified by states. In 1987, however, the 
European Community and the Council of Europe concluded an Arrangement in which they agreed: 
’As regards any new draft European convention or agreement, consideration will be given to 
the appropriateness of inserting a clause allowing for the European Community to become a 
Contracting Party to the convention or agreement.’254 
Today, 53 treaties of the Council of Europe are open to the accession of the EU.255 Typically they 
contain a clause which stipulates that ’this Convention shall be open for signature by … the European 
Union‘. The text of the Convention usually refers to ’any state or the European Union‘ or simply to 
’parties‘. Nevertheless, the EU has only signed 15 and ratified eleven of them. Of the 53 instruments, 
20 have particular implications for human rights. So far, the EU has signed three conventions dealing 
with terrorism, but ratified none of them (table 4).  
Table 3 List of Council of Europe legal instruments with particular human rights relevance which are open to the EU 
CETS 
No. 
Title Opening of 
the treaty 
Entry into 
Force 
EU 
signature 
EU 
ratification 
005 Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
04/11/1950 03/09/1953   
160 European Convention on the 
Exercise of Children's Rights 
25/01/1996 01/07/2000   
164 Convention for the protection 
of Human Rights and Dignity of 
the Human Being with regard to 
the Application of Biology and 
Medicine: Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine 
04/04/1997 01/12/1999   
                                                          
254 Arrangement between the Council of Europe and the European Community, concluded on 16 June 1987. 
255 CoE, ‘Treaties open to: European Union’, <www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-states/-
/conventions/treaty/openings/EU?p_auth=9M5qrk84> accessed on 10 March 2016. 
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168 Additional Protocol to the 
Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Dignity of 
the Human Being with regard to 
the Application of Biology and 
Medicine, on the Prohibition of 
Cloning Human Beings 
12/01/1998 01/03/2001   
173 Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption 
27/01/1999 01/07/2002   
174 Civil Law Convention on 
Corruption 
04/11/1999 01/11/2003   
181 Additional Protocol to the 
Convention for the Protection 
of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data, regarding 
supervisory authorities and 
transborder data flows 
08/11/2001 01/07/2004   
186 Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine concerning 
Transplantation of Organs and 
Tissues of Human Origin 
24/01/2002 01/05/2006   
191 Additional Protocol to the 
Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption 
15/05/2003 01/02/2005   
192 Convention on Contact 
concerning Children 
15/05/2003 01/09/2005   
195 Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine, concerning 
Biomedical Research 
25/01/2005 01/09/2007   
196 Council of Europe Convention 
on the Prevention of Terrorism 
16/05/2005 01/06/2007 22/10/2015  
197 Council of Europe Convention 
on Action against Trafficking in 
Human Beings 
16/05/2005 01/02/2008   
198 Council of Europe Convention 
on Laundering, Search, Seizure 
and Confiscation of the 
16/05/2005 01/05/2008 02/04/2009  
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Proceeds from Crime and on the 
Financing of Terrorism 
201 Council of Europe Convention 
on the Protection of Children 
against Sexual Exploitation and 
Sexual Abuse 
25/10/2007 01/07/2010   
203 Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine concerning 
Genetic Testing for Health 
Purposes 
27/11/2008 
 
  
210 Council of Europe Convention 
on preventing and combating 
violence against women and 
domestic violence 
11/05/2011 01/08/2014   
213 Protocol No. 15 amending the 
Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
24/06/2013 
 
  
214 Protocol No. 16 to the 
Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
02/10/2013 
 
  
216 Council of Europe Convention 
against Trafficking in Human 
Organs 
25/03/2015 
 
  
217 Additional Protocol to the 
Council of Europe Convention 
on the Prevention of Terrorism 
22/10/2015 
 
22/10/2015  
 
In light of the EU’s strong commitment to human rights, its close relations with the Council of Europe 
and the – in theory – legal feasibility of participation, the low ratification rate raises questions. While 
the ongoing saga about the EU’s accession to the ECHR has been thoroughly analysed (see also in this 
report chapter II.E.3.), the EU’s lack of accession to other instruments has received less attention. One 
might suspect some form of ’EU exceptionalism‘ at play, with the EU seeking to preserve the autonomy 
of EU law and rejecting external scrutiny. One may also refer to the EU’s troubled approach towards 
socio-economic rights which may be the reason why the EU pushes to accede to the ECHR but largely 
ignores the European Social Charter. Nevertheless, since the EU’s accession to the ECHR has been 
halted with the Opinion 2/13, there appears to be some new momentum for accession to other 
Council of Europe conventions.  
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(2) The role of the ECHR and of the European Social Charter 
in the EU legal order 
The Council of Europe counts among its core human rights instruments the ECHR, which focuses on 
civil and political rights, and the European Social Charter, which focuses on socio-economic rights. The 
EU is a party to neither. Yet, whereas the ECHR has played a central role in the development of 
fundamental rights protection in the EU and is widely referred to in EU law and the case law of the 
CJEU, the European Social Charter has so far been mostly ignored.  
EU primary law referred for the first time to the ECHR and the ESC in the Single European Act (1986). 
The preamble confirmed the determination of the EC Member States to ’to work together to promote 
democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights recognized in the constitutions and laws of the 
Member States, in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and the European Social Charter‘. Noticeably, the provision does not distinguish between the ESC and 
the ECHR, but refers to them equally. The position of the reference in the preamble, however, meant 
that the legal value was limited. 
In the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the reference to the ECHR moved into the operative part, where art. 
F(2) enshrined the ECHR as forming part of the general principles of EU law: ’the Union shall respect 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law‘. The 
reference to the ESC, on the contrary, was dropped entirely. 
After the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the ESC reappeared in the TEU and the TEC, 
albeit with a comparatively limited scope. The TEU, which continued to refer to the ECHR as being part 
of the guiding principles of EC law, only made a reference to the European Social Charter in its 
preamble. The TEC referred to the ESC in art. 136, which sets out the objectives of European social 
policy, ’having in mind fundamental social rights such as those set out in the European Social Charter 
signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social 
Rights of Workers‘. The provision identifies the ESC as a source of inspiration for EU social policy, 
without however binding the EU legislator to observe it.256 Furthermore, the ESC is mentioned in the 
same breath with the 1989 Community Charter – a non-binding EC document, which contains social 
rights for workers, although with a narrower scope than the ESC. It has been considered as an 
indication for the ’lack of commitment among at least some of the Member States to the protection 
of such rights at the EU level’.257 
Today, the TEU not only refers to the ECHR in the context of the general principles of EU law (art. 6(3) 
TEU), but also commits the EU to accede to the Convention (art. 6(2) TEU). The references to the ESC, 
on the other hand, have remained unchanged, in the preamble of the TEU and art. 151 TFEU (ex art. 
136 TEC). It is noticeable that the treaties neither envisage an accession of the EU to the ESC, nor do 
they explicitly consider the ESC to inform the Union’s general principles of law. 
The discrepancy is also apparent in the CFR. The preamble refers to both the ECHR and the ECJ: 
                                                          
256 See: Olivier De Schutter, ‘The European Social Charter in the context of implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights’ (Europea Parliament 2016) 13. 
257 Urfan Khaliq, ‘The EU and the European Social Charter: Never the Twain Shall Meet?’, in Catherine Barnard and others 
(eds) The Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol 15 (Hart 2013) 175. 
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This Charter reaffirms, […], the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional 
traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty on 
European Union, the Community Treaties, the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Community 
and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities and of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Again, the ESC is mentioned together with the non-binding and considerably narrower Community 
Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. The Charter contains a number of provisions 
concerning socio-economic rights, which, according to the Explanations Relating to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, have been based on the ESC (table 5).258 
Table 4 Articles of the CFREU which draw on the ESC 
Article 15 
CFR 
Freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage 
in work 
Article 1(2) ESC 
Article 19(4) ESC 
Article 23 
CFR 
Equality between women and men Article 20 ESC (revised) 
Article 25 
CFR 
The rights of the elderly Article 23 ESC (revised) 
Article 26 
CFR 
Integration of persons with disabilities Article 15 ESC 
Article 27 
CFR 
Workers' right to information and consultation within 
the undertaking 
Article 21 ESC 
Article 28 
CFR 
Right of collective bargaining and action Article 6 ESC 
Article 29 
CFR 
Right of access to placement services Article 1(3) ESC 
Article 31 
CFR 
Fair and just working conditions Article 2 ESC 
Article 32 
CFR 
Prohibition of child labour and protection of young 
people at work 
Article 7 ESC 
Article 33 
CFR 
Family and professional life Article 16 ESC 
Article 8 ESC 
Article 27 ESC (revised) 
Article 34 
CFR 
Social security and social assistance Article 12 ESC 
Article 13 ESC 
Article 30 ESC (revised) 
                                                          
258 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ [2007] C 303/17. 
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Article 31 ESC (revised) 
Article 35 
CFR 
Health care Article 11 ESC 
Article 13 ESC 
Whereas the ESC appears to have informed the CFREU to a considerable extent, the CFREU’s 
provisions on the scope and interpretation of the rights, again confirm however the double standard. 
Article 52 CFREU provides: 
In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and 
scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. 
Whereas the provisions of the CFREU may not be interpreted more restrictively than the 
corresponding provisions in the ECHR, a similar reference to the ESC is missing. Similarly, art. 53 CFREU 
provides: 
Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union 
law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union, the 
Community or all the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States' 
constitutions. 
Again, the CFREU makes an explicit reference to the ECHR but omits the ESC. Although the CFREU 
protects a range of socio-economic rights that draw on the ESC, the consequence is that the scope of 
protection for those rights is less rigorous than for the civil and political rights protected by both the 
CFREU and the ECHR.  
The central role of the ECHR in the development of fundamental rights protection through the case 
law of the European Court of Justice has already been highlighted above. The ESC has so far not played 
a similar role in the case law of the Court. It has been observed, that the Court only refers rarely to 
the ESC and even if it does, the ESC has so far not played a substantive role in any decision. As Khaliq 
has observed, ‘[t]he ESC has not, in any case, materially influenced the reasoning of the CJEU‘.259 
Whereas the Court has relied on the ECHR as a source for the development of general principles of 
law in line with art. 6(3) TEU, it has largely ignored the ESC in this respect.260  
This distinction between civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural 
rights on the other, contradicts the Union’s commitment to the indivisibility of human rights.261 Not 
only does it render the EU externally vulnerable to the criticism of double standards, it also creates 
internal incoherence between the obligations that the EU Member States have under EU law and 
those that they have under the ESC.262 It should be explored how the EU could align the roles of the 
ECHR and of the ESC in its legal order. This could include acceding to the ESC, but also granting the ESC 
the same role in the case law of the European Court of Justice than the ECHR plays. 
 
                                                          
259 Khaliq, supra (fn 257) 176. 
260 De Schutter, supra (fn 256) 13. 
261 See for example TEU art. 21(1). 
262 See supra (fn 93), 67 et seq. 
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d) A new momentum for ratification? 
Although there appears to be no momentum for the accession to the ESC, or indeed strengthening 
the status of the ESC in the EU legal order at all, there have been a few initiatives recently to accede 
to other instruments of the Council of Europe. Up until 2014, the EU’s priorities for the cooperation 
with the Council of Europe focused exclusively on the Union’s accession to the ECHR.263 Accession to 
other human rights instruments of the Council of Europe did not appear to play a major role in the 
strategy of the EU. When, however, the European Court of Justice halted the EU’s accession to the 
ECHR on 18 December 2014, this strategy needed to be reconsidered. In the introduction the 2016-
2017 EU priorities state: 
[…] the EU's political commitment to the CoE’s convention system is strong. The EU should 
therefore strengthen its commitment to accede to a number of selected conventions and 
these priorities identify a number of such conventions.264 
In the subsequent thematic priorities, four conventions were identified as goals for eventual EU 
accession: 
 Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (as a long term objective) 
 Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse  
 Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence 
(Istanbul Convention) 
 Convention on data protection.265 
With regard to the Istanbul Convention the first steps have been taken. On 4 March 2016, the 
Commission published a proposal for a Council Decision on the signing of the convention.266 It states: 
The signing of the Convention would send a strong political message about the EU’s 
commitment to combating violence against women, create coherence between its internal 
and external action, as well as complementarity between national and EU levels, and reinforce 
its credibility and accountability towards its international partners. It would also consolidate 
the EU’s action targeting violence against women by achieving a more coordinated approach 
internally and giving it a more effective role in international fora.267 
The remainder of the proposal provides information about the background and content of the 
convention, and identifies the legal basis for the accession by the EU. The proposal was discussed by 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 11 March 2016.268  
                                                          
263 Council of the EU, ‘EU Priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe in 2012-2013’, 25 July 2012, Doc No 12898/12; 
Council of the EU, ‘EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe in 2014-2015’, 19 November 2013, Doc No 
16444/13. 
264 Council of the EU, ‘EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe in 2016-2017’, 18 January 2016, Doc No 
5339/16. 
265 See Supra. 
266 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Council of 
Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence’, COM(2016) 111 final, 4 
March 2016. 
267 Supra, para 1.3. 
268 Provisional agenda, 3455th meeting of the Council of the European Union (Justice and Home Affairs), Doc No 6757/16, 9 
March 2016. 
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The EU’s accession to the Istanbul Convention would contribute considerably to strengthening the 
coherence in the EU’s approach to human rights. Firstly, it would demonstrate that the EU does not 
hold partner countries and potential accession candidates to higher standards than it is itself willing 
to observe. The criticism of ’EU exceptionalism‘ and of maintaining a double standard between its 
internal and external human rights promotion weakens the EU’s external perception as a human rights 
advocate. Secondly, the Convention would become part of Union law and thus directly applicable to 
the EU Member States, even to those who have not yet signed or ratified the Convention, thereby 
strengthening coherence among the Member States. The EU institutions would be bound to observe 
the Convention, and the European Court of Justice would have jurisdiction over the Convention to the 
extent that it falls under Union competence, thereby strengthening coherence in its interpretation. 
Finally, the EU would be subjected to the external monitoring of the Group of experts on action against 
violence against women and domestic violence (‘GREVIO‘). This would avoid incoherencies between 
the EU and its Member States and ensure a high level of protection by the EU. 
Proposals for the ratification of the other four Conventions have not progressed that far. However, 
the ratification of the Istanbul Convention could be the first step towards strengthening the impact of 
Council of Europe legal instruments on the EU legal order. The benefits for the coherence of EU human 
rights law and policy will be significant. 
 
e) Information exchange  
As stated above, the Council of Europe has acquired a particularly broad range of expertise and 
information on a variety of policy matters with relevance for EU human rights policies. By providing 
information, knowledge and expertise to the EU, the Council of Europe can exercise direct influence 
on the EU human rights policies. It has been argued that the European Commission, as a ’transnational 
expertocracy‘269 is particularly dependent on information and expertise when exercising its mandate. 
Using external sources, such as for example from the Council of Europe, is not only less cost and time 
intensive, it may also increase the legitimacy of the Commission’s actions.270  
Schumacher observed this relationship between the EU and the Council of Europe in the context of 
the EU’s neighbourhood policy.271 When the ENP was launched in 2004, the European Commission 
lacked the necessary experience in the thematic and geographic area. It consequently relied heavily 
on the expertise of the Council of Europe, which had closely followed the democratic reform processes 
in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War. This was not only easier and cheaper, but also 
strengthened the legitimacy of the EU’s policy. Instead of imposing (external) EU legal standards on 
the Eastern partners, it relied on the standards of the Council of Europe, to which the partner countries 
had committed.  
This information exchange can take multiple channels. Meetings between EU and Council of Europe 
officials take place regularly and at all levels. Council of Europe representatives are invited to sessions 
of COHOM and COSCE, they meet with the HR/VP, with the EUSR, and with representatives of the 
Commission, and engage with the European Parliament. Members of the EU Delegation to the Council 
of Europe in Strasbourg regularly attend sessions at the Council of Europe, including for example the 
                                                          
269 Schumacher, supra (fn 227) 189 citing Maurizio Bach, Die Bürokratisierung Europas. Verwaltungseliten, Experten, und 
politische Legitimation in Europa (Campus Verlag 1999). 
270 Supra, 190. 
271 Supra, 190 et seq. 
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meetings which address the compliance with judgments of the ECtHR.272 The Council of Europe 
regularly organizes training sessions for the staff of the EEAS on a range of topics in the areas of human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law.273 
The EU relies in particular on the expertise of Council of Europe treaty and resolution based monitoring 
mechanisms. The Council Regulation concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital 
punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, for example, 
provides that the decision whether or not to grant an export authorisations shall take into account the 
reports of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment and Punishment (CPT).274 References to the CPT can be found in a variety of Council 
Decisions on accession partnerships, for example with Bulgaria, Macedonia and Turkey. Repeatedly 
the Council requested the accession candidates to ensure the implementations of the 
recommendations made by the CPT.275 As stipulated in the EU’s Human Rights Guidelines, it relies on 
the recommendations of the CPT more generally in its external human rights policies, certainly in the 
fight against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment,276 but also in the promotion of LGBTI 
rights.277 Similarly, the EU ensures close relations with the Group of Experts on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA). GRETA members regularly participate in meetings, consultations 
and conferences organized by EU institutions, for example the meetings of National Rapporteurs and 
Equivalent Mechanisms.278 The Group of States against corruption (GRECO) has for example been 
consulted by the EEAS for the preparation of European Union progress reports on the implementation 
of European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans.279 
Reliance is particularly strong on the case law of the ECtHR and the expertise of the Venice 
Commission.  
 
f) Conclusions 
While the influence of the EU in international institutions has received a lot of scholarly attention, the 
influence of international organisations on the EU is often overlooked. Although being sometimes 
perceived as the ’weaker‘ of the two institutions, the Council of Europe impacts considerably on EU 
human rights laws and policies. Through the adoption of legal standards and the provision of 
information and expertise, the Council of Europe has a number of direct channels of influence at its 
disposal, through which it can shape EU policy-making. Impact is strongest when the EU ratifies legal 
                                                          
272 Council of Europe, Directorate of External Relations, ‘Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Council of Europe and the European Union: Overview of Activities (1 January-31 December 2011), Doc No 
DER/INF(2012)3 REV, 14 June 2012. 
273 Supra. 
274 Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 of 27 June 2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital 
punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, art 6(2). 
275 See only Council Decision 2008/157/EC of 18 February 2008 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey and repealing Decision 2006/35/EC; Council Decision 2008/212/EC of 18 
February 2008 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and repealing Decision 2006/57/EC; Council Decision 2003/396/EC of 19 May 2003 on the principles, 
priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Bulgaria. 
276 Council of the European Union, ‘Guidelines to EU Policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, Doc No 6129/1/12 REV1, 20 March 2012. 
277 Council of the European Union, ‘Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons’, 24 June 2013. 
278 Supra (fn 273). 
279 Supra. 
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instruments of the Council of Europe, but even beyond that the EU has tended to draw on the 
conventions of the Council of Europe as a source of inspiration for its own legal framework, and as an 
indication for the guiding principles of EU law. It is noticeable that the EU has so far only acceded to a 
very few Council of Europe conventions, although more than 50 are open to EU participation. The 
exclusive focus on the Union’s accession to the ECHR has been partially redirected after the European 
Court of Justice issued its Opinion 2/13. Now, accession to other conventions, in particular in the areas 
of trafficking of human beings, children’s rights, data protection and women’s rights is being 
considered. A concrete proposal for signing the Istanbul Convention has most recently been published 
by the European Commission. Unfortunately, this progress can above all be witnessed in the area of 
civil and political rights, while economic, social and cultural rights continue to take second place in the 
EU. Particularly the different treatment of the ECHR and the ESC is striking, although the Turin process 
may generate new political momentum.280 The Council of Europe does not only impact on EU human 
rights law and policy through the adoption of legal standards, but also by providing information and 
expertise. The European Commission relies heavily on knowledge provided by external sources, acting 
like a ’hunter and gatherer‘ for information.281 Building on information provided by the Council of 
Europe is not only more convenient in terms of cost and time for the European Commission, it also 
adds legitimacy to its action. Close exchanges between officials of both institutions on all levels, 
training provided to EEAS staff by the Council of Europe, and the use of the recommendations made 
by the Council of Europe’s monitoring bodies all contribute to strengthening the Council of Europe’s 
impact on the EU. More research is needed in order to identify information streams and measure the 
impact.  
 
 
 The EU and the European Convention on Human Rights - the legal 
commitments  
a) Introduction 
The process of rapprochement of the European Union and the Council of Europe has been going on 
almost since the establishment of the two organisations or their predecessors. The process has thus a 
long history and on different stages, it resulted in various common engagements. Different aspects 
and dimensions of this cooperation are being examined throughout this whole deliverable. In this 
chapter the attention will be focused on the rapprochement of the EU and the central CoE’s human 
rights protection mechanism, which is the system of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,282 commonly known as the European Convention on Human 
Rights (further: Convention or ECHR) in its formal aspect, namely the accession of the EU to the 
Convention.  
In this regard the EU has found itself at the moment in a puzzling situation. On the one hand it is 
obliged to accede to the Convention by its own primary law (art. 6(2) Treaty on European Union283; 
further TEU) and the Convention has been amended in order to allow that (with adoption of Protocol 
                                                          
280 See above ch II.A.5. 
281 Schumacher, supra (fn 227) 190. 
282 See supra (fn 29).  
283 Treaty on European Union from 7 February 1992, OJ C 191 from 29 July 1992. 
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14284) as well as further, necessary instruments have been agreed on in the Draft Accession 
Agreement285 (further: DAA), yet on the other hand the EU cannot accede to the Convention, at least 
on the terms so far agreed (in the DAA) due to the opinion issued by the CJEU which stated that the 
conditions agreed on in the DAA are not compatible with the EU law. 286  
A brief summary and analysis of the current situation regarding the process of the EU accession to the 
Convention will be provided in this chapter. In order to do so firstly, some background information on 
the history of the process will be presented. Secondly, a brief summary of the current legal and 
political situation will be provided. It will be followed by an assessment of the current state of the 
matter and with some comments on the perspectives on the future of the accession. 
 
b) Background 
(1) The EU 
The idea of incorporating the Convention into the European Communities legal order dates back as 
early as to the first half of the 50’s of the twentieth century, hence to the very beginning of the 
European integration, which led to the development of the EU. This idea found its expression for the 
first time in the European Political Community treaty (further: EPC), which was drafted in 1953.287 The 
EPC has however never entered into force and the idea has been abandoned for a longer while. The 
three founding treaties,288 on which the ECs were finally based, were all absent from any reference to 
human rights, not to even mention any direct reference to the Convention. ’Designed in that mode, 
the EEC treaty system provoked numerous claims — both academic and practical — as to the political 
accountability and constitutional legitimacy. The raison d’etre of the initial construction of the EEC 
was to provide for economic integration of then Member States, therefore, went the argument, there 
was no need to surpass into the territory of political issues, such as human rights law‘.289 As some have 
argued, on the issue of human rights the EU and CoE became twins separated at birth.290 The process 
of their full reunion showed up to be turbulent.  
The idea resurfaced in official documents in 1976 when the European Commission examined it in its 
report to the European Parliament and to the Council.291 The issue has however been abandoned 
                                                          
284 Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control 
system of the Convention, 14 May 2004, CEST no. 194. 
285 Fifth Negotiation Meeting Between the CDDH Ad Hoc Negotiation Group and The European Commission On the Accession 
of the European Union to The European Convention On Human Rights. Final report to the CDDH, 47+1(2013)008rev2, 10 
June 2013. 
286 Opinion 2/13 pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU — Draft international agreement — Accession of the European Union to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms — Compatibility of the draft 
agreement with the EU and FEU Treaties from 18 December 2014. 
287 Griaenne de Búrca, ‘The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global Human Rights Actor’ (2011) 105 American 
Journal of International Law 4. 
288 Namely the: Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community from 18 April 1951; Treaty Establishing the 
European Economic Community from 25 March 1957; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community from 25 
March 1957. 
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(2000-2001) 46 McGill Law Journal. 
291 The protection of fundamental rights as Community law is created and developed. Report of the Commission submitted 
to the European Parliament and the Council, COM (76) 37 final, 4 February 1976. Bulletin of the European Community, 
Supplement 5/76 5-16. 
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again. Nota bene at that time even the Commission did not consider it necessary for the Community 
to become a party to the Convention. The situation changed in 1979, when the Commission in its 
memorandum292 clearly stated that the best way to enhance the human rights protection within the 
EC would lead through formal accession to the Convention. In this document the Commission 
examined theoretical and practical dimensions of such a step and despite some serious obstacles, 
which in its opinion were not impossible to overcome, recommended formal accession of the EC to 
the Convention. The proposition has been well received especially by the European Parliament293 but 
not only. It did not however result in any instant actions towards accession. The Commission reiterated 
its position in 1990 and requested the Council both, for approval for the accession to the ECHR as well 
as for authorisation to negotiate the matter according to negotiating directives, which the Commission 
attached to its communication.294 
After the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993295 the Council decided to verify whether 
the accession was at all legally possible and requested the ECJ for an opinion on the matter. The 
opinion296 was issued on 28 of March 1996. The Court stated in it that the accession was not possible 
on the basis of the Community law as it stood at the time. Nota bene at this point accession was more 
of a hypothetical question as the EC had not yet even begun negotiations on the accession. The Court 
was clearly uncomfortable answering such a question in the abstract stating:  
’the Court has been given no detailed information as to the solutions that are envisaged to 
give effect in practice to such submission of the Community to the jurisdiction of an 
international court. It follows that the Court is not in a position to give its opinion on the 
compatibility of Community accession to the Convention with the rules of the Treaty’.297 
The CJEU noted that accession would involve a ’substantial change to the present system for the 
protection of human rights‘, which would be of ’constitutional significance‘ to the Community.298 The 
treaty did not provide for ’any general power to enact rules on human rights‘299 and the residual power 
to negotiate treaties, at that time set out in art. 235,300 was insufficient to negotiate a change of such 
significance.301 The CJEU therefore concluded that the European Community did not have competence 
to accede to the Convention. It became thus clear, that the EU could not accede to the Convention 
without amending the EU law and providing the Union with such a competence. 
Proposal to do so was made by Finland in 2000 in the process of the EU law reform taking place at that 
time. The proposal was aimed at changing at that time art. 303 of the EC by adding to it a provision 
                                                          
292 Memorandum on the accession of the European Communities to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. COM (79) 210 final, 2 May 1979. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/79. 
293 European Parliament, Resolution of 22 October 1982 embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the 
memorandum of the Commission of the European Communities on the accession of the European Communities to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, OJ C 304. 
294 European Commission Communication on Community accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and some of its Protocols. SEC (90) 2087 final, 19 November 1990. 
295 Treaty on European Union from 7 February 1992, OJ C 191. 
296 Opinion 2/94 pursuant to Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty (Accession by the Community to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) from 28 March 1996. 
297 Supra, para 21-22. 
298 Supra, para 34. 
299 Supra, para 27. 
300 Now in the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/01, art. 352(1). 
301 Supra (fn 296) para 35. 
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providing the EU with competence to accede the Convention.302 Nevertheless, finally the reform of 
the EU law introduced with the Treaty of Nice303 did not include such a provision, hence the accession 
remained legally impossible. Appropriate provision found its place in art. I-9 in the final version of the 
Constitutional Treaty.304 The treaty however never entered into force. The situation has finally 
changed when it comes to the EU’s competence to accede to the Convention on 1 December 2009, 
with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon305 (further: TL), which provided the EU law with the 
express legal basis for the accession. As it will be explained later, after the TL reform, the EU not only 
did become competent to accede to the Convention, but also it became bound to do so. 
Shortly after entry into force of the TL, on 11 December 2009, the European Council adopted the so-
called Stockholm Programme. The Programme stressed inter alia that: ’After the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, the rapid accession of the Union to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is of key importance‘.306 Nota bene the Programme was 
aimed to cover four-years perspective (2010-2014).307 
 
(2) The CoE 
When it comes to the Council of Europe, the idea of the accession has been welcomed by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (further: Parliamentary Assembly or PACE) at least 
since 1981, when it issued its favourable resolution on the matter.308 In 2002 the Steering Committee 
for Human Rights (CDDH) of the Council of Europe prepared a study, in which it went through technical 
and legal issues concerning the EU joining the Convention.309 The study reflected the fact that the EU 
is a sui generis international organisation. It also noted that due to the scope of the EU’s competences 
and the organisation’s supranational character the accession might not be an easy process. The study 
took under consideration as well the necessity of the Convention and CoE system adjustments in order 
to accommodate the fact of the EU becoming a party to it.  
The emergence of the obligation on the side of the EU to join the Convention after the TL was 
positively noted by the PACE.310 Regardless of the political favour, the legal system of the Convention 
was not ready for an accession. The same as the EU law it needed to be amended in order the EU 
could join the ECHR. Such a fundamental change has been introduced by additional Protocol no. 14 to 
the Convention. The Protocol was an important step in the process of the reform of the Convention 
system and it introduced many significant procedural changes to the system of the Convention, which 
however did not relate to accession, hence remain out of the scope of this analysis.311 The process of 
ratification of the Protocol has been rather lengthy. This did not necessarily had to do only with the 
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question of the EU’s accession to the convention, but also with the depth and scope of Convention 
system reform, which the Protocol introduced.312 One should however bear in mind the attitude of 
Russia towards the Protocol, which refused to ratify it over an extended period of time, which in effect 
was obstructing both – elimination of the main obstacle on the side of the CoE for the EU’s accession 
to the Convention as well as internal reform of the Convention system aimed at increasing its 
effectiveness.313 The Protocol was opened for signatures on 13 of May 2004 and entered into force on 
1 June 2010 after being finally ratified by all the parties to the Convention, which was a condition for 
its entry into force. However, the adoption of Protocol 14 was only half the battle. Protocol 14 did not 
settle many of the substantive issues posed by EU accession (like possibility on the side of the EU to 
elect a judge or to participate in the Committee of Ministers of the CoE in its activities related to 
implementation of the Convention) because, at the time it was drafted, the EU did not have 
competence to negotiate the terms of its accession. On 26 of May 2010 the Committee of Ministers 
of the CoE (further: CoM) provided the CDDH with ad hoc terms of reference for the CDDH to 
elaborate, in co-operation with representative(s) of the EU on the details of the accession.314 
 
(3) The EU and the CoE 
The question of accession inevitably required cooperation between the two organisations, hence it 
has been a matter the EU and CoE common activities. They took place along other common 
endeavours of the two institutions which are examined in other parts of this deliverable. In May 2005 
the CoE Warsaw Summit (of Heads of State and Government), which ’gave the impetus for the 
reconstruction of the relations between the COE and the EU‘,315 inter alia invited then Prime Minister 
of Luxembourg Jean-Claude Juncker to prepare a report on how the two organisations could better 
cooperate. The report316 to the Parliamentary Assembly, among other proposals of enhancing the 
cooperation between the EU and CoE especially in the field of human rights, advocated also for the 
EU’s accession to the Convention. It all led to the development of the Memorandum of understanding 
between the CoE and the EU, which covered many aspects of cooperation between the two 
organisations.317 The memorandum stated that: ’Early accession of the European Union to the 
Convention for The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms would contribute greatly 
to coherence in the field of human rights in Europe. The Council of Europe and the European Union 
will examine this further’.318 
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c) Legal basis for the Accession and the status of the Convention 
in the EU law 
(1) The EU – legal basis for the accession 
This long political process in which the CoE as well as the EU have concluded on the need of accession, 
led both sides to undertake legal steps and adjust their respective legal systems so that the accession 
was formally possible. As it has been said, that demanded both – EU law amendment as well as 
adjustment of the text of the Convention. 
 
(a) The Treaty of Lisbon 
After the Treaty of Lisbon art. 6(2) of the TEU states as follows: 
’The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined 
in the Treaties.’ 
From the wording of the article it is clear that the EU is legally bound to accede to the Convention 
(Union shall accede). It is not therefore anymore a matter of a political decision if the Union joins the 
Convention or not.319 What is the matter of a decision though, are the conditions on which it is going 
to happen. Art. 6(2) underlines that the accession may not interfere with the competences of the 
Union. According to this article, not only is the EU obliged to join the Convention but also some 
conditions for accession are put forward. Moreover, the treaty has been supplemented with some 
other, express frames, which the final terms of accession must meet, which are going to be addressed 
below. 
After the TL also some procedural aspects of the accession have been clarified, which included 
establishment of an obligation of the Council to act unanimously on the matter320, a demand of a 
consent of the European Parliament before the Council adopts the decision concluding the agreement 
as well as of a demand of approval by the EU member-states of the Council’s decision concluding the 
agreement for it to enter into force (see: current art. 218 TFEU321). 
 
(b) Protocol no. 8 
In relation to the mentioned above art. 6(2) a special protocol322 has been added to the TL and hence 
has an equal legal status to it. The protocol states as follows: 
‘(Article 1) The agreement relating to the accession of the Union to the European Convention 
on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the 
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‘European Convention’) provided for in Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union shall 
make provision for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union law, in 
particular with regard to: 
(a) the specific arrangements for the Union's possible participation in the control bodies 
of the European Convention; 
(b) the mechanisms necessary to ensure that proceedings by non-Member States and 
individual applications are correctly addressed to Member States and/or the Union as 
appropriate. 
(Article 2) The agreement referred to in Article 1 shall ensure that accession of the Union shall 
not affect the competences of the Union or the powers of its institutions. It shall ensure that 
nothing therein affects the situation of Member States in relation to the European 
Convention, in particular in relation to the Protocols thereto, measures taken by Member 
States derogating from the European Convention in accordance with Article 15 thereof and 
reservations to the European Convention made by Member States in accordance with Article 
57 thereof. 
(Article 3) Nothing in the agreement referred to in Article 1 shall affect Article 344 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union.’ 
The protocol underlines in a little more detailed way than art. 6(2) TEU the conditions for future 
accession of the EU to the Convention. It reiterates that that the accession needs to be based on such 
rules, which are in accordance with the EU law and EU’s specificity as a sui generis organisation. It all 
needs to be reflected in the accession agreement also for that the EU can fully participate in the 
Convention system as well as for it to be well distinguished from its MS when it comes to responsibility 
for protection of the rights guaranteed in the Convention. Special attention is put to the competences 
of the EU and powers of its institutions, which cannot be affected by the accession. Moreover, the 
accession cannot influence the legal situation of the EU MS in relation to the Convention together with 
the additional protocols to it. Finally, Protocol no. 8 also underlines the importance of the EU member-
states obligation not to submit any possible disputes concerning the interpretation or application of 
the EU law to any method of settlement other than those provided in the EU law. This last issue 
perhaps is however more of an internal issue of relation between the EU and its member-states after 
the accession.  
 
(c) Declaration no. 2 
The final act of the intergovernmental conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon has also been 
annexed with some declarations, one of which is also related to the art. 6(2). Declaration no. 2323 
states that: 
’The Conference agrees that the Union's accession to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms should be arranged in such a way as 
to preserve the specific features of Union law. In this connection, the Conference notes the 
existence of a regular dialogue between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the 
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European Court of Human Rights; such dialogue could be reinforced when the Union accedes 
to that Convention’. 
This declaration succinctly reinforces in political terms some of the points raised in the 
aforementioned Protocol no. 8 and art. 6(2) TEU itself. It also points out to a very important and 
delicate issue of the relationship between the ECtHR and the CJEU. The question of relations between 
the two courts as well as their mutual influence and cooperation is examined in a more detailed way 
in chapters II.E.2 and II.F of this report. 
 
(d) Summary 
The main consequence of the aforementioned regulations is that the EU can and is obliged to accede 
to the Convention. This obligation, however, is hedged around with some formal conditions regarding 
the procedure of concluding and entering into force of the agreement on the accession, which include 
demands of: 
1.) unanimity of the Council, 
2.) consent of the European Parliament, 
3.) approval of the EU member-states of the decision concluding the agreement. 
Even more importantly, according to the aforementioned regulations, the obligation of the EU to 
accede to the Conventions is hedged around with four main material conditions which have to be met 
by the agreement on accession, which can be summed up as follows: 
1.) it cannot infringe the EU’s competences nor influence powers of any of its institutions, 
2.) it has to respect the special characteristics of the EU and the EU law, 
3.) it has to respect the mechanisms of interpretation and application of the EU law, 
4.) it shall not affect the situation of the EU Member States in relation to the European Convention 
and its Protocols. 
 
(2) The EU – current status of the Convention in the EU law 
After entry into force of the TL not only did the EU become bound to accede to the Convention, but 
also the Convention has gained a special status within the EU legal system even though the Union is 
not yet a party to it. The fact that the Convention has been formally incorporated into the EU legal 
system intensified the ongoing interrelation between the two systems. 
Art. 6(3) TEU states that: 
’Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law.’ 
TL finally, after some years of uncertainty, introduced the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union324 (CFREU) to the legal system of the EU and placed it at the same level as the Treaties 
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hence gave it a status of primary law. The Charter was drafted by the European Convention, which 
was called to consolidate rights for the citizens of the EU and enshrine them in the EU law.325 The 
Charter was solemnly proclaimed on December 2000 by the European Parliament, the Council of 
Ministers and the European Commission. In order to gain an undoubted legal status in the EU law it 
had to wait though until entry into force of the TL, which introduced the new art. 6(1) to the TEU. Art. 
6(1) TEU states that:  
’The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 
12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.’ 
Already the Preamble to the CFREU states that: 
’This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Union and for the 
principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional 
traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social 
Charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union and of the European Court of Human Rights. (…)’ 
Further in art. 52(3) of the Charter regulates that: 
’In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and 
scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This 
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’ 
Finally, according to art. 53 of the Charter: 
’Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union 
law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union or all the 
Member States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States' constitutions.’ 
Moreover, the final act of the intergovernmental conference which adopted the TL has also been 
annexed with Declaration no. 1, which relates to the fundamental rights within the EU and to the 
Charter in relation to the Convention. The Declaration states that: 
’The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which has legally binding force, 
confirms the fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States. 
The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the 
Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined 
by the Treaties.’ 
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The abovementioned regulations and their consequences for the Union fundamental rights protection 
amounting to parallel to the accession dimension of legal rapprochement of the EU and Strasburg 
human rights protection system, in more details have been addressed in section concerning common 
human rights standards within the EU and the CoE (II.F) and relations between the CJEU and the ECtHR 
(II.F). What is important here is the fact, that despite the EU has not yet become a party to Convention, 
to do what it is bound since 2009, the Convention has already been expressly introduced to the EU 
legal system through the TEU and the CFREU, which intensifies the bond between the two regimes. 
After initial disregard, human rights with time have become one of the most significant areas of EU 
law.326 Together with that the significance of the Convention for the EU increased, which was reflected 
in the CJEU jurisprudence relating to the Convention.327 The ’Convention is not formally binding to the 
Union, but its provisions can and must be given effect as general principles of Union law‘.328 Especially 
after the TL the Convention is undoubtedly one of the sources for the EU fundamental rights law. The 
issue has been addressed in more details in section II.F of this report. 
The Charter became the EU’s basic document guarantying fundamental rights within the community 
and in a sense it is parallel to the Convention. Development of the Charter was preceded by the EU 
legal system becoming gradually human rights oriented mostly through long standing judicial activity 
of the Luxemburg Court.329 Adoption of the Charter as a document of the same legal value as the 
Treaties was one of the final steps in the process of strengthening human rights protection within the 
EU, which at its origins was outside the scope of the Communities. The Charter reaffirms the rights 
guaranteed in it within the scope they overlap with rights which result from the Convention and the 
way in which the latter have been interpreted by the ECtHR. Rights guaranteed by the Charter, which 
correspond with rights guaranteed in the Convention according to the Charter shall have the same 
scope as they have on the basis of the Convention, except only if the EU would provide more extensive 
protection to those rights. 
Nevertheless, just after the development of the Charter and long before the TL, already in 2000 Luzius 
Wildhaber, President of the ECtHR at that time, expressed a not uncommon concern when he 
addressed the EU initiatives to draw up its human rights charter and to accede to the Convention by 
stating that creating ‘alternative, competing and potentially conflicting systems of human rights 
protection both within the Union and in the greater Europe (…) runs the risk of weakening the overall 
protection offered and undermining legal certainty in this field‘.330 Such a threat seems to be more 
feasible without completing the integration of the two systems through the EU’s accession to the 
Convention. 
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(3) The CoE – legal basis for the accession 
The question of possibility of accession of a new party to the Convention has been regulated in its art. 
59. Initially, this article formulated two conditions, which had to be met by the prospective party to 
the Convention for it to actually accede to the treaty. The first condition was that the party-to-be to 
the Convention was a member of the CoE. The second condition was that it properly deposited its 
instruments of ratification of the Convention. Art. 4 of the Statute of the CoE331 has always made it 
clear that only states may become members of this organisation, hence due to the first condition from 
art. 59 of the Convention, only state actors could become parties to the Convention. 
The Protocol 14 to the Convention added to art. 59 of the Convention a new paragraph 2, which reads 
that: ‘The European Union may accede to this Convention’. By doing so, it created an exception for 
the EU, which can accede to the Convention even without becoming a party to the CoE, which it cannot 
do, as it is not a state. That solves the essential obstacle on the part of the CoE for the accession. 
Nevertheless, that does not solve some other difficulties relating to different aspects of functioning of 
the system of the Convention, especially relating to functioning of the control bodies of the 
Convention, which are rooted in the institutions of the CoE. As the EU is as not a member of the CoE 
it could not participate in them and thus would be excluded from some important activities that all 
the other parties to the Convention undertake and which are necessary for full participation in the 
ECHR human rights protection system (i.e. especially issues like the appointment of judges to the 
ECtHR and participation in CoM activities regarding implementation of the Convention). Even after 
adoption of Protocol 14 those issues demanded further arrangements and adjustments, which would 
reflect the particular character of the EU as a non-state party to the Convention and needed to be 
reflected in the detailed instruments of the accession agreed on by the both sides. 
 
d) Summary 
With the entry into force of the TL the process of the EU’s accession to the Convention has reached, 
at least on the side of the EU, a point of no return.332 The Union is obliged to join the Convention. It 
cannot do it however in a way which would turn out to be contrary to its laws and to its characteristics 
set forth in the treaties on which the Union is based. Crucial conditions which have to be met by the 
terms on which the accession will be based result from EU law and the specificity of EU as a sui generis 
organisation. The EU in order to become a fully-fledged member of the ECHR system needs also to 
gain the possibility to fully participate in this system and its institutions, hence also in those activities, 
which are so far accessible only to state-parties to the Convention, which are at the same time parties 
to the CoE and its institutions.  
The aforementioned provisions make the accession possible, oblige the EU to accede to the 
Convention, as well as set forth main conditions for the accession. The changes introduced to the EU 
legal system with the TL as well as the changes introduced to the Convention system by the Protocol 
14 were necessary for the accession to happen, nevertheless they were not sufficient for it to happen. 
                                                          
331 Statute of the Council of Europe from 5 May 1949, CETS no. 1. 
332 Alexander Kornezow, ‘The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Light of the EU Accession to the ECHR – Is the 
Break-up Inevitable?’ in Catherine Barnard, Albertina Albors-Llorens, Markus W. Gehring, Robert Schutze (eds) Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies vol. 15 (Hart Publishing 2012-2013) 251. 
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What was necessary were further negotiations between the both sides aimed at developing detailed 
instruments of accession. 
 
 Negotiations concerning the Draft Accession Agreement and the 
CJEU opinion 2/13 and their perspectives 
 
a) Negotiations on the EU’s Accession to the ECHR 
Such negotiations were an unprecedented endeavour. So far, the process of accession to the 
Convention was rather similar to application to the system, based on fulfilling by the candidate 
conditions imposed by the Convention. There was no room for negotiations as all the parties to the 
Convention were states and thus were similar to each other. With respect to the EU, due to its 
international character and the fact that it comprises of states, which are already parties to the 
Convection, which had to be reflected in its later functioning as a party to the Convention, the situation 
was different. 
 
(1) Background and Preparations for the Negotiations 
On 17 March 2010 the Commission presented to the Council its negotiating recommendations333. On 
19 May 2010 the European Parliament adopted a resolution334 on the matter in which it highlighted 
inter alia main arguments in favour of the accession. In short, according to the resolution, the 
accession:  
1.) is a move forward in the process of European integration,  
2.) will send a strong signal concerning the coherence between the Union and the countries 
belonging to the CoE and its pan-European human rights system, which will also enhance the 
credibility of the Union,  
3.) will afford citizens protection against the action of the Union similar to that which they already 
enjoy against action by all its Member States,  
4.) will create an integral system of human rights protection, in which the CJEU and ECtHR will 
function in synchrony,  
5.) will also compensate to some extent for the fact that the scope of CJEU is somewhat 
constrained in the matters of foreign and security policy and police and security policy by 
providing useful external judicial supervision of all EU activities.335 
                                                          
333 Council of the European Union, Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the Commission to negotiate the 
Accession Agreement of the European Union to the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 7668/10. 
334 European Parliament resolution of 19 May 2010 on the institutional aspects of the accession of the European Union to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2009/2241 (INI). 
335 Supra, para K(1). 
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Shortly after entry into force of the Protocol 14, on 4 June 2010, the Council of the EU adopted its 
negotiating mandate.336 It nominated the European Commission to negotiate on behalf of the EU. The 
Commission were to conduct the negotiations in consultation with the Working Party on Fundamental 
Rights, Citizens Rights and Free Movement of Persons (FREMP), as the special committee appointed 
by the Council, in accordance with art. 218 (4) TFEU. The decision was annexed (Annex II337) with 
negotiating directives. The directives demanded that the effect of the negotiations ensured that:  
1.) the EU or its member-states competences are not affected, 
2.) powers of the EU institutions, offices or agencies including the CJEU are not affected,  
3.) substantive and procedural features of the system of the Convention should be preserved to 
the largest extent possible,  
4.) the EU member-states obligations under the Conventions are not affected, 
5.) the CoE bodies applying the Convention are not called upon to interpret (even implicitly or 
incidentally) the EU law,  
6.) equal status of the EU within the Convention system including participation in the ECtHR (i.e. 
equal status of the EU judge) as well as in the other CoE bodies activities (including CoM and 
PACE),  
7.) the proceedings before the ECtHR properly involve member-states and/or the Union, as 
appropriate and that, if sufficient link with the EU law exists, Union should have the right to 
join the proceedings brought against its member-state as a co-respondent and vice versa.  
The necessity to develop the latter mechanism, which will be described in a little more detail later on, 
seems necessary due to complex relationship between the EU law and the EU member-states law, 
which might lead to uncertainty whether the EU or a member-state is responsible for introducing 
certain norm leading to Convention rights violations and thus to uncertainty over who is thus 
responsible for the violation. In Annex III338 the Council declared that parallel with the negotiations 
the Council will discuss binding internal rules setting up a co-respondent mechanism and determining 
in which cases the mechanism would be triggered. According to the Council, these internal rules 
should also establish a procedure for settling disagreements between the EU and its member-states 
arising in respect to the application of the co-respondent mechanism. These rules shall be adopted 
unanimously before the conclusion of the accession agreement of the European Union to the 
Convention. The annex mentions as well development of internal rules regarding prior involvement of 
the CJEU procedure. 
In the Final clause339 the Council reiterated that the accession agreement can enter into force only 
after the Council has taken a unanimous decision concluding the agreement, after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament and after having received the approval by the EU member-states, 
in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
                                                          
336 Council of the European Union, Council Decision authorising the Commission to negotiate the Accession Agreement of 
the European Union to the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 
10817/10. 
337 Supra. 
338 Supra. 
339 Supra. 
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The CJEU was also active in the process leading to the development of an agreement on the accession. 
In January 2010 the Permanent Representatives Committee, approved the participation, as an 
observer, of a delegate from the Court in the meetings of the FREMP, throughout the duration of the 
discussions on the draft recommendations for the opening of the negotiations for the accession of the 
EU to the ECHR.340 On 24 January 2011 Presidents of the CJEU and the ECtHR issued a joint 
communication341 in which they agreed that ‘The accession of the EU to the Convention constitutes a 
major step in the development of the protection of fundamental rights in Europe.’ They also 
underlined that in order for the principle of subsidiarity to be respected a procedure should be put in 
place, in connection with the accession of the EU to the Convention, which would ensure that the 
CJEU may carry out an internal review of the EU law before the ECHR carries out an external review 
(the question of the prior involvement mechanism). This question was also one of the central issues 
raised by the CJEU in its discussion document on the accession from 5th May 2010.342 
 
(2) The Negotiations 
As it has been said on 26 of May 2010 the CoM gave its mandate to negotiate the details of accession 
to the CDDH. The CDDH entrusted with this task the informal working group CDDH-EU. The group was 
composed of 14 experts from the CoE Member States (7 from EU member-states and 7 from non-EU 
Member States). It was agreed that the group together with the EU representative (the Commission) 
would draft instruments of the accession. The group therefore became the main working forum for 
the accession negotiations. It held eight meetings between July 2010 and June 2011, when its mandate 
ended. On 19 July 2011 draft of legal instruments on the accession343 has been delivered to the CDDH. 
Organized shortly after, on 14 October 2011, the CDDH meeting, contrary to expectations, was not 
conclusive in a sense that the draft agreement has not been accepted due to two of delegations doubts 
regarding some elements of the agreement. The CDDH transmitted its report to the Committee of 
Ministers on the work done by the CDDH-EU together with the not accepted draft legal instruments 
on accession in appendix.344 
On 27 April 2012, as a result to a discussion during the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA),345 the 
negotiations on the accession have been recommenced. On 13 June 2012, the CoM instructed346 the 
CDDH to pursue negotiations with the EU within the ad hoc group ‘47+1’ (47 CoM member-states and 
the representative of the EU – the Commission) in order to finalise agreement on draft legal 
instruments dealing with the accession modalities. The group held five meetings, which took place in 
Strasbourg. In the course of negotiations, the EU proposed many changes in relation to the previous 
                                                          
340 Council of the European Union, ‘I’ Item Note from Presidency to COREPER 17807/09 5 January 2010. 
341 Joint communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, Strasbourg and Luxembourg, 24 January 2011. 
342 Discussion document of the Court of Justice of the European Union on certain aspects of the accession of the European 
Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Luxembourg 5 May 
2010. 
343 8th Working Meeting of the CDDH Informal Working Group on the Accession of the European Union to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (CDDH-UE) with the European Commission, Draft legal instruments on the accession of the 
European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, CDDH-UE(2011)16 Final Version. 
344 Report to the Committee of Ministers on the elaboration of legal instruments for the accession of the European Union to 
the European Convention on Human Rights, CDDH(2011)009. 
345 Council of the European Union, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms (ECHR): = Exchange of views/Certain issues 8915/12, 3 June 2015. 
346 Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) ‘Report to the Committee of Ministers on the elaboration of legal 
instruments for the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
(CM/Del/Dec(2011)1126/4.1, CM(2011)149) 13 June 2012. 
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draft agreement. The issues raised concerned many of the covered by the previous agreement 
aspects.347 The non-EU countries were often sceptical to interferences in the draft agreement as it was 
drafted by the CDDH-EU. Fourteen of the non-EU countries after the third negotiations meeting 
expressed some of their concerns in a common paper from 21 January 2013,348 which was prepared 
for the fourth meeting. The fourteen states underlined especially the necessity of preserving the 
nature, the integrity and the effectiveness of the Convention and respect for the values and traditions 
of the CoE as well as of equal footing between the EU and other parties to the Convention and of 
avoiding differentiating the situation of states which are members of the EU and those which are not. 
The negotiations again were not easy. Positions of parties involved in the negotiations differed 
significantly, which was reflected in various documents prepared in the course of the negotiations.349 
The starting point for the fifth meeting was a revised Chairperson’s of the group proposal,350 which 
was based on discussions during the 4th negotiation meeting and subsequent bilateral informal talks. 
As the Chairperson herself admitted: ‘The package proposed should be considered in its entirety and 
requires all negotiating parties to show flexibility and to depart from their respective original 
positions’.351 The fifth meeting was held on 3-5 April 2013 and it became the last one. It was concluded 
with adopting a package of five accession instruments:352  
1.) Draft revised agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (further: Draft Accession Agreement 
or DAA);353 
2.) Draft declaration by the European Union to be made at the time of signature of the Accession 
Agreement;  
3.) Draft rule to be added to the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the 
execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements in cases to which the 
European Union is a party;  
4.) Draft model of memorandum of understanding between the European Union and X [State 
which is not a member of the European Union];  
5.) Draft explanatory report to the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
                                                          
347 See reports from the three first meetings: 1st meeting at: 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/47_1(2012)R01Erev2.pdf>; 2nd meeting 
at: 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Working_documents/47_1(2012)02_Extracts_CDDH_Rep
ort_EN.pdf> 
3rd meeting at: 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/47_1(2012)R03_EN_final.pdf>.  
348 Common Paper of Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Montenegro, 
Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine on major concerns regarding the Draft Revised 
Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, 47+1(2013)003. 
349 List of the most important working documents including ‘Chairperson’s proposal on outstanding issues and Secretariat’s 
Participation of the EU in the Committee of Ministers when the latter takes decisions other than those expressly provided in 
the Convention: implications of the various options under discussion’ can be found here: 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Working_documents_en.asp> 
350 Revised chairperson’s proposal on outstanding issues, 47+1(2013)006, 19 March 2013. 
351 Supra, para 1. 
352 Final report to the CDDH, 47+1(2013)008rev2. 
353 For more on the process of negotiations see: Andrew Drzemczewski, ‘The EU Accession to the ECHR: The Negotiation 
Process’ in Vasiliki Kosta, Nikos Skoutaris, Vassilis Tzevelekos (eds) The EU Accession to the ECHR (Hart 2014) 17-29. 
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b) The Draft Accession Agreement 
The agreement covers all the most important and difficult matters relating to the accession, which are 
going to be just briefly highlighted below.354 According to the DAA, art. 59 of the Convention shall be 
further amended so that that the EU may join also Protocols to the Convention. Article 1 DAA deals 
with the scope of the accession and regulates that the accession shall impose on the EU obligations 
with regard only to acts, measures or omissions of its institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, or of 
persons acting on their behalf and that it will not require the EU to act outside its competences. Article 
1 also provides rules for attribution of acts, measures or omissions to the EU member-states even 
when they implement they EU law (which does not preclude the European Union from being 
responsible as a co-respondent).  
Article 3 DAA sets up a co-respondent mechanism.355 The mechanism allows the EU or its member-
states to become a co-respondent to proceedings before the ECtHR. A co-respondent becomes then 
a party to the case. The admissibility of an application shall be assessed without regard to the 
participation of a co-respondent in the proceedings. This mechanism is supposed to deal with cases 
concerning the EU law. It makes possible to include the EU in proceedings in which a Member State 
has allegedly violated the Convention but it ‘was obliged’ by the EU law to act in that particular way, 
notably where the violation could have been avoided only by disregarding by the state an obligation 
under the EU law. Also, the other way around, the EU member-states may become co-respondent in 
cases where the EU is a respondent to an application. This concerns cases in which the EU primary law 
is at stake, notably where the violation could have been avoided only by disregarding by the EU an 
obligation under the TEU, TFEU or any other provision having the same legal value pursuant to those 
instruments. According to the DAA, there are two ways of becoming a co-respondent: either by 
accepting an invitation by the ECtHR or by a decision of the ECtHR upon a request of the EU or a 
member-state to become a co-respondent. 
The co-respondent mechanism is connected with the prior involvement procedure356 also provided in 
the DAA. In proceedings to which the EU is a co-respondent, if the CJEU has not yet assessed the 
compatibility with the rights at issue defined in the Convention or in the protocols to which the EU has 
acceded of the provision of the EU law, such a possibility should be afforded to the CJEU before the 
ECtHR judges the case. The main reason behind the procedure is to exhaust domestic remedies in the 
EU system but also to avoid circumventing the CJEU in its competences. 
Article 4 of the DAA aims at amending art. 33 of the Convention so that it allows cases inter all parties 
to the Convention, which after the accession will not be just states but also the EU. Article 5 of the 
DAA covers questions relating to interpretation of art. 35 and 55 of the Convention so that the 
proceedings before the CJEU shall be understood as constituting neither procedures of international 
investigation or settlement within the meaning of art. 35, paragraph 2(b), of the Convention, nor 
                                                          
354 For more on the DAA and the mechanisms it seeks to introduce see for example: Paul Gragl, ‘Agreement on the Accession 
of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights’ in Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner, Angela 
Ward (eds) The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – A Commentary (Hart 2014); Paul Gragl ‘A Giant Leap for European Human 
Rights? The Final Agreement on The European Union’s Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2014) 51 
Common Market Law Review. 
355 For more on the co-respondent mechanism as drafted in the DAA see for example: Vasiliki Kosta, Nikos Skoutaris, Vassilis 
Tzevelekos (eds) The EU Accession to the ECHR (Hart 2014). 
356 For more on the prior involvement procedure as drafted in the DAA, See Supra. 
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means of dispute settlement within the meaning of art. 55 of the Convention. The DAA covers also 
some other issues relating to the accession, which include questions of: adjusting understanding of 
the wording of the Convention and Protocols thereto to the special character of the EU as a non-state 
party to the Convention including understanding of the Convention’s jurisdiction clause (art. 1 DAA); 
the EU’s possibility to make reservations to the Convention and Protocols (art. 2 DAA); the EU 
participation in functioning of the ECtHR and some CoE institutions involved in application of the 
Convention (art. 6 and 7 DAA); participation of the EU in the expenditure related to the Convention 
(art. 8 DAA); relations with other agreements (art. 9 DAA) as well as procedural issues regarding the 
DAA itself (art. 10-12 DAA). These regulations were not subject of the utmost controversies during 
drafting, nor did the effect turn out to be of the highest controversy afterwards, at least in the light of 
the CJEU’s opinion.357 
The DAA is annexed with other accession instruments including Union’s declaration that it will request 
to become a co-respondent to the proceedings before the ECtHR or accept an invitation by the Court 
to that effect where the conditions set out in the DAA are met (Appendix II); additional rules for the 
supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements in cases to which 
the EU is a party (Appendix III); memorandum of understanding between the EU and states which are 
not members of the Union regarding cases between the EU and such states in which an alleged 
violation of the Convention or its Protocols calls into question a provision of the EU law (Appendix IV). 
Some complex issues resulting from the DAA are further explained in the Draft explanatory report to 
the DAA (Appendix V). 
 
c) Opinion 2/13 of the CJEU on the Draft Accession Agreement 
Pursuant to art. 218(11) TFEU, which reads: 
‘A Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission may obtain the 
opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the 
Treaties. Where the opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not enter 
into force unless it is amended or the Treaties are revised’; 
On 4 July 2013 the European Commission requested the CJEU for an opinion on the DAA. The Court 
issued its long awaited opinion on 18 December 2014.358 In the Opinion the Court, contrary to the 
view of the Commission,359 member-states, European Parliament and the Council submissions360 as 
well as its own Advocate General,361 stated that for numerous reasons including the very fundaments 
of the EU and its law the DAA as negotiated on April the 5th 2013 is not compatible with the EU law, 
namely with art. 6(2) TEU and to the Protocol 8 relating to this article. After such a verdict of the Court 
                                                          
357 For more on some of those issues see for example: Andrew Drzemczewski, ‘Election of EU Judge onto the Strasbourg 
Court’, in Vasiliki Kosta, Nikos Skoutaris and Vassilis Tzevelekos (eds) The EU Accession to the ECHR (Hart 2014) or more 
generally for a more thoroughgoing analysis of the whole DAA see Supra (fn 329), 89-350.  
358 Opinion 2/13 pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU — Draft international agreement — Accession of the European Union to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms — Compatibility of the draft 
agreement with the EU and FEU Treaties, 18 December 2014. 
359 Supra, para 71-107. 
360 Supra, para 108-143. 
361 View of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 13 June 2014; what perhaps best reflects the differences between the 
Court’s and the AG’s approaches are the Advocate General Kokott’s softer views ending in ‘Yes, but only if (…)’ [and] the 
Opinion’s harsh ‘No, unless (…)’, compare: Daniel Halberstam, ‘”It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defence of Opinion 
2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 106. 
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accession of the EU to the Convention on the basis of the instruments of the accession as drafted in 
the DAA is not possible. 
According to the Court the DAA is not compatible with the EU law as: 
‘– it is liable adversely to affect the specific characteristics and the autonomy of EU law in so 
far it does not ensure coordination between art. 53 of the ECHR and art. 53 of the Charter, 
does not avert the risk that the principle of Member States’ mutual trust under EU law may 
be undermined, and makes no provision in respect of the relationship between the 
mechanism established by Protocol No 16362 and the preliminary ruling procedure provided 
for in Art. 267 TFEU; 
– it is liable to affect Art. 344 TFEU in so far as it does not preclude the possibility of disputes 
between Member States or between Member States and the EU concerning the application 
of the ECHR within the scope ratione materiae of EU law being brought before the ECtHR; 
– it does not lay down arrangements for the operation of the co-respondent mechanism and 
the procedure for the prior involvement of the Court of Justice that enable the specific 
characteristics of the EU and EU law to be preserved; and 
– it fails to have regard to the specific characteristics of EU law with regard to the judicial 
review of acts, actions or omissions on the part of the EU in CFSP matters in that it entrusts 
the judicial review of some of those acts, actions or omissions exclusively to a non-EU body’.363 
The main concerns of the Opinion and main values, which the Court defends in it are the special 
characteristics of the EU especially when it comes to the relationship between the EU and its 
members-states in the context of the division of competences between them and in resulting from 
this scope of the EU institutions powers as well as the autonomy of the EU law and the CJEU’s exclusive 
power to interpret the Union law in a binding manner. 
Reference to previous Court’s jurisprudence in cases on the international agreements concluded by 
the Union compatibility with the EU shows that an approach adopted by the Court in Opinion 2/13 is 
not unprecedented.364 A good example here may be the CJEU’s Opinion 1/00365 in which the Court 
‘identified the two key components of the Union’s external autonomy claim to be: (i) that the essential 
character of the powers of the Union and its institutions as laid down in the Treaty must remain 
                                                          
362 Namely Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms from 2nd 
October 2013, CETS no. 214. The Protocol seeks to introduce to the system of the Convention an institution of advisory 
opinion from the ECtHR to the highest courts and tribunals of the parties to the Convention and the Protocol; for more on 
the Protocol and mechanisms it introduces see for example: Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Noreen O’Meara, ‘Advisory jurisdiction 
and the European Court of Human Rights: a magic bullet for dialogue and docket-control?’ (2014) 34 Legal Studies 3; Paul 
Gragl, ‘(Judicial) Love is Not a One-Way Street: The EU Preliminary Reference Procedure as a Model for ECtHR Advisory 
Opinions under Draft Protocol No. 16’ (2013) 38 European Law Review; Władysław Jóźwicki, ‘Protocol 16 to the ECHR. A 
Convenient Tool for Judicial Dialogue and Better Domestic Implementation of the Convention?’ in Elżbieta Kużelewska, 
Dariusz Kloza, Izabela Kraśnicka, Franciszek Strzyczkowski (eds) European Judicial Systems as a Challenge for Democracy 
(Intersentia 2015). 
363 Supra (fn 358), para 258. 
364 I mean here especially, but not only, Opinion 1/91 delivered pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228 (1) of 
the Treaty - Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade 
Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area from 14th December 1991 (for more see 
for example: Gragl supra (fn 327). For more on the relevant CJEU case law in the context of the EU accession to the 
Convention see also for example: Tobias Lock, ‘Walking on a tightrope: The draft ECHR accession agreement and the 
autonomy of the EU legal order’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review. 
365 Opinion 1/00 pursuant to Article 300(6) EC - Proposed agreement between the European Community and non-Member 
States on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area from 18 April 2002. 
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unaltered and (ii) that an international agreement must not grant a supervisory body the competence 
to interpret EU law in an internally binding manner, that is in a manner which binds the EU and its 
institutions’.366 
In the Opinion 2/13 the Court ruled that the DAA is incompatible with and does not reflect the specific 
characteristics and the autonomy of the EU law for seven main (groups of) reasons: 
1.) not curtailing the possibility of the EU member-states to have higher human rights protection 
standards than the EU law on the basis of the Charter in the fields where the EU has 
harmonized the law;367 
2.)  not providing for the application of the rule of mutual trust between the EU member-states 
especially in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) matters;368  
3.) not ruling out the possibility that when applying Protocol 16 to the Convention national courts 
and tribunals would ask the ECtHR to rule on EU law issues, before asking the CJEU, which 
would circumvent the EU’s preliminary ruling procedure;369  
4.) violating art. 344 TFEU by failing to rule out the possible use of the ECtHR to settle disputes 
between the EU member-states regarding the EU law (to settling which the CJEU has 
monopoly);370  
5.) setting up a co-respondent mechanism in a way that would give the ECtHR power to: a) 
interpret the EU law while assessing the admissibility of requests to apply this mechanism; b) 
ruling on the joint responsibility of the EU and its member-states, which could impinge on the 
EU member-states’ reservations to the Convention; c) to allocate responsibility for violating 
the Convention between the EU and its member-states, which would violate the monopoly of 
the CJEU to rule on the EU law;371  
6.) setting up a prior involvement of the CJEU procedure in a way which did not reserve to the EU 
itself the power to rule on whether the CJEU has already dealt with an issue or not, and in a 
way which did not allow to the CJEU to rule on the interpretation the EU law at stake but just 
on its validity;372  
7.) giving to the ECtHR competence of judicial review over EU acts in the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) matters, despite the fact that the CJEU has no such jurisdiction in most 
CFSP questions.373 
Some of these arguments of the Court, which are just highlighted above, are further examined in 
chapter II.F of this report in the context of the common human rights protection standards in the 
Convention system and the EU. 
 
                                                          
366 Louise H. Storgaard, ‘EU Law Autonomy versus European Fundamental Rights Protection—On Opinion 2/13 on EU 
Accession to the ECHR’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 490. 
367 Supra (fn 358), paras. 185-190. 
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d)  Summary and prospects for the future 
The opinion by the CJEU is binding and thus halts the process of the EU’s accession to the Convention 
until the accession agreement is changed in a way, that it becomes compatible with the EU law or until 
the EU law is changed itself so that the agreement in not contrary to it any more. Knowing the history 
of Convention reforms, especially those concerning the accession (Protocol 14) and knowing the 
history of the EU primary law amending processes in the last decades as well as most importantly 
knowing the history of the negotiations over the accession instruments, ‘[t]o say that either of these 
options is difficult is probably an understatement’.374 
If the accession is to happen there are three ways of making it possible:  
1.) the DAA is renegotiated and agreed on by all the parties to the Convention as well as the EU 
so that it is compatible with the EU law as set out in the Opinion 2/13;375 
2.) the EU law is amended and the EU is restructured so that the DAA is not any more 
incompatible with it;  
3.) both the DAA is partially renegotiated as well as the EU law is partially modified so that they 
are compatible.  
If none of these happens, the EU will not be able to accede to the Convention but that would be 
contrary to the obligation imposed on it in art. 6(2) TEU. Non-accession would then also demand some, 
perhaps even more difficult to be agreed on and accepted, revision of the EU primary law.  
The ECtHR President Dean Spielmann after the opinion was issued noted: ‘Bearing in mind that 
negotiations on European Union accession have been under way for more than thirty years, that 
accession is an obligation under the Lisbon Treaty and that all the Member States along with the 
European institutions had already stated that they considered the draft agreement compatible with 
the Treaties on European Union and the Functioning of the European Union, the CJEU’s unfavourable 
opinion is a great disappointment’.376 Indeed the opinion has not been welcomed with enthusiasm 
neither by human rights scholars nor practitioners.377 Some commentators referred to it as to a 
                                                          
374 Ágoston Mohay, ‘Back to the Drawing Board? Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice on the Accession of the EU to the ECHR 
- Case note’ (2015) I Pécs Journal of International and European Law 34. 
375 It bears to mention that the new agreement might again undergo the CJEU control under the 218(11) TFEU procedure. 
376 European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2014, 6. 
377 See for example the immediate reactions to the opinion: Leonard F. M. Besselink, ‘Acceding to the ECHR notwithstanding 
the Court of Justice Opinion 2/13’ Verfassungsblog <http://verfassungsblog.de/acceding-echr-notwithstanding-court-
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Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance Blog <http://acelg.blogactiv.eu/2015/01/06/reaction-to-leonard-
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Verfassungsblog, <http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/thou-shalt-no-courts/> last accessed on 22 April 2016. These instant 
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and its halting effect to the process of accession, see: Piet Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial 
Dialogue: Autonomy or Autarky?’ (2015) 38 Fordham International Law Journal; Jed Odermatt, ‘A Giant Step Backwards? 
Opinion 2/13 on the EU's Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2015) KU Leuven Working Paper No. 
150; Steve Peers, ‘The EU’s Accession to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a Nightmare’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal, and 
many other, including some also referred to in different parts of this paper. 
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‘bombshell’378 or as to a ‘clear and present danger to human rights protection’.379 Some of the critics 
have even proposed to disregard or to overrule the opinion entirely and adopt a so called 
‘notwithstanding protocol’, which should read: ‘The Union shall accede to the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, notwithstanding Art. 6(2) Treaty on 
European Union, Protocol (No 8) relating to Art. 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union and Opinion 
2/13 of the Court of Justice of 18 December 2014’.380 This is probably the most dramatic and clear-cut 
proposition in order for the EU to accede to the Convention. However, it is probably not the most 
likely one especially in the current political situation within the EU.381  
Perhaps is it neither the most advisable solution and the Opinion 2/13 should be taken seriously and 
thoroughly examined, which might lead to more nuanced approach in adopting further steps. Already 
on the day of the Court’s opinion the President of the PACE Anne Brasseur called ‘on the negotiators 
to carefully study this opinion, and immediately set to work to overcome the legal hurdles identified 
by the Court. We have begun a historic process, and I remain convinced that a coherent Europe-wide 
system of human rights protection is strongly in the interest of all of us’.382 Daniel Halberstam argues 
that ‘a blanket dismissal of the Court’s concerns would (…) be throwing out the baby with the 
bathwater’.383 Another compromise is probably necessary for the accession to happen and for thus 
including the EU to the human rights protection scrutiny under the Convention system. 
Reopening of negotiations, especially due to difficulties encountered in the process of reaching the 
current state of affairs does not promise an easy success. Some parties to the Convention, which are 
not members to the EU, might not be willing to easily adjust the DAA and accept a new agreement 
accordant to all the demands set up in the Opinion 2/13. More importantly such adjustments, if they 
were to fully follow the opinion, might not serve well when it comes to fulfilling the goals behind 
accession and thus not result in truly enhancing the human rights protection within the EU. Sionaidh 
Douglas-Scott argues that: ‘Accession in compliance with the CJEU’s judgment would not provide 
effective external control of the EU’s actions’.384 Hence, it would be counterproductive. For example, 
even the European Parliament in the process of preparing the accession admitted that the lack of 
competence by the CJEU in some areas (like some of the CFSP matters) might be compensated by the 
external scrutiny by the ECtHR. For the CJEU its lack of such a competence was an argument against 
anyone else, including the ECtHR, having it. As Steve Peers notices this ‘could have serious 
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consequences, leaving the victims of serious human rights violations without an effective remedy at 
international level’.385 
Some of the objections to the DAA pointed out by the CJEU are possible to be solved with internal 
regulations adopted by the EU and its member-states themselves or just through accurate 
interpretation of the DAA and the EU law.386 That might lead to limiting the scope of the issues, which 
need to be renegotiated leaving some questions to be solved within the EU. For example, the CJEU 
concerns relating to the Protocol 16 giving the EU member-states possibility to circumvent the 
preliminary reference procedure seem to be based on a threat to the autonomy of EU law which 
indeed does not stem from an obligation the Convention or its organs impose but from a shift in the 
incentive structure for the EU Member States. The concerns, rather, are EU-internal problems. Quite 
understandably, the Convention’s system does not offer any safeguard here because it is only 
indirectly the root of the problem. However, remedy for the CJEU’s concerns can be found with the 
Member States. ‘A joint declaration before accession combined with rules in the implementing 
measures after accession would suffice’.387 
The adverse impact of the EU’s non-accession on the situation of individual seems to be of key 
importance. The lack of a possibility by an individuals to bring a complaint directly against the EU in 
the same way that he or she is able to bring a complaint against the EU member-states, since they are 
and the EU is not a party to the Convention, is indeed one of the ‘anomalies of the protection of human 
rights in Europe’.388 With the development of its competences and the scope in which the EU can 
shape the situation of an individual, the Union became a sort of a missing link of the European human 
rights protection system.389 After the Opinion 2/13 such a situation has been at least prolonged for an 
unpredictable period of time. The President of the ECtHR Dean Spielmann noticed that ‘the principal 
victims will be those citizens whom this opinion (no. 2/13) deprives of the right to have acts of the 
European Union subjected to the same external scrutiny as regards respect for human rights as that 
which applies to each Member State’.390  
The reasons behind the accession, which inspired the process since the beginning and which also have 
been reflected by the EU institutions and in the Preamble to the DAA391 should be borne in mind. The 
accession is not a goal in itself, the goal is to achieve stronger human rights protection within the EU. 
The accession should essentially bring: 
‘- guarantees of coherence as to approach to human rights in horizontal and vertical Union 
plan (…); 
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- legal binding of the process of enactment as well as application of the Union law by the ECHR, 
and therefore by the fundamental catalogue of classical rights in Europe; 
- better communication between the two human rights protection orders, including the two 
Courts; 
- introduction of an external control of human rights implementation within the Union legal 
order by a judicial organ independent of the Union – Strasburg Court; this will also allow the 
Union to have its views and interests represented before this Court; 
- facilitation and strengthening of the situation of the rights holder by admitting an application 
to the Strasburg Court directly against the Union as the alleged perpetrator of human rights 
violation and to against one or all the Member States (…); 
- facilitation of the situation of the applications’ author by relieving him or her from the 
necessity to conduct complicated legal analysis concerning unclear system of relevant sources 
of law; 
- reinforcement of legal security with regard to the execution of the ECtHR judgments which 
will concern directly the EU as the perpetrator of violations (…); 
- reinforcement of the credibility of the EU as an international advocate of human rights, 
including with reference to states, organisations and institutions cooperating with the 
Union’392.  
Therefore, it seems advisable that the approach chosen by the EU and its institutions after the CJEU’s 
opinion stalled the process of accession, should to aim at renewing the process and shaping it in a 
way, which would enable fulfilling to the highest possible extent the reasons behind the accession, 
hence provide the EU and individuals under its powers with an effective external scrutiny mechanism 
on the human rights matters. If the negotiations are to be reopened both the Opinion 2/13 and the 
values behind the accession should serve as benchmarks for them. Before reopening the negotiations 
perhaps internal reforms of the EU law should be considered (possible within the frames of the EU 
law and desirable in the light of reasons behind the accession). 
Finally, it seems that the EU rather than the CoE should show initiative in solving the deadlock. After 
all, it is the EU who is obliged by its own law to accede to the Convention. It is also the EU who in a 
sense withdrew from the previous agreement after it itself drafted it and preliminarily agreed on the 
terms contained in it. As the Opinion comes from within and is directed towards the EU, the CoE or its 
member-states which are not parties to the EU, seem to have, at least at present, less reasons to take 
initiative on this matter.  
 
F. The Issue of Common Human Rights Standards 
This section examines what the common human rights normative standard is between the EU and the 
Council of Europe (CoE). This section does not focus in detail on specific convergences or divergences 
in the interpretation of specific rights between CoE treaties and EU law, which would be beyond the 
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scope of this short section,393 beyond using certain convergences and divergences as practical 
examples. Instead it looks at the overarching relationship between the EU and the CoE on the subject 
of human rights. In principle, the response to this question is obvious: the European Convention on 
Human Rights should be the common standard, the thread binding the EU and the CoE together. 
However, the relationship between the EU and the CoE on the subject of human rights is paradoxical. 
On the one hand, the EU is massively exposed to the influence of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), but on the other it is also shielded from its effects in various ways and we will explore 
this subject in some depth in this section. In seeking to establish the common normative standard, the 
judgments of both the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) are extremely important, two judgments in particular, the Bosphorus v Ireland 
judgment of the ECtHR and Opinion 2/13 of the CJEU will be discussed in detail.  
 
 The Centrality of the European Convention on Human Rights  
A good place to start our discussion is Art. 6 of the Treaty on European Union, which sets out a number 
of human rights parameters for the EU. It states:  
1. The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union […] which shall have the same legal value 
as the Treaties. 
The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the 
Union as defined in the Treaties. 
The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance 
with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and 
application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that 
set out the sources of those provisions. 
2. The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's 
competences as defined in the Treaties. 
3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general 
principles of the Union's law. 
Thus, the treaty sets out three sources for EU fundamental rights law, these are:  
a) the constitutional traditions common to the Member States,  
b) the European Convention on Human Rights and  
c) the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.394  
                                                          
393 For a thorough account see: Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner, Angela Ward, The EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: A Commentary (Hart 2014). 
394 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13, ar.t 6; See generally Robert Schutze, ‘Three 
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This provision of the treaty has been described as a ’”codification” of the pre-existing position’,395 
rather than a sea change in the legal situation. The CJEU has had regard to other international treaties 
as sources of fundamental rights when defining EU law,396 but the ECHR has been singled out as a 
special source among the international treaties the CJEU has regard to.397  
The interplay between these different sources of law creates a cycle of reinforcement within EU 
fundamental rights law with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) at its core. As we 
mentioned, the ECHR is expressly recognised as a source of fundamental rights law in the Treaty on 
European Union. However, it also influences EU fundamental rights law indirectly through the other 
channels. As all Member States are signatories to the ECHR and have been for a number of decades, 
it has formed part of their constitutional traditions to varying degrees and thus feeds into EU 
fundamental rights law through this channel. At the same time, the Charter makes numerous express 
references to the ECHR linking the Charter and the ECHR together. The preamble to the Charter states:  
‘[t]his Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Union and 
for the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in particular, from […] the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms’.398 
As the first declaration annexed to the Lisbon treaty notes, the Charter confirms the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the European Convention.399 The Charter also mirrors many of the provisions of 
the ECHR both textually and in substantive terms. The cross-pollination is expressly recognised in the 
Charter where it states that:  
‘[i]n so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention’.400  
It is also clear from this article that the ECHR forms part of the general principles of law, which the 
CJEU has regard to when interpreting EU law and making decisions. There is no single instrument 
setting out what values are fundamental in EU law. This is viewed by some as a source of great richness 
in the law and by others as unnecessarily complex.401 Determining the general principles is to an extent 
and open-ended process,402 although it has served to reinforce the position of the ECHR in EU law. The 
cycle of reinforcement is clearly reflected in the jurisprudence of the CJEU, with the ECHR becoming 
increasingly embedded in the EU’s legal order. The CJEU for its part was initially very reluctant to 
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engage with human rights law.403 However, in the early 1970s, the CJEU recognised that respect for 
fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of Community law.404 It began to 
make express references to the ECHR in the Rutili case.405 Since then, the CJEU has gradually relied on 
the ECHR more and more and from the mid-90s the CJEU increasingly looked to the Convention for 
inspiration as to the nature and scope, or even existence, of fundamental rights in Community law.406  
The CJEU has also embraced the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. When determining the meaning and scope of 
certain rights, the CJEU often takes its lead from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, as it did in the case 
of McB v LE where the CJEU stated that: ‘Art. 7 of the Charter must therefore be given the same 
meaning and the same scope as Art. 8(1) of the ECHR, as interpreted by the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights’.407 The CJEU closely follows ECtHR case law and in some instances has changed 
its own jurisprudence to respond to changes in ECtHR case law. Thus, in Hoechst v Commission, the 
CJEU held that business premises were not protected by Art. 8 of the Convention guaranteeing the 
inviolability of the home.408 However, the ECtHR changed its approach to this issue in Societe Colas Est 
v France.409 There it held that Art. 8 could be construed, in certain circumstances, as including a right 
to respect for a company's business premises. This in turn prompted the CJEU to change its 
jurisprudence to align with the development of the ECtHR jurisprudence in Roquette Freres.410 Thus, 
both the ECHR and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence are central sources when defining EU fundamental rights 
law, influencing it both directly and indirectly. The reliance on the ECtHR standards at the CJEU has a 
significant reinforcing and amplifying effect upon them. Whereas ECtHR judgments are normally only 
binding on the individual parties, the CJEU judgments have an erga omnes effect flowing out to all of 
the Member States and binding them.411 
 
 A Complex Relationship  
There is clearly a strong degree of commonality between the EU and the CoE on the subject of human 
rights as the foregoing paragraphs have illustrated. However, this relationship is quite complex and 
paradoxical when one looks beyond the surface. The European Court of Human Rights exercises 
limited scrutiny over the actions of the EU from a human rights standpoint, thereby reducing the 
prospects of aligning a common human rights standard. The ECtHR is motivated to limit its scrutiny of 
the EU for compliance with human rights law by a number of factors. Firstly, the distinct nature of the 
EU as a separate legal entity has led the ECtHR to naturally limit its scrutiny as it would with any other 
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international organisation because it is not yet a party to the ECHR. Secondly, the existence of a 
parallel legal system, both at domestic and European levels, in which EU acts can, at least in principle, 
be challenged on human rights grounds, has given the ECtHR some peace of mind regarding EU 
compliance with human rights law. Thirdly, it has been argued that Strasbourg’s limited oversight is 
motivated by a fear that the CJEU would not follow its judgments.412 The following sections analyse 
the scope of judicial supervision exercised by the ECtHR and how this affects the convergence of 
human rights standards between the EU and CoE.  
 
 Ratione Personae 
Initially when applicants brought cases challenging the actions of the EU (or its forebear the EC), these 
were rejected on ratione personae grounds by the ECtHR. In general, an application may only be 
brought against a Contracting State for a violation of the Convention for which the State is in some 
way responsible,413 or which is in some way imputable to it.414 This criterion has been used to dismiss 
a variety of applications including, for example, applications directed against international 
organisations like the EU.415 Thus, in the early case of Confederation Francaise Democratique du 
Travail v EC,416 the applicant confederation alleged violations of Art. 11, 13 and 14 of the ECHR when 
it was not appointed as a member of the European Coal and Steel Community’s Consultative 
Committee. The French government was responsible for designating the specific representatives, but 
did not designate the applicant organisation and as a result the EC Council did not endorse their 
membership of the committee. The European Commission on Human Rights considered that by 
challenging this move, the applicant was challenging ‘an act which has its effects within the internal 
framework of the European Communities’.417 Insofar as the application was directed at the European 
Communities, the European Commission on Human Rights did not have jurisdiction ratione personae 
to address this because the European Communities were not a contracting party to the ECHR.418  
However, the fact that the EU was exercising some powers on behalf of the contracting States did not 
mean that they were completely immune from scrutiny. The European Commission on Human Rights, 
again very early on in its jurisprudence, stated that: 
‘If a State contracts treaty obligations and subsequently concludes another 
international agreement which disables it from performing its obligations under the 
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first treaty it will be answerable for any resulting breach of its obligations under the 
earlier treaty’.419 
Thus, the relationship of oversight between the EU and the Convention organs was not entirely clear. 
On the one hand, the EU ought to be immunised from scrutiny to an extent by the ratione personae 
principle. On the other hand, both the European Commission on Human Rights and Court of Human 
Rights were clearly reluctant to forego oversight completely.  
 
 Bosphorus v Ireland  
The position was clarified in later judgments like M and Co v FRG and Bosphorus v Ireland.420 In 
Bosphorus v Ireland,421 the ECtHR examined the case of an aircraft impounded by Irish authorities. The 
aircraft had been leased by a Turkish airline from a Yugoslav airline. The Turkish airline complained 
that by impounding the aircraft, the Irish authorities had compromised its right to property as 
guaranteed by Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. The aircraft was impounded pursuant to an EC 
regulation,422 which was itself implementing a UN Security Council Resolution aimed at strengthening 
an embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.423 
The ECtHR held that the company’s rights under Convention had not been violated. While impounding 
the aircraft amounted to an interference with the applicant’s rights, the interference was justified as 
it was done in pursuit of Ireland’s duty to comply with its international obligations under EC law.424 In 
these circumstances, there was a presumption that Ireland had not departed from the requirements 
of the Convention when it implemented legal obligations flowing from its EU membership. The ECtHR 
declared that: 
‘State action taken in compliance with [legal obligations arising from membership of an 
international organisation] is justified as long as the relevant organisation is considered to 
protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the 
mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be considered at least 
equivalent to that for which the Convention provides’.425 
It noted that respect for fundamental rights has become ‘a condition of the legality of Community 
acts’ and in carrying out this assessment the ECJ refers extensively to the ECHR and ECtHR 
judgments.426 As a result, there was a rebuttable presumption that EC law provided equivalent 
protection to that of the ECHR system and that a State has acted in compliance with the Convention, 
where the State had no discretion in implementing the legal obligations flowing from its membership 
of the organisation.427 
The result of the judgment was a test, which the ECtHR is meant to apply when an applicant challenges 
an international organisation’s actions before it. The test is comprised of two parts. First, the ECtHR 
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should examine whether the international organisation in question provides ‘equivalent protection’ 
to the ECHR. Second, the ECtHR should examine whether the presumption that the international 
organisation provides such equivalent protection has been rebutted in the concrete case before it 
because of a manifest deficit in the protection of human rights. 
 
 A Messy Compromise  
While the Bosphorus decision went some way toward clarifying the scope of the ECtHR’s review of EU 
activities, it also generated a number of loose ends. Firstly, discretion plays a significant role in the 
Bosphorus test. The motivation for the exception created in Bosphorus was that the contracting State 
lacked discretion over the measures it was implementing, it was simply upholding its obligations under 
the EU and should not be penalised for this. Thus, logically it only applies where the State is 
implementing secondary legislation or judicial decisions over which it has no discretion as to how they 
are implemented.428 The ECtHR will still evaluate whether a State has violated the Convention when 
it is applying primary EU law e.g. treaty articles. Thus, in Matthews v UK,429 the applicant, who was a 
resident of Gibraltar, tried to register to vote in the European elections, but was refused by the British 
authorities who had not extended the franchise to those elections in Gibraltar. The ECtHR examined 
whether the UK had violated the applicant’s right to the free expression of opinion in the choice of 
the legislature and found that it had. The Court’s reasoning for scrutinising these measures lies in two 
contentions. First, the measures the applicant was complaining about stemmed from international 
instruments, which were freely entered into by the UK.430 Therefore the contracting State did have 
some discretion over whether and how these measures were implemented.431 Secondly, as the acts 
in this case concerned treaty articles, these could not be challenged within the EU’s legal system, 
which generated a greater impetus for the court to review them, as Lock rightly notes ‘the main reason 
why the Bosphorus presumption does not apply to violations originating in the treaty itself is that 
there is no judicial remedy against them under EC law’.432 
A key problem with applying the Bosphorus test is that it attempts to draw a distinction between law 
which States do not have discretion over and law over which they do. De Hert and Korenica argue that 
the border between the Member States’ actions that implement EU law and the Member States’ 
actions that are not derived from an obligation arising from EU law is becoming increasingly unclear. 
There is a steady increase in law which is related to the implementation of EU law, making it more 
difficult to distinguish.433 The CJEU itself is facing a similar problem in attempting to define the areas 
that the Charter of fundamental rights applies to.434 Furthermore, in a post-Lisbon era where national 
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parliaments have an enhanced role in influencing secondary legislation, it becomes difficult to speak 
of discretion in any kind of absolute terms.435  
Another key shortcoming in the Bosphorus test is the faith it places in the EU legal system. In essence 
the EU’s legal system was deemed to offer sufficient avenues to protect Convention rights with the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, consistent references to the Convention in CJEU jurisprudence and 
the EU’s judicial system with its scope for judicial review, preliminary references and principles of State 
liability, direct and indirect effect.436 Yet there are some very obvious shortcomings in the EU’s legal 
system, which clearly impact upon Art. 6 rights in the Convention, such as the unduly restrictive locus 
standi rules utilised by the EU in judicial review cases,437 and the absence of individual control over 
whether a preliminary reference is sought domestically.438 The Bosphorus test only demands an 
abstract assessment of whether equivalent protection exists within the EU system, it does not require 
in depth analysis of whether equivalent protection of human rights is actually provided in practice.439 
This is inconsistent of the ECtHR’s usual position that rights must be practical and effective and not 
theoretical and illusory.440  
Thus, the Bosphorus test itself naturally inhibits scrutiny on the part of the ECtHR, but that is only half 
the problem. The ECtHR has also been extremely inconsistent in its application of the Bosphorus 
test.441 In some cases, such as MSS v Belgium and Greece, the ECtHR has undertaken a clinical 
examination of the facts before determining whether to apply the presumption in Bosphorus.442 
However, the more common approach is for the ECtHR to engage in a very superficial review of the 
facts before applying the Bosphorus presumption.443 This light touch and inconsistent approach to 
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review effectively amounts to a full confidence in the capacity of the EU’s legal order to protect human 
rights in a comparable manner to the ECtHR. As such it generates a significant barrier to the realisation 
of uniform standards of human rights across Europe.  
A number of critics have also argued that Bosphorus creates a double standard for human rights 
protection. The EU is presumed to provide equivalent protection and this presumption will only be 
rebutted where the protection is ‘manifestly deficient’. Even at the time the judgment was issued, one 
of the concurring judgments noted that ‘the criterion “manifestly deficient” appears to establish a 
relatively low threshold, which is in marked contrast to the supervision generally carried out under 
[the ECHR]’.444 It is not clear what the ECtHR means by the term manifestly deficient,445 and a number 
of observers have alluded to the difficulties applicants will face in proving that the protection is 
‘manifestly deficient’.446 The deference shown to the EU in Bosphorus ‘is not a deference the Court 
has shown to contracting States to the Convention who have a highly developed constitutional and 
judicial system for protecting human rights, at least equal to that of the EU’.447 Thus, the EU is held to 
a lower standard of conduct than a contracting State, which impedes the realisation of common 
human rights standards between the EU, the CoE and their Member States.  
While the ECtHR reached a messy compromise in Bosphorus, there was a sense that it was a temporary 
solution pending EU accession to the ECHR, which would ostensibly clear up many of these issues. As 
Murray noted, there is probably scope for more meaningful scrutiny of EU action under the ECtHR and 
this will probably occur post-accession, in his words EU accession will ‘plug a considerable lacuna in 
the system of European human rights protection’.448 While accession is demanded by the TEU, this 
accession process had a considerable setback in late 2014 which will be discussed in the next section.  
 
 Opinion 2/13 
Opinion 2/13 dealt a significant blow to the realisation of common human rights standards within 
Europe. In Opinion 2/13, the CJEU regarded the EU’s accession to the ECHR as a threat to the 
autonomy of EU law, its supremacy, the principle of direct effect, the conferral of powers, as well as 
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the principle of mutual trust. These concerns prompted the CJEU to reject the Draft Accession 
Agreement as being incompatible with the treaties,449 thereby stalling the accession of the EU to the 
ECHR for the foreseeable future. 
The rejection of the accession agreement has a number of implications for the realisation of common 
human rights standards within Europe. Firstly, in Opinion 2/13 the CJEU re-asserted its independence 
and freedom to interpret fundamental rights in the EU. The CJEU states:  
‘The autonomy enjoyed by EU law in relation to the laws of the Member States and in 
relation to international law requires that the interpretation of those fundamental 
rights be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the EU’.450 
Essentially, the CJEU is making a statement about its freedom to interpret fundamental rights law. The 
CJEU has made similar statements in the past noting that the nature and ambit of fundamental rights 
in Community law must be determined autonomously and according to Community aims, and that it 
may interpret international agreements (including the ECHR) according to the Community's 
objectives.451 As the CJEU stated in Hauer, ‘the question of a possible infringement of fundamental 
rights by a measure of the Community institutions can only be judged in the light of Community law 
itself’.452  
 
This assertion of autonomy has significant impacts on the realisation of common human rights 
standards. As O’Neill notes ‘the CJEU holds itself out to be the European Supreme Court, finally and 
authoritatively interpreting – at least for the EU Member States – the provisions of the ECHR when its 
provisions arise within a field also covered by EU law’.453 The implications of this are that there are 
two courts asserting the right to issue final, binding interpretations of the ECHR within EU Member 
States. The CJEU is claiming a right to issue binding interpretations of the ECHR in the context of EU 
law, while the ECtHR asserts jurisdiction over anything that falls within the scope of the Convention. 
If both courts interpreted the law in the same way all of the time and the scope of EU law was clearly 
demarcated, this would not be that big a problem. However, in practice the scope of EU law is not 
clear and divergences in interpretation are increasingly common.  
 
 Divergences are Common 
In theory, the autonomy of the CJEU to interpret fundamental rights law in a manner at odds with the 
ECtHR should be severely circumscribed. As a matter of law, the Charter must be interpreted in light 
of the ECHR and the other sources of fundamental rights law in the EU,454 for instance the constitutions 
of Member States, are already heavily influenced by the ECHR and the ECtHR, as we noted above. 
However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the EU’s legal order is designed to ensure economic 
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freedoms e.g. free movement of goods, services, people etc. When the CJEU applies fundamental 
rights law, it has to give due regard to the economic freedoms it is designed to protect, which the 
ECtHR does not have to do.455 Thus, the CJEU’s impetus to protect the internal market generates 
conflicts of interest, which the ECtHR does not face.456 While the CJEU is clearly capable of favouring 
the fundamental right over the economic freedom,457 this impetus can drive the CJEU to diverge from 
the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in practice. Sometimes these divergences lead to greater protection on the 
EU side and at others they lead to lower protection. The interpretations of the prohibition on 
discrimination and the right to strike between both the CJEU and ECtHR offer cogent examples.  
 
Burri, for example, argues that the concepts of discrimination are more developed in EU law than at 
the ECtHR, particularly in the case law of the CJEU.458 EU measures aimed at creating a common 
market for the free movement of workers have restricted discrimination on the grounds of sex. These 
directives only permit direct discrimination on the grounds of sex in very limited circumstances, and 
these exceptions are strictly interpreted by the CJEU.459 By contrast, the ECtHR applies a different test 
in cases of direct sex discrimination, whereby discrimination can be permitted when it is objectively 
justified and States are allowed a large margin of appreciation, leaving more scope for arguments 
which might justify such discrimination.460 Thus, in this instance the economic freedoms protected by 
EU law ensure greater protection than would otherwise be the case, although it does counteract the 
establishment of a common human rights standard on sex discrimination across Europe. 
In other cases, the economic freedoms in EU law have served to curtail rights and have led to divergent 
standards. Veldman points to the jurisprudence within Europe on the right to strike and argues that 
there is ‘a remarkable contrast in the evolving case law in this field of the CJEU and the ECtHR’.461 In 
his article, he compares and contrasts the Strasbourg case law with its counterpart in Luxembourg 
using the examples of Viking Line462 and Laval463 in the EU and Demir & Baykara v Turkey464 and Enerji 
Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey465 at the European Court of Human Rights. 
                                                          
455 Albertine Veldman, ‘The Protection of the Fundamental Right to Strike within the Context of the European Internal 
Market: Implications of the Forthcoming Accession of the EU to the ECHR’ (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 104. 
456 Jason Coppel and Aidan O’Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’ (1992) 31 Common Market Law 
Review 669, 692. 
457 See, for example, Case C-112/00 Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659 and Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen [2004] 
ECR I-9609.  
458 Susanne Burri, ‘Towards More Synergy in the Interpretation of the Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in European Law? A 
Comparison of Legal Contexts and some Case Law of the EU and the ECHR’ (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 80. The author 
compares cases at the CJEU like Case C-366/99, Griesmar [2001] ECR I-9383 with cases at the ECtHR like Andrle v Czech 
Republic, (App No 6268/08) judgment of 17 February 2011.  
459 See, for example, Council Directive 2000/78/EC on establishing a legal framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation, [2000] OJ L303. 
460 Susanne Burri, ‘Towards More Synergy in the Interpretation of the Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in European Law? A 
Comparison of Legal Contexts and some Case Law of the EU and the ECHR’ (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 80, 102-103. 
461 Albertine Veldman, ‘The Protection of the Fundamental Right to Strike within the Context of the European Internal 
Market: Implications of the Forthcoming Accession of the EU to the ECHR’ (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 104, 105. 
462 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation v Viking Line [2007] ECR I-10779. 
463 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767; See also the Swedish case 
decided by the European Committee of Social Rights where legislative amendments introduced following the Laval case were 
deemed to violate the European Social Charter - Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and Swedish Confederation of 
Professional Employees (TCO) v Sweden (Complaint No. 85/2012) European Committee of Social Rights 3 July 2013. 
464 Demir and Baykara v Turkey [GC] (App No 34503/97) judgment of 12 November 2008. 
465 Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey (App No 68959/01) judgment of 21 April 2009. 
FRAME    Deliverable No. 5.2 
91 
 
In the Viking case, for example, a Finnish ferry operator tried to re-register its vessel in Estonia in order 
to avoid paying higher wages to workers under a collective bargaining agreement negotiated in 
Finland. The Finnish workers threatened to strike in response to this move and the International 
Transport Workers Federation issued a circular demanding that affiliated unions not enter into 
negotiations with Viking. As a result, the company sought an injunction in the English courts 
demanding that the federation withdraw its circular and that the Finnish workers not interfere with 
its plan to re-register the vessel. The English court referred a number of questions to the CJEU under 
the preliminary reference procedure, in particular, whether the action of the trade union fell within 
the scope of the protection of freedom of establishment and constituted a restriction of that freedom. 
The CJEU ruled that the Unions’ actions were capable of restricting Viking’s right to freedom of 
establishment under the treaty and therefore fell within the scope of Art. 43 (now Art. 49).466 It further 
noted that the social policy interests at stake in this case had to be balanced against the economic 
freedoms at issue and that the collective action in this case had to be objectively justified under EU 
law and was subject to a proportionality test.467 If the collective action did not satisfy this test, the 
strike could be restricted. Thus, the right to strike was severely curtailed by this case as it expanded 
the circumstances in which national courts could restrict strike activities where they impact on 
economic freedoms under EU law.468  
By contrast in Demir & Baykara v Turkey, the applicants, who were civil servants in Turkey, created a 
trade union and entered into a collective agreement with a local authority. When the local authority 
failed to meet some of its obligations, the union brought proceedings against it. The action was 
dismissed on the grounds that domestic legislation did not permit civil servants to form trade unions. 
The ECtHR held that the restriction on their right to form trade unions was not justified under the 
ECHR as it did not respond to a pressing social need.469 Furthermore the annulment of the collective 
bargaining agreement amounted to a violation of Art. 11. Thus, in this judgment and Enerji Yapi-Yol 
Sen, the ECtHR gave full protection to the right to collective bargaining and collective action under Art. 
11 of the ECHR. Indeed, the CJEU’s judgment in Viking flies in the face of the terms of Art. 53(3) of the 
Charter, which stipulates that the EU must ensure fundamental rights protection, which at least 
corresponds to the ECHR, if not a higher standard that it has developed itself.470 
These divergent interpretations create a genuine issue for the national courts of Member States, who 
may be faced with similar problems and have to reconcile the divergent approaches of the CJEU and 
the ECtHR. Admittedly all of this is in the context of provisions covered by EU law and therefore the 
CJEU’s scope for issuing divergent rulings is limited only to the field of EU law. Yet in practice the scope 
of EU law and the jurisdiction of the CJEU to make pronouncements on fundamental rights are unclear.  
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 The Scope of EU Law  
The outer limits of what falls within the scope of EU fundamental rights law are worryingly 
indeterminate, as EU law interacts with the legal orders of its Member States in a wide variety of 
different ways. In the Akerberg Fransson case,471 for example, a Swedish fisherman received both an 
administrative fine and was subject to criminal prosecution for tax evasion when he failed to correctly 
report tax information for two years. The fisherman complained that being subjected to both an 
administrative fine and a criminal penalty amounted to a violation of his right not to be tried or 
punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence under Art. 50 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. The applicant claimed that Sweden was implementing EU law in this case and the 
matter therefore fell within the scope of Charter.  
While the obligation to submit a tax return was based on EU law, which also allowed Member States 
to introduce other obligations aimed at the prevention of tax evasion, the actual tax penalties were 
set out in separate legislation, which was not transposing a directive. By fining and prosecuting Mr. 
Fransson Sweden was not ‘applying’ or ‘implementing’ the VAT Directive at issue in any immediate 
sense, as that Directive does not contain measures on enforcement of VAT offences. As Art. 51 of the 
Charter states that ‘[t]he provisions of this Charter are addressed […] to the Member States only when 
they are implementing Union law’,472 some had argued that the Charter only applied in the context of, 
for example, transposing a directive into national law. However, a broader interpretation of this 
provision could be adopted whereby the Charter could be held to apply to broader activity linked 
incidentally to the implementation of EU law, such as that in the Fransson case.473 
In its judgment, the CJEU stated ‘the tax penalties and criminal proceedings to which Mr Åkerberg 
Fransson has been or is subject are connected in part to breaches of his obligations to declare VAT’.474 
Furthermore ‘every Member State is under an obligation to take all legislative and administrative 
measures appropriate for ensuring collection of all the VAT due on its territory and for preventing 
evasion’.475 Therefore, the CJEU concluded that the measures penalising the applicant under the 
separate tax law fell within the scope of EU fundamental rights law. Thus, following this case the scope 
of EU fundamental rights law extends to a very broad category of laws which are more tangentially 
related to the implementation of EU law.  
Some have argued that this was a foreseeable interpretation of the scope of the Charter in light of 
previous jurisprudence of the CJEU,476 while others have argued that it does not follow unambiguously 
from the CJEU’s previous case law.477 Indeed some subsequent cases, such as Dano v Jobcenter 
Leipzig478 and Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte v Banco Português de Negócios,479 appear to have 
                                                          
471 Case C-617/10 Aklagaren v Fransson [2013] 2 CMLR 46. 
472 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/02, art. 51. 
473 Michael Dougan, ‘Judicial Review of Member State Action under the General Principles and the Charter: Defining the 
“Scope of Union Law”’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 1201, 1205-1206. 
474 Case C-617/10 Aklagaren v Fransson [2013] 2 CMLR 46 at [24]. 
475 Case C-617/10 Aklagaren v Fransson [2013] 2 CMLR 46 at [25]. 
476 See Panos Koutrakos, ‘Does the United Kingdom have a general opt out from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights?’ 
(2014) 39 European Law Review 1; Michael Dougan, ‘Judicial Review of Member State Action under the General Principles 
and the Charter: Defining the “Scope of Union Law”’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 1201, 1214-1215. 
477 Bas Van Bockel and Peter Wattel, ‘New wine into old wineskins: The scope of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU After Akerberg Fransson’ (2013) 38 European Law Review 866, 871. 
478 Case C-333/13 Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig [2015] 1 CMLR 48. 
479 Case C-128/12 Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte v BPN [2013] ECR I-149. 
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restricted the application of the Charter,480 making the actual scope of the Charter even less clear. 
What is clear is that with the EU asserting a right to interpret the ECHR in the context of EU law and 
the scope of EU law and the CJEU’s jurisdiction over fundamental rights expanding, the potential for 
clashes with ECtHR jurisprudence and divergences from common standards of human rights are 
becoming increasingly likely.481 
 
 A Race to the Bottom in EU Law? 
There is also a very worrying prospect that the EU’s pursuit of a level playing field across Europe in 
different fields risks creating a race to the bottom, with the lowest common standard becoming the 
European norm.482 In theory, this should be prevented by the application of Art. 53(3) of the Charter, 
as we noted above, however in practice the results are quite different. In the case of Melloni,483 the 
applicant was arrested in Spain under a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) after he had been convicted 
in absentia of bankruptcy fraud in Italy and sentenced to 10 years in prison. The applicant knew he 
was set to be tried for this offence and sent lawyers to represent him at the trial. However, on being 
detained in Spain pursuant to the arrest warrant, he protested that he would not be entitled to a 
retrial in Italy once he returned and as a result could not be surrendered under Spanish law. 
The right to a fair trial in the Spanish Constitution requires that, if a person has been convicted in his 
absence, a surrender for the execution of that conviction must be made conditional on the right to 
challenge the conviction in order to safeguard that person’s rights of defence, even if he had given 
power of attorney to a lawyer who effectively represented him at the trial.484 The right to a fair trial is 
also protected in the Charter. Art. 47 states ‘[e]veryone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within 
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone 
shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented’.485 
Art. 53 of the Charter also made it clear that: 
‘Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of 
application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to 
which the Union, the Community or all the Member States are party, including the 
                                                          
480 For analysis see Cian Murphy, ‘Bulletin on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: an introduction (Part 1)’ [2016] European 
Human Rights Law Review 24, 28 and Bas Van Bockel and Peter Wattel, ‘New wine into old wineskins: The scope of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU After Akerberg Fransson’ (2013) 38 European Law Review 866. 
481 It is worth noting that this generated a further divergence from the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on the ne bis in idem principle 
see Bas Van Bockel and Peter Wattel, ‘New wine into old wineskins: The scope of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU After Akerberg Fransson’ (2013) 38 European Law Review 866, 871-872. Although for a contrasting view that the Fransson 
case was consistent with ECtHR jurisprudence see Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner, Angela Ward, The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart 2014) 1583. 
482 The European Court of Human Rights has also been criticised for allowing States too much leeway to interpret Convention 
rights through the margin of appreciation, with some arguing it is used to apply a lowest common denominator standard – 
see John Murray, ‘The Influence of the European Convention on fundamental rights on Community Law’ (2010) 33 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1388, 1404; Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the 
Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
(2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 625. 
483 Case C-399/11 Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal [2013] 2 CMLR 43. 
484 Case C-399/11 Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal [2013] 2 CMLR 43 at [17]. 
485 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/02, art. 47. 
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and by the Member States' constitutions’.486 
By contrast the EAW Framework Decisions only allowed States to refuse to surrender a person subject 
to a European Arrest Warrant in certain circumstances.487 Where a person who was convicted in his 
absence was defended and represented by a lawyer, the executing State cannot refuse to surrender 
(Art. 4a(1)(b)). Thus, the Spanish constitutional court issued a preliminary reference asking:  
(a) whether the Framework decision precluded Spain from making M’s surrender 
conditional on the availability of a retrial? 
(b) whether the framework decision was compatible with the Art. 47 of the Charter?  
(c) whether Art. 53 allowed Spain to make the applicant’s surrender conditional on 
the availability of a retrial?  
The CJEU held that the Framework Decision precluded Spain from making the execution of the arrest 
warrant conditional on the conviction being open to review in Italy and where the applicant had been 
aware of the trial and represented, the executing State was obliged to surrender him. The Court also 
held that the Framework Decision was compatible with Art. 47 and 48 of the Charter. The right to a 
fair trial was not absolute and the applicant could have attended the trial if he wished. As he hadn’t 
attended, he had effectively waived his fair trial rights.488 Most importantly, in this context, the CJEU 
held that the national court was not permitted to apply the superior human rights protection in the 
domestic law to areas that were fully harmonised under EU law. The rationale for this was that it 
would cast doubt on ‘the uniformity of the standard of protection of fundamental rights’, it would 
‘undermine the principles of mutual trust’ and ‘compromise the efficacy of that framework 
decision’.489 
In theory, this approach serves to secure a common human rights standard across Europe in areas 
that are subject to complete harmonisation under EU law. However, in practice this ruling does not 
serve the ends of human rights protection. It effectively ensures that only the lowest common 
denominator of human rights protection within the EU will prevail over higher national levels of 
protection. Indeed it creates the possibility of further divergences in common human rights standards 
whereby areas that are not subject to EU harmonisation may benefit from superior fair trial 
protections, possibly even those introduced by the ECtHR, while areas subject to EU harmonisation 
may suffer from poorer human rights protection.  
This brings us back to Opinion 2/13. In that case, the CJEU maintained that accession to the ECHR 
would undermine the principle of mutual trust.490 In the CJEU’s own words:  
‘the principle of mutual trust between the Member States is of fundamental 
importance in EU law, given that it allows an area without internal borders to be 
created and maintained. That principle requires, particularly with regard to the area 
of freedom, security and justice, each of those States, save in exceptional 
                                                          
486 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/02, art. 53. 
487 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 
Member States [2002] OJ L 190/1. 
488 Case C-399/11 Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal [2013] 2 CMLR 43 at [52]. 
489 Case C-399/11 Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal [2013] 2 CMLR 43 at [63]. 
490 Opinion 2/13 of the court (Re accession to European Convention on Human Rights) [2015] 2 CMLR 21 at [194]. 
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circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law 
and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law’.491 
Thus each MS must presume that the other MS is complying with EU fundamental rights law and ‘may 
not check whether that other Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the EU’.492 One of the CJEU’s central objections to accession was that the ECtHR 
would require a Member State to check that another Member State has observed fundamental rights, 
which would conflict with the obligation of mutual trust between those Member States and would 
‘upset the underlying balance of the EU’ and ‘undermine the authority of EU law’.493  
Of course the CJEU is completely correct in its assessment, accession to the Convention would 
certainly undermine the principle of mutual trust and this measure is ostensibly aimed at ensuring 
common standards across the EU. However, in practice this approach actually undermines the 
realisation of common human rights protections within the EU. We know for a fact that there are 
disparities in the levels of human rights protection between different Member States, these have even 
been pointed out in the specific context of EU law by the ECtHR in MSS v Belgium and Greece.494 In 
that case an asylum seeker was sent from Belgium back to Greece, where he first entered the EU, 
under the Dublin Regulation.495 The applicant was detained in appalling conditions there, which 
amounted to a violation of the prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.  
The CJEU later ruled on a very similar case in R. (NS) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.496 
In that case asylum seekers were due to be returned to Greece by UK and Irish authorities under the 
Dublin Regulation. A preliminary reference was sought inter alia to determine whether the sending 
State was obliged to assess the receiving State’s compliance with fundamental rights when applying 
the Dublin Regulation. The CJEU ruled ‘it must be assumed that the treatment of asylum seekers in all 
Member States complies with the requirements of the Charter, the Geneva Convention and the 
ECHR’.497 However, this presumption was rebuttable where the Member State at issue ‘cannot be 
unaware’ of the systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure of a Member State.498 Thus, while the 
CJEU entertains the possibility that the presumption can be rebutted, the threshold for doing so is 
particularly high and Koutrakos notes that the CJEU later held that the identification of systemic 
deficiencies in the asylum procedure is the only way in which the presumption can be rebutted.499 The 
ECtHR by contrast demands ‘a thorough and individualised examination of the situation of the person 
concerned’.500 
More recently the CJEU has taken an approach closer to that of the European Court of Human Rights 
in the case of Aranyosi and Caldararu v Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen.501 In that case the 
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497 Case C-411/10 R. (NS) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 2 CMLR 9 at [80]. 
498 Case C-411/10 R. (NS) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 2 CMLR 9 at [106]. 
499 See Panos Koutrakos, ‘ECJ, Strasbourg and national courts: an exercise in guesswork?’ (2015) 40 European Law Review 
641 citing Case C-394/12 Abdullahi v Bundesasylamt [2013] ECR I-813 at [60]. 
500 Tarakhel v Switzerland (App No 29217/12) judgment of 4 November 2014 at [104]. 
501 Case C-404/15 and C-659/15 Aranyosi and Caldararu v Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen unreported 5 April 2016 
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applicants were subject to EAWs and challenged the warrants on the ground that they faced return to 
inhuman and degrading detention conditions in Hungarian and Romanian prisons, which are incredibly 
overcrowded.502 The CJEU ruled that where there is evidence of a real risk of inhuman or degrading 
treatment of persons detained in the Member State where the warrant was issued, the executing 
Member State can defer the execution and seek additional information from the Member State to 
discount the risk to the individual applicant.503 If the existence of that risk cannot be discounted within 
a reasonable period, the executing authority must decide whether the surrender procedure should be 
brought to an end.504 This approach is much more promising from a human rights protection 
perspective. It recognises the differing levels of protection between different Member States and 
allows this to influence the EAW procedures giving some discretion to the executing state. It also 
focuses more on the threat to the individual, rather than systemic deficiencies, thereby aligning it 
more closely with the ECtHR’s approach. This judgment clearly shows that the EAW can be flexible and 
arguably shows that the CJEU’s concerns about the influence that ECHR accession will have on mutual 
trust are overstated.  
The CJEU undermines the protection of human rights within Europe through its interpretation of the 
principle of mutual trust in Opinion 2/13. This is one of the reasons why Professor Steve Peers 
described Opinion 2/13 bluntly, but accurately, as ‘a clear and present danger to human rights 
protection’ in Europe.505 While the principle of mutual trust may be an expedient tool for 
harmonisation within the EU, what good is it if it persistently undermines human rights protection? 
Ultimately, this conflict between preserving mutual trust and ensuring human rights protection need 
not even arise. The issue is, at its heart, a question of prioritisation for the CJEU, because if you look 
at the article in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union establishing the area of freedom 
security and justice within the EU, it states: 
‘The Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for 
fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member 
States’ (emphasis added).506 
In cases like Melloni and Opinion 2/13, the CJEU focuses disproportionately on the establishment of a 
common area of freedom, security and justice, without placing enough emphasis on ensuring respect 
for fundamental rights and the different legal systems of Member States. Nowhere in the terms of EU 
law does it say that the principle mutual trust should override fundamental rights protection. In 
establishing an area of freedom, security and justice underpinned by mutual trust within the EU, the 
CJEU has ‘forgotten’ that it must simultaneously ensure respect for human rights. Preventing Member 
States from checking whether human rights are actually protected by the other Member States in 
practice, rather than simply in theory, will not ultimately ensure that this end is achieved and that 
common human rights standards are actually protected within Europe. 
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G. Joint programmes  
 Introduction 
While the topics of EU accession to the ECHR and the mutual influence of human rights law of both 
organisations attract the majority of academic attention, other forms of interaction between EU and 
CoE have insofar gathered sporadic interest in literature. This chapter seeks to explore the background 
and the current state of the Joint Programmes (JP), which constitute one of the largest areas of 
cooperation between the CoE and the EU in terms of resources involved and both geographic and 
thematic scope. Evolving over the course of over 20 years, the JP framework was expanded, modified 
and adjusted on several occasions, following major developments in relations between the CoE and 
the EU. The goals of the FRAME project encourage a closer look at the history and the current state of 
the JP, with a view towards assessing the role they have played insofar and the prospects for their 
further development towards meeting the needs of both organisations.  
 
 History and Development of Joint Programmes 
The history of Joint Programmes begins with the 1987 arrangements between the CoE and the EU, 
which have opened a new chapter of increased contact and co-operation between both 
organisations.507 Moving forward with the concept of joint action in the field of democracy, human 
rights and rule of law, the EU and the CoE have set out to find a formula for collaboration. The first JP 
were launched in 1993 with an initial focus on the CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) area.508 The 
overarching principles of the JPs have not changed much since their introduction. The EU, drawing 
upon its considerably larger financial resources, acts as a primary donor of funds and resources for 
carrying out the JPs, while the CoE, in its capability as an implementing institution with extensive on-
the-ground experience, implements the JPs and facilitates all activities therein, including management 
and evaluation of projects. While the initial idea regarding the financing of the JPs was for both 
organisations to share the costs on a 50/50 basis, the discrepancy in available funds between the CoE 
and the EU quickly led to the latter taking on the majority of financial burden. Additionally, the 
financing of JP was made open to donations from EU and CoE Member States and observers.  
The rationale for these arrangements flowed from axiological differences between the organisations 
at the time, when the EU was seen as an economically-based organisation with little concern for 
human rights, while the CoE continued to persist as a value-based organisation for which human rights 
were of direct and primary concern. Another characteristic of the JP which has developed and 
continued across the years is their thematic and geographic scope. While initially the JP were aimed 
at new CoE members509, over the time the JP have expanded in their scope, including both existing 
and prospective EU Member States as well as the EU’s broadly understood ‘neighbourhood’. As new 
Member States joined the EU, the geographical focus of JPs expanded, yet remained firmly centred 
around prospective candidates, associated states and the close perihelion of the EU. Several 
multilateral JP as well as projects specifically aimed either at EU Member States have been carried out 
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over the years, yet in general it can be concluded that the EU has primarily focused its cooperation 
with the CoE under the JP framework on countries which were part of its enlargement policy and 
regional external action.  
As the relationship between the EU and the CoE entered into new phases, so did the JP framework 
evolve following important developments in the relations between both organisations. The Joint 
Declaration of 2001 highlighted the importance of JP and established their place within the larger 
context of EU-CoE cooperation.510 Monitoring the current state of the JP was entrusted to the annual 
CoE-Commission meetings, and the principle of co-financing by both organisations was enshrined, 
however the Joint Declaration did not specify the co-financing ratio. Strategic coordination of JP was 
implemented via so-called ‘scoreboard’ meetings, held on the margins of the annual CoE-EU Senior 
officials meeting.511 In addition, on a regular basis, the Council of Europe and the European 
Commission were to review progress made under the Joint programmes through Steering 
Committees. In January 2003, the CoE Office of the Director General of Programmes launched the JP 
website with a list of all current and concluded JP, complete with basic information on their budgets, 
activities and the unit responsible within the CoE.512 The website serves to this day as the primary 
resource of information on JPs. 
Throughout the first decade of the XXI century, the JP have gradually expanded in both scope and 
budget. The 2007 Memorandum of Understanding between the CoE and the EU reaffirmed the 
importance of JP and contained a paragraph related to their status and future: 
‘In line with the Joint Declaration on co-operation and partnership between the Council of 
Europe and the European Commission signed on 3 April 2001, ongoing co-operation will be 
reinforced in the framework of the joint programmes, which could include regional thematic 
programmes. The Council of Europe will continue to provide for consultations with Council of 
Europe beneficiary member countries. Consultations involving the European Commission, the 
Secretariat of the Council of Europe and as a general rule the Council of Europe member 
countries concerned will continue to be organised to discuss the priorities of cooperation. 
Member and observer states which are donors will be invited to take part in this co-operation 
and its evaluation.’513 
 At the same time, tensions of both intra- and inter-organisational nature began to arise. These 
tensions reflected several factors present within the CoE and the EU as well as in their mutual 
engagement. On the EU side, the two entities responsible for facilitating cooperation with the CoE in 
the context of JP, namely the EEAS (formerly DG RELEX) and the DG DEVCO/EuropeAid have displayed 
different visions of the nature of relationship between both organisations. The DG RELEX/EEAS 
assumed a value-based approach, considering the CoE as an overarching strategic partner for 
furthering common policy goals, while the DG DEVCO saw the CoE primarily as an instrument for 
implementation.514 Aside these differences, the EU institutions became increasingly concerned 
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regarding CoE’s implementation of JPs and the actual impact of activities, as well as the issue of 
visibility of EU’s contribution to the JPs. On the CoE side, the disparity in capabilities of both 
organisations became an increasing issue.515  
Towards assessing the current state of JP and taking stock of achievements and shortcomings of 
engagement with the CoE, in 2010 the DG DEVCO commissioned an evaluation of cooperation 
between the Commission and the Council of Europe. The evaluation was carried out by the 
consultancy company PARTICIP GmbH, which delivered the final evaluation report in 2012.516 While 
the ToR of the framework contract for evaluation assumed an analysis of all aspects of EU-CoE co-
operation facilitated by the Commission, in fact the vast majority of the final report pertains to JP. The 
evaluation covered all JP carried out from 2000 to 2010 with primary objectives outlined as: providing 
the relevant services of the Commission and the wider public with an overall independent and 
accountable assessment of the EC’s past and current cooperation with the CoE; identifying key lessons 
from the EC’s past overall co-operation, and providing the EC’s policy-makers and managers with a 
valuable aid to evidence-based decision making, and for planning, designing and implementing EU 
policies.517 The evaluation was focused on managerial and technical aspects of JP, with a special view 
towards taking stock of practical aspects of cooperation between various actors within both 
organisations. The evaluation included an assessment of the impact the JPs have on human rights 
protection in beneficiary countries, but it was primarily focused on inter-institutional and technical 
aspects of the JPs. The evaluation found the cooperation between both organisations as highly 
relevant and sustainable, yet suffering in efficiency due to weaknesses in management which in turn 
have had impact on effectiveness of JP.518 Lack of systematic evaluation of JPs made measuring 
progress difficult and issues of horizontal complementarity and synergy between JP as well as on-the-
ground coordination between EU and CoE country offices was raised as well. The main 
recommendations included: encouraging the CoE to adopt an institution-wide approach to delivering 
assistance in line with international best practices, strengthening strategic joint priority setting at 
country level, insisting on and supporting stronger project cycle management of JP, ensuring stability, 
predictability and reasonable flexibility of the funding for the JP and strengthening the foundation for 
capacity building activities and establishing their links to results.519 
These recommendations were, for the most part, accepted fully or partially by both organisations, and 
moves were taken towards decreasing fragmentation of the JPs, increasing their predictability and 
improving impact of results on the ground. While the evaluation was still underway, in 2011 the CoE 
and DEVCO agreed on the visual identity of JPs, which ensured that both organisations’ presence was 
to be adequately visualised.520 The efforts towards reforming the JP framework resulted in signing a 
programmatic agreement – ‘Statement of Intent’ (SoI) - between the EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle, and the Secretary General of the CoE, 
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Thorbjørn Jagland, on 1 April 2014.521 The scope of the agreement and the fact that it was negotiated 
and signed by the head of DG ENLARG reinforces the status of JP within the EU policies as instruments 
of enlargement and neighbourhood policies. The Statement of Intent outlines its aims to provide a 
specific and predictable cooperation framework built towards reinforcing  
‘the link between the Council of Europe's standard-setting and monitoring tools and its 
cooperation activities’522 as well as ‘(…) ensuring predictable and flexible long-term CoE-EC 
engagement through reinforced upstream coordination on assistance to partner countries 
and through an increased coordination in policy definition and implementation of 
cooperation in mutual fields of interest.’523 
The Statement of Intent covers three priority geographical areas: the countries of Enlargement 
(Albania, FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey), the countries covered by the EU Eastern 
Partnership (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus) and the countries of the 
Southern Mediterranean region (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and 
the Palestinian National Authority; the EU-Syria bilateral cooperation has been suspended since May 
2012). The Statement of Intent was meant to be followed up by new frameworks specific to each of 
the three areas. Insofar, such frameworks were established in regard to EU Eastern Partnership and 
the Southern Mediterranean. In regard to the Eastern Partnership countries, a new modality of 
cooperation ‘Programmatic Co-operation Framework for the countries of the Eastern Partnership’ 
(PCF - EaP), was introduced in December 2014 with an overall envelope of 33.8m EUR over the course 
of 3 years.524 The funding of PCF-EAP is split into 90% funding from the EU and 10% funding from the 
CoE, with the CoE as the implementing partner as per usual JP modalities. The programming of PCF-
EaP is based upon EU policy priorities for the EaP and EU human rights country strategies as well as 
CoE country-specific Action Plans. The PCF-EaP includes five principal priority areas for action: 
protection and promotion of human rights, ensuring justice, combating threats to the rules of law, 
addressing challenges of the information society and promoting democratic governance. In regard to 
the Southern Neighbourhood, the Statement of Intent set out to continue the existing JP approach, 
with the specific aim to build upon the experiences of one particular JP, namely the ‘South Programme 
I’ and with a long-term goal of establishing a co-operation framework akin to the PCF-EaP.525 In 
December 2014, a follow-up JP to the ‘South Programme I’ entitled ‘Towards Strengthened 
Democratic Governance in the Southern Mediterranean’ (South Programme - II) was initiated with a 
budget of 7.37m EUR for the years 2015-2017.526 Its principal purposes have been outlined as: 
supporting constitutional processes, the development of new legislation and the setting-up and 
functioning of human rights and democratic governance structures; promoting the creation and 
consolidation of a common legal space between Europe and the Southern Mediterranean by raising 
awareness on key CoE Conventions and other European and international standards; supporting on-
going democratic reform processes and foster regional co-operation in the field of human rights, rule 
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on 22 April 2016. 
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of law and democracy through the creation of, and support to, formal and informal networks between 
Europe and the South Mediterranean, as well as within the region. At the time of preparation of this 
report a framework agreement was foreseen concerning the Enlargement countries of South East 
Europe, with preliminary work on the nature and structure of the programme underway.  
Meanwhile, both the CoE and the EU underwent internal adjustments towards increasing the quality 
of cooperation in the context of the JP. The CoE is currently implementing a major reform of its 
programme management framework towards increasing efficiency and delivering results-based 
evaluation and performance criteria, while the EU has established a new model of contractual 
arrangement with international organisations. In June 2015, the CoE and the European Commission 
concluded the Framework Administrative Agreement which contains provisions regarding technical 
and financial aspects of co-operation in the context of Joint Programmes such as granting procedures 
and rules specific to the co-operation between both organisations.527 
 
 Statistical information 
For the fiscal year 2014, 54 JPs were active.528 The total financial volume of these active programmes 
amounted to 88.5m EUR, down from 95.3m EUR in 2013.529 Across all active JP in the year 2014, the 
budget share of the EU amounted to 75.6m EUR (86%), while the CoE share corresponded to 12.7m 
EUR (14%).530 The annual budgetary envelope for the year 2014 amounted to 29.2m EUR, with the EU 
share at 24.5m EUR (84%) and the CoE share a 4.7m EUR (16%).531 To provide some perspective on 
these numbers, the budget of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency for 2014 was set at 21.3m EUR, while 
the core budget of the OSCE ODIHR for 2014 was set at 16m EUR. An even more striking figure is the 
amount of EU contributions to the JP budget set against other extra-budgetary contributions to the 
CoE finances. In 2014, all EU receipts for JP registered by the CoE amounted to 21.5m EUR, which is 
just over 50% of the CoE’s total income from extra-budgetary sources and 91% of the total EU 
voluntary contributions (covering JP and other forms of co-operation).532 The following chart shows 
the value of the total financial volume of all JP active through the years 2006-2014:533 
                                                          
527 Council of Europe, European Union, Framework Administrative Agreement between the Council of Europe and the 
European Union on Actions administered by the Council of Europe and funded or co-funded by the EU, 18 June 2015. 
528 Council of Europe, Joint Programmes between the Council of Europe and the European Union in 2014 – Information 
Document. GR-EXT(2015)6, 23 March 2015 3. 
529 Supra. 
530 Supra. 
531 Supra. 
532 Supra. 
533 Supra. 
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Figure 2 EU/CoE Contributions to Joint Programmes 2006-2014 
 
In 2014, the geographical distribution of JPs was heavily slanted towards South Eastern Europe and 
Turkey – the total volume of ongoing JP concerning these areas was at 40.5m EUR (46% total), with 
Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus at 20.9m EUR (24% total), multilateral JP at 13.4m EUR (15%), 
JP aimed at non-Member States (South Neighbourhood and Central Asia) at 8.4m EUR (9%) and JP 
aimed at EU Member States at 5m EUR (6%).534 Thematically, the JP were distributed as follows: rule 
of law at 36.6m EUR (41%), democracy at 32.1m EUR (36%) and human rights at 19.2m EUR (23%).535 
The distribution of EU financial sources used to fund the JP in 2014 is illustrated by the chart below. 
 
                                                          
534 Supra, 5-6. 
535 Supra, 8. 
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Figure 3 Distribution of JP financing by EU instruments/budget lines 
 
As the above chart indicates, the majority of the EU financial contribution to JP is channeled through 
instruments and budget lines related to external action (IPA, ENPI, EIDHR, IFS, DCI-ENV, DCI-ASIE, PFM, 
DCI-NSA and DG IND). The contribution from the budget lines of primarily internally-oriented 
Commission’s directorates-general DG EAC, DG EMP, DG HOME, DG IND and DG JUST amounted to 
just over 16% of the total. One must remember that the internally-oriented DGs feature external 
actions in the areas of international cooperation relevant to the respective DG’s policy areas.  
 
 JP Modalities  
Currently, the JP can be broadly divided into two categories. One comprises the PCF-EaP programmes 
(15 linked JPs) and the ‘South Programme II’ JP, which are all entrenched in the agreements enshrined 
in the 2014 Statement of Intent. The second group comprises of other JP, which follow pre-existing 
modalities. Priorities and purposes of the JP are set out jointly the by the EEAS and the CoE Office of 
the Directorate General of Programmes (ODGP, formerly Directorate of Strategic Planning), as well as 
other services as applicable. The final selection and administrative follow-up as well as evaluation and 
monitoring of JPs is carried out by DG DEVCO. DG ENLARG is also involved in the planning process as 
far as the JPs concern Enlargement/Neighbourhood countries, which in practice is the case for 
majority of the JPs. Other actors within the Commission such as DG HOME and DG JUST are 
occasionally involved if the given JP is related to their policy areas or is proposed to be co-funded from 
their budgets.  
Modalities of JP implementation vary greatly. Horizontal JPs which involve more than one beneficiary 
country are overseen by project managers both at DG DEVCO and at the CoE ODGP. For country-
specific JPs, the EU works through its EUDELs and in case of Enlargement countries, through existing 
national contracting authority. In Enlargement countries, the CoE typically acts through a dedicated 
project office, which usually is attached to the CoE country office or with the beneficiary authority, 
and will liaise on contractual issues with the contracting authority, but also with the EUDEL on major 
questions regarding the substance and progress of the project. All CoE activities regardless of the 
character of the JP are backstopped by the CoE Secretariat and the ODGP in Strasbourg.536 Some JPs 
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are organised as so-called joint actions, which are financed or co-financed by the EU on a regular, 
recurring basis, frequently with a multi-annual framework agreement reinforced by annual 
agreements for specific activities. However, some JPs are implemented in multiple phases without 
framework agreements, such as was the case with the JP ‘Peer-to-Peer II’ (see Appendix I.3 of this 
report) which was a follow-up to the ‘Peer-to-Peer’ JP.  
The JP consist of various activities agreed upon by both organisations in consultation with relevant 
authorities of participating states and stakeholders such as the national NHRIs. Typical activities 
include: trainings, expert opinions and advice, conferences, workshops, seminars, publications and 
dissemination activates. Some JPs engage in peer-to-peer sharing of best practices and achievements. 
Overall, the bulk of JP actions are centred on training, education and advice. Material support is rare 
but present in some JPs, in particular when the EU and the CoE jointly support the establishment of 
new institutions or facilities. The JPs engage a wide variety of stakeholders, including governmental 
bodies (ministries and departments), courts, prosecutors, NHRIs, professional associations 
(journalists, lawyers), NGOs and human rights defenders. Evaluations and assessments of JPs have 
insofar been conducted on an irregular basis. Prior to the 2012 evaluation of the JPs there were no 
established practices for evaluating JPs, with some programmes relying on external experts while 
some conducting purely internal evaluations.537 In either case, the evaluations were facilitated by the 
CoE. Following the establishing of the Directorate of Internal Oversight (DiO) within the CoE 
Secretariat, the evaluations have become a standard feature of every JP with the DiO working together 
with DG DEVCO on methodology and management of evaluation process. 
 
 Conclusions 
The JPs represent a unique example of inter-organisational cooperation in the fields of democracy, 
the rule of law and human rights. No two other regional organisations have been able to implement 
an instrument of joint action on such a scale and magnitude as the CoE and the EU. The JP will soon 
see the 25th anniversary of their introduction and their continued existence can be certainly 
considered a success of EU and CoE. Furthermore, the JP are a dynamic instrument, which has evolved 
the years, with both organisations being able to look critically at achievements and shortcomings of 
JP and to adjust towards increased relevance, efficiency, efficacy and sustainability. From the overall 
perspective of EU’s engagement with the CoE, the JPs represent the third vital pillar of this 
relationship, next to the process of EU accession to the ECHR and the ongoing political co-operation 
and dialogue between both organisations. Given the current situation after the CJEU opinion 2/13, the 
importance of JPs as a vehicle for fulfilling common human rights aspirations of the EU and the CoE is 
all the greater. In fact, while the EU seeks a solution to the stumble in accession to the ECHR, the JPs 
represent the primary means of achieving the joint aspirations and goals set out by both organisations 
in the 2007 MoU. With the matter of resolving the accession stumble arguably having now secondary 
priority on the EU’s agenda, the JPs could well become the primary mode of substantive cooperation 
with the CoE for some time to come. 
Yet despite the significance and successes of JPs, they are not free from criticism. The CoE has 
found itself in the position of a partner with inferior resources yet supposedly superior knowledge and 
ability, with some within the CoE questioning the ‘joint’ nature of the JPs and pointing out that in fact 
                                                          
537 Interview with experts, Strasbourg, November 2012. 
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the CoE is being employed by the EU as an arguably inexpensive outsourcing towards meeting EU’s 
policy goals.538 On the other hand, the EU has criticised the aforementioned shortcomings of project 
management within the CoE and at low visibility of EU’s contribution despite its value. The reforms of 
the JP framework should hopefully alleviate most of these issues. The adoption of the 2014 Statement 
of Intent and the 2015 FAA are promising developments, and the ‘new opening’ of JPs spearheaded 
by the PCF-EaP programmes and the large ‘South II’ JP hopefully signal a new era in history of JPs, yet 
it is too early at this stage to conclude whether the expected improvements were attained. For certain, 
both the PCF-EaP and South II have attained increased visibility compared to other JPs, with 
comprehensive websites and use of social media.539 
One of the most striking critical observations regarding JPs concerns the paradigm of the EU employing 
the JP as a tool of enlargement and neighbourhood policies, with their geographical scope shrinking 
as new Member States join the EU and thus cease to be primary beneficiaries of JPs. The new 
arrangements regarding the JPs established via the ‘Statement of Intent’ in 2014 reinforce this status 
quo with the ‘new wave’ of JP (PCF-EaP and South II) aimed at South Mediterranean and Eastern 
Partnership. While some JPs engage EU Member States to a limited degree, the 28 countries remain 
at best secondary beneficiaries of the most extensive form of CoE-EU cooperation. Up until now, the 
EU could have presented such status quo as a consequence of the fact that the ‘internal’ sphere of 
engagement with the CoE was to be addressed by the EU accession to the ECHR. However, with 
prospects for speedy accession being bleak, the EU could do well to revisit the role of the JPs and 
reflect on whether they shouldn’t be reoriented towards engaging EU Member States to a greater 
degree than they have been so far. 
 
H. Chances and opportunities  
1. The interest of the EU in cooperation with the Council of Europe has been growing in parallel 
with the increasing role of fundamental rights within the EU. Today, the EU recognizes the partnership 
with the Council of Europe in the area of human rights and democracy as particularly important. From 
the Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative of the European 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament and the Council: Action Plan 
on Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019), one can gather that like the United Nations is the EU 
key partner at the multilateral level, the Council of Europe takes a similar position at the regional level.  
2. A Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2007 between the European Union and the 
Council of Europe (MoU) provides the policy foundation for the current state of relations between 
both organisations. By reaching this agreement, both Organisations successfully took an important 
threshold-test in the process of creating a cohesive European space of human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law. The MoU has outlined common goals, objectives and principles. It has lessened fears 
of possible institutional competition which might have had a disintegrating impact on the European 
scene. Finally, MoU has also identified areas and modalities of cooperation between both 
organisations to the benefit of people in Europe.  
                                                          
538 Supra (fn 138), 28. 
539 The PCF-EaP website is currently available at <http://pjp-eu.coe.int/en/web/eap-pcf/home> and the South II website is 
available at <http://pjp-eu.coe.int/en/web/south-programme2/home> as of 26 April 2016. 
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3. Although oriented to the future, the MoU, as any other agreement, is also a testimony of its 
birth-time. While approaching the 10th anniversary of this document, it is justified to revisit its content 
and progress of its implementation. The last 10 years have brought several changes in the mutual 
relations between the EU and the Council of Europe, on the one hand, and the approaches to human 
rights, on the other hand. The report provides an in-depth and comprehensive analysis in this regard, 
emphasizing inter alia that:  
a. The MoU reaffirms the central role of EU - CoE joint programmes, the history of which goes 
back to 1993, in reinforcing cooperation between both organisations.  
b. The scope of biannual priorities guiding cooperation of the EU with the CoE in the framework 
of the MoU has expanded and the last of these documents for 2016-2017 covers the entire range 
of human rights issues listed in the MoU. This is an important development, since previous 
biannual priorities omitted certain important areas, such as racism, xenophobia and intolerance. 
In this context, it is to be pointed out that none of the EU’s policy documents analysed in this 
report reflect the CoE’s active engagement with regard to the rights of migrants and the rights of 
people with disabilities. These gaps and inconsistencies are unfortunate, for both of these issues 
should play a significant role in EU human rights policy, in light of the migrant crisis on the one 
hand, and the EU’s accession to the UN Disability Convention on the other hand.  
c. However, the MoU itself takes a selective and unequal approach to various categories of 
human rights. It focuses primarily on civil and political rights, such as freedom of expression or 
prohibition of torture, or on general concerns, such as rights of minorities, discrimination, 
intolerance, racism, cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue, and education. References to core 
ESC rights, such as labour rights, right to health, right to adequate standards of living or right to 
social security are missing. In the light of the current Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 
(2015-2019), which attaches significantly more weight to economic, social and cultural rights 
than previous EU policy documents, this question deserves to be rectified. Yet, the report 
emphasizes that even under the present MoU several aspects of safeguarding these rights have 
been included into EU-CoE Joint Programmes.  
d. Institutionally, the MoU is seen as a source of the limitation of the Fundamental Rights Agency 
mandate to the observance of fundamental rights solely within the framework of the EU policies, 
law and practice. In the light of the experience gathered and taking into account cooperation 
agreement between the FRA and the CoE, which provides the basis for working effectively 
together towards common goals, such a limitation seems to be not only unnecessary, but also 
interfering with the potential of FRA eventually at the expense of the human rights protection.  
4. Besides the process of EU accession to the ECHR and the ongoing political co-operation and 
dialogue, EU-CoE Joint Programmes constitute the third vital pillar of cooperation between both 
organisations. Their focus: progress in the fields of democracy, rule of law and human rights at the 
country level make them a vehicle for transferring common policies in reality. The continuing process 
of their assessment reveals some points that need to be addressed. Because of an imbalance in 
financing (the EU as the main contributor), some commentators tend to see the Joint Programmes as 
an ‘inexpensive’ outsourcing towards meeting EU’s policy goals. Yet, these observations should be put 
against the background of resource statistics of both organisations: the budget of the EU for the year 
2016 is set at 155b EUR, compared to the total budget of the CoE set at 422m EUR. On the other hand, 
there are some critical voices from the EU about low visibility of its contribution. The Joint 
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Programmes framework is, however, evolving, embracing some new initiatives, such as Programmatic 
Cooperation Framework for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus 
or South II (the Southern Mediterranean). This gives not only new impetus to cooperation between 
the EU and CoE, but may also facilitate addressing problems that have occurred.  
5. One of the critical challenges to the EU and the CoE is to work together towards a cohesive 
European framework of human rights that would enhance the impact of relevant standards Europe-
wide and made stronger their institutional protection at the regional level. Several steps have been 
taken in this regard by the Member States, policy making and judicial bodies of both organisations. 
Progress achieved is unquestionable. The impact of the Council of Europe heritage in the area of 
human rights on EU human rights laws and policies is widely recognized and welcomed. The CoE does 
not only contributes to the development of EU human rights law and policy through the adoption of 
legal standards, but also by providing information and expertise. Exchanges between bodies and 
officials of both organisations, training provided to EEAS staff by the Council of Europe, and the use of 
the recommendations made by the Council of Europe’s monitoring bodies all are examples of channels 
of mutual enrichment and influence.  
6. The EU legislative bodies and the Court of Justice tend to draw on the conventions and 
jurisprudence of the CoE as a source of inspiration for their own law-making and judicial 
interpretations respectively. Yet, although more than 50 CoE conventions are open for accession by 
the EU, only in a few cases the EU benefited from this opportunity (see chapter II.E.1). It is to be hoped 
that ratification of the CoE legal instruments by the EU will be an increasingly important factor in 
building cohesive EU-CoE approaches in the areas of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. In 
particular, in the areas of trafficking of human beings, children’s rights, data protection and women’s 
rights, there are signals that the ratification of the relevant instruments is under consideration by the 
EU.  
7. Cooperation between the EU and the CoE has reached a new legal dimension with the 
adoption of Lisbon Treaty in which the Union commits itself to become a party to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, giving the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights the status of 
the Union’s primary law, this Treaty made the interpretative linkage of the Charter with the European 
Convention a legal commitment of the EU Member States and the relevant EU institutions.  
8. The accession to the ECHR should not only serve the strengthening of a cohesive human rights 
system in Europe but also enhance the protection of the rights-holders within the EU. It turns out, 
however, that despite expected advantages of this step and dedicated efforts aimed at the elaboration 
of accession instruments, the ratification process has encountered significant hurdles. In its Opinion 
2/13, the CJEU regarded some elements of the Draft Accession Agreement as a threat to the autonomy 
of EU law, its supremacy, the principle of direct effect, the conferral of powers, as well as the principle 
of mutual trust. For that reason, the CJEU has recognized the Draft Accession Agreement as 
incompatible with the EU treaties and thereby stalled the accession of the EU to the ECHR for the 
foreseeable future. The impact of this decision is analysed in details in the chapter II F of this report.  
9. Thus, the highly complex issue of the rapprochement of the human rights protection systems 
of the CoE and the EU has entered a new phase featured by dilemmas that might be difficult to 
overcome in the near future. No surprise that the CJEU’s Opinion has not been welcomed by many 
advocates of a coherent Europe-wide human rights system. While a period for a ‘second thought’ is 
obviously needed, it is, however, important to find the way to overcome the current difficulties rather 
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sooner than later. It seems that the ball is now in the EU garden as the CJEU’s Opinion comes from 
within and is directed towards the EU. Moreover, it seems that the Lisbon Treaty itself demands from 
the EU to go the extra mile and take again the initiative to move beyond the existing stalemate. 
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Appendix I – case studies 
 
 The role of Venice Commission ‘Democracy through Law’ and its 
cooperation with the European Union 
 
a) The legal status and nature of the Venice Commission 
In May 1990, eighteen countries acting in accordance with Council of Europe Resolution (90) 6 on the 
basis of a partial agreement established the European Commission for Democracy through Law, 
commonly known as the ‘Venice Commission’.540 The Commission was designed as an independent 
consultative institution whose main function is to provide assistance on issues of constitutional law, 
including the functioning of democratic institutions, human rights, electoral law and constitutional 
justice. The Resolution stated that the Commission should be a fundamental instrument in the area of 
developing democracy in Europe.  
The Commission was initially established for a period of two years, however, it quickly became obvious 
that there was a need for such independent advice on constitutional matters in Europe on a more 
permanent basis. As a result, the Deputy Ministers of the CoE decided to extend the mandate of the 
Venice Commission in the framework of the Partial Agreement in December 1992. 
Under a resolution of the CoE’s Committee of Ministers adopted on 2 August 1951, ‘partial 
agreements’ create a form of cooperation which involves only selected Member States of the Council 
that decide to participate in the undertaking. The will of the CoE to engage in cooperation with non-
member states and other entities was reflected in Statutory Resolution (93) 28, which was passed by 
the Committee of Ministers in 1993. This Resolution distinguished between three types of 
agreements: 
1) a partial agreement:  concluded, as indicated above, by some member States of the 
CoE; 
2) an enlarged partial agreement: involving some member States of the CoE and one 
or more non-member states; 
3) an enlarged agreement: adopted by all CoE’s member States and one or more non-
member states.541 
This decision opened the door to changing the composition of the Venice Commission and allowed 
non-members of the CoE and other organisations to participate in its work, it was also crucial for 
expanding the Venice Commission’s cooperation with other partners from outside the CoE. Resolution 
(93) 28 specifically empowered the Council of Ministers to invite the European Community to 
participate in the agreements of the aforementioned types.542 On this basis, the Venice Commission 
gradually embraced non-CoE country partners, the European Community and other organisations. 
Later on, when the last remaining CoE member states decided to join the Venice Commission,543 its 
                                                          
540 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Norway, Portugal, San 
Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey. 
541 A list of partial and enlarged agreements within the Council of Europe is available at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTousAP.asp?CL=ENG>. 
542 See: CoE Committee of Ministers Statutory Resolution (93) 28 on partial and enlarged agreements, Chapter VI. 
543 Monaco in 2004 and Montenegro in 2006. 
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founding document was eventually transformed into an ‘enlarged agreement’ through Statutory 
Resolution (2002)3 ‘Revised Statute of the European Commission for Democracy through Law’, 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 21 February 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Statute’). 
Dallara observes that completed in this way, the process of opening the Venice Commission to various 
categories of partners shows the growing role and recognition of the importance of this body. This 
was the final step for the institutionalization of the [Venice Commission] within the CoE and, more in 
general, in the EU international community.544 
Currently, there are five categories of involvement in the activity of the Venice Commission:  
1) 60 member states (including all CoE members);  
2) 5 observer states;  
3) 1 associate member (Belarus);  
4) 2 states with a special cooperation status (South Africa and Palestinian Autonomy);  
5) 2 international partners – so called ‘participants’ in the work of the Commission (EU 
and OSCE/ODIHR).545 
The Venice Commission is closely connected to the Council of Europe, but is not a statutory organ of 
it. It has been described as a Council of Europe ‘body’. Its status is governed by the principles of 
institutional autonomy and the independence of its members. Although members are nominated by 
the member states, they act in their individual capacity as independent experts. This is determined by 
the Art. 2 of the Statute according to which they shall not receive or accept any instructions from the 
states. Nor can they be recalled before the end of their tenure. Most of the members have expertise 
as judges, prosecutors, professors of law or high State officials. Some have gone on to become judges 
in European courts after they have completed their term of service at the Venice Commission. 
Despite the evolution described, the initial concept underlying the creation of the Venice Commission 
- to establish an independent, professional body acting in the legal field, providing legal, not political 
opinions and advice - has been maintained throughout the last 26 years. In other words, the 
Commission is a body which is engaged in the legal discussion, but not in the political debate at both 
country and international levels. 
It is obvious, however, that the Commission is not acting in a vacuum. Its work is linked to the political 
sphere insofar as legal, and especially constitutional matters, are connected with politics. In this wider 
sense, the Commission is often called on to examine requests for opinions submitted by political 
bodies, at the State level or representing the CoE. However, the political origins of requests do not 
determine in any way the content of the substantive position taken by the Commission. In its opinions, 
the Commission uses only legal argumentation, considering the political context of the case only as a 
kind of background information.546  
                                                          
544 Cristina Dallara, ‘Transnational legal institutions as source of European normative power: The role of the Venice 
Commission in two Rule of Law reversal attempt cases.’ Paper prepared for the ECPR General Conference, Science Po – 
Bordeaux (2013) 5. 
545 Algeria (2007), Brazil (2009), Chile (2005), Israel (2008), Kazakhstan (2011), Kyrgyzstan (2004), Kosovo (2014), Mexico 
(2010), Morocco (2007), Peru (2009), the Republic of Korea (2006), Tunisia (2010) and the USA (2013). 
546 Hanna Suchocka, ‘Stanowisko Komisji Weneckiej dotyczące pozycji ustrojowej sądownictwo konstytucyjnego w 
demokratycznym państwie prawa’ (2016) 1 Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny 5-8. 
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In the past, the political organs of the CoE have attempted to establish a kind of a political umbrella 
over the Venice Commission, but it has succeeded in maintaining its autonomy and preserving the 
independence of its members and thus defended its authority. This has eventually been beneficial not 
only to the implementation of the Commission’s mandate, but also to the overall mission of the 
Council of Europe.   
 
b) The main tasks of the Venice Commission  
 
Art. 1 of the Statute states that the specific field of action of this body ‘shall be the guarantees offered 
by law in the service of democracy’. 
The two elements: ‘democracy’ and ‘law’ are interlinked in the Commission’s mandate and perceived 
as interdependent and mutually supportive. They are also clearly expressed in the Commission’s 
official name: ‘democracy through law’.  
According to Art. 1 of its Statute, the Venice Commission shall fulfil the following objectives: 
- strengthening the understanding of the legal systems of the participating states, 
notably with a view to bringing these systems closer; 
- promoting the rule of law and democracy; 
- examining the problems raised by the working of democratic institutions and their 
reinforcement and development.   
The idea of setting up an international body with such a mandate was encountered some political 
opposition. But, the collapse of communism helped to overcome the initial scepticism.547 Batole 
argues 
‘The coincidence of its establishment with the fall of the Berlin Wall facilitated the 
involvement of the Commission in the development of the democratic constitutional 
reforms in the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe as far as they moved in the 
direction of the adhesion to the Council of Europe and to the European Union and were 
and are interested, year by year, in keeping safe this membership’.548  
Also the newly emerging countries in this region needed urgent constitutional assistance. For that 
reason, in the last 25 years the majority of Venice Commission’s opinions have been devoted to 
Central and Eastern Europe. But, the scope of the activity of this body has not been limited to the 
post-communist countries only.549  
                                                          
547 Gianni Buquicchio, Simona Granata-Menghini, ‘The Venice Commission Twenty Years On. Challenges Met but Challenges 
Ahead in Marjolein van Roosmalenm, Ben Vermeulen, Fried van Hoof, Merten Oostling (eds) Fundamental Rights and 
Principles – Liber amicorum Pieter van Dijk (Intersentia 2013) 241. 
548 Sergio Bartole, ‘International Constitutionalism and Conditionality. The Experience of the Venice Commission’ (2014) 
Rivista AIC 5. 
549 For example the following opinions: CDL-AD(2003)022-Opinion on the Implications of Legally-binding EU Charter of 
fundamental rights on Human Rights Protection in Europe; CDL-AD (2008)010 – Opinion on the Constitution of Finland; CDL-
AD(2013)010 – Opinion on the draft New Constitution of Iceland; CDL-AD(2005)017 Opinion on the compatibility of the Laws 
‘Gasparri’ and ‘Frattini’ of Italy with the Council of Europe standards in the field of freedom of expression and pluralism of 
the media; CDL-AD(2013)038 - Opinion on the Legislation on Defamation in Italy; CDL-AD(2002)032 – opinion on the 
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It goes without saying that the process of democratic transition has a political character. Its main aim 
is to replace an authoritarian system with a democratic one. In this process, however, there is often a 
temptation to look for shortcuts, which can result in measures if not contra legem, then at least 
praeter legem. Law is sometimes perceived as an inconvenient constraint in the process of building 
democracy. The experience of many countries going through the process of political transformation 
in Europe since 1990 has proven the correctness of this observation, especially in the context of 
reforms of the judiciary or vetting procedures (so called lustration). For that reason, the main 
responsibility of the Venice Commission has been to offer guidance on how to build democracy within 
the framework of law, and more specifically on the basis of the rule of law.    
Opinions of the Venice Commission do not have a legally binding character. In spite of this and the 
lack of formal ‘sanctions’ for non-implementation of the opinions, States usually take them into 
account in their constitutional law and in ordinary legislation.550 Proposals and guidance contained 
therein have been positively echoed by interested States in the majority of cases. 
Benoit-Rohmer and Klebes have observed that:  
‘[t]he Commission specializes in drafting and reviewing constitutions, and has done 
outstanding work in this field. […] On a wider front, it takes an interest in laws on 
constitutional courts, electoral laws, laws on national minorities and, more generally, all 
laws on the operation of democratic state institutions. It is also required to study 
transnational themes and prepare legal opinions for the Assembly or the Committee of 
Ministers – including opinions on the interpretation of Council of Europe treaties.’551 
Although the original mission of the Venice Commission was specifically related to ‘constitutional 
assistance’ and ‘emergency constitutional aid’ to states in transition, during the last ten years, the 
number and the type of activities performed by the network has significantly increased, behind its 
original function of advisor on constitutional matters. In fact, it is playing an increasingly global role in 
developing knowledge and producing documents, opinions and guidelines on various judicial and 
governance issues.552 
 
c) Points of reference for Venice Commission’s opinions  
A profound political transformation must be followed by constitutional changes, which are necessary 
for the creation of a new political system. A common tendency in all Central and Eastern European 
countries after the collapse of communist rule was to build on the traditional democratic principles 
recognised by the Western democracies in the course of their constitutional development.  
                                                          
Amendments to the Constitution of Liechtenstein proposed by the Princely House of Liechtenstein; CDL-AD(2002)018 – 
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The general principles of the so-called socialist constitutionalism ran contrary to the Western 
perception of democracy. This system was characterised by: 
1. rejection of the separation of powers and its replacement with the principle of unity of 
power based on the leading role of the communist party, 
2. recognition of the state will as an essential factor in determining individual freedom 
[rejection of the liberal concept], and 
3. rejection of political pluralism. 
This clearly shows that ‘socialist constitutionalism’ was an attempt to construct a system that was 
alien to the main principles of European constitutional heritage. Practice amply demonstrated its 
consequences.  
Therefore, the constitutional development in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s has been 
determined by three major factors:  
1. abandoning the recent (socialist) constitutional doctrine,  
2. reorientation of the constitutional system towards the well-established European 
standards,  
3. reconciliation of some local constitutional traditions and expertise with the European 
standards.  
By and large, these factors featured in the constitutional reforms of the new democracies. This can be 
said about both the countries which had previously been part of the Soviet Union itself, such as the 
Baltic States and Ukraine, and those which were part of a broader Soviet satellite system, such as 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania etc. 
However, at the beginning of transformation, the reorientation towards European constitutional 
standards became the most common and vivid tendency. As a consequence, the role of the Venice 
Commission as a source of information, guidance and advice, as well as a de facto monitoring tool 
assisting states in constitutional reforms became central. Primarily, its task was to help Central and 
Eastern European partners to get acquainted with and internalise the European constitutional legacy 
by interpreting the specific content of the so-called European standards in the areas of democracy, 
the rule of law and human rights.553 A by-product of this exercise was the development of commonly 
shared criteria for the evaluation of the accession documents of the interested States applying for 
membership in the Council of Europe and the European Union or relevant for the continuity of 
participation in the European arrangements554.  
Thus, the point of reference for the Venice Commission has always been European law, especially the 
European Convention of Human Rights (hard law) and the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights, as well as the constitutional legacy of European democracies. The Commission also 
takes into account the wide area of so-called European soft law including recommendations of the 
Committee of Ministers at the Council of Europe, recommendations and resolutions of the 
Parliamentary Assembly and its commissions. In addition, the Venice Commission benefits from the 
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relevant United Nations documents since all European countries are members of this organisation and 
according to the principle that regional law should be coherent with international law. 
Despite these generally coherent sources of reference, the Venice Commission has been confronted 
with complex challenges in its evaluative and advisory functions vis-à-vis countries in transition. The 
list of problems with democracy in post-communist states encompass a broader range of topics for 
discussion than a simple analysis of the rules governing free elections and the organisation of state 
organs would entail. The newly established democratic procedures and institutions in the post-
communist states were weaker than in well-established democracies, and, for obvious reasons, more 
susceptible to a number of problems.555 These countries often suffered under deficits in political 
culture and traditions that are common in consolidated democracies. It is understandable since 
countries in this part of Europe usually did not have the historical opportunity to collect relevant 
experience. Most of them were unable to develop their own political system at a time when the 
democratic systems of Western Europe were stabilising. Sometimes, the Venice Commission was 
confronted with the difficult problem of applying European standards to some of the institutions of 
the concerned countries, strongly rooted in the communist heritage, such as the State Prosecutor’s 
Office in Russia or Ukraine. There was also a low level of awareness of the separation of powers and 
the related system of checks and balances and the need to internalise these principles at all levels of 
government. Seeing this as an essential factor in determining how power is exercised, the Venice 
Commission has, therefore, always examined not only the letter of the law, but also how it is 
practically implemented in a given political surrounding.556 
  
d) The status of the EU within the Venice Commission and the 
normative framework of cooperation between them  
A common understanding of democracy, the rule of law and human rights provides a solid foundation 
for long-term cooperation between the Venice Commission and the European Union in the context of 
the Commission’s mandate. Moreover, experience shows that the European Union and the Venice 
Commission have a similar focus and both embrace:  
1. constitutional justice – the Commission has paid a lot of attention to the establishment, 
development and functioning of constitutional courts in the new democracies; 
2. the independence of the judiciary, including the appointment and status of judges, as 
well as relevant institutional and procedural safeguards; 
3. free elections, freedom of the media and freedom of speech. 
 
These substantive commonalities are obviously helpful when it comes to setting up a formal 
framework for cooperation. The European Union’s status as a ‘participant’ in the work of the Venice 
Commission derives from Art. 2 (6) of the Venice Commission’s Statute: ‘The European Community 
shall be entitled to participate in the work of the Commission’. The same provision also establishes 
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that the European Community (now Union) can become a member of the Commission ‘according to 
modalities agreed with the Committee of Ministers’. Although these rules date back to the ‘pre –EU’ 
situation, after the EU replaced the European Community its situation has continued to be the same 
in two ways:  
1. the Statute has not been amended with regard to the EU; 
2. the EU has not requested the Council of Ministers to agree to its membership in the 
Venice Commission.  
Hence, the EU has maintained its status as a ‘participant’ in the work of the Commission. This formula 
is very general. There are no clear stipulations which could help to precisely determine its meaning.  
Fears are sometimes expressed that this situation might give rise to some uncertainty as to the actual 
room (legal status) for the EU’s action within the Venice Commission. However, experience has proven 
that this lack of precise rules does not create any particular obstacles to the input of the EU in the 
work of the Venice Commission. Moreover, the following forms of EU involvement have become a 
well-established and accepted practice:  
1) participation in the plenary sessions and sub-commissions – usually two 
representatives of the EEAS take part in sessions - one representative of the European 
Commission’s Legal Service who since March 2012 is accompanied by a representative of 
the European External Action Service;557 
2) participation in the debates; 
3) submission of requests for the Commission’s opinion; 
4) submission of requests for the Commission’s legal assistance (a different form of 
guidance than ‘opinions’); 
5) meetings between the EU’s ambassadors and the Commission’s delegations during 
country missions.  
This means that the EU can actually contribute to the substantive work of the Venice Commission. 
However, its representatives do not act as rapporteurs of the Venice Commission and they do not take 
part in the country missions of the Venice Commission. They also cannot vote in Commission elections 
for, nor be elected to, the Venice Commission’s organs. These entitlements are reserved only for the 
members. 
To date, the Venice Commission has received two formal requests for opinions from the European 
Commission, notably in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina558 and of Bolivia.559 
In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Commission formally requested an opinion on: 
‘how the judicial framework, the division of powers and the existing co-ordination mechanisms affect 
legal certainty and the independence of the judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina’. In this context, the 
Venice Commission was represented in the meetings of the International Consultative Group on the 
judiciary held in the framework of the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Structured 
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Dialogue on the work of the judiciary, which was an integral part of the Stabilisation and Association 
Process. 
In the case of Bolivia, the President of the Chamber of Deputies of this country requested that the EU 
Delegation forward to the Venice Commission a request for an opinion on the draft Code on 
Constitutional Procedure. The European Union and the Venice Commission had previously concluded 
a joint programme of cooperation on the development of constitutional reforms in Bolivia. 
In addition to EU formal requests, on a number of occasions EU representatives have triggered 
national requests to the Venice Commission. For example, the Venice Commission was asked to 
express its views in the context of the enlargement policy on: 
a) the negotiations on the status of Kosovo in 1998/99;  
b) the negotiations leading to the Ohrid Framework Agreement in ‘the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia’ in 2001;  
c) the negotiations on the State Union between Serbia and Montenegro in 2002/03, 
judicial reforms in Serbia;  
d) the negotiations on the Montenegro independence referendum in 2006.  
In the ongoing process of Serbian accession to the EU, many of the requests for opinions of the Venice 
Commission have been initiated by the Government of Serbia, perhaps upon the invitation of the 
EU.560 
After the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has also drawn on the Commission assessments concerning the 
observance of the ‘European standards’ of democracy and the rule of law in EU member states. Three 
cases should be mentioned here: the constitution making processes in Hungary (2011-2013) and 
Romania (2012-2013),561 as well as the legislative steps taken by the Polish authorities after the 
parliamentary elections in October 2015, which have affected the status and functioning of the 
Constitutional Tribunal in Poland.562 
As these examples show, in such situations, the opinion of the Venice Commission is being taken by 
EU institutions as an essential contribution to their own assessment. It is also evident that the reaction 
of the governments concerned is informed, not only by strong legal arguments brought forward by 
the Commission, but also by the related action taken by competent EU organs. Thus in a press release 
from the EU, it stated ‘The [EU] Commission will keep the matter under close review […] and will take 
into account whether the amendments will be implemented in line with the Venice Commission’s 
opinions’. Hoffmann-Riem emphasises that in both cases (Hungarian and Romania) the Venice 
Commission turned out to be a key-player and the ‘technical-executive arm’ for the EU, despite the 
fact that there was no formal request by the EU for an opinion.563 It is noteworthy that the Hungarian 
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case was the first one in which the EU Commission explicitly referred to the Venice Commission as a 
relevant and crucial ally.564 
The Venice Commission is also involved in the implementation of specific projects in the framework 
of different EU – CoE Joint Programmes.565 For example in 2012, the Commission following 
cooperation with different countries of Central Asia in the framework of a Joint Programme ‘Rule of 
law in Central Asia’ developed a cooperation programme in the electoral field with the Central 
Electoral Commission in Kazakhstan. The Venice Commission also developed several activities in 
Tunisia and Morocco in the framework of the joint programme between the European Commission 
and the CoE on ‘Strengthening democratic reform in the Southern Neighbourhood’.566   
It should also be pointed out that representatives of the Venice Commission, especially the President 
and Secretary-General, participate in the meetings of various EU bodies and cooperate with the EU on 
a number of country related projects. For example, in 2011 the Venice Commission got involved in the 
implementation of the Eastern Partnership Program founded by the EU on the strengthening of 
electoral administrations in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.  
In 2014, the Venice Commission’s President briefed the European Parliament on the assessment of 
the new Tunisian constitution adopted in January 2014 carried out by the Venice Commission. The 
Venice Commission’s President has also been involved in regular consultations with EU bodies on a 
broad range of topics concerning EU policies and its relations with the EU member states, states 
aspiring to the EU membership, and neighbourhood states.567 
The Commission maintained regular and frequent high level and working level contacts with the 
European Union, in particular with respect to constitutional issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine, but also in the Arab countries as a consequence 
of the Arab spring. The EU Commissioners for Human Rights, for Enlargement and Eastern European 
Neighbourhood Policy along with the Special Representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo 
sought the advice of the Venice Commission on questions pertaining to their mandates.568 
Cooperation with the EU has contributed to the expansion of the Commission’s outreach and influence 
as its opinions not only provide direct guidance to the countries concerned, but also contribute to 
policy development and decision-making within the EU itself. The impact of the Venice Commission - 
EU cooperation can be seen especially in two situations: 
a) in developing partnerships between the EU and third countries, as well as in the 
context of EU-accession plans by third countries; 
b) where the EU considers that European standards of democracy, the rule of law and/or 
human rights might be at risk in the EU member states. 569 
The Venice Commission offers assistance to countries adjusting their laws, institutions and procedures 
with a view to matching them with the criteria for EU accession. Moreover, the membership of the 
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applicant country in the Venice Commission can be perceived as an indicator of adherence to the 
relevant standards.570 The case of Serbia is a good example here. The Annual Progress Report from 
2014 prepared by the European Commission on Serbia states that:  
‘[t]he Constitution is largely in line with European standards. Some provisions remain to 
be put in line with the recommendation of the Venice Commission, in particular 
concerning the role of parliament in judicial appointments, the political parties’ control 
over parliamentary office, the independence of key institutions and the protection of 
fundamental tights, including data protection’.571 
Altogether, one can conclude that the confirmation of Serbia’s status as a candidate for European 
Union membership in March 2012 has been facilitated by cooperative efforts between the EU and the 
Venice Commission.  
Sometimes the European Commission explicitly calls on the Venice Commission to help bring about 
changes that need to be accomplished in the legal system prior to EU membership. 
The Venice Commission works on delicate matters. It has to deal with sovereign States and even legal 
criticism based on the interpretation of European standards deriving from common European heritage 
might meet resistance and be construed as interfering with state sovereignty. The Committee 
responds to this challenge with the clear methodology adopted in its work, but especially in the 
process of the elaboration of guidelines and opinions for individual states which consists in dividing 
between:  
1) matters which constitute the fundamentals of the European democratic tradition 
(European standards) and, therefore, must be interpreted in a mandatory way.572 This is 
the case, for example, with regard to standards of constitutional justice and the 
independence of the judiciary based on the principle of the division of powers and the 
mechanism of checks and balances. 
2) matters which belong within the margin of appreciation of states. The Commission is 
sensitive to differences in political cultures and the traditions of different countries, 
which may influence the democratic order. Its advice is based on the recognition of this 
diversity. While the fundamental standards cannot be put into question, there is always 
room for various modalities of their implementation in good faith.573 
This methodological position provides a functional basis for the Venice Commission – EU partnership. 
Soft-law and commentaries elaborated by the Venice Commission are important not only for the 
member countries, but also for countries and institutions cooperating with the Venice Commission. 
Hoffman-Riem notes that  
‘These states accept the normative bases of the [Venice Commission’s] work and its 
practices. It is clear that they want to be seen as belonging to a community of states 
committed to the ideals of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law under a 
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framework shaped by the Venice Commission. Put differently, states are looking for more 
than just suggestions on how to develop their own legal systems – they also want to share 
in the esteem that comes with being part of a community founded on human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law. As a reputation- enhancing community, the Venice 
Commission affords states the opportunity to add to their esteem by contributing to the 
Commission’s work, as well as by the way in which they handle recommendations as part 
of their sovereign responsibility to their respective legal systems and societies’.574  
 
e) Conclusions 
Over the past number of years, there has been a noticeable increase in ties and cooperation between 
the EU and the Venice Commission. The question arises as to why the EU has not decided to move 
from its status of ‘participant’ in the work of the Commission to a formal and full membership. As it 
has already been mentioned, this is possible under the Commission’s statute.  
We would argue that this change might give a new impetus to cooperation between the two actors 
and enhance the professional status of the EU representatives at the Venice Commission. As an 
independent professional body, composed of lawyers, judges, and academics, the Commission’s 
power derives from autonomy and independence. As the EU holds the status of ‘participant’, it is not 
obliged to fulfil the criterion of independence of its representatives.  For that reason, the EU is 
represented at the Venice Commission not by independent professionals, but by EU officials. There is 
a tangible imbalance between the professional and autonomous character of the Commission and the 
political (or sometimes even bureaucratic) role of the EU representatives. This can be clearly seen in 
difficult discussions concerning individual states.575 The suggested change of the status of the EU in 
the Venice Commission might have a bearing in particular in situations where the EU would like to use 
the opinion of the Venice Commission as a neutral contribution to a possible infringement procedure 
against a country, which is a procedure of a strongly political character.  
The EU in such situations acts in a double role: a) inside the Commission, as a participant in its work, 
and b) outside the Commission within the EU’s own political structures and procedures (like the 
infringement procedure) to ensure compliance by its member states with the EU’s fundamental values 
and principles in the area of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. 
Over the last number of years, the Venice Commission’s opinions have been used by the EU in three 
difficult cases, notably Hungary, Romania and Poland. On the one hand, it shows the importance of 
the role of the Venice Commission. But, on the other hand, it could also be seen as a source of hazards 
related to the involvement in political processes within which the Commission does not appear as an 
actor. It is vital, therefore, for both the Venice Commission and the EU to take all the necessary steps 
to protect the Venice Commission’s independence, political neutrality and authority. This is not only 
a matter of objective facts, but also of the perception of the formal and practical status of the Venice 
Commission.  
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For these reasons, changing the status of the EU inside the Venice Commission from a participant to 
a full member would open the way for the EU to appoint professionals, such as judges, lawyers or 
academics to the Venice Commission, but allow them to act in their own personal capacity. This would 
make the EU references to the Commission’s assessments and opinions more powerful. This situation 
could also reinforce the position of the Commission as a professional body, with its opinions always 
rooted in law, not on political bases. 
Keeping in mind that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is a point of reference 
for the Venice Commission’s rapporteurs in most cases, active professional participation on the part 
of the EU could be also a good step in facilitating the ratification of the ECHR by the EU as envisaged 
by the Lisbon Treaty. The described approach should give an answer to the question ‘why the road 
from Luxembourg to Strasbourg leads through Venice’.576 
 
 Legal influence of the European Convention on Human Rights on the 
European Union – right to an effective remedy and right to a fair trial 
a) Introduction 
This case study presents the influence of the European Convention on Human Rights (and its 
interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights) on the European Union system of fundamental 
rights on an example of two basic procedural rights: right to an effective remedy and right to a fair 
trial.  
Before the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights the EU system lacked a bill of rights, but it 
does not mean that human rights were not protected within the EU (and earlier, the EC). Already in 
1969, in the famous Stauder577 case, the ECJ included fundamental rights to the general principles of 
the Community law protected by the Court. Measures incompatible with observance of human rights 
recognized as general principles were therefore not acceptable in the EC.578 
In its later jurisprudence the ECJ pointed to the main sources of inspiration and guidelines for the 
protection of fundamental rights within the: ‘constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States’579 and ‘international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States 
have collaborated or of which they are signatories’. 580 In practice, ever since the Rutili581 case, the ECJ 
often relied on the provisions of the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.582 Both the ECJ and the 
CFI considered the ECHR as a ‘special source of inspiration’ for the general principles of EU law.583 
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The case study will briefly present the history of the recognition of the right to an effective remedy 
and the right to a fair trial by the Court of Justice of the EU and the milestone judgments of the CJEU 
concerning these right. It will also compare the scope these rights within the EU and the CoE systems.  
 
b) Right to a fair trial and right to an effective remedy in the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
Before analysing the case-law of the ECJ it is necessary to cite the provisions of the ECHR related to 
the right to a fair trial, which became a source of inspiration for the EU court.  
The right to a fair trial is guaranteed by Art. 6 (1) of the ECHR: 
‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press 
and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order 
or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection 
of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of 
the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.’ 
Paras 2 and 3 of Art. 6 guarantee the presumption of innocence and minimum rights of those charged 
with a criminal offence. 
According to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, Art. 6(1) secures the right to a court, including the right 
of access, procedural guarantees and the implementation of judicial decisions.584 Additionally, this 
provision guarantees a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law.  
The European Convention on Human Rights also safeguards the right to an effective remedy in Art. 
13: 
‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have 
an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.’ 
These provisions of the ECHR, as well as the related case-law of the ECtHR, strongly influenced the 
understanding of justice-related rights by the CJEU (previously European Court of Justice) and the 
General Court (previously the Court of First Instance). 
 
c) Recognition of the right to fair trial and related rights by the 
Court of Justice 
The right to a fair hearing was first considered by the ECJ in two cases from 1980.  
First of them was the Pecastaing585 case, which was initiated by a reference for a preliminary ruling by 
a Belgian tribunal. The referring court made direct references to the right to a fair hearing and Art. 6 
of the ECHR. In its judgment the ECJ found that there was no need to consider if it was necessary to 
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ensure compliance in the Community legal system with the requirements of Art. 6 ECHR in that 
particular case. The ECJ pointed out that the directive applicable in the case ‘may be considered as 
fulfilling (…) the requirements of the “fair hearing” set out in Art. 6 of the Convention at least with 
regard to the arrangements for appeals to the courts (…)’.586 For these reasons, the ECJ stated that it 
was unnecessary to give a reply to a question submitted by the national court. 
In the second case, van Landewyck587, one of the parties (Fedetab) claimed that the conduct of the 
Commission in the case was an infringement of Art. 6(1) of the ECHR. Citing the case-law of the ECtHR, 
the Commission pointed out, that ‘one of the criteria for the existence of a “tribunal” laid down by the 
European Court of Human Rights is its independence of the executive’. The Commission further 
observed ‘that since the executive power of the Community is in fact vested in it is at least doubtful 
whether, not being independent of that power, it can constitute a tribunal within the above-
mentioned sense’. The ECJ found the arguments of Fedetab irrelevant and stated that: 1) ‘The 
Commission is bound to respect the procedural guarantees provided for by Community law’ and 2) 
The Commission ‘cannot, however, be classed as a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 6’ of the ECHR.  
These two cases are important because the ECJ clearly recognized the existence of a fair hearing 
standard flowing from Art. 6 (1) of the ECHR. Although, in both cases, the ECJ finally decided both 
cases solely based on Community procedural guarantees, it has taken the Convention standard into 
consideration. However, it did not explicitly identify the right to a fair trial as a general principle of the 
Community law.  
In 1986, the ECJ recognized the principle of effective judicial control as a general principle in the 
Johnston case. 588 The case was initiated by a reference for a preliminary ruling. The national court has 
asked, inter alia, ‘whether Community law, and more particularly directive no 76/207, requires the 
Member States to ensure that their national courts and tribunals exercise effective control over 
compliance with the provisions of the directive and with the national legislation intended to put it into 
effect’.589 In its judgment, the ECJ first referred to the Community provision applicable to the case, but 
then added that: 
‘The requirement of judicial control stipulated by that article reflects a general principle of law 
which underlines the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. That principle 
is also laid down in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950. (…)[A]s the Court has recognized in 
its decisions, the principles on which that Convention is based must be taken into 
consideration in Community Law’.590 
The ECJ then interpreted the relevant directive in the light of the general principle requiring effective 
judicial control.  
What is interesting in the Johnston case is that, unlike the above-mentioned cases from 1980, none of 
the parties (or the Advocate General in his opinion) referred to the relevant provisions of the ECHR. In 
its decision to recognize the right to an effective remedy as a general principle of the EC law, the ECJ 
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588 Case 222/84 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR I-1651. 
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pointed to both of the main sources of inspiration for the protection of fundamental rights 
(constitutional traditions and the ECHR). Some authors claim that the Johnston case was not really a 
landmark case,591 especially if one takes into account that the applicable directive clearly provided for 
a judicial remedy. It is true that the use of the right to an effective remedy in the Johnston case was 
still indirect, for as Cherednychenko explains, that right was ‘being used as an interpretative aid to the 
written provisions of the Community law against which a Member States’ derogation was to be 
tested’.592 Still, the ECJ took the opportunity to unequivocally confirm both, the special significance of 
the ECHR593 and the right to an effective remedy in that case.594 
The shift towards a direct use of the right to a fair trial and the right to an effective remedy can be 
observed on the example of cases concerning the actions of EU institutions. In particular, in cases 
concerning the right to legal process within a reasonable period. 
In the Baustahlgewebe595 case the appellant before the ECJ claimed, inter alia, that because the 
duration of the proceedings was excessive, the CFI infringed the right to a hearing within a reasonable 
time as laid down in Art. 6 (1) of the ECHR. Before deciding on that point the ECJ first explained that 
in appeals it has jurisdiction, inter alia, to ‘verify whether a breach of procedure adversely affecting 
the appellant's interests was committed before the Court of First Instance and must satisfy itself that 
the general principles of Community law and the Rules of Procedure applicable to the burden of proof 
and the taking of evidence have been complied with’.596 The ECJ then stated that: 
‘It should be noted that Article 6(1) of the ECHR provides that in the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law. 
The general principle of Community law that everyone is entitled to fair legal process, which 
is inspired by those fundamental rights (…), and in particular the right to legal process within 
a reasonable period, is applicable in the context of proceedings brought against a Commission 
decision imposing fines on an undertaking for infringement of competition law’.597 
The ECJ concluded that in an appeal, it can consider pleas on such matters concerning the proceedings 
before the CFI.598 
According to the appellant, the time taken for the proceeding was excessive (approximately five years 
and six months). The ECJ pointed out that although that period is considerable, ‘the reasonableness 
of such a period must be appraised in the light of the circumstances specific to each case and, in 
particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the 
                                                          
591 See for example Nikos Vogiatzis, ‘The Right to Extra-Judicial Redress in EU Law after the EU’s Accession to the ECHR: The 
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Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and 
Nicolaos Avdellas and others [1991] ECR I-02925 para 41. 
594 See also judgment in the case 222/86 Union nationale des entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionnels du football 
(Unectef) v Georges Heylens and others [1987] ECR I-4097 para 14. 
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596 Supra, para 19. 
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applicant and of the competent authorities’.599 These elements, which allow for determining if the 
case was decided in a reasonable time, were established by the ECtHR. In its judgment, the ECJ directly 
referenced four cases of the Strasbourg court related to that right: Erkner and Hofauer v Austria,600 
Kemmache v France,601 Phocas v France602 and Garyfallou AEBE v Greece.603  
After analysing the four areas of the circumstances specific to the case, the ECJ held, that ‘the 
proceedings before the Court of First Instance did not satisfy the requirements concerning completion 
within a reasonable time’.604 
There are four reasons for which the Baustahlgewebe case in noteworthy. Firstly, the ECJ recognized 
that the principle that proceedings must be disposed of within a reasonable time is a general principle 
of Community law. Secondly, in an appeal, the ECJ can consider pleas on such matters concerning the 
proceedings before the CFI. Thirdly, this case shows an extensive use of the principles established by 
the ECtHR concerning the determination of reasonableness of the time in a particular case. Those 
principles were not only invoked, but also applied by the ECJ. Fourthly, the ECJ directly relied on one 
of the elements of the right to a fair trial in determining a case.605 
Similarly, the CFI heard cases, in which the parties of the dispute submitted that the Commission was 
required to comply with the requirements of Art. 6 (1) of the ECHR. For example, in the SCK and FNK 
v Commission606 the applicants claimed that the Commission failed to comply with the requirement of 
a ‘reasonable time’ laid down in Art. 6(1) of the ECHR (the administrative procedure before the 
Commission took more than 45 months).607 The CFI first noted, that: 
‘It is a general principle of Community law that the Commission must act within a reasonable 
time in adopting decisions following administrative proceedings relating to competition policy 
(…). Accordingly, without there being any need to rule on the question whether Art. 6(1) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights is, as such, applicable to administrative 
proceedings before the Commission relating to competition policy, it is necessary to consider 
whether, in this case, in the proceedings preceding the adoption of the contested decision, 
the Commission offended against the general principle of Community law requiring it to act 
within a reasonable time.’608 
The Court of First Instance, invoked the case-law of the ECtHR related to the determination of the 
reasonableness of the time in a particular circumstance of each case.609 After conducting an analysis 
of all the relevant contexts, the CFI found that the Commission did act in accordance with the principle 
requiring it to act within a reasonable time in the administrative procedure preceding the adoption of 
the contested decision.610 
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The CFI therefore applied the standards of the ECtHR inspired by Art. 6 (1) of the ECHR, but by stating 
that an obligation to act within a reasonable time is a general principle, it did not have analyse the 
problem of applicability of that provision to administrative proceedings.611  
Summarising the cases presented in this sub-chapter one can note that before the adoption of the 
CFREU the Court of Justice recognized a number of justice-related rights as fundamental rights 
guaranteed as general principles of the Community law: right to a fair hearing, right to an effective 
judicial control and right to legal process within reasonable time.  
In its judgments, the ECJ also recognized such elements of the right to a fair trial as: right to judicial 
review by an independent and impartial judicial body, right to reply in adversarial proceedings, 
presumption of innocence, right of access to a lawyer and right to call witnesses. 612 
In some cases, the Court of Justice ruled on these fundamental rights and found them inapplicable, in 
other, only relied on them indirectly. However, in its considerations, the ECJ often relied on the ECHR 
and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The ECJ often underlined the ‘special significanc’ of the ECHR as 
a source of inspiration for the protection of fundamental rights as general principles of Community 
law.613 
 
d) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was first proclaimed in 1999 in Nice. 
However, for the first decade it did not have a binding force. With the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the CFREU not only gained a binding force, but according to Art. 6 (1) TEU, it now has the same 
legal value as the Treaties.  
Title VI of the Charter guarantees several justice-related rights. In particular, Art. 47 CFREU protects 
the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. This provision reads: 
‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the 
right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in 
this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of 
being advised, defended and represented. 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is 
necessary to ensure effective access to justice.’ 
The explanations relating to Art. 47 of the CFREU clearly point to the corresponding provisions of the 
ECHR as the basis of the right to a fair trial. The first paragraph is based on Art. 13 of the ECHR, second 
paragraph, on Art. 6(1) of the ECHR. The third paragraph guarantees the right to legal aid, which, 
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although not directly protected by the ECHR, has been recognized as an important guarantee of an 
effective access to court by the ECtHR already in 1979.614 
Although Art. 47 of the CFREU was largely based on Art. 6 and 13 of the ECHR as well as on the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the scope of the rights as guaranteed by the ECHR and the CFREU is 
different.  
Firstly, the Art. 6 (1) of the ECHR applies only to cases concerning the determination of civil rights and 
obligations or of any criminal charge. Although the ECtHR interprets these notions broadly,615 some 
issues remain outside the scope of the Convention, for example cases related to voting rights.616 Art. 
47 of the CFREU is not similarly restricted and that provision applies not only to ‘protection of 
fundamental rights or general principles of EU law (…) [but] to all the rights of individuals guaranteed 
in the system’. 617 
Secondly, according to the explanations to Art. 47 of the CFREU is more extensive ‘since it guarantees 
the right to an effective remedy before a court’, while the corresponding Art. 13 of the ECHR only 
guarantee that right ‘before a national authority’, therefore not necessarily a court.  
 
e) Post-Charter references to the ECHR in the case-law of the 
CJEU 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the CFREU gained a binding force. However, the Treaties 
still refer to the ECHR. According to Art. 6 (3) TEU:  
‘Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law’.618 
According to Art. 52 (3) of the CFREU: 
‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and 
scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This 
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection’. 
Because of these provisions, even though the EU now has its own bill of rights, the CJEU still refers to 
the Convention and to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
In one of the first cases concerning Art. 47 of the CFREU, the CJEU decided a case initiated by a 
reference for a preliminary ruling by a German court.619 The question of the national court concerned 
the right of a legal person to effective access to justice. The CJEU reminded that Art. 47 (3) of the 
CFREU 
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‘must be interpreted in its context, in the light of other provisions of EU law, the law of the 
Member States and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights’.620 
The CJEU first analysed the relevant provisions of the CFREU and then reviewed the case-law of the 
ECtHR regarding the right of access to a court and legal aid.621 The CJEU stated that according to the 
ECtHR ‘the grant of legal aid to legal persons is not in principle impossible, but must be assessed in the 
light of the applicable rules and the situation of the company concerned (...)’ and concluded that ‘the 
principle of effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted 
as meaning that it is not impossible for legal persons to rely on that principle (...)’. 622 
This case clearly show that the CJEU might still draw inspiration from the case-law of the ECtHR related 
to the right to fair trial.623 This practice is necessary for the proper application of Art. 52 (3) CFREU, 
cited above. If the meaning and scope of rights protected by the CFREU shall be, at the minimum, the 
same as those laid down by the ECHR, the Court of Justice should always carefully analyse the current 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR in order to ascertain the level of protection of the ECHR.  
However, the CJEU is also clear that despite the provisions of Art. 6 (3) TEU and 52 (3) CFREU, the 
ECHR ‘does not constitute, as long as the European Union has not acceded to it, a legal instrument 
which has been formally incorporated into European Union law’.624  
Finally, in some cases, the CJEU omits the references to the ECHR, in particular, when the parties refer 
to Art. 6 and 13 of the ECHR. In such cases, the CJEU might remind that ‘the principle of effective 
judicial protection is a general principle of EU law, to which expression is now given by Art. 47 of the 
Charter’ and that ‘the Charter provision guarantees various elements of that principle’, in particular, 
‘the rights of the defence, the principle of equality of arms, the right of access to a tribunal and the 
right to be advised, defended and represented’. Since Art. 47 of the CFREU ‘secures in EU law the 
protection afforded by Art. 6(1) of the ECHR. It is necessary, therefore, to refer only to Art. 47’.625 By 
similar statements, the CJEU underlines the importance of the CFREU as the bill of rights of the EU. 
However, similar statements will only be acceptable in view of Art. 52 (3) CFREU if according to a 
settled case-law, the level of protection guaranteed by the Charter is at least the same as that 
guaranteed by the Convention.  
 
f) Conclusions 
The European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights has served as a special source of inspiration for the general principles of EU law. In the period 
preceding the adoption of the CFREU, the European Court of Justice regularly made referenced to 
both Art. 6 and Art. 13 of the ECHR in order to construct the elements of the EU system of justice-
related guarantees.  
As this case study shows, in some cases, the Court of Justice ruled on these fundamental rights and 
found them inapplicable, in other, only relied on them indirectly. However, in its considerations, the 
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ECJ often relied on the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The ECJ often underlined the ‘special 
significance’ of the ECHR as a source of inspiration for the protection of fundamental rights as general 
principles of Community law.626 
Although Art. 47 of the CFREU was largely based on Art. 6 and 13 of the ECHR as well as on the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the scope of the rights as guaranteed by the CFREU, in comparison to the 
ECHR, is broader. Even so, after the entry into force of the CFREU the legal influence of the Convention 
standard related to the right to an effective remedy and the right to a fair trial remains strong. The 
CJEU clearly stated in one of its judgments that Art. 47 CFREU must be interpreted in its context, in 
the light of, i.a., the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.627 References to the ECHR and 
the case-law of the ECtHR are necessary for the proper application of Art. 52 (3) CFREU, which provides 
that the meaning and scope of rights protected by the CFREU shall be, at the minimum, the same as 
those laid down by the ECHR. In order to ascertain the level of protection of the ECHR, the Court of 
Justice should always carefully analyse the current jurisprudence of the ECtHR related to the right in 
question.  
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 Joint Programme – Peer to Peer II  
Disclaimer: the authors of this section have contributed to an independent external evaluation of the 
‘Peer-to-Peer II’ Joint Programme on Council of Europe’s behest in November 2012. The following case 
study is based upon the outcome of this evaluation. 
 
a) The Outline of the ‘Peer-to-Peer II’ JP 
 
(1) General aim of the Joint Programme 
The CoE-EU Joint Programme ‘Peer-to-Peer II’, which ran from March 2010 to June 2012, was aimed 
at promoting national non-judicial mechanisms for the protection of human rights with particular 
focus on the prevention of torture. Its overall objective, as envisioned jointly by the EU and the CoE, 
was ‘To help avoid, put an end to or compensate for human rights violations in Council of Europe 
Member States which are not EU members, as well as, to the extent possible, Belarus.’ ‘Peer-to-Peer 
II’ was a follow-up project to a previous JP ‘Peer project - Setting up an active network of independent 
non-judicial Human Rights Structures in the Council of Europe Member States which are not members 
of the European Union’, whose goal was envisioned as ‘To assist National Human Rights Structures 
(NHRS) in developing competencies concerning European human rights standards and practice and 
promote their joint initiatives aimed at networking, mutual exchange of information and sharing of 
best practices.’628 Both JPs were organised towards facilitating direct contact between beneficiaries 
and peer-to-peer exchange in order to enhance cooperation, mutual learning process, dissemination 
of good practices, encouragement and support among and between the NHRIs from EU non-Member 
States and Member States with the Council of Europe and the European Union as partners in a 
common endeavour. 
 
(2) Objectives of the JP – the evolving perspective  
(a) First phase: networking and strengthening of 
NHRIs (JP ‘Peer Project’ 2008-2009) 
The first JP ‘Peer Project’ was oriented at facilitating substantive cooperation among European 
NHRIs and promoting compliance with the Paris Principles, in particular in non-EU Member States, 
with a view to finding effective solutions to human rights violations. The JP sought to enable national 
structures to improve their performances in terms of: 
 raising human rights awareness in their countries; 
 detecting potential or existing human rights problems; 
 proceeding to efficient investigations were this is in their mandate; 
 engaging in constructive dialogue with the authorities to avert or solve problems 
 of human rights protection; 
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 triggering rapid mobilisation of international partners if necessary. 
The JP also intended to support the creation of NHRIs at national, regional (within the country) 
or local level, where they did not exist.629 
 
(b) Second phase: continuation and expansion - focus 
on National Preventive Mechanisms against Torture (JP 
‘Peer to Peer II’ 2010-12)  
The second JP (‘Peer-to-Peer II’) had two objectives. While the overarching aims of the first JP were 
continued, the second JP adopted a two-track approach. The first track (continuation) was aimed at 
facilitating networking between and among NHRIs and thus enhancing their capacities. The underlying 
rationale for the second specialised track was to contribute to the prevention of torture and any other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as enshrined in the UDHR and other 
international instruments, as well as in the ECHR and the European Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture. In this context, the JP has paid primary attention to setting-up and strengthening of National 
Preventive Mechanisms (NPM) as envisaged by the 2002 Optional Protocol to the UN Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. However, since the 
existing NHRIs have assumed the function of an NPM in many CoE Member States, both dimensions 
of the Peer-to-Peer II JP were closely linked and activities related to both tracks did overlap.  
 
(3) Target groups, methodology and format of activities 
The primary beneficiaries of the JP were NHRIs in CoE Member States which were at the time not 
members of the EU. Such geographical focus was the result of EU’s engagement in the JP being 
facilitated through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), whose aim is 
to provide support for the promotion of democracy and human rights in non-EU countries.630 The 
‘Peer-to-Peer II’ JP carried over the format of networking involving NHRIs from both EU non-members 
and EU members from the ‘Peer Project’ JP. However, particular emphasis has been placed on the 
development of preventive capacities to counter torture. National Preventive Mechanisms have been 
developed mainly as a specific profile within the existing NHRIs. The methodological approach largely 
benefited from the experience of the ‘Peer Project’ JP. It has been, however, enriched by activities 
aimed at capacity building, namely the ‘On-site Exchange of Experiences’ and several miscellaneous 
activities. In addition, the JP has facilitated direct cooperation between participating NPMs with a view 
to further developing local institutional capacities and skills of the staff. 
 
(4) Partners at the national level  
The underlying concept of both ‘peer-to-peer’ JPs was to engage NHRIs from Member States of the 
Council Europe. Among them, both the primary beneficiaries (NHRIs from non-EU Member States) and 
NHRIs from EU Member States were to participate in order to facilitated exchange and cooperation 
between institutions with a varied degree of experience and capabilities. This concept was based on 
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the assumption that knowledge and experience flow from those who possess them to those who 
suffer some deficits in available know-how or resources. Therefore, although the implementation of 
the JP was primarily oriented on NHRIs in EU non-members, participating NHRIs from EU Member 
States benefitted from the JP as well. One of the tools to diagnose the standing of the NHRIs is the 
accreditation process under the UN auspices. It is based on the assessment of the compliance of the 
legal set-up of NHRIs and their practice with the Paris Principles.631 According to these criteria, NHRIs 
have been categorised in three status groups:  
a) status ‘A’ means that the NHRI is fully in compliance with the Paris Principles;  
b) status ‘B’ means that the NHRI is partially in compliance with the Paris Principles; 
c) status ‘C’ means non-compliance with the Paris Principles.  
In the light of the accreditation process, the target NHRIs can be divided in four following groups: 
a) 8 NHRIs with status ‘A’: Albania - People’s Advocate, Armenia - Human Rights Defender, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina - Human Rights Ombudsman, Croatia - Ombudsman632, Georgia - 
Public Defender’s Office, Russian Federation - Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian 
Federation, Serbia - Protector of Citizens, Ukraine - Parliamentary Commissioner for Human 
Rights; 
b) 2 NHRIs with status ‘B’: Republic of Moldova - Human Rights Centre of Moldova, The Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – Ombudsman; 
c) 2 NHRIs which have at the time not underwent the accreditation process: Montenegro - 
Human Rights and Freedoms Ombudsman, Turkey - Ombudsman (in statu nascendi at the 
time). 
Some activities of the JP were aimed not only at NHRIs in the target countries but also in EU Member 
States, e.g. the ‘On-site Exchange of Experiences’ activities organised in Poland. The JP has extensively 
engaged the civil society (NGOs) in the general NHRI-oriented leg of its activities, inviting its various 
representatives to participate. Due to a very focused theme of the NPM-oriented leg and relative lack 
of dedicated civil society actors concerned solely with the topic of torture prevention, the NGO 
involvement wasn’t very strong overall, yet in some cases the NHRIs were able to engage NGOs in the 
activities related to prevention of torture, such as it was the case in Serbia in 2011, where the Serbian 
NHRI/NPM issued a public call for cooperation to Serbian civil society. 
 
(5) International partners  
The ‘Peer-to-Peer II’ JP engaged the UN Sub-Committee of the Prevention of Torture (SPT), the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) and one of the key NGOs engaged in the 
prevention of torture, namely International Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT), as 
implementing partners. Consultations meetings between the Programme Team and the SPT and APT 
took place in Switzerland.  
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(6) Financing 
The ‘Peer-to-Peer II’ JP was co-financed by the Council of Europe and the European Union with the 
amount of 1.6 million Euro, of which roughly 80% was contributed by the European Commission via 
the EIDHR, while the remaining budget was covered by the CoE. In addition, at the initiative of the 
Programme Team, its NPM-oriented leg of activities has been supported by the CoE Human Rights 
Trust Fund with the amount of EUR 480k. Beyond that, the Governments of Liechtenstein and 
Germany also provided voluntary contributions to the financing of the Project. 
 
 
(7) Management, monitoring, and evaluation 
The first ‘Peer project’ JP was coordinated by the NHRI Unit located in the Office of the Commissioner 
for Human Rights of the Council of Europe. The responsibility for the management of the ‘Peer-to-
peer II’ JP was vested initially with the NHRI Unit but in 2009 it was transferred to the Directorate 
General Human Rights and Rule of Law (DG I) of the CoE Secretariat. The JP was managed by a three-
person team (Project Supervisor, a Project Manager and a Project Assistant). The Association for the 
Prevention of Torture (APT) was the implementing partner for the JP. The NHRI leg of the Joint 
Programme benefited from expertise of Professor Stefano Valenti from University of Padua. 
Additionally, Ms. Silvia Casale from the UK, former President of both the CPT and the SPT, served as 
Project Advisor. Contact Persons were appointed by each of the cooperating NHRIs to interface with 
the Programme Team and other participants of the JP. Every year, meetings of the heads of NPMs 
accompanied by the Contact Persons were held to evaluate the past JP activities and design the future 
ones. These meetings were attended by CPT and SPT representatives. Three such annual meetings 
were convened, providing an opportunity for stock-taking of the JP and NPMs’ input into programming 
of future activities. The annual meeting of the heads of NPMs was followed by a meeting of the 
Contact Persons, to work more on technical details of co-operation. The evaluation of the JP was 
facilitated by issuing a call for external consultancy, which resulted in prof. Zdzisław Kędzia from Adam 
Mickiewicz University (Poznan, Poland) preparing an assessment of the JP in November 2012. 
 
b) Implementation of the ‘Peer-to-Peer’ II JP  
 
(1) Types of activities  
The substantive activities of the JP can be divided into four major groups according to their overall 
aim, with each of these groups dedicated to different goals and including varied types of activities. In 
addition, the JP encompassed miscellaneous and technical activities such as document translations, 
external consultancy and evaluation of the JP. An overview of each identified group follows below. 
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(a) Activities related to the establishing new 
NHRI/NPM 
These activities were aimed at enhancing the process of establishing NHRIs conforming with Paris 
Principles and NPMs conforming with OPCAT. The activities in this field included: participation of the 
Programme Team members in the OSCE Human Dimension Review Conference in Warsaw, Poland 
(October 2010), support for establishing an NPM in Ukraine633 and in Italy.634 
 
(b) Activities related to supporting existing NHRI/NPM 
These activities were aimed at knowledge transfer, training and capability enhancements of target 
institutions, in particular in the areas of regional human rights protection standards and UN OPCAT 
standards of preventing torture and degrading treatment. This group of activities formed the bulk of 
substantive content of the JP, and felt into the following major categories: 
a) Workshops – five thematic workshop sessions were carried out for NHRIs and nine for NPMs. The 
themes of each particular Workshop were selected by the Programme Team from a list of topics 
proposed by the participating Institutions during the initial phase of the JP in 2010. Each workshop 
session was carried out with participation of the Programme Team, beneficiary institutions, JP 
partners (APT/CPT/SPT) and other stakeholders (i.a. representatives of OSCE, UNDP and 
independent experts). 
b) On-site exchange of experiences – A total of eight on-site experience exchanges were carried out, 
six of them engaging NPM staff from a single beneficiary Institution (a pilot exchange in Estonia 
and exchanges in Poland, Spain, Armenia, Albania and Georgia) and two multilateral exchanges 
(engaging institutions from Albania, Slovenia, Serbia and FYROM). The on-site exchanges were 
organized per request from hosting Institutions. During the exchanges, host NPM staff and experts 
had the opportunity to share experiences, best practices and methods, both in theoretical analysis 
of NPM’s functioning vis-a-vis OPCAT standards (as interpreted by the SPT) and in practical 
experience of a preventive visit to a place of detention. In this framework, a team of experts 
worked on the ground together with the staff of the NMP. Initially, the team of experts carried 
out visits to the places of detention and engaged with their staff and detainees towards 
demonstrating standards and methods of work to the participating NPM staff. Subsequently, the 
same team coached the visits and interviews carried out by the NPM staff. The practical part of 
the on-site exchange was followed up by a detailed joint debriefing. A wide range of publications 
– both working materials, confidential debriefing papers (for participants only) and general 
summaries were circulated in conjecture with the on-site exchanges. 
                                                          
633 The Programme Team was officially requested by the Ukrainian authorities to provide support in creating a new NPM 
body within the structure of the existing Ukrainian NHRI. The Programme Team, along with experts from APT/CPT/SPT held 
roundtable discussions in October 2011 with the Ukrainian Ombudsperson’s office, Ukrainian civil society and the Ukrainian 
authorities. This activity was followed up by two meetings with relevant representatives of Ukrainian institutions in 2012, 
during which various models of NPMs were discussed in an attempt to find the optimal solution for the proposed office. As 
result, since July 2012 the Ukrainian NHRI has efficiently exercised the function of an NPM, and in October 2012 the Ukrainian 
parliament formally established the NPM. 
634 A consultation meeting on ‘Prospects for the ratification of the OPCAT and the setting-up of an NPM in Italy’ was held on 
26 March 2010 Padua. Italian politicians, civil society representatives and Government officials as well as many 
representatives of the European NPM Network discussed a road map to prepare for the ratification of OPCAT by Italy. 
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c) Independent Medical Advisory Panel (IMAP) – A separate leg of activities within the Joint 
Programme was dedicated towards establishing an expert body, drafted from experienced 
physicians and experts on medical facets of torture. The Panel was formed in March 2011 and has 
since provided advice and support to the NPM network. Composed of 8 medical doctors with a 
wide range of expertise linked to torture prevention, the IMAP was established to advise NPMs in 
response to queries addressed to the IMAP via the NHRI Unit of the Council of Europe. Members 
of the IMAP were selected by the Programme Team and acted in individual, independent capacity. 
Both the questions forwarded to the IMAP and summaries of its advice were brought to the 
knowledge of the European NPM Network by way of the European NPM Newsletter. A confidential 
Debriefing Paper and public ‘Operational Guidelines of the IMAP’ were drafted by the Programme 
Team and IMAP members.  
d) Substantive consultations, meetings and conferences – several joint meetings aimed at exchange 
of experiences, best practices and knowledge were carried out. These activities included: 
consultation meetings with Russian Public Monitoring Commissions (April 2010), Inter-NPM 
meeting on issues related to deportation flights with NPM representatives from France, Germany, 
Spain Switzerland and the United Kingdom (July 2011), participation in a consultation meeting 
‘Methodology for visits by members of national parliaments to places of detention of irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers in Europe’ held by PACE in Strasbourg in April 2012, Participation in 
a discussion panel ‘The triangular working relationship between SPT, CPT and NPM: inspection in 
the field of detention on a global, regional and domestic level’ held by the Netherlands NPM in 
June 2012 and roundtable meetings with Russian Federation NHRI/NPM and local Russian NHRIs 
(September 2010, November 2011). 
 
(c) Activities related to promotion of networking  
The third major branch of the project was devoted to building and strengthening an efficient network 
of multilateral cooperation between existing NHRI/NPM institutions. Following activities were carried 
out within this branch: 
a) Annual meetings of the Network – these meetings were carried out twice: in December 2010 and 
December 2011. Participants included: representatives of NHRIs and NPMs, the Programme Team 
and representatives of participating institutions (CPT/SPT/APT). The meeting’s agenda included: 
evaluation of the progress of the Joint Programme so far, discussion on obstacles/issues 
encountered, review of Joint Programme activities and upcoming developments within the JP. 
b) Meeting of the European Group of National Human Rights Institutions on establishment of a 
European Group Secretariat and coordination meetings with the APT/SPT about the NPM Project 
– a multilateral event held by the UN in February 2011. 
c) Participation in ‘Cooperation and Coordination Meeting between the FRA and NHRIs’ organised 
by the FRA (April 2012).  
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(d) Activities related to awareness raising  
The fourth major branch of the project was devoted to increasing the knowledge on the role and 
necessity of NPMs in the societies in target countries and raising general awareness as to their 
existence and functioning. Following activities were carried out within this branch:  
a) Participation in the OPCAT Global Forum ‘Preventing Torture, Upholding Dignity: from Pledges 
to Actions’ organised by the APT (November 2011) 
b) Participation in the Fundamental Rights Conference ‘Dignity and rights of irregular migrants’ 
(November 2011) 
c) Lecture on torture prevention monitoring bodies and the European NPM JP to academia and 
students of Essex University's LLM on International Human Rights Law (January 2012) 
Publication of an annual compendium of human rights activities of participating NHRIs was planned 
within the JP. Due to difficulties in finding qualified translators and analysts, the compendium was not 
completed within the timeframe of the JP. Additionally, the JP was supported by two ongoing 
publications funded from the project’s budget and distributed by the Council of Europe:  
a) The Regular Selective Information Flow (RSIF), a bi-weekly newsletter on CoE human rights 
activities aimed at NHRIs. The idea behind the RSIF was to keep the National Human Rights 
Structures permanently updated of Council of Europe norms and activities by way of regular 
transfer of information. The RSIF included information on case law of the European Court for 
Human Rights and developments related to it, on execution of the judgments of the ECtHR 
and on human-rights related work of other CoE institutions. The RSIF outlived the ‘Peer-to-
Peer II’ project and continued to be published in cooperation with the Versailles St Quentin 
Institutions Publiques research centre (Versailles St-Quentin-en-Yvelines University, France) 
until the end of October 2015.635 
b) The European NPM Newsletter, a bi-monthly review of information deemed relevant by the 
Programme Team for National Preventive Mechanisms (NPMs) in the Council of Europe region. The 
Newsletter ceased to be published at the end of the ‘Peer-to-Peer II’ project. 
 
(2) Evaluation of Impact 
In questionnaires carried out during the evaluation, the participating institutions have unanimously 
indicated that the ‘Peer-to-Peer II’ JP made a significant impact on their capacities. Their observations 
taken together with an analysis of debriefings and narratives of the JP allow to identify the following 
areas in which the activities of the JP have been most successful:  
a) Transfer of knowledge – the participating institutions were granted the opportunity to 
acquire significant amounts of knowledge and information during the Workshops. The 
substantive content of the Workshops has been rated overall as highly satisfactory to 
satisfactory, and in several instances the Institutions have expressed regret at not being able 
to send more of their representatives to attend. Practical experiences during on-site events – 
the on-site events have been unanimously rated as highly satisfactory. The Institutions which 
                                                          
635 Archived issues of the RSIF are available at <http://www.coe.int/t/dgi/hr-natimplement/rsif_en.asp>. 
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took part in these events have highly praised the methodology of the JP and its impact on their 
capabilities. 
b) Networking – in almost every case, participating Institutions have indicated that the 
networking aspect of the JP was one of its greatest achievements. The establishment of both 
formal and informal networks of contacts and exchange of experiences was highly valued and 
praised as an important vehicle for the further improvement of these Institutions.  
c) Institution building – due to political factors in play, the outcome of this aspect of the Project 
was largely uncertain at its start. The JP was able to actively contribute to the processes which 
led to establishment of the Ukrainian NPM and to the ongoing process of establishing one in 
Italy. However, one of the principal objectives of the JP, namely contributing to establishment 
of an NHRI in Belarus, was not met due to lack of cooperation from Belarusian government. 
d) Awareness raising – awareness raising was considered a secondary objective in the JP 
narrative, and was difficult to evaluate due to lack of substantive indicators of its impact. While 
the Project Team has taken stride to make progress in this area, several obstacles have been 
encountered, not the least ones related to the visibility of the Project and its online presence.  
 
 
c) Conclusions 
The design and planning of the ‘Peer-to-peer II’ JP serve as an example of thoughtful and consequent 
building up upon a previous JP. Taking the existing concept of a networking-oriented framework for 
cooperation, the project was expanded to include a new substantive goal of supporting the NPMs in 
beneficiary countries. The objectives of the JP were both clear and flexible, and could be easily 
evaluated based on progresses made such as the contribution to establishing the Ukrainian NPM and 
on feedback from beneficiaries. 
Management of the project followed a typical setup for horizontal JPs which engage stakeholders from 
multiple CoE Member States, with centralised management team in Strasbourg coordinating the joint 
activities of beneficiary institutions. The involvement of SPT, APT and CPT, despite their varied level 
of participation in the programme, was a good practice which ensured raising the added value of the 
JP. The management team was able to adequately monitor the Programme and adjust it as needed.  
One characteristic feature of both the ‘Peer-to-Peer II’ JP and its predecessor is the remarkably low-
key engagement of the EU bodies and institutions. While the overarching planning of the JPs was 
carried out with the involvement of DG DEVCO/EuropeAid, the project itself saw very little 
involvement from the EU institutions. Apart from the beneficiaries participating in events organised 
by the FRA, no other actions were carried out which would engage stakeholders from the EU domain. 
One can easily identify potential interest in the JP among actors from the Commission (DG HOME, DG 
JUST) or the advantage of greater involvement by the FRA. However, both ‘Peer-to-peer’ JPs represent 
what can be seen as a typical modality of the JPs prior to the 2014 Statement of Intent, namely that 
of the EU acting solely as an initiator and donor of the projects, with no major engagement in the 
substance of the activities carried out as part of JPs.  
As far as the substance of the project is concerned, it was able to achieve highly satisfactory results in 
all three principal areas: supporting and strengthening the functioning of NHRIs in line with 
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international and European standards (including the Paris Principles), assisting the newly established 
NPMs in the development of competencies concerning European human rights standards and 
practices, promoting networking, mutual exchange of information and sharing of best practices 
between NHRIs/NPMs. In the first area, the programme was able to supplement the knowledge and 
expertise of the NHRIs and assist them in capacity building. In the second area, the ‘Peer-to-peer II’ JP 
was able to assist the existing NPMs and support the creation of new ones, with the particular 
achievement of contributing to the establishment of the Ukrainian NPM. A notable success of the JP 
were the on-site exchanges of experience and practices, which helped aligning the programme with 
the situation on the ground and the problems faced by NPMs in practice. In the third area, the JP was 
able to facilitate networking among both primary and secondary beneficiaries and encourage sub-
regional cooperation between NHRIs/NPMs facing similar challenges and obstacles. 
The biggest shortcoming of the ‘Peer-to-Peer II’ JP was the fact that despite strong foundations and 
existing achievements, no subsequent iterations of the project have been carried out so far. It is 
unclear what the reasons for lack of a subsequent follow-up were, but perhaps a not insignificant 
factor was the fact that the person who was the driving force between both ‘Peer-to-peer’ JPs left the 
post at the relevant CoE unit in 2012. Unfortunately, the ongoing publications of the project (the 
newsletter and the RSIF) were also ultimately not sustained, with the NPM newsletter ceasing 
publication at the end of the JP and the RSIF ultimately having its last issue published in 2015. This 
situation illustrates one of the recurring issues which dodged the JP framework, namely the lack of 
sustainability. While certainly not every JP warranted follow-up iterations, the ‘Peer-to-peer’ series 
would greatly benefit from a third iteration which could further the achievements of the previous two. 
Another issue which was somewhat typical of the JPs at the time was the relatively low visibility of the 
Programme. While the relevant information on its activities and publications were all made available 
on the websites of the CoE, one can hardly describe them as easily accessible or visible. While media 
and journalists in target countries were informed of the JP activities, there was little in the way of 
ensuring that the greater picture of joint contribution of the CoE and the EU to improving the 
protection of human rights was made visible to societies in beneficiary countries. 
It is encouraging that exactly these issues are hopefully being addressed within the new JP framework 
following the 2014 Statement of Intent. Both the Programmatic Cooperation Framework and the 
South II JP are envisioned to feature enhanced sustainability and visibility, as well as cross-fertilisation 
between JPs concurrently active in given area.  
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III. Cooperation with the Organisation of Security and Cooperation 
in Europe  
 
A. Mapping the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in 
Europe 
 Introduction 
The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe is in many respects unique among entities 
analysed in FRAME project Work Package 5. Unlike the UN, the CoE or non-European regional 
organisations, the OSCE does not function on basis of a ratified international treaty and has no legal 
personality. Some academics discuss whether the OSCE can be considered a fully-fledged international 
organisation636 owing to its specific legal status, but considering the high degree of institutionalisation 
and the scope of OSCE’s activities this report will consider it on the same footing as the EU and other 
organisations analysed in FP7-FRAME Work Package 5.637 Several of OSCE features, such as the 
reliance on the concept of ‘soft-law’ voluntary political commitments instead of ‘hard law’ treaties 
and conventions, its concept of human dimension and the autonomous character of OSCE’s human 
rights institutions set it apart from other international actors. Finally, of all multilateral environments 
considered in FRAME research, the OSCE is perhaps to the greatest degree influenced by the political 
situation among is Participating states. While the EU sees frequent friction between Member States, 
sub-regional groups and EU bodies, none of those dynamics match the current tension between OSCE 
Participating states. This is exacerbated by the fact that unlike it is the case with the EU, which has 
begun to move away from the paradigm of requiring unanimous agreement in its decision-making, 
the intergovernmental processes within the OSCE continue to rely on all Participating states adopting 
a common position. The political dynamic within the OSCE is widely seen as one of its defining traits, 
and has resulted in ebbs and flows in OSCE history, as the organisation saw periods of increased 
dialogue and co-operation between Participating States as well as times of heightened tension 
emerging from European crises such as the 1999 NATO bombings of Serbia, the 2008 Georgian-Russian 
war and most recently the crisis in Ukraine from 2014 on .638 The unique character of OSCE invites a 
closer look at primary bodies, agencies and venues of the organisation in order to shed a light on the 
scope and complexity of its operations. An attempt to map and analyse the entirety of OSCE work 
related to human rights goes well beyond the scope of this report. For sake of both serviceableness 
and brevity, the analysis focuses on an array of critical bodies and mechanisms which have the biggest 
influence on shaping the OSCE human dimension system and where the EU is present in a meaningful 
capacity. 
 
                                                          
636 Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Organizations Law (Cambridge 2015) 11. 
637 Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2015) 991. 
638 David J. Galebreaith, The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (Routledge 2007) 129. 
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 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe – General 
Information 
The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe is an intergovernmental organisation 
focused on security and related policy areas. Its composition, legal nature and historical development 
are distinctively different from other regional organisations. The majority of OSCE Participating states 
are geographically located in Europe, while some lie beyond the traditional boundaries of the 
continent. While most OSCE activities pertain to matters of security in Europe and in this regard it is 
considered a regional organisation, the presence of North American and Central Asian Participating 
states has profound impact on politics and policies of the OSCE, not the least by the virtue of having 
both the US and Russia present. The OSCE has never attained legal personality as its founding 
instruments are not international treaties in the understating of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. This feature sets OSCE apart from majority of organisations and has profound impact on its 
operations. Under the national law of the respective host countries, the OSCE Secretariat, the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) and the three so-called ‘autonomous institutions’: Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), High Commissioner on National Minorities 
(HCNM) and Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM) enjoy various degrees of legal capacity 
as well privileges and immunities at the level customarily enjoyed by the international organisations 
in the United Nations system. However, only one OSCE field mission enjoys treatment equivalent to 
that of the United Nations: the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK), which is an element of the United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).  
The lack of legal personality of the OSCE has had increased negative impact on its activities, due to i.a. 
the inability to conclude legally binding agreements between OSCE as a whole and Participating states 
who host various OSCE bodies, difficulties in entering into agreements on cooperation with other 
international organisations (such as the EU), uncertainties as to legal status and liability of field 
operations or down-to-earth yet relevant issues with opening bank accounts and registering 
vehicles.639 These problems have exacerbated during OSCE activities in Ukraine during the ongoing 
crisis,640 however no solution to the situation appears attainable due to political situation within the 
OSCE. 
The genesis of OSCE lies with the 1973 Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 
which took place in Helsinki. Before that landmark event, a long process of quiet and conference 
diplomacy, launched on a West Germany’s initiative of establishing a forum for East-West 
conversation on security in Europe, took place.641 This process culminated with the Helsinki Final Act 
(HFA), signed by 35 states, including all European countries except Albania plus United States and 
Canada in August 1975.642 The President of the Council of the European Communities signed the HFA 
on behalf of the EC. The HFA is not an international treaty, and has no legally binding nature. Despite 
its nature, the HFA was a major achievement in relations between The West and the Communist Bloc. 
The HFA contains the so-called ‘Helsinki Decalogue’, envisioned as principles for co-operation of 
signatory states, laid out as follows: 
                                                          
639 OSCE PA, ‘Food-for-Thought Paper: The OSCE’s Lack of an Agreed Legal Status – Challenges in Crisis Situations’ April 2015. 
640 See case study on OSCE-EU cooperation in Ukraine, ch IV.D. 
641 Bjørn Møller, ‘European Security: The Role of the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe’, Working Paper 
30 Regional and Global Axes of Conflict, (2008) 2 Crisis States Working Papers Series 3-4. 
642 CSCE, Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, 1 August 1975. 
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1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty,  
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force,  
3. Inviolability of frontiers,  
4. Territorial integrity of states, 
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes, 
6. Non-intervention in internal affairs, 
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
9. Cooperation among states, 
10. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law. 
The diplomatic process continued with serval follow-up conferences (Belgrade 1977-1978, Madrid 
1980-1983, Vienna 1986-1989). In 1990, a CSCE Summit in Paris adopted the Paris Charter for a New 
Europe, a document reflecting the geopolitical changes that began a year earlier.643 The Charter 
highlighted the collective affirmation of human rights by signatories, placing a section entitled ‘Human 
Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law’ on a prominent position following its preamble.644 The Charter 
laid out the outline of institutionalisation of the CSCE, which has insofar functioned on markedly ad 
hoc basis with no permanent structures. This entailed, inter alia, the creation of the Council, the 
Secretariat and the Office for Free Elections, which has later evolved into ODIHR. The Paris Charter for 
a New Europe was signed both by the then EU presidency and the President of the Commission.  
The process of institutionalisation of the OSCE progressed over the next two years and in 1994 during 
the Budapest Summit the CSCE participants took the decision to change the name of the organisation 
to ‘Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’ and to proclaim it as a regional organisation 
in line with provisions of the Chapter VIII of the UN charter.645 The change of name took effect on 1 
January 1995. Currently, the OSCE has 57 participating states646 and 11 partners for co-operation. The 
latter form two regional groups: Mediterranean States647 and Asian States648 with Australia functioning 
as a partner for co-operation outside of regional groups. The partners for co-operation are equivalent 
to observer states in treaty-based international organisations and participate in various OSCE events 
and works, including in OSCE Ministerial Council meetings.649 The OSCE maintains close cooperation 
with partner organisations. Currently, the highest level of cooperation exists between the OSCE and 
the UN, the EU, the CoE and NATO. The OSCE maintains partner relations at various levels with several 
other international and regional organisations. 
The official representation of the OSCE and co-ordination of the work of its institutions lies with the 
Chairperson-in-Office. The chairpersonship rotates on an annual basis and is held by the Minister of 
                                                          
643 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 21 November 1990. 
644 Supra 3-4. 
645 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Budapest Document 1994. Towards a Genuine Partnership 
in a New Era, 21 December 1994. 
646 All European states, Canada, United States, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, United States, Uzbekistan. 
647 Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia. 
648 Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Afghanistan. 
649 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Factsheet on OSCE Partners for Co-operation, 20 May 2011. 
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Foreign Affairs of a participating state which holds the chairpersonship in a given year. The rotation is 
alphabetical and currently (as of March 2016) held by Germany with the German MoFA acting as the 
OSCE CiO. The CiO is supported by the incoming CiO and the CiO for the previous year, with all together 
forming the so-called OSCE Troika. Administrative functions of the OSCE are handled by the 
Secretariat, located in Vienna and headed by the Secretary General. The Secretariat provides 
operational support to the OSCE and assists the Chairmanship in its activities by offering expertise, 
providing analysis and drafting decisions.  
The finances of the OSCE are split into two major areas: the general budget, made up of participating 
states’ contribution and extra-budgetary resources. The general budget of the OSCE for the year 2016 
is set at 141.107.600 Euro at is identical to the 2015 budget.650 The budget has steadily declined since 
2007, when it was set at Euro 186.2m and is currently the lowest since 1998, when it was set at EUR 
118.7m. The situation of general budget is one of the greatest issues within the OSCE, with the political 
deadlock between Participating states preventing moves towards reversing the decline. In light of this, 
the vital role of extra-budgetary contributions is evident, as they do not fall under political 
deliberations of participating states. While the international organisations cannot, as per OSCE rules, 
contribute in their own name to the general budget, they may provide extra-budgetary contributions 
both in money and in kind.  
 
 Political situation within the OSCE 
Every international organisation is subject to various political factors emerging from differing agendas, 
aims and capabilities of their members. Neither the EU, nor the UN or the CoE are free from political 
tensions which influence their internal and external policies. While many of such frictions, such as the 
so-called North – South divide at the UN or various political alignments and tensions within the EU do 
have substantial impact on the organisation as a whole, the influence of geopolitics on the OSCE is 
perhaps most severe at the moment. While initially the CSCE was highly successful in bringing 
conflicted sides of the East-West faceoff to one table and throughout the 90s was able to pursue 
dialogue between Participating states, towards the end of the final decade of the XX century the OSCE 
found itself in increasing turmoil brought about by differences between Participating states, in 
particular between Russia and its traditional allies on one hand and the Western European states and 
the U.S. on the other.651 The situation began to deteriorate in 1999 during the conflict in Kosovo, 
where Russian expectations for the OSCE to prevent NATO involvement collided with the position of 
the NATO Member States. The subsequent outbreak of the second war in Chechnya led to the onset 
of political crisis within the organisation which persists to this day.  
One can directly identify how the phases of the political crisis influenced the OSCE budget over the 
years, with the 2001 budget being the first one lower than in the previous year, and the next decline 
setting off after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. The OSCE slid into what many see as an institutional 
crisis, with political deadlocks preventing a reform of the organisation and halting advancement in 
several areas, not the least in the scope of political commitments.652 During the 2012 OSCE Ministerial 
                                                          
650 Permanent Council of the OSCE, Decision No.1197 Approval of the 2016 Unified Budget, PC.DEC/1197, 31 December 2014. 
651 Dov Lynch, ‘The State of the OSCE’ in Russia, the OSCE and European Security (2009) 12 The EU-Russia Centre Review 9-
11. 
652 Christian Nünlist and David Svarin, ‘Introduction’ in Christian Nünlist and David Svarin (eds), Overcoming the East-West 
Divide. Perspectives on the Role of the OSCE in the Ukraine Crisis (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich and foraus – Swiss 
Forum on Foreign Policy 2014) 9. 
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Council meeting in Dublin, the Participating States adopted a decision on initiating a comprehensive 
reform, dubbed the ‘Helsinki+40’ process.653 The process was envisioned as ‘an inclusive effort by all 
participating States to provide strong and continuous political impetus to advancing work towards a 
security community, and further strengthening co-operation in the OSCE on the way towards 2015, a 
year that marks four decades since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.’654 The Helsinki+40 process 
was expected to achieve a major breakthrough by 2015, but political disagreements as to its content 
have impaired and delayed progress on substantial reforms. In the meantime, the OSCE was able to 
achieve an arguable success in its reaction to the crisis in Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring 
Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, established in March 2014, was an example of timely and rapid response 
to an emerging crisis. Notwithstanding the challenges and shortcomings of OSCE’s deployment in 
Ukraine, the SMM is a remarkable achievement and reminder of the importance of the OSCE, as the 
organisation was able to facilitate dialogue between the Participating States and reach an agreement 
on action towards mitigating the crisis in Ukraine.655 It must be noted that then abovementioned 
impediments of political nature do not affect the OSCE autonomous institutions (ODIHR, HCNM and 
RFoM) to such major degree, owing to their relative independence and established mandate. 
However, the political deadlocks also prevent any major reform or upgrade of these institutions, 
locking them in the established status quo.  
 
 Instruments of the OSCE human dimension system 
The OSCE defines its component related i.a. to protection and promotion of human rights as the 
‘human dimension’, as opposed to the politico-military and economic and environmental dimensions. 
The human dimension is centred around an array of political commitments undertaken by the 
Participating States. These commitments follow two fundamental principles of the human dimension. 
The first is that the commitments and responsibilities undertaken in the field of the human dimension 
apply in their entirety and equally in each and all of the participating states and thus indivisible and 
universal. The second is the principle that human dimension commitments are 
matters of direct and legitimate concern to all Participating states both individually and collectively, 
and the responsibility for implementation of commitments falls not just on each Participating state 
separately, but on the entire OSCE collectively.656 The OSCE political commitments are elaborated in 
various forms, from conference or summit concluding acts to documents of the OSCE Council, yet all 
share the same nature of voluntary political obligations and are agreed to unanimously by all OSCE 
participating states. Their unique character of the OSCE human dimension sets it apart from other 
international and regional human rights systems, which are either based around a core of legally 
binding documents, such as treaties or conventions or around non-legally binding instruments which 
lack mechanisms for monitoring of their implementation. The specific nature of OSCE human 
dimension has not been deferential to its importance. To quote Alston and Goodman: 
‘The non-binding diplomatic nature of the Helsinki Process led many observers to 
question its utility. Whatever contribution the process ultimately made to the demise 
                                                          
653 See: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Ministerial Council Decision on the OSCE Helsinki+40 
Process, 7 December 2012. 
654 Supra, 1. 
655 Erwan Fouéré, ‘The OSCE marks 40 years since the Helsinki Final Act: Its principles are more valid than ever.’ (2015) CEPS 
Essay No. 196. 
656 Audrey Glover, ‘Human Dimension of the OSCE-From Standard-Setting to Implementation’ (1995) 6 Helsinki Monitor 31. 
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of Communism, it clearly played an important role, especially in the second half of the 1980s 
and early 1990s, in legitimating human rights discourse within Eastern 
Europe, providing a focus for nongovernmental activities at both the domestic and 
international levels, and developing standards in relation to democracy, the rule of 
law, “human contacts”, national minorities, and freedom of expression which went 
beyond those already in existence in other contexts such as the Council of Europe 
and the UN. To a large extent, its formally non-binding nature enabled the CSCE 
standard-setting process to yield more detailed and innovative standards than those 
adopted by its counterparts.’657 
Currently, the OSCE human dimension is enshrined in over 30 documents of various nature.658 The 
commitments contained therein can be grouped into following major thematic areas: 
1. Nature of the Human Dimension 
2. Implementation of Commitments 
3. Restrictions and derogations 
4. Democratic society (incl. elections, democratic institutions and rule of law) 
5. Civil and political rights 
6. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
7. Rights of National Minorities 
8. Roma and Sinti  
9. Indigenous Populations 
10. Refugees, Returnees, Displaced and Stateless Persons 
11. Migrant Worker’s Rights 
                                                          
657 Philip Alston, Ryan Goodman International Human Rights (Oxford 2013) 974-975. 
658 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, 1 August 1975; Concluding Document of 
Madrid — The Second Follow-up Meeting, Madrid, 6 September 1983; Concluding Document of Vienna — The Third Follow-
up Meeting, Vienna, 15 January 1989; Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension 
of the CSCE, Copenhagen, 29 June 1990; Charter of Paris for a New Europe/Supplementary Document to give effect to certain 
provisions contained in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 21 November 1990; Document of the Cracow Symposium 
on the Cultural Heritage of the CSCE Participating States, Cracow, 6 June 1991; Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on 
National Minorities, Geneva, 19 July 1991; Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension 
of the CSCE, Moscow, 3 October 1991; Document of the Second Meeting of the CSCE Council, Prague, 30-31 January 1992; 
Concluding Document of Helsinki — The Fourth Follow-up Meeting, Helsinki, 10 July 1992;  
Document of the Third Meeting of the CSCE Council, Stockholm, 14-15 December 1992; Document of the Fourth Meeting of 
the CSCE Council, Rome, 30 November-1 December 1993; Concluding Document of Budapest, 6 December 1994; Lisbon 
Document, Lisbon, 3 December 1996; Document of the Sixth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Copenhagen, 18-19 
December 1997; Document of the Seventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Oslo, 2-3 December 1998; Istanbul Document, 
Istanbul, 19 November 1999; Document of the Eighth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Vienna, 27-28 November 2000; 
Document of the Ninth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Bucharest, 3-4 December 2001; Document of the Tenth Meeting 
of the Ministerial Council, Porto, 6-7 December 2002; Document of the Eleventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council, 
Maastricht, 1-2 December 2003; Document of the Twelfth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Sofia, 6-7 December 2004; 
Document of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Ljubljana, 5-6 December 2005; Document of the Fourteenth 
Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Brussels, 4-5 December 2006; Document of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Ministerial 
Council, Madrid, 29-30 November 2007; Document of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Helsinki, 4-5 
December 2008; Document of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Athens, 1-2 December 2009; Astana 
Commemorative Declaration, Astana, 2 December 2010. 
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12. Persons with Disabilities 
13. Children 
14. Armed Forces Personnel 
15. Persons in Detention or Prison 
16. Prevention of Gender-Based Persecution, Violence and Exploitation 
17. Prevention in Drugs and Arms Trafficking and Other Organised Crime 
18. Prevention of Terrorism 
19. International Humanitarian Law 
While the political commitments of the human dimension are not enforceable domestically and the 
OSCE does not feature a judiciary body entrusted with safeguarding their implementation, a so-called 
human dimension mechanism was established in order to facilitate monitoring and implementation 
of commitments by participating states. The Human Dimension Mechanism features two instruments: 
The Vienna Mechanism (established in the Vienna Concluding Document of 1989)659 and the Moscow 
Mechanism (established at the last meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension in Moscow 
in 1991)660, the latter partly constituting a further elaboration of the Vienna Mechanism. The Vienna 
Mechanism provides a set of procedures which allows participating States to initiate an exchange of 
information regarding the human dimension in other OSCE states. This includes bringing forth 
questions regarding the situation in an OSCE state, requesting information, holding bilateral discussion 
and discussing the issues raised during OSCE meetings and conferences. The Vienna Mechanism was 
activated on several occasions between 1989 and 1992.661 The Moscow Mechanism features an 
expanded list of procedures linked to the Vienna Mechanism, including a list of independent experts 
nominated by participating States, a possibility of a State suggesting for another State to invite an ad 
hoc mission of said experts, and in case of a State refusing to establish a mission of experts or if the 
requesting State considers the issue unresolved, a request for establishment of a mission of 
rapporteurs. Apart from the expanded Vienna procedure, the Moscow Mechanism provides 
independent procedures: a voluntary invitation of a mission of experts by an OSCE state, the 
establishment of a mission of experts or rapporteurs by a decision of the Permanent Council or the 
Senior Council following a request from an OSCE state, and establishment of an emergency mission of 
rapporteurs in case of a serious threat to the human dimension per request of at least 10 agreeing 
OSCE States. At the time of completion of this report, the Moscow Mechanism has been used seven 
times.662 
                                                          
659 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Concluding Document of the Third Follow-up Meeting, 
Vienna, 4 November 1986 to 19 January 1989. 
660 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Moscow Mechanism, collected excerpts from relevant OSCE 
documents constituting the Moscow Mechanism available at <http://www.osce.org/odihr/20066>. 
661 During 1989-1990, the UK invoked the Vienna Mechanism in relation to human rights abuses in Romania, Czechoslovakia, 
the GDR and Bulgaria; Turkey invoked it against Bulgaria over treatment of its Muslim minority; Hungary invoked it against 
Romania over treatment of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania; in 1991 it was used to draw the attention to the civil war 
in Yugoslavia, and the military actions of Soviet forces in Lithuania; in 1992 Austria invoked the mechanism with respect to 
Turkey’s treatment of its citizens of Kurdish descent in south eastern Turkey; in 1992 the Russian Federation activated the 
first phase of the mechanism (exchange of information) with regard to Estonian citizenship legislation. 
662 Twice in 1992 by the 12 states of the European Community and the United States on the issue of reports of atrocities and 
attacks on unarmed civilians in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and by Estonia to study Estonian legislation and to compare 
it and its implementation with universally accepted human-rights norms (1992); Twice in 1993: by Moldova to investigate 
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 Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe 
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) consists of 323 representatives of national parliaments 
from OSCE Participating States, who meet three times in a year.663 The OSCE PA was established with 
the aim of promoting parliamentary involvement in the activities of the OSCE and facilitating inter-
parliamentary dialogue and co-operation. It does not have the power to enact binding laws, while it 
may adopt declarations and recommendations, these instruments do not reflect political 
commitments of Participating States. The relationship between the PA and the intergovernmental 
OSCE bodies is highly informal and the former’s ability to influence the latter has been frequently 
observed as limited.664 Unlike the PACE, OSCE PA does not have any creation competences and cannot 
exercise any formal procedure of oversight over other elements of the OSCE system.665 Since 1993, 
the OSCE PA is involved in electoral observation activities of the OSCE and has sent over two thousand 
Parliamentarians to monitor elections worldwide. The emerging overlap in election monitoring work 
between OSCE PA and ODIHR was resolved by a co-operation agreement signed by both institutions 
in 1997.666 
 
 The OSCE Summits, the Ministerial Council and the Permanent 
Council 
The intergovernmental decision-making process within the OSCE and its actors are a unique 
arrangement. The overarching rule of consensus within the OSCE is that of a unanimous agreement 
required in all decisions on intergovernmental level, not unlike the principle of unanimity required in 
the EU’s CFSP.667 This requirement determines the dynamics within the organisation, for one 
participating State is able to effectively veto any decision. The principal element of the OSCE’s 
decision-making process lies with the OSCE Summits, which represent the highest political level of 
OSCE. The Summits are periodic meetings of Heads of State/Government of OSCE participating States 
and deal with setting strategic priorities and policies of the OSCE. Insofar, the CSCE/OSCE has held 
seven Summits: Helsinki in 1975, Paris in 1990, Helsinki in 1992, Budapest in 1994, Lisbon in 1996, 
Istanbul in 1999 and Astana in 2010. There are no pre-existing rules dictating the frequency of 
Summits, any participating State may propose a Summit to be held, but the decision must be adopted 
                                                          
current legislation, interethnic relations and the implementation of minorities' rights on the territory of Moldova and by the 
CSCE Committee of Senior Officials vis-a-vis Serbia-Montenegro, to investigate reports of human rights violations (this 
mission was unable to fulfil its task because of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's lack of co-operation), Once in 1999 by 
the Russian Federation in relation to NATO’s military operation in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; once in 2002 
by 10 OSCE participating States (Germany, the United States, Austria, Canada, the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Norway, Sweden), in relation to Turkmenistan, to examine concerns arising out of investigations resulting from the reported 
attack on 25 November 2002 on President Niyazov, and to investigate all matters relating to the conduct of the investigation; 
once in 2011 by 14 participating States of the OSCE (Germany, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the United 
Kingdom, Iceland, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, and the Czech Republic) to investigate the 
situation in Belarus after the presidential election of 19 December 2010. 
663 Two of these meetings are held in Participating States on a rotating basis, the third meeting takes place in Vienna. 
664 Robert S. Oliver ,‘The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’ (1996) 7 Helsinki Monitor 142-143. 
665 In 1999 the OSCE PA issued a Declaration requesting for the power to appoint the OSCE Secretary General to be 
transferred to itself. This declaration was not taken up by the intergovernmental bodies of the OSCE.  
666 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Co-Operation Agreement Between the OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly and The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Copenhagen 2 September 1997. 
667 See supra (fn 10), 69-71. 
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by all States unanimously. The final documents of the OSCE Summits (such as the HFA, CPNE or the 
Astana Declaration) represent decisions and commitments of highest level and importance for further 
developments within the OSCE. The highest permanent decision-making body of the OSCE is the 
Ministerial Council, which consists of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of participating States. The 
Ministerial Council meets annually in every year when no Summit takes place. The Council reviews the 
current OSCE activity, undertakes strategic decisions towards implementing aims and goals set during 
the Summits and elaborates political commitments related to every dimension of the OSCE. Regular 
consultation and decision-making related to day-to-day operations of the OSCE is entrusted in the 
Permanent Council, consisting of ambassadorial-level representatives of all participating States. The 
Permanent Council meets weekly in Vienna and is chaired by the ambassador of the country which 
currently holds the rotating OSCE chairpersonship. Finally, decision-making related to military and 
security affairs is also entrusted in the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), which consists of 
ambassadorial-level representatives of all participating States who meet weekly in Vienna under a 
rotating FSC chairpersonship. 
 
 The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights evolved from the Office for Free 
Elections and began functioning in its current shape in 1992, headquartered in Warsaw. It is one of 
OSCE’s so-called autonomous institutions, understood as it having a degree of independence in 
decision-making and policy-setting from the intergovernmental mechanisms and bodies of the 
OSCE.668 Currently, the ODIHR has doesn’t have a legal personality and no explicit legal status under 
Polish domestic law. While Poland continues to recognise the status of ODIHR’s employees and 
premises as equal to those of the United Nations as per the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations669, currently such recognition is purely customary and has no 
grounds in any normative act. In 2009 the Polish government undertook an attempt to regulate the 
status of ODIHR and its employees by means of a statute of the parliament, but these attempts have 
not materialised insofar.670 
The ODIHR is headed by a Director, appointed for a renewable three-year term by the OSCE Ministerial 
Council at a recommendation from the Permanent Council. The ODIHR is the OSCE’s primary 
institution responsible for assisting participating States in fulfilling their human dimension 
commitments. The current mandate of the ODIHR, as laid out in the 1992 Helsinki Document, is to 
ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to abide by the rule of law, to 
promote principles of democracy and to build, strengthen and protect democratic institutions, as well 
as promote tolerance throughout society.671 ODIHR is tasked with assisting OSCE participating States 
to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; to abide by the rule of law; to 
                                                          
668 Kurt P. Tudyka, ‘The margin beyond intergovernmentalism. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’ in 
Bob Reinaldaand Bertjan Verbeek (eds) Autonomous policy making by international organisations (Routledge 2003) 115. 
669 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 13 February 1946. 
670 Government of Republic of Poland, Legislative Council, ‘Opinia z 15 stycznia 2009 r. o projekcie ustawy o Biurze Instytucji 
Demokratycznych i Praw Człowieka Organizacji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie oraz o Sekretariacie Wspólnoty 
Demokracji RL-0303-1/09’ (Opinion dated January 15th 2009 on the project of statute on OSCE’s ODIHR and Community of 
Democracies) <http://radalegislacyjna.gov.pl/dokumenty/opinia-z-15-stycznia-2009-r-o-projekcie-ustawy-o-biurze-
instytucji-demokratycznych-i-praw> last accessed on on 20 February 2016. 
671 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), CSCE Helsinki Document 1992 – The Challenges of Change, 
Helsinki 9-10 July 1992 23-28. 
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promote principles of democracy; to build, strengthen and protect democratic institutions; and to 
promote tolerance throughout their societies. It organizes the yearly OSCE Human Dimension 
Implementation Meeting, three supplementary meetings and a seminar, which provide an 
opportunity for the OSCE community to review Participating States’ progress in the human dimension 
and give other stakeholders, including international and regional organisations as well as civil society 
a platform to communicate.  
The current overarching policy areas of ODIHR are: elections, democratisation, human rights, 
tolerance and non-discrimination, Roma and Sinti Rights. In respect to elections, ODIHR carries out 
observing missions jointly with the OSCE PA. The OSCE activity in monitoring elections has over the 
decades become its arguably most visible and recognisable activity. In fact, the specialisation and 
expertise achieved by ODIHR in this field is frequently held as a benchmark of monitoring mechanisms. 
In the field of human rights, ODIHR works by providing assistance to Participating states and facilitating 
cooperation between national governments, NHRIs, civil society and other international 
organisations. In 2014, the primary human rights issues identified by ODIHR were: death penalty, 
freedom of assembly, human rights defenders, human rights in counter-terrorism and situation in 
Ukraine. ODIHR carries out its mandate through a varied array of activities. The most visible of them 
are the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meetings, which are a platform for OSCE 
participating States, Partners for Co-operation, NHRIs, civil society and other stakeholders to assess 
implementation of the OSCE human dimension, discuss issues, share good practices and elaborate 
recommendations. Representatives of international and regional organisations participate in the 
HDIM, however, unlike e.g. the CoE or the UN, who are represented in their own capacity, the EU is 
represented by the rotating presidency. The 2015 HDIM was held in Warsaw and addressed topics 
such as: freedom of media and expression, challenges to human rights in the ae of new ITC and IT 
technologies, freedom of assembly and associations, NHRIs, human rights education, tolerance and 
non-discrimination, independence of the judicial system, rule of law, prevention of torture, death 
penalty, human rights in counter-terrorism, democracy, citizenship and political rights, freedom of 
movement, migrants and migrant workers, human trafficking, hate crimes, freedom of religion and 
belief, Roma and Sinti issues, national minorities. 
Apart from the abovementioned activities, ODIHR carries out legislative assistance, training, education 
and capacity building actions, monitors the state of human rights in Participating States, publishes 
various publications (including handbooks and guidelines) related to protection of human rights and 
facilitates various events aimed at dialogue and exchange of best practices among stakeholders. Its 
2016 unified budget is set at c.a. 16m Euro. However, the ODIHR is not limited to core budget as 
established by the Ministerial Council as part of the general OSCE budget, and may accept extra-
budgetary contributions from both States and other international organisations.672 The Russian 
proposal of a stronger linkage between the ODIHR budget and the general OSCE budget and the 
West’s opposition to such notion remains one of flashpoints of political conflict within the OSCE.673 
The current arrangement allows ODIHR to operate with far greater freedom and efficiency than if it 
was limited solely to its core budget. However, despite substantial support from several Participating 
States and as of recently, of the European Commission, the scope of ODIHR activities remains largely 
dependent on its financial capabilities. To provide some perspective on the issue, ODIHRs annual 
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673 David Lane and Stephen White, Rethinking The ‘Coloured Revolutions’ (Routledge 2013) 65. 
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budget is below that of the EU’s FRA (21m EUR for 2016), while the geographical and thematic scope 
of ODIHRs mandate is arguably far wider. 
 
 Other OSCE institutions and structures 
Beyond the core bodies and instruments of the OSCE, protection and promotion of human rights is 
present in majority of OSCE work and is the primary or secondary focus of great deal of institutions 
and structures formed within the OSCE. An exhaustive review of all OSCE human rights mechanisms is 
beyond the scope of this report, however, a few specialised entities within the OSCE sphere warrant 
mentioning: 
 
a) The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media 
The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFoM) was established by the OSCE Permanent 
Council in November 1997 as an autonomous institution tasked with monitoring developments 
relevant to freedom of media and expression in Participating States.674 The Representative is an 
independent expert appointed by the Ministerial Council unanimously upon the recommendation of 
the CiO after consultation with Participating States. The RFoM serves for a three-year term which may 
be extended once. He or she is headquartered in Vienna and has permanent staff of 15. The RFoM’s 
role is to provide early warning and rapid response to violations of freedom of expression and freedom 
of media in the OSCE region. The Representative works through various means, including quiet 
diplomacy, providing advice on media law report, raising awareness of violations of journalists’ rights, 
publishing guides and handbooks and conducting visits to Participating States. In the recent years, the 
RFoM has increasingly raised the issues of freedom of media and expression on the internet, including 
within social networks. The RFoM is one of few international institutions mandated exclusively with 
protecting the freedom of the media (the other being i.a. the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression) and co-operates closely with similar institutions, issuing an annual joint 
declaration on freedom of expression worldwide.675 
 
b) The High Commissioner on National Minorities 
During the OSCE Helsinki Summit in 1992, the Participating States established the High Commissioner 
on National Minorities (HCNM) as an autonomous institution mandated to act as conflict prevention 
instrument.676 The mandate of the HCNM does not cover all minorities-related topics, instead it is 
narrowed down to acting as an early warning-rapid response institution for dealing with ethnic 
tensions which might have security implications within the OSCE sphere. The Commissioner is an 
independent expert appointed by the OSCE Ministerial Council unanimously upon the 
                                                          
674 OSCE Permanent Council, Decision No. 193 Mandate of the OSCE Representation on Freedom of the Media, 5 November 
1997. 
675 The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special 
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676 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), CSCE Helsinki Document 1992 – The Challenges of Change, 
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recommendation of the CiO for a three-year term, which may be extended once. The HCNM has its 
headquarters in The Hague. The HCNM focuses on preventive actions, conducted via quiet diplomacy 
and entrenched independence and confidentiality. Apart from the general focus on short-term action 
and conflict prevention, the HCNM engages also in long-term activities, such as fostering international 
standards and good practices related to minorities. The HCNM has published several 
recommendations and guidelines related to human rights of minorities, such as The Hague 
Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities (October 1996)677, The Lund 
Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life (September 
1999)678 or The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations (June 
2008)679. 
 
 Conclusions 
When considering the OSCE as a partner for the EU and assessing their cooperation in the field of 
human rights, two major factors need to me kept in mind. The first is that the autonomous institutions 
of the OSCE (ODIHR, HCNM and RFoM) are largely independent from the intergovernmental bodies 
based in Vienna. Working within their mandates, the autonomous institutions are free to pursue their 
aims and goals as well as cooperate with other international and regional organisations. While 
tensions within the OSCE do impede on the autonomous institutions (not the least by limiting their 
budgetary capabilities as the OSCE is for some time unable to reach an agreement on expanding its 
budget), they The second factor to be considered is that the reaction of OSCE and its autonomous 
institutions to the expanding scope of EU’s activity in the field of human rights has been markedly 
different than that of the CoE. While the overlap between ODIHR and EU is growing, there is little 
friction or competitiveness between both organisations.680  
The second factor, not unlike as it is the case with the CoE, are the financial capabilities of the OSCE. 
With its budget shrinking over the recent years and political deadlock preventing any major reversing 
of the trend. This challenge for the OSCE is at the same time an opportunity for its partners, as extra-
budgetary donations which circumvent the general budget and support on-the-ground are increasing 
vital to the continued success of OSCE’s activities. This has all the more relevance to the ODIHR and 
other autonomous bodies, as their budgets are small compared to capabilities of the EU or the CoE. 
In 2009, the then-Secretary General of the OSCE reflected upon the comparison between the three 
European organisations, stating: 
‘The EU is the elephant in the room. But we can think of the EU as the elephant, the Council 
of Europe as the dog and the OSCE as the flea. And of course, the flea can bite the dog that 
bites the elephant.’681 
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While such statement is perhaps too disingenuous to the efforts of all three organisations, the 
disparity in available resources is a factor that needs to be taken into consideration throughout any 
assessments of cooperation between the EU and the OSCE. 
 
B. Mapping the EU: Major EU Human Rights Stakeholders involved 
directly or indirectly with the OSCE  
The following section will briefly introduce the primary EU institutions, agencies and other bodies or 
stakeholders which are involved in the cooperation with the OSCE. For more detail about the 
competences of the individual institutions, agencies and other bodies, please see supra II.B.  
The European Council, in its capacity as the primary agenda setter of the EU, has in the past frequently 
addressed cooperation with the OSCE, focusing on security (in particular the Ukraine crisis) and 
democracy (in particular election observation) and not mentioning human rights aspects 
specifically.682 Strategy development for EU human rights cooperation with the OSCE is consequently 
carried out by the Foreign Affairs Council, based on the preparatory work of COHOM and COSCE. The 
Strategic Framework and Action Plans, as well as most of the EU human rights guidelines explicitly 
refer to the OSCE as a partner for human rights cooperation, and detail the specific areas and ways in 
which both organisations should engage.683 The Council is responsible for coordinating EU action and 
ensuring consistency.684 COSCE prepares the issues discussed in the OSCE and coordinates a common 
European position on them.  
The EEAS is one of the main partners for ODIHR in terms of policy-setting and strategic matters.685 On 
the ground, the EU Delegation to the International Organisations in Vienna coordinates EU action 
and represents the EU externally. Although the EU is not a full member of the OSCE and consequently 
does not have voting rights, it is treated as a ‘virtual member’ that can participate fully in every other 
way.686 If an issue under discussion falls within the scope of EU competences, the EU delegation can 
intervene like a full Member State, it can represent the common position of the EU Member States in 
decision-making bodies and represent the EU in non-decision-making bodies. The representative of 
the EU Delegation is regarded as part of the delegation of the EU Presidency and sits next to the head 
of mission of the latter in meetings of OSCE decision-making bodies.687 The EU Delegation also actively 
participates in the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meetings (HDIMs) and organizes side 
events.688 In meetings at the level of Heads of State or Government or at ministerial level, the EU is 
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represented by the HR/VP, the President of the European Council or by the President of the 
Commission.689 
The EU and the OSCE engage in regular dialogue, among others at the ministerial level, the level of the 
Political and Security Committee, and at staff level.690 The EU Special Representative for Human 
Rights takes part in meetings with OSCE representatives and participates in OSCE conferences.691 On 
the ground, EU Delegations in OSCE Member States and EU CSDP missions cooperate with field 
missions of the OSCE.692 EU Special Representatives whose mandate covers areas of OSCE operations 
are held to cooperate and coordinate closely with the OSCE in their work towards conflict prevention 
and resolution.693  
In the European Commission, the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement 
Negotiations (DG NEAR), the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG 
DEVCO) and the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers (DG JUST) are the primary 
interlocutors for ODIHR, particularly with regard to operationalisation and technical matters.694 In 
addition, the FRA cooperates closely with the OSCE, in particular with ODIHR and with the Human 
Dimension Committee of the Permanent Council. For example, FRA participates actively in the annual 
HDIMs,695 it involves ODIHR officials in its Working Party on Improving Reporting and Recording of 
Hate Crime and in the Working Party on Roma Integration.696 Given the similar budgets of FRA and 
ODIHR, there is much common ground for cooperation, for example with regard to election 
observation, the rights of Roma, and tolerance issues.697 
 
C. The position of the EU vis-à-vis the OSCE  
 Introduction 
Compared to the relationship between the EU and the CoE, the EU’s engagement with the OSCE has 
invited relatively scarce attention from academia.698 Research carried out on the topic has been mostly 
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focused on mutual engagement in the areas of security and defence as well as implications of the 
geopolitical situation in Europe for both organisations. This report seizes the opportunity to approach 
the relationship between the EU and the OSCE from the perspective of human rights. An opportunity 
to assess achievements and challenges both organisations face while furthering protection and 
promotion of human rights in Europe and beyond is all the more important given the recent 
developments both within the EU and the OSCE, such as the migrant crisis and the situation in Poland 
as well as in countries where they cooperate with the crisis in Ukraine as a challenge for both 
organisations. This chapter will open with brief presentations of the two organisations, signifying the 
vital characteristics and recent developments which impact the relationship between the EU and the 
OSCE.699 Following that, the framework for cooperation between the organisations will be presented, 
addressing the normative grounds within both the EU and the OSCE.  
 
 Profile of the EU 
The European Union has undergone a long and complicated evolution from a loose association of six 
Western European countries working together towards common economic goals to a unique supra-
national organisation of 28 Member States spanning the area from Lisbon to Bucharest. Three 
elements of this evolution and expansion have particular relevance for EU’s engagement with the 
OSCE. 
First is the EU’s increasing interest in the matters of security and defence, which begun with 
incorporation of the so-called Petersburg Tasks in the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam. The Petersburg 
Tasks were a set of principles for mutual European security adopted in 1992 by the now-defunct 
Western European Union.700 These principles related to matters of humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping 
and engagement of armed forces in crisis management. In this same year, during the European Council 
meeting in Cologne, the European Security and Defence Policy came into being as an element of the 
overarching Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. The ESDP steadily evolved into its current 
form, the Common Defence and Security Policy which was established by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. 
With the expansion of its defence and security policy areas and aspirations as to becoming a major 
military actor in Europe, the EU stepped into an arguably crowded field where both the OSCE and the 
NATO were already active, although with very different profiles and aims. While examining the 
entirety of the CSDP is well beyond this report (and is a focus of another FP7-FRAME work package701), 
it bears to mention that the EU’s increased activity in the field of military security and conflict 
prevention are factors that do have influence on the entirety of its relations with the OSCE, especially 
when the EU is confronted with OSCE Participating states that have their own agenda for European 
security, such as the US and Russia.  
The second major factor was the increased focus of the EU on human rights in external relations. 
Initially, as the FRAME report D4.1 observes, the EU focused on economic integration and cooperation 
while following assumptions of neo-functionalist logic that progress and integration in economy 
should result in a spill-over effect on other sectors and eventually result in a closer cooperation and 
                                                          
699 A more detailed mapping of the OSCE and presentation of some of its unique features and characteristics see above 
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700 Western European Union Council of Ministers, Petersburg Declaration, 19 June 1992. 
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integration in the political sector as well.702 Additionally, there existed an assumed division of 
competences in Western Europe where the CoE dealt with human rights while the EU focused on 
economic cooperation. The change in the geopolitical paradigm from 1989 on resulted in a shift in 
EU’s orientation, with the recognition of respect for fundamental rights as one of core values of the 
EU in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht. Subsequent developments such as the adoption of the 
Copenhagen Criteria and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU expanded the EU fundamental 
rights framework. At the same time, the external human rights policy of the EU began to evolve 
following the adoption of the 2003 European Security Strategy, and currently according to provisions 
of the Treaty of Lisbon mandates the EU to engage in promotion of human rights in multilateral fora, 
including the OSCE. 
The third factor emerges from the geopolitical expansion of the EU.703 The aspirations of post-
communist countries to join the NATO and the EU became the subject of a political struggle between 
the ‘old’ EU Member States, United States and Russia. While arguably it was the expansion of NATO 
that caused most of the friction between the actors invested in European politics, the subsequent 
major expansion of the EU in 2004 not only did place Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus as 
immediate neighbours of EU Member States, but also led to expansions of the EU’s ‘periphery area’ 
of candidate, associated and partner countries, towards which the EU implemented various external 
policies either alone or in cooperation with other organisations, among them the CoE and the OSCE. 
The enlargement led to a shift in EU’s position within several multilateral fora, as its internal and 
external policy became increasingly focused on areas which were at the same time the focus of 
Russian and American foreign policies. 
 
 Profile of the OSCE 
Contrary to the early phases of the EU, human rights were present from the very onset of the 
processes that led to the birth of CSCE/OSCE. In fact, one can argue that they were one of the core 
elements of the arrangements behind the OSCE, for the Western states were actively looking to bring 
the Warsaw Pact countries to commit themselves to recognising civil and political rights. Yet despite 
the OSCE proclaiming its engagement in three equally important ‘baskets’ (politico-military, economic 
and environmental, human dimension), the politico-military aspect has been the primary focus of the 
OSCE since its inception, with the human dimension being the second most important and the 
economic and environmental aspects falling behind. This state of affairs is a consequence of aims and 
goals of the Participating states. While all participants of the CSCE/OSCE process shared, to a varied 
degree, common interest in the matters of security and political dialogue in Europe, the human 
dimension was mostly an insistence of the Western states who provided the momentum for its 
furthering and development. Between the EU and its partners in the EEA emerging as economic 
powerhouses of the continent and relatively sparse common ground for co-operation between major 
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actors in Europe, the economic basket never evolved to the degree where OSCE would be considered 
as a major regional stakeholder.704 
The development of the OSCE’s human dimension over time is closely linked to the ups and downs of 
the whole organisation. After the political climate in Europe changed in 1989, the CSCE was able to 
swiftly transform itself into a more institutionalised and permanent form of the OSCE and moved 
forward to make several sound achievements, such as the expansion of the human dimension political 
commitments or establishing the autonomous institutions. However, the political crisis that struck the 
OSCE in the late 90’s and largely persists to this day has also had a negative impact on its human rights 
work. While the autonomous institutions were shielded from such impact to a degree, thanks to their 
relatively independent mandate and the ability to procure funds outside of the core OSCE budgets, 
the same cannot be said of development of political commitments of the OSCE. While the organisation 
was able to hold five summits during the 90’s, it has succeeded to organise just a single summit since 
1999, thus severely limiting its ability to carry out the high-level dialogue that is the core of the OSCE 
process. At the same time, as outlined in the previous section, the EU became increasingly focused on 
internal and external human rights policies. Interestingly, while the CoE reacted to these 
developments within the EU with reservation, the OSCE never developed a similar attitude. Interviews 
with stakeholders from OSCE/ODIHR indicate that from the very onset of EU’s increased activity in the 
field of human rights, the conversation between both organisations was focused on finding synergies 
and complementary areas.705 While there is certainly overlap between both geographic and thematic 
fields of human rights policy of both organisations, it has never resulted in tensions nearly as profound 
as disagreements between the EU and the CoE regarding the FRA (see chapter II.C). 
Currently, the OSCE is undergoing a phase of reinvigoration which could lead to a wider revival of the 
organisation as a whole. This phase begun with its timely and strong response to the crisis in Ukraine 
in 2014, where the OSCE was able to swiftly launch its biggest field operation in history, the OSCE 
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM).706 Its rapid deployment and role in stabilizing and de-
escalating the conflict is seen as one of the most vital achievements of the OSCE in this decade – one 
that possibly leads to restoration of its relevance and could pave way to a larger reform of OSCE’s 
mandate, policies and modalities.707 
 
 Normative frameworks for co-operation 
a) The EU 
On the legal level, the EU primary law features both general and specific provisions for the EU’s 
engagement with the OSCE. The relevant normative foundations lie in the art. 21 TEU, which provides 
that ‘The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with (…) international, regional 
or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall 
promote multilateral solutions to common problems (…)’. The principles mentioned earlier in art. 21 
TEU are: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity and respect 
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for the principles of the UN Charter and international law. This general provision is supplemented by 
the art. 220 TFEU, which states that ‘The Union shall establish all appropriate forms of cooperation 
with (…), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’. In paragraph 2 of art. 220 the TFEU 
outlines the responsibility of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy and the Commission to implement the cooperation. Thus, the OSCE is one of four international 
and regional organisations which are explicitly indicated in the primary EU law as partners for 
multilateral cooperation, the others being the UN, the CoE and the OECD. 
 
b) The OSCE 
Until 1999, the co-operation between the OSCE and other international and regional organisations 
active in Europe was largely concluded on ad hoc basis. Although contacts between the OSCE and 
other organisations were established as early as in 1991, they initially lacked formalisation. Regular 
frameworks for dialogue were established primarily vis-à-vis the CoE and the UN, with the then-
European Communities present in a marginal capacity.708 During the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, 
on the initiative of the EU,709 the OSCE adopted the Operational Document – the Platform for Co-
operative Security (PCS) as part of the Charter for European Security.710 The aim of the PCS was to 
constitute the basis for the OSCE’s engagement with other organisations operating in the broadly 
understood OSCE area of activity. The Platform’s goals are outlined as ‘to strengthen the mutually 
reinforcing nature of the relationship between those organisations and institutions concerned with 
the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area.’711 The PCS outlines a list of features 
required to be present within organisations with whom the OSCE commits to co-operate, interestingly, 
the list does not refer directly to respect for human rights or human dimension, but it does recall the 
need for such organisations to adhere to principles of the UN Charter and the OSCE principles and 
commitments set out in the HFA, the Charter of Paris and the concluding documents of the 1992 
Helsinki Summit and the 1994 Budapest Summit, which all include provisions related to human rights. 
The PCS defines the modalities for co-operation between the OSCE and other organisations, including 
the following instruments and mechanisms: ‘Regular contacts, including meetings; a continuous 
framework for dialogue; increased transparency and practical co-operation, including the 
identification of liaison officers or points of contact; cross-representation at appropriate meetings; 
and other contacts intended to increase understanding of each organisation’s conflict prevention 
tools.’712 In the following years, the PCS was operationalised in relation to engagement with the EU, 
with regular meetings of the EU-OSCE ministerial and ambassadorial troikas held under the rotating 
EU Presidency since 2002 and annual staff-level meeting of representatives of the European 
Commission with their counterparts in the OSCE/ODIHR.713 The presence of the EU within the political 
decision-making bodies of the OSCE was formalised in the 2006 Rules of Procedure of the Organisation 
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for Security and Co-Operation in Europe714, which provided the European Commission a seat next to 
the EU Member State holding the current Presidency in all OSCE decision-making bodies. 
 
c) Mutual agreements 
Unlike it is the case with the CoE, which signed the 2007 Memorandum of Understanding with the EU 
(see chapter II.C of this report), there exists no overarching written agreement formalising the 
cooperation between the EU and the OSCE. Naturally, concluding a legally binding international treaty 
between both organisations is impossible due to lack of legal personality on OSCE’s part, this however 
does not preclude the possibility of entering an agreement which could take the form of a soft law 
instrument. In fact, the OSCE has insofar formalised its relations i.a. with the UN and the CoE in a series 
of Permanent Council decisions and bilateral soft law agreements.715 The current political situation 
within the OSCE coupled with its modalities of requiring a unanimous agreement of all Participating 
States makes prospects for entering a similar agreement with the EU unlikely due to the current state 
of relations between the EU and Russia. Such obstacles do not apply to the eventual possibility of the 
EU entering agreements with the autonomous institutions of the OSCE, due to the ability to formalise 
cooperation with other organisations being an element of their autonomy which does not require 
consent from the political decision-making bodies of the OSCE. 
 
D. Substantive Human Rights goals and objectives of the EU vis-à-
vis the OSCE 
 Introduction 
The overarching priorities of the EU for the co-operation with the OSCE have insofar focused on four 
major areas:716  
1. Improving capabilities for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts, and making 
progress on resolving the protracted conflicts; 
2. Strengthening conventional arms control including security- and confidence-building 
measures; 
3. Strengthening implementation of norms, principles and commitments, in particular in 
the human dimension, including full support for the work of the relevant OSCE 
institutions; 
4. Tackling transnational and emerging threats and challenges. 
In practice, while the EU addresses all four areas in its policy goals and objectives, the EU focuses 
heavily on the implementation of OSCE political commitments in the human dimension.717 Several 
factors have contributed to such orientation of the EU policy towards the OSCE. First is the overall 
strong commitment of the EU to promoting human rights in its external policy, as laid out in art. 21 
TEU. Respect for human rights and their universality and indivisibility is enshrined as one of the 
foundations of EU external action, and the EU has over the last decade increasingly heightened the 
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importance of human rights in its multilateral relations.718 Historically, the Western European 
countries which formed the EU were at the onset of the OSCE process oriented heavily towards 
promoting respect for the human dimension in all OSCE Participating States, and this orientation 
continues to form a cornerstone of their focus both in national foreign policy towards the OSCE and 
as part of the EU CFSP. This orientation was also assumed by new Member States which joined the EU 
from 2004 on. Finally, on a more pragmatic side, the current political situation within the OSCE means 
that while achieving defense- and security-related policy goals and objectives in the 
intergovernmental bodies of the OSCE faces major obstacles, the EU is able to make substantial 
progress in cooperation with the human dimension-oriented autonomous institutions of the OSCE, 
chief amongst them the ODIHR. 
Unlike in the case with the Council of Europe, the relationship between the EU and the OSCE is not 
entrenched in an agreement akin to the 2007 MoU. Therefore, the primary overarching policy 
document outlining priorities and goals for the EU’s engagement with the OSCE is the 2012 Strategic 
Framework on Human Rights and Democracy (SF) which outlines the overall strategic aims of the EU 
in its external human rights action.719 The 2012 SF contains a section on ‘Working through multilateral 
institutions’, which outlines the EU’s commitment to ‘(…) continue its engagement with the invaluable 
human rights work of the Council of Europe and the OSCE’.720 The strategic priorities of the SF are 
operationalised by the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, which was introduced in its 
first four-year cycle concurrently with the SF, and has had its second iteration adopted in 2015.721 Both 
Action Plans refer to co-operation with multilateral partners in general and to the OSCE/ODIHR in 
particular as indicated below in this subchapter. 
Another important group of overarching policy documents for human rights in external action are the 
EU Guidelines on Human Rights. To date, 11 thematic guidelines have been adopted. All of the 
Guidelines are related to either general issues (such as human rights defenders) or civil and political 
rights (such as freedom of religion and belief). The Guidelines outline the issue in questions, provide 
relevant definitions and objectives as well as operationalisation of the issue by the EU in its external 
action, including in multilateral fora and in cooperation with other international and regional 
organisations. 
As it is the case in the EU’s engagement towards the UN722 and the CoE,723 the EU adopts specific 
documents outlining its policy objectives towards the OSCE. However, unlike the policy documents 
related to the UN and the CoE, the EU priorities for cooperation with the OSCE are confidential and 
are not made available to the public. Their existence is confirmed by publicly available documents (e.g. 
meeting agendas)724 which refer to OSCE priorities and by interviews carried out by the research team 
with representatives of EEAS, ODIHR and EU Member States. According to stakeholders interviewed, 
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these priorities are confidential owing to their security-related content and due to the political 
situation within the OSCE. Some elements of the EU priorities for cooperation with the OSCE have 
been made available to the authors of this report and will be referenced throughout this subchapter. 
These priorities are adopted biannually, with the current document covering the years 2016-2017. 
The procedure of their drafting and adoption also differs from the procedures used in formulating EU 
priorities towards the UN and the CoE. Unlike the ‘conveyor belt’ process common for other strategic 
human rights documents, which are prepared in the Council Working Party on Human Rights (COHOM) 
and adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council,725 the OSCE priorities are drafted by the EU Delegation to 
the OSCE in Vienna and discussed by relevant stakeholders, including the EU Member State HoMs, the 
Council Working Party on CoE/OSCE (COSCE) and COHOM. 
 
 Thematic priorities 
The areas of human rights priorities listed below reflect both core areas of activity of the OSCE and 
the EU, including areas which do not feature on the OSCE’s agenda but are highlighted by EU’s 
documents as prioritiers where the EU aims to work with the OSCE/ODIHR. Together with the Action 
Plans and the EU human rights guidelines they provide details on possible thematic and geographic 
focal areas and concrete strategies to operationalize them.  
Table 5 Overview of EU thematic priorities for cooperation with the OSCE 
 EU 
Priorities 
for OSCE 
2014-
2015 
2012 Action 
Plan  
2015 Action 
Plan  
EU 
Guidelines 
Strengthening the OSCE (Helsinki+40 
process) 
●    
Support for OSCE autonomous 
institutions and field missions 
●    
Full implementation of human rights 
(human dimension) 
● ● (●)  
Democracy & Elections  ● ●  
LGBTI rights  ● (●) ● 
Gender equality ●    
Freedom of expression and of the media ●  (●) ● 
Freedom of religion and belief ● ● (●) ● 
Freedom of assembly and association ●  (●)  
Torture and ill-treatment  ● (●) ● 
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Civil society and Human Rights 
Defenders 
●  (●) ● 
Children    ● 
 (brackets indicate that a thematic issue is not expressly declared a priority or that the document only generally refers to 
regional organisations without explicitly mentioning the OSCE) 
 
a) Full implementation of human dimension (human rights) 
According to information gathered in interviews with stakeholders, the overarching aim of ensuring 
full implementation of the OSCE human dimension is an ongoing and permanent objective of the EU. 
In the 2014-2015 biannual EU priorities for the OSCE the EU set out to ‘[s]eek full implementation of 
human dimension commitments in all areas relevant to the mandate of the OSCE (...)’. The OSCE 
Priorities outline several specific focus areas of the human dimension as noted later in this subchapter. 
Beyond the biannual priorities, the 2012 and the 2015 Action Plan also commit the EU to strengthening 
regional human rights mechanisms, although only the former refers to the OSCE explicitly.726 
 
b) Strengthening the OSCE (Helsinki+40) process 
The biannual EU priorities for the OSCE continue to reinforce the EU’s commitment to support the 
Helsinki+40 process, which was launched in 2012 as an attempt to undertake a major reform of the 
OSCE framework and alleviating the issues faced by the organisation. The 2014-2015 priorities for the 
OSCE outlined this aim as to ‘engage constructively in the Helsinki+40 processwith the aim of 
strengthening the organisation, its procedures, structures and implementing capacities, 
enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation, and developing a more 
focused substantive agenda.’ However, the priorities stop short of elaborating what solutions the EU 
envisions towards handling the vital areas of the Helsinki+40 process, such as the issues of the legal 
status of the OSCE, the role of the OSCE PA or the question as to the degree of autonomy of ODIHR, 
HCNM and RoFM. 
 
c) Support for OSCE autonomous institutions and field missions 
The biannual priorities for the OSCE feature an ongoing commitment of the EU to ‘Support the 
autonomous institutions and field missions' role in supporting participating States to ensure the full 
implementation of commitments in all three dimensions, including through a more systematic follow-
up of recommendations, as well as their role in monitoring and reporting in these areas’. These 
priorities are consistient across the years and emerge from an established practice of EU support for 
ODIHR, HCNM and RoFM as well as engagement with field presence of the OSCE. 
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d) Democracy & Elections 
Interestingly enough, the topic of electoral rights and election observation does not feature in the 
current biannual EU priorities for the OSCE. However, they feature in the general policy aims and 
objectives as outlined in the 2012 SF and both Action Plans. The Strategic Framework refers to the 
EU’s commitment to ‘(….) strengthen its work with partners worldwide to support democracy, notably 
the development of genuine and credible electoral processes and representative and transparent 
democratic institutions at the service of the citizen’.727 However, it must be noted that despite its title, 
the Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy concerns predominantly human rights and 
topics related to democracy feature less prominently.728 The 2015 Action Plan features a significant 
upgrade of topics related to democracy and elections. As part of the ‘I. Boosting Ownership of Local 
Actors’ section under the ‘Delivering a comprehensive support to public institutions’ general objective 
the 2015 AP outlines several objectives and actions related to democratisation and electoral 
processes, with the overarching objective of ‘Strengthening cooperation with the UN and regional 
Human Rights and Democracy mechanisms’, however it does not mention the OSCE/ODIHR 
explicitly.729 In the section V. ‘A more effective eu human rights and democracy support policy’ the 
2015 AP includes the objective of ‘Maximising the impact of Electoral Observation’.730 This objective 
refers to the OSCE/ODIHR in two of its actions: ‘Support and re-commit to the implementation of the 
Declaration of Principles (DoP) for International Election Observation and co-operate closely with 
organisations that are applying the DoP in observation methodology, such as 
ODIHR.’ and ‘Consolidate best practices for leveraging EU EOMS and OSCE/ODHIR Election 
Observation Missions recommendations in EU and EU Member State political dialogues and 
democracy support activities’.731 Interestingly, the first publicly available draft of the 2015 AP did not 
include the first of abovementioned actions, which was added during the final stage of work on the 
Action Plan.732 All objectives and actions of section V are reinforced by the overarching objective 
‘Ensuring the effective use and the best interplay of EU policies, tools and financing instruments’ which 
features the action ‘Engage systematically with the UN and with the regional organisations (e.g. AU, 
OAS, LAS, CoE, OSCE, ASEAN, SAARC, PIF) on best practices for human rights and the strengthening of 
democracy in all regions.’733 
 
e) Human Rights of LGBTI persons 
The case of EU’s priorities for action on LGBTI rights within the OSCE is an interesting element of the 
current array of EU’s goals and aims in its engagement towards the OSCE/ODIHR. The OSCE is set apart 
from the EU, the UN and the CoE by the fact that LGBTI rights are largely absent from its activities. 
They are not enshrined in any OSCE political commitments nor in any documents adopted at 
intergovernmental level. This situation is a result of the Holy See’s continued opposition to the topic.734 
                                                          
727 Council of the EU, ‘EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy’, 25 June 2012, Doc No 11855/12. p 2. 
728 FP7-FRAME, ‘European policy brief: the EU and Human Rights’ (2014) 9. 
729 Council of the EU, ‘EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’, 20 July 2015, Doc No 10897/15 [2015 Action Plan]. 
7-9. 
730 Supra, 28. 
731 Supra, 21. 
732 See supra (fn 14), 21. 
733 Council of the EU, ‘EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’, 30. 
734 Cees Van Beek ‘The Politics of LGBT Rights: A Comparison Between the United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of 
Europe’ (Leiden University 2013) 92. 
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The Holy See, employing the fact that it is a full participating state of the OSCE, has so far blocked any 
attempts to include LGBTI rights in the OSCE agenda. On the other hand, LGBTI rights feature 
prominently in policy documents of the EU. Both the 2012 and 2015 AP feature objectives related to 
promoting enjoyment of human rights by LGBT persons. Specifically, the 2012 AP included the 
outcome 22., ‘Enjoyment of human rights by LGBT persons’ with attached action ‘Develop an EU 
strategy on how to cooperate with third countries on human rights of LGBT persons, including within 
the UN and the Council of Europe. Promoting adoption of commitments in the area of human rights 
of LGBT within the OSCE, including through organisation of a public event in the OSCE framework’.735 
The LGBTI rights were markedly downgraded in the 2015 AP. While they feature in several actions 
related to Human Rights Defenders and non-discrimination, the overarching objective on enjoyment 
of human rights by LGBT was not carried over from the 2012 AP. In 2013 the Council of the EU adopted 
the EU Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of All Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons.736 The Guidelines refer explicitly to the OSCE in 
several general areas concerning the activities of international and regional organisations, suggesting 
it to engage with civil society that works to promote and protect human rights of LGBTI persons and 
to address LGBTI issues in the work of OSCE field missions. Additionally, the Guidelines feature the 
following suggestions aimed exclusively at the OSCE: 
 When appropriate, incorporate LGBTI concerns in national statements and in questions during 
interactive dialogues within the OSCE.  
 Continue to work actively to include ‘sexual orientation and gender identity’ as explicitly 
recognised discrimination grounds in OSCE Commitments or Ministerial Council Decisions.  
 In accordance with the commitment of OSCE participating states to exchange information on 
the abolition of the death penalty and to make it available to the public (Copenhagen 
Document), incorporate in the EU Member States’ national statements within the OSCE’s 
Human Dimension framework information on the abolition of the death penalty with regard 
to LGBTI persons (measure contained in the EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty).737 
The rights of LGBTI persons do not feature in the biannual EU priorities for the OSCE. Interviews with 
stakeholders indicate that the commitment to achieving progress in including these rights in the work 
of the OSCE is sufficiently entrenched in the AP and the Guidelines as to not repeat them in other 
policy documents. 
 
f) Torture and ill-treatment 
Prevention of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is firmly entrenched in the OSCE political 
commitments.738 However, the activity of the OSCE in this field did ebb and flow, having largely fallen 
from the OSCE’s political agenda after 2003 and returned on intiative of the Swiss chairpersonship in 
                                                          
735 Council of the EU, ‘EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy’, 25 June 2012, Doc No 11855/12. p 2. In 
September 2012, the EU organized a side event on ‘Monitoring of manifestations of intolerance and discrimination against 
LGBT persons’ at the OSCE annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) in Warsaw. 
736 Council of the European Union, Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of All Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons, 24 June 2013, Doc No 11492/13. 
737 Supra, 11. 
738 OSCE/ODIHR, ‘OSCE Human Dimension Commitments. Volume 1: Thematic Compilation’ (OSCE 2012) 108-111. 
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2014.739 In 2014, the ODIHR organised a Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on the Prevention 
of Torture, which signaled the return of anti-torture-related activity to the OSCE’s agenda. On the EU 
side, the fight against torture and inhuman treatment in its external action is enshrined in several 
policy documents. The EU has adopted Guidelines to EU policy towards third countries on torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (first published in 2001, updated in 2008 
and 2012) which in all versions included the undertaking to cooperate with multilateral partners, 
including the OSCE/ODIHR, towards raising the issue in their fora.740 The 2012 AP includes the outcome 
‘Eradication of torture and mother cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ but 
interestingly does not indicate the OSCE as a partner for anti-torture efforts. Similarly, the 2015 AP 
commits the EEAS, the European Commission and the EU Member States to ‘undertake joint actions’ 
for the eradication of torture in close cooperation with regional organisations, though not explicitly 
mentioning the Council of Europe.741 The 2014-2015 EU biannual priorities for the OSCE suggest that 
‘[t]he EU can also support strengthened OSCE commitments on torture’, but does not elaborate any 
details as to what action can or should be undertaken towards that goal.  
 
g) Freedom of expression and freedom of the media 
The promotion of freedom of expression and of the media is among the core priorities of both the EU 
and the OSCE. Freedom of expression features prominently in the acquis of the OSCE. Its crucial role 
in a democratic society has been reaffirmed for example in the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting 
of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1990),742 the Budapest Document (‘Towards 
a Genuine Partnership in a New Era’, 1994)743, and Decision No 633 of the OSCE Permanent Council.744 
In 1997 the OSCE appointed its first Representative on Freedom of the Media, whose mandate 
includes promoting freedom of expression and the media, and keeping track of developments in the 
OSCE Member States.745 The EU has recognized freedom of expression and freedom of the media as 
one of its priorities for cooperation with the OSCE in 2014-2015, with a particular focus on digital 
media and the safety of journalists. This corresponds to other strategic EU documents. In the 2015 
Action Plan, the EU commits to oppose restrictions on the freedom of expression in its bilateral and 
multilateral relations, including in –unspecified – regional fora. The safety of journalists and the online 
dimension are particularly emphasized. The EU Guidelines on freedom of expression contain several 
express references to the OSCE. Not only does the EU seek in its bilateral relations to encourage the 
adoption and implementation of regional human rights instruments and of recommendations made 
by OSCE bodies, it also seeks to cooperate closely with the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the 
Media, and to generally ‘step up’ its engagement with the OSCE in this respect.746 
                                                          
739 Association for the Prevention of Torture, ‘Prevention of torture in the OSCE region’, < http://www.apt.ch/en/osce/> last 
accssed on 22 February 2016. 
740 Council of the EU, ‘Guidelines to EU Policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’, 20 March 2012, Doc No 6129/1/12. 
741 Council of the EU, ‘EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’, 20 July 2015, Doc No 10897/15 [2015 Action Plan]. 
para 13.c. 
742 OSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 29 June 1990, 
available at <www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304>. 
743 CSCE, Budapest Document 1994, ‘Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era’, 6 December 1994, available at 
<www.osce.org/mc/39554>. 
744 OSCE, Permanent Council Decision No. 633, 11 November 2004, available at <www.osce.org/pc/16912>. 
745 See the website of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, <www.osce.org/fom>. 
746 See also paras. 61 and 62. 
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h) Freedom of religion or belief 
Freedom of religion or belief are another joint priority of the EU and the OSCE. ODIHR, assisted by an 
Advisory Panel of independent experts on freedom of religion or belief observes the implementation 
of freedom of religion or belief in OSCE Member States, reviews national legislation and provides 
expertise and guidance. In doing this it can rely on a solid acquis of relevant OSCE standards.747 The 
EU places a strong emphasis on freedom of religion or belief in its external relations, as evidenced for 
example by the annual tabling of thematic resolutions in the UN Human Rights Council. In line with 
this commitment, the EU has identified freedom of religion and belief as one of the priorities for its 
cooperation with the OSCE in 2014-2015. The promotion of ‘initiatives at the level of OSCE’ was also 
explicitly listed as an action in the 2012 Action Plan. This express reference has disappeared in the 
revised version, which merely generally refers to ‘multilateral fora’. The EU Guidelines on Freedom of 
Religion and Belief reaffirm and specify the EU’s approach, referring in particular to strengthening the 
regular exchanges with ODIHR. The Guidelines also include OSCE standards in the list of international 
norms on which the EU will base its external human rights promotion. 
 
i) Children 
Art. 3(5) TEU commits the EU to contribute to the ‘protection of human rights, in particular the rights 
of the child’ in its external relations. This focus on children’s rights has been put into practice for 
example through the annual sponsoring of resolutions in the UN Human Rights Council, but also 
through the adoption of two sets of Guidelines on children’s rights generally, and the protection of 
children in armed conflicts. Both Guidelines specifically identify the OSCE and the ODIHR as ‘relevant 
actors’, whose work the EU seeks to support. The EU Guidelines on children’s rights in addition commit 
the EU to develop its partnership and strengthen its coordination with the OSCE, ‘particularly around 
research and systematic data collection, analysis and dissemination and in designing appropriate 
country response strategies’. Beyond this, however, children’s rights are not identified as a priority for 
EU-OSCE cooperation in any other strategic EU document, including the two Action Plans and the 
biannual priorities.  
 
j) Civil society and Human Rights Defenders 
The 2014-2015 priorities for cooperation with the OSCE state that the ‘EU can also support […] 
stronger engagement with civil society, including youth’. Based on the wording, this commitment 
comes across as slightly weaker than the prioritisation of the abovementioned human rights areas. In 
the 2015 Action Plan the EU commits to putting encroachment on civil society space and restrictions 
of the work of Human Rights Defenders on the agenda of –unspecified – regional fora, and to continue 
its support and cooperation with regional fora for the protection of HRDs. Only the EU Guidelines on 
Human Rights Defenders expressly refer to the OSCE, committing the EU to strengthen the focal point 
for human rights defenders and national human rights institutions of ODIHR. 
 
                                                          
747 See OSCE, ‘Freedom of religion or belief’, <www.osce.org/odihr/44455>. 
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k) Other 
The EU’s priorities for cooperation with the OSCE in 2014-2015 additionally list freedom of assembly 
and association and gender equality as focal areas. However, it is not specified how these priorities 
are going to be implemented. In addition, the EU’s Action Plans do not contain any references to the 
OSCE in this respect.  
 
 Country-specific priorities 
Assessing country-specific priorities of EU external action is made problematic by the fact that the EU 
country human rights strategies, which are drafted by COHOM in co-operation with EU delegations, 
are confidential owing to their political nature. Interviews with stakeholders indicate that the topic of 
cooperation on the ground with the OSCE/ODIHR is included in such strategies and that COHOM takes 
into the account information provided by OSCE field missions while assessing the situation on the 
ground. Apart from country strategies, geographical focus is included in the biannual EU priorities for 
the OSCE. The 2014-2015 priorities included a focus on the following countries and areas: 
 Georgia, Moldova and Nagorny-Karabach (all in the context of conflict resolution) 
 Central Asia 
 Mediterraean and Asian partners for co-operation 
Beyond these priorities, interviews with stakeholders indicate that the EU has an overarching principle 
of focusing on all areas where the OSCE maintains field presence (Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan) as well as EaP countries where the OSCE does not have field 
presence (Belarus, Georgia) although the scope and priority of engagement in these areas varies. In 
the last two years, the EU has significantly focused on co-operation with the OSCE/ODIHR in Armenia, 
Belarus, Macedonia and Ukraine. Ukraine is an interesting case, as the 2014-2015 EU priorities for 
cooperation with the OSCE did not highlight Ukraine as a priority area, yet when the Ukrainian crisis 
unfolded in February 2014 the EU was able to shift its priorities rapidly and focus on cooperation with 
OSCE. The policy background for the EU’s cooperation with the OSCE/ODIHR in Ukraine in the context 
of the 2014 events is explored in a case study presented in Appendix II of this report. 
 
 Conclusions 
The goals and objectives of the EU in its engagement with the OSCE fall into several categories. The 
majority of them are traditional core priority areas of the external action of the EU in the field of 
human rights. This includes the topics of freedom of religion and belief, children’s rights, human rights 
defenders and human rights of LGBTI persons. Interestingly, while the EU’s focus on LGBTI rights in 
the OSCE is on the one hand consistent with its engagement in this topic in other venues, it also 
remains a contentious topic for several EU Member States. This shows that the EU is capable of 
consistently advancing this item despite internal tensions. Similarly, the geographic priorities of the 
EU follow the pattern of focusing on the candidate and associated states, the Eastern Partnership, the 
South Med countries and Central Asia. The goals of providing support for the Helsinki+40 process, 
strengthening the autonomous institutions and field operations, and enhancing the human dimension 
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of the OSCE all are in line with the EU working towards ensuring effectiveness and sustainability of 
international and regional human rights systems and institutions. 
Some systematic shortcomings of EU’s human rights policy towards the OSCE are visible as well. 
Economic, social and cultural rights, which were only recently upgraded in the 2015 Action Plan, did 
not feature at all in its priorities towards the OSCE. This should be seen as a lost opportunity given 
that ESC rights are absent from the OSCE agenda and would benefit greatly from a strong promoter 
raising their profile. Roma and Sinti rights, which are featured prominently in the OSCE framework, 
are absent from both general and specific priorities of the EU. It is quite likely that the decision to 
distance itself from Roma/Sinti rights (and to consider them covered by the general topics of 
supporting tolerance and non-discrimination) come from the EU’s perception of these areas as Russian 
initiatives within the OSCE which are employed as tools for naming and shaming the EU and its 
Member States, yet this does not justify distancing from the problem altogether. Tackling human 
rights from the perspective of geopolitical tactics instead of a value-based approach risks moving 
towards an instrumentalisation of human rights, which would be contrary to the principles laid out in 
the Treaties and overarching policy documents such as the Strategic Framework. 
Several inconsistencies feature in the array of EU policy documents relevant for the engagement with 
the OSCE. Perhaps the most striking is the nature and procedure of elaborating the biannual EU 
priorities for the OSCE. Their confidentiality and the modalities of their drafting and adoption differ 
greatly from both general strategic documents and specific priorities for venues such as the UN and 
the CoE. The supposed reasoning behind this situation is perplexing given the fact that the OSCE is not 
the only forum where the EU faces strong and organised opposition to its principles and goals. For 
example, both the UNGA and the HRC are markedly politicised, and especially the latter sees the EU 
in a politically charged situation, where it is at this time the main force actively supporting universality 
and indivisibility of human rights while facing the opposition of China, Russia and Saudi Arabia. Some 
interviews with stakeholders indicate that the current situation is also a result of complicated 
interaction between relevant actors within the Council of the EU, with the division of labour and 
competence between COSCE and COHOM being not as clear as they are between COHOM and 
CONUN. 
As for inconsistencies across policy documents, observations made elsewhere in this report regarding 
the array of policy documents concerning engagement with the CoE hold true here as well. Lack of 
consistent identification of the OSCE/ODIHR as a regional partner combined with ‘blind spots’ where 
the goals and aims of the EU do not correspond fully with the current agenda of the given organisation 
are all factors that impede full realisation of EU’s significant potential for bringing about positive 
developments within the OSCE framework. 
 
E. Common EU-OSCE Human Rights Standards 
 Introduction 
This section examines the topic of common human rights standards between the EU and the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Unlike it is the case with the exploration 
of the common human rights standard between the EU and the Council of Europe (see chapter II.F), a 
direct comparison between the two normative systems of human rights of the EU and the OSCE is 
hardly straightforward. This is not the least due to the fact that the OSCE norms are enshrined in a 
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system of voluntary political commitments made by OSCE Participating states. The EU relies upon a 
more traditional array of legal norms enshrined in primary and secondary EU law, international 
treaties ratified by the EU, general legal principles as established in the CJEU jurisprudence and other 
sources, as well as policy documents. This section does not focus in detail on specific convergences or 
divergences in the interpretation of specific rights and freedoms between OSCE political commitments 
and EU law, beyond using practical examples. Instead, it looks at areas of human rights where both 
organisations share common standards and provides examples of both highly aligned standards and 
standards which align in principle, but diverge in scope and precision. Such analysis entails three major 
elements. First is a brief introduction to the OSCE political commitments and their unique nature as 
the sole sources of human dimension obligations. Second is an exploration of the role and significance 
of the common human rights reference points for both organisations, namely the international human 
rights system. Then third element of analysis focuses on the examples of lacunae between both 
systems, indicating areas where either organisation has elaborated its standards to a significantly 
different degree than the other. 
 
 OSCE Political Commitments 
The OSCE normative framework is built using the around the concept of relying solely on non-
legally binding political commitments. While several other international and regional human rights 
systems feature non-binding instruments, they are all centred around core documents which have 
direct legally binding effect for the ratifying states and organisations, such as it is the case with core 
UN treaties or EU primary law. The OSCE in turn operates solely on grounds of political commitments 
and did not resort to use of treaties or other hard law instruments throughout its history. As far as 
organisations which deal with human rights are concerned, this is a rare approach. A similar 
framework has been adopted by the ASEAN, but is far less extensive both scope and relative 
importance for the organisation.748 Without delving too deeply into the theory of international law 
and international relations, this section presents some of the most relevant characteristics of political 
commitments as they feature within the OSCE. 
Political commitments have over the years garnered significant attention from academia.749 In fact, it 
was the adoption of OSCE’s Helsinki Final Act which triggered an extensive scholarly discourse as to 
the role and importance of high-level non-binding agreements in international law. Some authors 
question their normative power, with Jan Klabbers providing an argument for ambiguity of the OSCE’s 
Helsinki Final Act character, claiming that if it was truly a non-legally binding instrument, then it would 
not have the capability to act as a founding instrument of an international organisation.750 Others, 
such as Michael Bothe, highlight the advantages of non-legal commitments and their potential 
relevance in the areas where rigid legal norms would not be feasible for the agreeing states.751 From 
today’s perspective it is quite clear that the OSCE framework is a remarkable example of non-binding 
political commitments having tangible impact in form of establishing an international actor and 
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providing it with both substance and procedure necessary to meaningfully act on the regional and 
global scene. The majority of the aforementioned discourse on the nature of political commitments is 
centred around high-level documents and their relevance vis-à-vis traditional international law 
instruments. This report takes a closer look at the nature, role and relevance of the bread and butter 
of the OSCE human dimension, namely political commitments related directly to specific areas of 
human rights. In doing so, the broadly accepted definition of political commitment elaborated by 
Hollis and Newcomer as ‘(…) a nonlegally binding agreement between two or more nation-states in 
which the parties intend to establish commitments of an exclusively political or moral nature (…)’ will 
be used.752 Furthermore, the analysis will operate under three out of four core assumptions provided 
by Hollis and Newcomer. First assumption is that international ‘hard’ law is not the sole and exhaustive 
source of rules that define international relations and obligations, including those in the field of human 
rights.753 Second assumption is that political commitments do not have legal force and are thus 
unenforceable before national or international courts754 and instead their enforcement relies on 
purely political mechanisms, such as is the case with Vienna and Moscow mechanisms of the OSCE. 
Third is that political commitments of the OSCE framework do not fall into the category of ‘soft law’, 
insofar as we assume that the term ‘soft law’ refers to instruments which are unenforceable (be it 
legally or politically) due to their vagueness or lack of relevant procedures. However, the fourth 
assumption made by Hollis and Newcomer, namely that of sovereign states being the sole actors 
capable of elaborating political commitments in the sphere of international relations, will not be 
considered. This is due to the fact that a vital question of this report concerns to what degree is the 
EU bound by OSCE political commitments undertaken by EU Member States. As examples such as the 
2007 MoU between the EU and the CoE show, political commitments can and do function in relations 
between international organisations, in particular where legally binding instruments would be not 
feasible due to obstacles such as in this case the OSCE’s lack of legal personality. 
As to precise characteristics of OSCE political commitments, they all share a high level of formality. 
OSCE instruments contain commitments elaborated on behalf of Participating states and signed by 
their authorised representatives on head of state/government or ministerial level. The analysed OSCE 
human dimension framework does not include unsigned written commitments, oral commitments or 
commitments elaborated on lower levels. This entails a high degree of their formal credibility, as they 
represent the direct political will of Participating states. Regarding the level of substance, the situation 
varies greatly between particular commitments. We assume the classification of substance provided 
by Hollis and Newcomer: 
Table 6 Substance of Political Commitments755 
 Low Medium High 
Normativity Statements of 
Intention 
Declarations of Effort Promises of Result 
Precision Principles Standards Rules 
                                                          
752 Supra (fn 749), 517. 
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carrying binding obligations. 
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Within the OSCE framework, one can identify commitments characterised of varied level of 
normativity and precision. On the normativity scale, the majority of human dimension commitments 
are of low to medium strength. For example, the 1997 HFA states that:  
‘The participating States, recognizing the contribution that national minorities or regional 
cultures can make to co-operation among them in various fields of culture/education, intend, 
when such minorities or cultures exist within their territory, to facilitate this contribution, 
taking into account the legitimate interests of their members.’  
This low level of normativity can be contrasted with the medium level of normativity found in the 1991 
Moscow documents, which contain several indications that the Participating states ‘will’ undertake 
specific action, e.g.  
‘The participating States will treat all persons deprived of their liberty with humanity and with 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person and will respect the internationally 
recognized standards that relate to the administration of justice and the human rights of 
detainees.’756 
The high level of normativity, which is usually found in treaties, does not feature in the OSCE 
framework. As far as precision is concerned, one must reflect that frequently political commitments 
of the same level of normativity feature varied levels of precision. Newcomer and Hollis provide a 
stellar example drawn from the OSCE human dimension framework:  
‘Contrast, for example, the precision of the 1996 OSCE Agenda on Security Cooperation’s 
“pledge to refrain from any policy of ethnic cleansing or mass expulsion” with the 2000 Charter 
for European Security in which participating states “pledge to take measures to promote 
tolerance and to build pluralistic societies where all, regardless of their ethnic origin, enjoy full 
equality of opportunity”.’757  
One should note that the criterion of precision should be examined while keeping the entire OSCE 
normative framework in mind. For example, no OSCE political commitments refer to the right to food 
and water (as understood in the context of art. 11 ICESCR), one must therefore assume that these 
rights can only be seen as included in the overarching general commitments to principle of protection 
and promotion of economic, social and cultural rights (see below, p. 201). On the other hand, several 
areas of OSCE political commitments feature a markedly high level of precision, with commitments 
setting out standards and rules. Examples of high level of precision feature among commitments 
related to the rights and freedoms of Roma and Sinti, for example the scope of commitments related 
to health care of Roma and Sinti is markedly more precise and extensive than the general 
commitments to upholding the right to health within the OSCE framework.758 Generally, OSCE human 
dimension commitments feature a medium to high level of precision in the areas where the OSCE has 
focused its work related to human rights (democratic institutions, rule of law, national minorities, 
Roma and Sinti, equality and non-discrimination) and low to medium level of precision in other areas. 
                                                          
756 OSCE, Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Moscow, 3 October 
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Other frequently identified characteristics of political commitments are their organisational 
implications and normative autonomy. As far as the first item is concerned, the OSCE framework is a 
unique occurrence of a non-legally binding framework leading the establishment of several 
permanent institutions and developing their mandates and procedures. Thus, its organisational 
implications are unparalleled and serve as an example of what can be achieved by means of political 
commitments alone without resorting to hard law instruments. Similarly, the level of normative 
autonomy of the OSCE framework is very high due to the fact it’s not dependant on any legal other 
norm or regime. While the OSCE instruments acknowledge the existence and role of other human 
rights frameworks, in particular the UN international human rights systems, they are entirely 
independent. 
 
 Common human rights reference points for EU and OSCE 
The question on the scope of human rights standards common to both the EU and OSCE cannot, for 
obvious reasons, entail an analysis of instruments which were adopted by both organisations, since 
the OSCE did not enter any human rights treaties due to its lack of legal personality. However, one can 
attempt to identify elements of the global human rights framework which are referenced by both 
organisations and employed as foundation for elaborating their own standards. Considering the 
composition of membership of both organisations, a natural step would be to consider the role of the 
international human rights system. All OSCE Participating states (and thusly all EU Member States) are 
members of the UN and signatories of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Almost all OSCE 
Participating states have ratified both core UN human rights conventions (ICCPR and ICESCR), the sole 
exceptions being the United States, which has ratified the ICCPR and signed but not ratified the ICESCR 
and the Holy See, which did neither sign or ratify the ICCPR and the ICESCR. As far as other core 
conventions of the UN system, the level of ratification of the 18 UN human rights treaties759 across 
the OSCE area is high, as indicated in the table below. The table assumes the methodology provided 
by the UN OHCHR:760 
 
 
Table 7 Ratification of UN human rights treaties among OSCE Participating states 
 Very high 
level of 
ratification 
(15-18 
instruments) 
High level of 
ratification (10-
14 instruments) 
Medium level of 
ratification (5-9 
instruments) 
Low level of 
ratification (0-4 
instruments) 
Number of OSCE 
Participating states 
20 35 2761 0 
 
                                                          
759 This number includes: ICCPR (with 2 optional protocols), ICESCR (with 1 optional protocol), CERD, CEDAW (with 1 optional 
protocol), CAT (with 1 optional protocol), CRC (with 3 optional protocols), CRMW, CPD, CRPD (with 1 optional protocol). 
760 UN OHCHR, ‘Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard’, <http://indicators.ohchr.org/> last accessed on 14 April 2016. 
761 Holy See, United States. 
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Naturally, the level of ratification of UN treaties by Participating/Member States of an organisation 
does not directly translate to the degree to which the organisation itself recognises them as a human 
rights standard. Such recognition can be found in references to said standard within the normative 
framework of the organisation. The earliest general reference to the importance of the international 
human rights system within the OSCE can be found in the Madrid 1983 document, which states that 
the Participating states  
‘(…) reaffirm the particular significance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
international Covenants on Human Rights and other relevant international instruments of 
their joint and separate efforts to stimulate and develop universal respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms; they call on all participating States to act in conformity with those 
international instruments and on those participating States, which have not yet done so, to 
consider the possibility of acceding to the covenants.’762 
Beyond references to the general importance of the UN human rights system, the OSCE political 
commitments also highlight specific areas of reference. For example, the Vienna 1989 document 
refers to the necessity of restrictions on human rights to be consistent with the UDHR and the ICCPR.763 
The same document highlights UDHR and ICCPR as sources of international commitments regarding 
freedom of expression and information.764 The UN human rights conventions are also highlighted in 
several OSCE documents, for example the Copenhagen 1990 document states that the Participating 
states ‘(…)will consider acceding to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, if they have not yet done 
so(…)’.765 However, as one looks at the development of OSCE political commitments over time, the 
general references to the international human rights standards feature prominently through early 90s. 
Later documents refer to the UN human rights system in specific focus areas (such as combating 
discrimination or Roma and Sinti rights). 
As far as the EU is concerned, the FRAME project has insofar identified a significant disparity between 
the internal and external spheres of EU human rights framework as far as recognition of UN standards 
is concerned. In its external action law and policy, the EU makes liberal use of the international human 
rights system as a reference point. The EU is committed to global promotion of universal and 
indivisible human rights as provided for in art. 21 TEU. Towards this goal it has developed an extensive 
array of policy tools, with the 2012 Strategic Framework for Human Rights and Democracy, the current 
2015 Action Plan, the EU Human Rights Guidelines and specific priorities and strategies for multilateral 
fora and bilateral relations. One can identify direct or indirect references to international human rights 
standards across all of the abovementioned instruments.  
Internally, the situation is markedly different. De Butler identifies three major issues in EU’s approach 
to international human rights law in its internal legislation and policy.766 First is the disparity between 
the scope of rights and freedoms guaranteed in UN treaties and those enshrined in EU law, such as 
the lack of explicit recognition in CFREU of rights of minorities as provided in art. 27 of ICCPR and right 
to adequate housing and food as enshrined in art. 11 of ICESCR. Second is the issue of the EU human 
rights law explicitly recognising only one aspect of human rights obligations, namely that of respecting 
                                                          
762 OSCE, Concluding Document of Madrid — The Second Follow-up Meeting, Madrid, 6 September 1983, para 7. 
763 OSCE, Concluding Document of Vienna — The Third Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 15 January 1989, para 21. 
764 Supra, para. 34. 
765 OSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Copenhagen, 29 
June 1990, para. 13. 
766 Israel de Jesus Butler, ‘The European Union and International Human Rights Law’ (OHCHR 2012) 21. 
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them. This does not imply that the EU does not take steps towards protecting and fulfilling human 
rights, but as far as the obligation to do so is not explicitly provided in EU law, the standards diverge. 
Finally, the mechanisms and procedures for including human rights concern in EU’s legislative and 
policy-making processes are at times ineffective and incoherent. Apart from these arguments one 
cannot ignore the position of the CJEU as regards the autonomy and position of the EU law vis-à-vis 
other normative systems. As early as in Kadi cases the CJEU has assumed the competence to review 
the UN legal instruments towards their compliance with the general principles of the EU law, thus 
rejecting the concept of the UN law being hierarchically superior to EU legislation. The trend of 
reinforcing the unique status and independence of EU legal system culminated with the CJEU Opinion 
2/13 on EU’s accession to ECHR (discussed further in chapter II.F.6 of this report). 
The final question concerns the role of the OSCE political commitments within the normative 
framework of the EU. The EU is not a full member of the OSCE and as such it is not a party to any OSCE 
instruments. Any consideration of the EU being formally bound by human rights obligations that do 
not stem from art. 6 TEU or do not emanate from treaties or agreements which it is party to should 
be taken in light of CJEU’s jurisprudence on autonomy of EU law and its relation to other normative 
frameworks.767 Given the insofar stance the CJEU has adopted in decisions such as Grant v South-West 
Trains Ltd., Kadi and the opinion 2/13, one can expect that if OSCE commitments were brought forth 
as a source of human rights obligations of the EU they wouldn’t be treated as sources of any 
obligations for the EU. These legal constraints do not preclude from the OSCE framework to be 
considered as a reference point and source of inspiration for the EU’s human rights policies. In fact, 
the OSCE instruments are one of the vital sources of principles of the EU’s global action. R. Balfour 
identifies the Charter of Paris for a New Europe as one of key instruments which the EU has drawn 
from in formulating its external policy.768 A more specific example of the EU drawing upon the OSCE 
framework are the methodologies of EU electoral observation missions, which closely follow the 
standards and practices adopted by the OSCE IOEMs. With the EU’s CFSP remaining outside the CJEU 
jurisprudence and relying primarily on strategic policy documents with light entrenchment in the EU 
treaty law, there is much more room for referencing and operationalising standards developed within 
other regional frameworks. Internally, while the OSCE political commitments cannot be considered as 
sources of EU’s obligations, they increasingly feature as reference points for activities of EU bodies 
and institutions. One salient example is the cooperation in the field of tolerance and non-
discrimination, where the achievements of ODIHR in the fields of data collection and capacity building 
were referenced by both FRA and DG JUST. 
The highest degree of commonality between the EU and OSCE human rights standards features in the 
area of civil and political rights. The OSCE has developed an extensive array of political commitments 
related to core rights and freedoms such as: right to life,769 prohibition of torture,770 personal freedom, 
                                                          
767 E.g. Case C-249/96 Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-621. 
768 Rosa Balfour, ‘Principles of democracy and human rights. A review of the European Union’s strategies towards its 
neighbours’ in S. Lucarelli and I. Manners (eds) Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy (Routledge 2006) 
Routledge. 
769 Eg. OSCE, Concluding Document of Vienna — The Third Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 15 January 1989, para 24; OSCE, 
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Copenhagen, 29 June 1990, 
para 17 in fine. 
770 i.a. OSCE, Concluding Document of Vienna — The Third Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 15 January 1989, para 23 in fine, 
OSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Copenhagen, 29 June 
1990, para 16 in fine., OSCE, Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 
Moscow, 3 October 1991, para 23.1.vii-x; OSCE, Concluding Document of Budapest, 6 December 1994, art. 20. OSCE, 
Document of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Athens, 1-2 December 2009. 
FRAME    Deliverable No. 5.2 
172 
 
right to a fair trial, freedom of conscience, religion, association and expression. Similarly, the EU has 
embraced the ECHR standards regarding civil and political rights, and enshrined all core rights and 
freedoms in the CFREU. Furthermore, both organisations are some of the strongest and consistent 
promoters of civil and political rights globally. Taking advantage of its unique position as a special 
observer, the EU carries several initiatives within the UN fora, such as resolutions on abolishing the 
death penalty and on respecting freedom of religion and belief. Another general area of significant 
convergence are human rights defenders. The OSCE has adopted several commitments related to the 
role and importance of human right defenders,771 both individual persons and organisations, in 
implementing the OSCE human dimension and monitoring the compliance of Participating states with 
OSCE standards. The EU has developed the Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders which serve as a 
reference points for cooperation with other organisations in the field and encourage the EU bodies 
and Member States to engage with the OSCE towards ensuring adequate support for HRDs.772 
 
 Substantive lacunae between the OSCE and EU human rights 
standards 
The most profound and immediately visible area of lacunae between the OSCE and EU human rights 
standards exists in the area of economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights. Initially, the CSCE (OSCE’s 
predecessor) elaborated a general commitment to promote and protect the ESC rights, as envisioned 
in the Helsinki Final Act: 
‘[The participating States] will promote and encourage the effective exercise of (…) economic, 
social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of 
the human person and are essential for his free and full development. (…) They will endeavour, 
in developing their cooperation, to improve the well-being of peoples and contribute to the 
fulfilment of their aspirations through, inter alia, the benefits resulting from increased mutual 
knowledge and from progress and achievement in the economic, scientific, technological, 
social, cultural and humanitarian fields. They will take steps to promote conditions favourable 
to making these benefits available to all; they will take into account the interest of all in the 
narrowing of differences in the levels of economic development, and in particular the interest 
of developing countries throughout the world.’773 
These overarching commitments were reinforced in the Concluding Document of the 1989 Vienna 
Follow-up Meeting, which stated that the Participating States will consider acceding to the ICESCR774 
and ‘will pay special attention to problems in the areas of employment, housing, social security, 
health, education and culture.’775 However, the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe - the next 
major milestone in development of OSCE political commitments, contained only a brief reference to 
                                                          
771 OSCE, Concluding Document of Vienna — The Third Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 15 January 1989 para 12, 13.3-13.9, 26; 
OSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Copenhagen, 29 June 
1990 para 10 in fine; OSCE, Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 
Moscow, 3 October 1991 para 43 in fine; OSCE, Concluding Document of Helsinki — The Fourth Follow-up Meeting, Helsinki, 
10 July 1992 para 1, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17; OSCE, Concluding Document of Budapest, 6 December 1994 para 18; OSCE, Istanbul 
Document, Istanbul, 19 November 1999 para 27; OSCE, Astana Commemorative Declaration, Astana, 2 December 2010 para 
6. 
772 Council of the EU, Ensuring protection - EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders (2008). 
773 OSCE, Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, 1 August 1975 7. 
774 OSCE, Concluding Document of Vienna — The Third Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 15 January 1989 para 13.2 
775 Supra, para 14. 
FRAME    Deliverable No. 5.2 
173 
 
ESC rights phrased in significantly weaker language, stating that the OSCE Participating states ‘(…) 
affirm that, without discrimination (…) everyone (…) has the right (…) to enjoy his economic, social and 
cultural rights.’776 The Charter of Paris for New Europe contains also references to importance of 
economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility. Further OSCE documents contain 
references to certain items closely linked to protection and promotion of ESC rights, such as the impact 
of economic and social factors on stability and security777, good governance778 and sustainable 
development,779 however general references to the importance and role of ESC rights weren’t 
featured among the OSCE political commitments since 2003.  
Several factors have contributed to the current state of ESC rights within the OSCE framework. The 
organisation’s gradual reorientation towards civil and political rights and select focus areas such as 
minorities’ rights or migrant worker’s right contributed to diminishing the focus on the ESC rights in 
general. Another important factor to consider is the presence of the United States and the Holy See 
within the OSCE. Both Participating states have not ratified the ICESCR and the United States in 
particular remain distanced from several core rights and freedoms enshrined therein. The EU at the 
same time experienced a reverse process, with the recognition of ESC rights, and in particular of 
economic and social obligations, steadily rising from the periphery of EU legal system to its centre. 
The first major EU instrument in the field of economic and social rights, the Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (Community Social Charter) was adopted in 1989.780 The 
Charter of Fundamental Rights elevated the role of economic, social and cultural rights within the EU 
framework, legally binding both the EU institutions and Member States (insofar as they are 
implementing the EU law) and enshrining several core ESC rights. Though the CFREU does not enshrine 
some core ESC rights (such as right to work, the right to a fair remuneration and the right to housing) 
and its scope does not extend to all policies and actions of EU Member States, it is nevertheless a vital 
reference point for the EU human rights framework and the benchmark for the EU bodies as well as 
Member States. 
An interesting element of the comparison between the ESC rights frameworks of the EU and the OSCE 
is that both organisations have developed certain specific areas of ESC rights in a greatly differing 
manner. Several early OSCE commitments referred to various aspects of worker’s rights, with the 1983 
Madrid Document containing a commitment of the Participating states to ensure the right to establish 
and join trade unions as well as union’s right to conduct their activities.781 These commitments were 
reiterated and reinforced with the recognition of freedom to strike in the 1990 Copenhagen 
Document.782 While general references to worker’s rights have faded away from the OSCE agenda, the 
organisation has steadily kept its focus on migrant worker’s rights. As early as in the 1975 HFA the 
CSCE has extensively referred to the situation of migrant workers in Europe and the importance of 
recognising their rights, laying out the obligations of Participating states to comply with international 
and bilateral agreements pertaining to migrant workers’ rights and elaborating several aims such as 
                                                          
776 OSCE, Charter of Paris for a New Europe/Supplementary Document to give effect to certain provisions contained in the 
Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 21 November 1990 4. 
777 OSCE, Document of the Eleventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Maastricht, 1-2 December 2003 para 14. 
778 OSCE, Document of the Eleventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Maastricht, 1-2 December 2003 para 2.2. 
779 OSCE, Document of the Eleventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Maastricht, 1-2 December 2003 para 2.3. 
780 For detailed account on development of EU’s economic and social rights framework, see: Tamara Hervey, Jeffrey Kenner 
(eds) Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights—A Legal Perspective (Hart 2003). 
781 OSCE, Concluding Document of Madrid — The Second Follow-up Meeting, Madrid, 6 September 1983. 
782 OSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Copenhagen, 29 
June 1990 para 9.3. 
FRAME    Deliverable No. 5.2 
174 
 
ensuring the equality of rights between migrant workers and nationals of host countries or facilitating 
the rights of their families.783 These concepts were furthered across a wide array of OSCE documents 
which contain several additional political commitments related to migrant worker’s rights.784 On the 
other hand, the EU has assumed a dual approach to migrant worker’s rights. As far as EU citizens (or 
their families) migrating from one EU or EEA Member State to another are concerned, the EU has 
developed an unparalleled legal and policy framework for ensuring the realisation of freedom of 
worker’s movement., as provided for in art. 45 TFEU and the Free Movement Directive.785 However, 
as concerns non-EU/EEA nationals seeking employment within the EU, the EU and its Member States 
have distanced themselves from the notion of providing such individuals with the same rights as intra-
EU migrants. No EU Member State has insofar ratified the UN Convention on Rights of Migrant 
Workers, and while the EU Member States are free to provide migrant workers from outside the 
EU/EEA area with the same levels of protection, few have opted to do so. 
Another specific group which has insofar received extensive attention in the OSCE human dimension 
framework with comparatively little focus within the EU human rights law and policy are national 
minorities and the particular case of Roma and Sinti. The OSCE has devoted a large bulk of its standard-
setting work to protection of rights of national minorities as well as Roma and Sinti rights. Within these 
areas, one can identify general standards related to protection of human rights and freedoms, equality 
of opportunity and non-discrimination, participation in public and political life, cultural and religious 
identity and education, freedom of media and education, socio-economic issues and protection 
against hate crime. The EU standards in these areas area grounded in art. 2 TEU and art. 21 CFREU, 
however the issue of national minorities lies outside the competence of EU bodies and is an exclusive 
concern of Member States. This arrangement, which has arguably led to no major issues prior to the 
2004 enlargement of the EU, fell short of expectations when faced with problems related to Roma and 
Sinti rights within the ‘new’ EU Member States. While the EU has recently made forays into expanding 
its legal and policy standards concerning Roma and Sinti,786 its array of standards and policies is far 
less developed than the one featured within the OSCE framework. 
As far as areas where the EU has attained a notable level of human rights protection standards while 
the OSCE standards haven’t been developed to a similar degree, one of the most striking examples 
are rights of persons with disabilities. The OSCE framework contains a single instrument which refers 
to rights of persons with disabilities, namely the Moscow 1991 document, where the Participating 
states have undertaken the obligations to ensure protection of the human rights of persons with 
                                                          
783 OSCE, Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, 1 August 1975, 34. 
784 i.a. OSCE, Concluding Document of Vienna — The Third Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 15 January 1989 para 40-44; OSCE, 
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Copenhagen, 29 June 1990 
para 22, 22.1, 22.2, 22.3; OSCE, Charter of Paris for a New Europe/Supplementary Document to give effect to certain 
provisions contained in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 21 November 1990 4 33-34; OSCE, Document of the 
Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Moscow, 3 October 1991 para 38-38.3, OSCE, 
Concluding Document of Helsinki — The Fourth Follow-up Meeting, Helsinki, 10 July 1992 para 36-38; OSCE, Document of 
the Eleventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Maastricht, 1-2 December 2003 para 11; OSCE, Document of the Thirteenth 
Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Ljubljana, 5-6 December 2005 para 4, 4.5; OSCE, Document of the Seventeenth Meeting 
of the Ministerial Council, Decision No. 5/09 on migration management, Athens, 1-2 December 2009 24-27. 
785 Directive 2004/38/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union 
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77. 
786 For an overview of EU’s recent effort in protecting Roma and Sinti rights in the context of their integration in European 
societies, see: Morag Goodwin and Roosmarijn Buijs, ‘Making Good European Citizens of the Roma: A Closer Look at the EU 
Framework for National Roman Integration Strategies’ (2013) 14  German Law Journal 2041-2056. 
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disabilities.787 Ever since, these rights were not mentioned in any OSCE political commitments, and 
the issue of the position of people with disabilities in the context of other rights and freedoms was 
not addressed beyond general commitments related to non-discrimination and equality. The EU, as 
part of its early efforts to combat discrimination in employment rights, has elaborated standards for 
non-discrimination of people with disabilities in the employment context as early as in the prominent 
Council Directive (EC) 2000/78, establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation. Beyond the general non-discrimination clause contained in the art. 21 (1), the CFREU 
contains the novel art. 26, which recognises the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from 
measures designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration and 
participation in the life of the community. The next major step in furthering the EU legal framework 
for protecting the rights of people with disabilities was the landmark ratification of the UN Convention 
on the rights of persons with disabilities (CRPD) by the EU in 2010. The EU was the first and insofar the 
only regional organisation to ratify the CRPD. This, coupled with the markedly high level of ratification 
of the CRPD among the EU Member States,788 results in one of the strongest frameworks for protection 
and promotion of rights of persons with disabilities. 
 
 Conclusions 
The significance of the international human rights system as a reference point for both organisations 
remains important. The OSCE continues to embrace the UN standards, and while the development of 
its political commitments has suffered from the internal problems of the organisation as a whole, it 
continues to refer to UN treaties and conventions throughout its normative and policy-making 
activities. The fact that the OSCE is not capable of becoming a party to any of those instruments can 
be seen as an advantage, since the OSCE needs not to consider the question of legal implications of 
relationship between its political commitment framework and the UN law. For the EU, the UN human 
rights standards continue to play a vital role in its external action, where a large bulk of cooperation 
with the OSCE/ODIHR takes place. In this dimension, both organisations refer to the same core 
elements of the international human rights system and align closely on most matters. Internally, the 
EU certainly is influenced by the fundamental concepts of the UN human rights system. Yet in the 
pursuit of autonomy and uniqueness of its own legal framework, it has distanced itself from external 
reference points other than the ECHR. Since insofar the EU’s cooperation with OSCE in the context of 
human rights was primarily focused on non-EU Member States, this did not lead to any major 
disconnects between both organisations. 
In the areas where both the EU and the OSCE share common human rights standards and policy 
focuses, both organisations are able to co-operate smoothly. This is in particular true regarding actions 
which fall under the EU’s external action, where the EU bodies operate under the broad mandate of 
the 2012 Strategic Framework and the flexible framework of the Action Plans. The substantive lacunae 
between both organisations arises from two different types of factors. As far as the EU is concerned, 
one factor is the delineation between the competences and tasks of the EU and its Member States. In 
some areas, such as protection of minority rights in Member States, the EU’s lack of competence 
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prevents it from developing standards that could allow for cooperation with other actors. In other 
areas, the issue arises from the lack of political will to develop some areas of EU’s human rights 
framework. An internal example of such impediment is the question of rights of workers migrating 
from outside the EU. In the external policy field, one can identify the reluctance to promote economic, 
social and cultural rights despite the EU having both the competence and the means to do so. As far 
as the OSCE is concerned, legal and policy barriers are not much of an issue, since the political 
commitment framework is highly flexible and autonomous. The problem of lack of political will within 
the OSCE, exacerbated by the requirement of unanimous agreement in policy-making, is the sole 
reason behind the underdevelopment (or, as it is the case with LGBTI rights, non-development) of 
some areas of human rights concern. The presence of several actors with strong positions on some 
items coupled with their determination to keep such items away from the OSCE agenda remains the 
key impediment in development of the human dimension. 
 
F. EU engagement in and support for OSCE human rights activities  
 Introduction 
The lack of a formal strategic partnership framework and the ad hoc nature of co-operation 
has not prevented the EU and the OSCE from carrying out a wide variety of joint initiatives and actions 
in the fields of democratisation, human rights and rule of law. Until the 1990s, engagement between 
the EU and the OSCE was a sporadic occurrence, with both organisations firmly focused on their non-
overlapping areas of policy and concern.789 However, as the EU became increasingly focused on both 
fundamental rights and security in Europe, the engagement with the OSCE increased in both intensity 
and scope.790 This coincided with the OSCE’s efforts to expand its relationship with other regional and 
international organisations, which began with adoption of the strategic document ‘Platform for Co-
operative Security’ during the Istanbul summit in 1999791, as outlined in chapter III.C of this report. 
While the EU engages in political dialogue on the OSCE human dimension in the work of 
intergovernmental bodies in Vienna, it is the work of OSCE field missions and of the ODIHR where the 
bulk of actual cooperation in the field of human rights between the EU and the OSCE takes place. The 
EU also engages to a lesser degree in activities of the two other autonomous OSCE institutions, namely 
the Representative on Freedom of the Media and the High Commissioner on National Minorities. Just 
as it is in the case of the cooperation between the EU and the CoE, neither organisation maintains a 
central directory of all modes of engagement between the EU and the OSCE. Insofar the only attempt 
to map the inventory of EU’s engagement with the OSCE was conducted by the Council of the EU in 
the 2004 Assessment Report on the EU’s Role vis-à-vis the OSCE.792 Given the variety and frequently 
informal nature of engagement between the EU and the OSCE, this chapter will not make an attempt 
to map all modes of cooperation between both organisations, instead focusing on select areas and 
examining the current developments. 
 
                                                          
789 Emma J. Stewart ‘Restoring EU–OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention.’ (2008) 29 Contemporary 
Security Policy 273. 
790 Dimitry Paunov ‘Assessing the success of EU-OSCE cooperation: a case of mutualism?’ (2014) 24 Security and Human 
Rights 375. 
791 OSCE, Operational Document – the Platform for Co-operative Security, Istanbul 1999. 
792 Council of the EU, Assessment Report on the EU’s role vis-à-vis the OSCE, 15387/1/04 REV 1, Brussels 10 December 2004. 
FRAME    Deliverable No. 5.2 
177 
 
 High-level engagement between the EU and the OSCE 
The highest political level of engagement between the EU and the CoE is represented by the EU’s 
presence within the political decision-making process of the OSCE in Vienna. In 1999 the OSCE adopted 
the strategic document ‘Platform for Co-operative Security’, which outlined the general parameters 
for cooperation between the OSCE and other international and regional organisations. The 2006 OSCE 
Rules of Procedure formalised the EU’s presence within the OSCE policy-making bodies, giving the 
Commission (and later, the EEAS) a seat next to the EU Presidency and allowing it to make statements 
on behalf of the EU. While this arrangement continues to function despite the reform of EU’s external 
presence following the Lisbon Treaty, interviews with diplomats indicate that it does not impede the 
EU’s presence, as the Presidency’s role has diminished and the burden sharing between the EUDEL 
and Member States is adequately resolved. Over the last decade, the EU has seized the opportunity 
for its increased presence within the OSCE political framework and put it to remarkable effect in 
particular within the context of the OSCE’s human dimension. The EU continues to be one of the 
strongest supporters of the human dimensions and expresses keen interest in development, 
sustainability and enhancement of the human rights arms of the OSCE. This policy priority of the EU is 
expressed both formally, by means of statements on behalf of the EU, as well as informally through 
diplomatic support for initiatives which, in EU’s assessment, lead to furthering the OSCE’s human 
dimension. Additionally, the EU is a vocal defender of select elements of the current status quo 
regarding the human dimension, not the least by providing continued resistance to calls for limitations 
on autonomy of ODIHR, HCNM and RoFM. The EU does not refrain from issuing statements which 
express its criticism of the current situation within the OSCE and its recent inability to further the 
human dimension. For example, the statement by the EU at the 2012 meeting of the OSCE’s Ministerial 
Council reads: 
‘The European Union deeply regrets the failure to adopt any decisions in the human dimension 
for the second year running. We reiterate that security cannot be achieved without respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including those of human rights defenders and 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons. Each participating State must implement all of 
its human dimension commitments. We deplore the clear signs of backwards movement on 
existing commitments and values. But our human dimension commitments also need 
updating to reflect the changing security environment. Freedom of the media, including the 
safety of journalists, and freedom of peaceful assembly and association are key issues in the 
OSCE area. We will continue to pursue them. We particularly regret that some participating 
States were not prepared to acknowledge explicitly that rights and commitments offline also 
apply online.’793 
An important element of the statements issued by the EU during the meetings of OSCE’s Ministerial 
Council is the wide groups of OSCE Participating States which align themselves with the EU. Several 
groups of states frequently express their alignment with the position of the EU and its Member States. 
These groups are: 
1. Acceding countries (Croatia prior to 2012, Romania and Bulgaria prior to 2007, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia prior to 2004), 
2. Candidate countries (e.g. Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey), 
                                                          
793 OSCE, Nineteenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council. 6 and 7 December 2012. 35. 
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3. Associated countries and potential candidates (e.g. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina), 
4. Members of the EEA and EFTA (Norway, Liechtenstein, Switzerland) 
5. Eastern Partnership countries (this group most frequently includes Georgia, Ukraine 
and Armenia), 
6. Other countries (e.g. San Marino and Andorra). 
 
Furthermore, the cooperation is maintained through consultations between the EU and the OSCE at 
both ministerial and ambassadorial level (the latter carried out i.a. by the PSC) and working contacts 
between the OSCE Secretary General and the EU HR/VP. Both organisations interface through cross-
representation in various working bodies and committees.794 
 
 Co-operation in the geographic context 
In the context of EU’s enlargement, the ODIHR delivers regular input to the so-called ‘EU Enlargement 
Package’ on the request of the European Commissions’ Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and 
Enlargement Negotiations. The contribution by ODIHR consists of reports on progress made by 
candidate and potential candidate states on aligning with EU values and policies. Currently, the 
Enlargement Package covers 7 countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey). In the 2015 round of Enlargement Package reports, the input from 
ODIHR was focused on the following areas: democracy (including elections), freedom of peaceful 
assembly, hate crimes, Roma and Sinti, gender equality and women’s participation in politics, 
parliament and independent institutions, political parties and criminal justice reports.795  
The arrangement regarding activities in the field of election observation and follow-up between the 
EU and the OSCE is based upon an unwritten agreement between both organisations whereas the EU 
does not deploy its own electoral observer missions (EOMs) to OSCE participating states.796 Instead, 
the observation delegations of the European Parliament are integrated into OSCE International 
Electoral Observer Missions (IOEM) whenever the EP and OSCE decide to delegate observers to the 
same election. These arrangements result in the following matrix of electoral observer deployment: 
 
Table 8 The arrangement regarding activities in the field of election observation and follow-up between the EU and the 
OSCE 
 EU OSCE 
EU Member State No deployment of observer 
mission possible due to lack of 
mandate. 
Deployment of OSCE IOEM 
Observer mission possible 
Non-EU Member State, OSCE 
Participating state 
Delegation integrated into the 
OSCE IOEM 
Deployment of OSCE IOEM 
Observer mission possible 
                                                          
794 Alyson J.K. Bailes, Jean-Yves Haine, Zdzislaw Lachowski, ‘Reflections on the OSCE-EU Relationship’ in Institute for Peace 
Research and Security Policy (eds) OSCE Yearbook 2007 (Nomos 2008) 77. 
795 Jean Pierre Froehly, ‘OSCE’/ODIHR’s added values for the European Union’s work in the field of Human Rights and 
Democratisation’ (forthcoming 2016) European Yearbook of Human Rights 5. 
796 Michael Meyer-Resende, ‘EU Election Observation: achievements, challenges.’ (European Parliament 2008) 6.  
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Non-EU Member State, Non-
OSCE Participating State 
Deployment of EU IOEM 
Observer mission possible 
No deployment of observer 
mission possible due to lack of 
mandate. 
 
In 2015, the OSCE carried out the following electoral observation missions and follow-up activities 
where the EU or its Member States were engaged to a degree: 
 
Table 9 2015 OSCE electoral observation missions and follow-up activities where the EU or its Member States were engaged 
EU Member States EU Candidate Countries EaP Countries Other countries 
Estonia (parliamentary 
elections) 
Turkey (two 
parliamentary elections) 
Belarus (presidential 
election) 
Kazakhstan 
(presidential 
election) 
United Kingdom 
(parliamentary 
elections) 
Albania (parliamentary 
elections) 
Ukraine (local 
elections) * 
Kyrgyzstan 
(parliamentary 
elections) * 
Croatia (parliamentary 
elections) 
Bosnia & Hercegovina 
(follow-up activities to 
the 2014 parliamentary, 
presidential council and 
local elections) 
Moldova (local 
elections) 
Tajikistan 
(parliamentary 
elections) * 
Poland (parliamentary 
elections, presidential 
election) 
Macedonia (follow-up 
activities to the 2014 
parliamentary and 
presidential elections) 
 Uzbekistan 
(presidential 
election) 
Czech Republic (follow-
up activities to the 2013 
presidential election) 
  Turkmenistan 
(follow-up to the 
2013 
parliamentary 
elections) 
Bulgaria (follow-up 
activities to the 2013 
presidential election) 
   
* indicates IOEMs where observers from the European Parliament were present 
 
Interviews with stakeholders from OSCE/ODIHR indicate that the ODIHR is capable of deploying 
observer missions to all elections in EU Member States providing the European Commission would be 
willing to provide technical support.797 Beyond the cooperation in for of participation of EP observers 
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in OSCE IOEMs, both the modalities of OSCE’s observer mission and their outcomes resonate with 
both the external policies and actions of the EU in the field of electoral rights and election 
observations. O 
One of the most extensive yet difficult to assess modes of co-operation between the OSCE and the EU 
is the interaction between the presence of both organisations on the ground in host countries of OSCE 
field operations and EU delegations. The following table indicates all active OSCE field ops in the areas 
where the EU has established its Delegations and other forms of local presence: 
 
Table 10 Active OSCE field ops in the areas where the EU has established its Delegations and other forms of local presence 
Country/area OSCE presence OSCE 
presence’s 
budget (2015) 
in EUR798 
Albania OSCE Presence in 
Albania 
2.918.500 
Armenia The OSCE Office in 
Yerevan 
2.954.400 
Azerbaijan OSCE Project Co-
ordinator in Baku 
1.800.000 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
OSCE Mission to Bosnia 
& Herzegovina 
11.315.600 
Georgia The Personal 
Representative of the 
Chairperson-in-Office on 
the Conflict Dealt 
with by the OSCE Minsk 
Conference 
1.173.000 
Kazakhstan The OSCE Programme 
Office in Astana 
2.148.700 
Kosovo799 OSCE Mission in Kosovo 18.886.600 
Kyrgyzstan The OSCE Centre in 
Bishkek 
6.909.600 
Macedonia OSCE Mission to Skopje 6.257.200 
Moldova OSCE Mission to 
Moldova 
2.200.000 
                                                          
798 OSCE, Survey of OSCE Field Operations, SEC.GAL/28/15. 
799 This designation is without prejudice to position on status, and is in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and 
the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 
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Montenegro OSCE Mission to 
Montenegro 
2.146.200 
Serbia OSCE Mission to Serbia 6.429.000 
Tajikistan The OSCE Office in 
Tajikistan 
7.338.200 
Turkmenistan The OSCE Centre in 
Ashgabat 
1.570.800 
Ukraine OSCE Project Co-
ordinator in Ukraine 
2.993.000 
Ukraine The OSCE Special 
Monitoring Mission to 
Ukraine800 
57.181.100 
Ukraine Observer Mission at the 
Russian checkpoints 
Gukovo and Donetsk 
Funding is 
allocated on ad 
hoc basis from 
the OSCE 
Unified Budget 
Uzbekistan The OSCE Project Co-
ordinator in Uzbekistan 
1.994.900 
 
The intensity, scope and modalities of co-operation between the field presence of the OSCE and the 
EU Delegations vary to a large extent, owing to several factors such as the relative priority of given 
area in each organisations’ policy and resources available. Currently, the greatest extent of co-
operation can be witnessed in the case of Ukraine. The engagement between the EU and OSCE in 
Ukraine expanded rapidly in the wake of the 2014 crisis and is a major achievement of both 
organisations. The relationship between the multiple forms of field presence of both organisations in 
Ukraine is explored in detail in Appendix II of this study. The second most extensive geographical area 
of cooperation between the EU and the OSCE is Kosovo. Before the establishment of the OSCE SMM 
in Ukraine, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) was the largest OSCE field presence, and is currently 
the third iteration of its presence on the ground following the 1999 conflict.801 The EU presence is also 
markedly extensive, with the EU Office in Kosovo and the EUSR in Kosovo present alongside the largest 
EU field operation, the EU Rule of Law Mission to Kosovo (EULEX). OMIK and EULEX are formally 
elements of the United Nations Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK) and have initially operated under a pillar-
based structure of UNMIK whereas the OMIK handled matters of democratisation and institution-
building while the EU was responsible for reconstruction and economic developments. This division 
has however since eroded, and with the downsizing of the UNMIK following the Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence, currently the OMIK deals with human rights, democratisation, good governance and 
public security, while the EULEX focuses on the rule of law. The third major area of cooperation 
                                                          
800 For detailed information on the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, see below Appendix II. 
801 The previous field ops of the OSCE operating in Kosovo were the OSCE Mission of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and 
Vojvodina and the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission. 
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between the EU and the OSCE is Macedonia. The OSCE is present in Macedonia since 1992, when the 
Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje was established, while the EU has concluded two civilian missions 
(EUPOL PROXIMA 2004-2005 and EUPAT 2006) and one military deployment (EUFOR CONCORDIA in 
2003). 
Despite these variations, several features of these engagement feature in virtually every case. First is 
the informality of the on-the-ground cooperation between the OSCE field ops and EUDELs. Just as 
both organisations haven’t entered an overarching agreement on cooperation on central level, the 
local co-operations between the EU and the OSCE have no formal grounds as well. Apart from 
observing the overarching commitments to cooperation with multilateral partners as enshrined in 
strategic documents of both organisations, the OSCE field ops and EUDELs have a large degree of 
leeway in how they operationalise the mutual engagement. This leads to a markedly high level of 
flexibility, which has been a major advantage on several occasions, such as was the case with the 
cooperation between the various OSCE actors and the EUDEL in Ukraine.802 The second feature is the 
importance of cooperation in diplomacy, and in particular in quiet diplomacy which is one of primary 
tools employed by the both organisations. The EU has a specific advantage in such cooperation owing 
to the fact that the EUDELs are a part of a larger whole of the CFSP. While OSCE diplomats are 
perceived as representatives of just the OSCE itself,803 the EUDEL is not only a representation of the 
EU in a narrow sense, but also an element of the EU’s wider diplomatic architecture which engages 
both the external action of EU’s central bodies (such as the EEAS and the Commission) but also of the 
28 Member States insofar as they pursue elements of the CFSP, of which human rights and 
democratisation are an important element. Another major element of co-operation between both 
organisations on the ground is information sharing. This too is a very informal modality and takes 
many forms, from sharing of documents and data to regular contributions by one organisation to 
another’s benchmarking and human rights indicators. While the OSCE provides the input into the EU’s 
enlargement package on the strategic level as indicated above, the field presences of both 
organisations engage in regular information sharing on tactical level, drawing upon each other’s 
expertise and experience. Once again, the exact and scope and intensity of this cooperation varies 
greatly depending on geographic area. 
Not unlike it is the case in engagement with the Council of Europe, the EU has carried out a number 
of joint actions/programmes with OSCE and ODIHR aimed at increasing the protection and promotion 
of human rights in third countries. These actions have followed similar modalities to the CoE-EU JPs 
(see chapter II.G), with the EU providing the funding and the OSCE/ODIHR acting as the implementing 
partner. However, the extensity and volume of cooperation under these frameworks has never 
reached the level comparable to the CoE-EU JPs. The funding provided insofar by the EU for 
joint/actions programmes with the OSCE was drawn exclusively from the EIDHR and did not involve 
any other instruments or budget lines. The EU-OSCE joint actions and programmes did not fall under 
any overarching agreement or framework for co-operation between the Commission and 
OSCE/ODIHR and were all established ad hoc under EIDHR in its capacity to provide funding for 
international and regional organisations through the so-called targeted projects, which are selected 
without calls for proposals and represent strategic partnerships aimed at ‘Supporting and 
strengthening the international and regional framework for the protection of human rights, justice, 
                                                          
802 See case study on EU-OSCE cooperation in Ukraine, see below Appendix II. 
803 Interviews with stakeholders, Poznan October 2015, Warsaw February 2016. 
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the rule of law and the promotion of democracy.’804 In the EIDHR financial envelope for the years 
2007-2013 only a single such project was carried out, namely the project EIDHR/2007/142-720 ‘Joint 
Management EC-OSCE/ODIHR: project to promote democratisation and human rights in Eastern 
Europe’ with a total budget of 600.000 Euro.805 
 
 Co-operation in thematic fields 
An interesting aspect of the engagement between the EU and the OSCE in the field of human rights is 
the close co-operation between the Fundamental Rights Agency and the ODIHR. This co-operation 
stretches back to the work of FRA’s predecessor, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia. Following the OSCE’s shift towards engagement with other international organisations 
in the first decade of the XXI century, the ODIHR and EUMC came into close contact and quickly 
developed several areas of co-operation, many of which were carried over to the FRA. Early 
engagement involved i.a. EUMC providing ODIHR with support in data collection methodology and 
regular meetings held towards ensuring that overlap and duplication between both institutions will 
be avoided.806 Unlike the situation with Council of Europe’s reaction to the notion of establishing a 
fully-fledged EU human rights agency, which caused major friction between both organisations (see 
chapter II.C), the OSCE positively welcomed the establishing of FRA. In his 2007 address on the creation 
of FRA, the then-director of the ODIHR C. Strohal stated: 
‘The OSCE and particularly the ODIHR stand to benefit if the coherence and consistency of the 
EU’s human rights policy is improved. The Agency will provide real added value to the EU 
architecture, not only within, but also if best practices and educational materials serve to 
strengthen the capacity of international human rights organizations to assist countries outside 
the EU. A consolidated collection of EU best practices will certainly assist the transfer of such 
assistance.’807 
Engagement and co-operation between both organisations continued in the following years. As a 
recent example, in 2014, following the Council of the EU’s call for FRA to take action towards 
combating hate crime in Europe,808 the FRA set up the Working Party on Combating Hate Crime jointly 
with the EU Member States, the European Commission (via DG JUST), ODIHR and ECRI. The Working 
Party aims to facilitate sharing of information on improving reporting mechanisms for victims of hate 
crime and preventing hate crime in a multi-agency approach, sharing and promotion of best practices 
and enabling factors and developing indicators for measuring progress in fighting hate crime.809 
Modalities of its work include regular meetings facilitated by FRA, horizontal and theme-specific 
activities including trainings and exchange of best practices as well as joint work on improving hate 
                                                          
804 Delegation of the European Union to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ‘European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR) 2010 Country Based Support Scheme (CBSS): Strengthening the Role of Civil Society in Promoting 
Human Rights and Democratic Reform’ 4. 
805 ADE ‘Evaluation of the European Commission’s Co-operation with Ukraine, Final Report. Volume 2: Annexes’ Annex 6, 35. 
806 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, ‘Activities of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia. EUMC Annual Report 2004/2005. Part I.’ 29. 
807 Address by Ambassador Christian Strohal, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR), ‘Fundamental Rights Agency: Cooperation between the Council of Europe and the OSCE’ (sic! - JJ), Warsaw 12 
February 2007. The title of the address in the document is obviously erroneous. 
808 Council of the EU, ‘Council conclusions on combating hate crime in the European Union.’, 5-6 December 2013. 
809 FRA, Working Party Improving Reporting and Recording of Hate Crime in the EU. Inaugural Meeting Report Rome, 4 
November 2014. 
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crime reporting and delivering training on effective counter-measures. ODIHR was able to provide 
substantial added value thanks to its own experience in prevention of hate crime. In October 2015, 
the European Commission hosted the first invitation-only Annual Colloquium on Fundamental Rights 
‘Tolerance and respect: preventing and combating anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim hatred in Europe’ 
with participation of the representatives of ODIHR. 
The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities became a partner for co-operation with the 
European Commission long before the other modalities of EU-OSCE engagement were developed. 
During the process of pre-accession engagement with the prospective new EU members during the 
1990s, the Commission drew upon the experience of the HCNM and his reports on situation of 
minorities and their legal situation within candidate states, with a particular focus on laws pertaining 
to elections and languages of minorities. This engagement influenced the Commissions’ actions 
towards candidate states, such as was the case with the evaluation of Slovakian governments’ policy 
towards minorities at the time contributing to a stall in negotiations on Slovakia’s accession to the 
EU.810 Over the years, the EU continued to engage with the HCNM. The relationship was maintained 
as mutually beneficial, the EU drew upon the work of the HCNM for the purposes of assessing the 
situation of minorities in enlargement and neighbourhood areas, while the HCNM could rely on 
political and diplomatic support of the EU and its Member States both within the OSCE and in his 
activities towards other stakeholders.811 Given the fact that the work of the HCNM relies upon careful 
application of quiet diplomacy, the EU’s collective capabilities in this regard were of high relevance to 
HCNM’s activities. The EU has repeatedly reinforced its high regard and support for the actions of the 
HCNM in the intergovernmental OSCE fora.812 Beyond information exchange and diplomacy, the 
European Commission has also recently assisted the HCNM in his efforts to further education of 
minorities in Serbia, with the DG EMPL providing jointly with the Swiss government a sum of 800k EUR 
via the PROGRESS programme towards the construction of new premises of Subotica Faculty of 
Economics’ Department in Bujanovac, the first bilingual high education facility in southern Serbia.813 
 
G. Chances and opportunities  
A reflection upon the chances and opportunities which the engagement between the EU and the OSCE 
presents at the time invites a look back on how this very report evolved over the time. Back in 2012, 
when the FP7-FRAME project was conceptualised, the situation of the OSCE was quite different than 
it is now. At that time, academic assessments of the state of the OSCE were virtually unanimously 
negative, with some referring to the organisations as ‘backwater of international diplomacy’.814 Such 
statements, while not unfounded, were perhaps overlooking the achievements the achievements of 
the OSCE in the sphere of human rights, most notably in the continued work of ODIHR and other 
autonomous institutions. Despite the political deadlock in Vienna and the deteriorating general 
budget of the OSCE, the autonomous intuitions were able to continue their work, engaging the EU and 
                                                          
810 Walter A. Kemp Quiet diplomacy in action: the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (Martinus Nijhoff 2001) 
97. 
811 Supra. 
812 European Union, OSCE Permanent Council N°1078 Vienna, 19 November 2015 EU Statement in Response to the Report 
by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Ms. Astrid Thors. 
813 European Progress, ‘New Building for Bujanovac Students in 2015’ <http://www.europeanprogres.org/vest/en/174/New-
Building-for-Bujanovac-Students-in-2015>, last accessed on 20 April 2016. 
814 Supra (fn 706), 3. 
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drawing upon the vital support in form of the extra-budgetary contributions from EU Member States 
and recently the European Commission as well. 
The situation changed drastically in February 2014, when the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine posed 
perhaps the biggest challenge in the history of the OSCE. The organisation was able, despite the 
constrains, to marshal enough political momentum and resources to launch a successful field 
operation and return to relevance in regional security. This was possible not the least due to the fact 
that with the NATO and the EU firmly situated on one side of the conflict, the OSCE remained the only 
inclusive regional security framework which provided an opportunity for dialogue between all relevant 
actors. Despite the clash between Russia and the West both within the outside the OSCE, no side of 
the conflict did walk away from the table and the mandate of the OSCE SMM to Ukraine was 
successfully extended.  
This situation invites hopes as to possible reform and strengthening of the OSCE. The arguably stalled 
Helsinki+40 process could provide a foundation for restructuring the mandate and framework of the 
OSCE. Apart from revitalisation of the politico-security aspects of the organisations, such reform could 
also foster changes to the human dimension. Adjusting the OSCE budget to more adequately reflect 
the growing needs of the organisation would entail providing ODIHR, HCNM and RoFM with resources 
necessary for them to meet all aspirations and goals of their mandates. A reform of the decision-
making process within the central OSCE bodies could help ensure progress in the area of political 
commitments related to the human dimension. A broader realignment of the human dimension itself 
would help increase the focus on topics which have fallen behind in the OSCE framework, such as 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
The EU appears as an actor with some unique capabilities and quantities for enhancing the OSCE 
during this window of opportunity. First of all, the EU has powerful resources at its command, both in 
forms of a capable diplomacy led by the EEAS, but also in terms of financial capabilities. The former, 
perhaps strengthened in order to meet the challenge, could help provide the OSCE with diplomatic 
momentum necessary to further an inclusive and broad action oriented towards reforms. The latter 
could help ensure implementation of these reforms if both organisations were able to establish a 
framework which would enable for the European Commission to support the OSCE budget the way it 
is able to contribute to the budgets of the UN (in particular the OHCHR) and the CoE. 
Above that, the EU is an organisation with extensive experience in reforming and even reinventing 
itself in order to meet the challenges ahead. The EU was famously able to circumvent several major 
political roadblocks it has faced in its history. The move from the failure of the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the subsequent reforms is an 
excellent example of how a major multilateral organisation can work to overcome seemingly 
immovable obstacles. This experience could provide vital in ensuring that the process of reforming the 
OSCE is able to move around issues the organisation faces currently without resorting to solutions 
which could exacerbate the situation. 
The eventual progress in reforming and strengthening the OSCE cannot be achieved without some 
consideration to the internal workings of the EU. Specifically, from the perspective of supporting the 
human dimension of the OSCE, the EU could reflect upon the way its bodies and institutions work and 
interact in formulating and carrying out its policies towards the OSCE. Two areas come immediately 
to mind. One is the question of fully implementing the Lisbon reform changes to the external 
representation of the EU in OSCE’s Vienna-based bodies. The other is the matter of ensuring internal 
FRAME    Deliverable No. 5.2 
186 
 
coherence in formulating the EU’s biannual policies for cooperation with the OSCE and having them 
fully reflected in the Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy. This 
entails also close cooperation between the relevant working groups of the Council (COHOM and 
COSCE). 
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Appendix II – case study 
 Introduction 
The present study focuses on the interplay between the European Union (EU) and the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Ukraine through the prism of the EU’s external 
human rights policy agenda and its actual implementation. 
In order to critically assess the ongoing cooperation between the two regional actors, the sources of 
the EU’s external human rights policy and its engagement with Ukraine in this particular field first need 
to be briefly outlined as the general source framework. The crisis ‘in and around Ukraine’, as referred 
to it in the OSCE context, which erupted at the end of 2013, brought significant changes into the EU’s 
approach towards the country, but also to its relationship with the OSCE. While the latter has been 
experiencing a revival as legitimate European security actor, the former found itself almost unable to 
act, even becoming a party to the conflict, if seen from the wider (geo)political perspective. 
Accordingly, Decision No. 1117 of the OSCE Permanent Council on ‘Deployment of an OSCE Special 
Monitoring Mission to Ukraine’ stipulates that ‘the aim of the said mission will be to contribute, 
throughout the country and in co-operation with the concerned OSCE executive structures and 
relevant actors of the international community (such as the United Nations and the Council of Europe), 
to reducing tensions and fostering peace, stability and security […]’815, leaving the European Union 
irrelevant, at least on paper. 
Needless to say, the Russian Federation being one of the OSCE’s participating States is at the same 
time one of the key (f)actors that the study takes into account when analysing the EU’s ability to work 
with the OSCE presence on the ground, but also in Vienna, in the pursuit of its external human rights 
objectives.  
Building on this framework, close attention will be given to different EU and OSCE mechanisms and 
actors involved in the promotion of (implementation of) human rights, on different levels, supported 
by existing literature, official documents and interviews conducted with EU officials in Brussels, Vienna 
and Kyiv and members of the OSCE Secretariat.816. In conclusion, the study provides a critical 
evaluation of how the EU is able to project its external human rights policy in Ukraine, in cooperation 
with the OSCE. This complex dynamic is particularly understood through the prism of an inevitable 
labour division and synergies, both on the political and practical level, and a certain degree of 
instrumentalisation of the OSCE field presence, given the structural constraints that the EU faces in 
pushing for its human rights agenda. 
 
 Motives of the EU’s external human rights policy 
As it exists today, the EU’s human rights agenda and action abroad817 shall be a priori guided by ‘the 
principles, which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
                                                          
815 OSCE, ‘Decision No. 1117 Deployment of an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine’, PC.DEC/1117, 21 March 2014, 
[emphasis added]. 
816 The detailed interviews were conducted with EU/OSCE officials during the period January 2016 – March 2016. 
817 The development of human rights driven EU foreign policy has been explained in a heterogeneous manner, stemming 
from diverse sources, dynamics and motivations, e.g. the convergence of the EU Member States’ objectives, quest for a 
shared external identity or EU identity as sui generis global actor (normative perspective) or comprehensive nature of 
security (realpolitik perspective). 
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rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity 
and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law’818. The EU 
institutions, particularly the European Commission, gradually adopted the OSCE’s understanding of 
security as comprehensive, including a strong human rights component, and have incorporated it since 
across its initiatives, instruments and actions in a relatively coherent manner.  
The current ‘Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019)’, issued together by the 
European Commission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(HR/VP), stresses that human rights are kept at the heart of the EU agenda.819 As regards the OSCE, 
the document stipulates principles that should ‘guide both bilateral work and EU engagement in 
multilateral and regional for a’.820 Interestingly, the document does not make any specific reference 
to the OSCE (in contrast to the case of the United Nations and the Council of Europe), even though 
one of its five strategic areas of action is ‘ensuring a comprehensive HR approach to conflict and 
crises’821, i.e. an area of action where the OSCE has proven to be an irreplaceable and inevitable 
partner (or ‘an important tool’822) of the Union in its immediate neighbourhood. 
On top of the considerable institutionalisation of the human rights agenda externally, a codification 
of human rights as a key cross-cutting objective of the EU’s external policy823 has also seen the light of 
day, having, potentially, a great significance for the EU involvement in and with its biggest direct 
Eastern neighbour. How has this rather decisive institutional and legal potential of the EU in the field 
of human rights materialised in Ukraine and where do the OSCE and its comprehensive security 
approach in which human rights constitute the key part fit? 
 
 Uneven EU engagement with Ukraine 
Before the outburst of the asymmetrical conflict in Eastern Ukraine, discontinuity and ambiguity 
characterised bilateral EU-Ukraine relations, stemming both from the ‘Russian factor’ and the Union’s 
unwillingness to offer EU membership to Ukraine. Even though the Commission designed the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), it was the EU Member States824 and the diversity of their 
perspectives on the EU-Ukraine future that became the detrimental driver of EU responses and 
policies towards Ukraine before the 2013 crisis. These responses were rather declaratory825 and often 
did not transcend the least common denominator stance. In short, there was no clear and shared 
vision on behalf of the EU institutions as well as significant heterogeneity of interests among EU 
Member States of the future relationship between the EU and Ukraine, which consequently reflected 
itself in an ad hoc and one-way engagement with Ukraine, including in the field of human rights.  
Moreover, the Union’s inability to meet the demands coming from Ukraine, magnified by the Orange 
Revolution (2004) and in the wake of the conflict with Russia, affected also the Union’s credibility. This 
                                                          
818 EEAS, ’Human Rights and Democracy’ <http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/about/index_en.htm>, last accessed on 20 
March 2016. 
819 Council of the EU, ‘EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’, 20 July 2015, Doc No 10897/15. 
820 Supra. 
821 Supra. 
822 Interview with an EU official (1), Brussels, 27 January 2016. 
823 The legal basis is found in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in the form of various provisions scattered across the 
Treaty, most importantly Art. 21. 
824 Rosa Balfour, Human Rights and Democracy in EU Foreign Policy: The Cases of Ukraine and Egypt (Routledge 2012). 
75. 
825 Supra, 76. 
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is especially the case in Eastern Ukraine826 where clearly the EU’s post-conflict future task will be to 
rebuild trust as well as the region.827 Still, even though the explanations of the sources of the growing 
tensions between Russia and Ukraine are heterogeneous, the recurrent parameter and independent 
variable has been ‘EU caution towards Russia […] determining a weak engagement with Ukraine’.828 
However, with the conflict in Ukraine being a game-changer, certain big EU Member States have 
assumed an even stronger leading role in different formats, including the Normandy format and the 
German 2016 OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office (CiO), generating a space for a coherent approach to the 
conflict in cooperation with the EU behind the scenes. Furthermore, given the well-developed and 
relevant EU toolbox and stronger normative position since the annexation of Crimea and (city of) 
Sebastopol, the EU institutions have turned out to be more consistently involved in Ukraine – hence 
the need of an efficient communication and cooperation with the OSCE both on a political and 
operational level.  
Ukraine, despite seeking EU membership, does not seem to be fully aware of what EU membership 
entails829, and oscillates/d (at least until recently) between the EU and Russia. Seen from this angle, 
EU normativism and a certain instrumentalism as well as the lack of progress on human rights in 
Ukraine was also used as one of the arguments supporting non-commitment on the side of the 
Union830, condemning Ukraine’s shortcomings in this field. Those tendencies also impacted the EU’s 
ability to exercise its influence and conditionality impact (e.g. related to visa liberalisation831), 
including when it comes to upholding and improving human rights standards in Ukraine, e.g. in case 
of political freedoms, rights of minorities, freedom of media and protection of journalists.  
By and large, Ukraine started to gradually reach the EU’s radar screens with unfolding crises since 2004 
and particularly, as the stability of the country became seen as threatened, the EU became de facto 
engaged and ‘human rights and democracy became merged in the conflict resolution package to which 
the EU contributed’.832 This pattern is partially valid today, bearing in mind that the Union per se is not 
directly part of the crisis management efforts due to the structural and geopolitical constraints. The 
modus operandi leans towards a multi-layered and multi-faceted division of labour between the 
international and regional actors that are presently engaged in and with Ukraine as well as the parties 
to the conflict. The EU’s ability to promote human rights and democracy in Ukraine has been 
constrained by security and geopolitical realities in Ukraine and beyond.833 
 
 EU and OSCE in Ukraine today: Story of an (almost) perfect couple? 
When analysing the present EU engagement with Ukraine in the field of human rights, both 
political/diplomatic and operational/practical dimensions shall be considered on different levels and 
in different contexts in order to understand where and how the OSCE fits into the equation.  
                                                          
826 In Eastern Ukraine even the internally displaced persons (IDPs) find it hard to reintegrate among those who have stayed 
in their places since the outburst of the violence in the area. See below, n 827. 
827 Interview with an OSCE official, via telephone, 15 February 2016. 
828 Supra (fn 824), 76. 
829 Supra (fn 827) 
830 Supra (fn 824), 76. 
831 Interview with an EU official (3), via Skype, 22 February 2016. 
832 Supra (fn 824), 97. 
833 E.g. detention of Ukrainian citizens in Russia and adoption of law against NGOs seen as undesirable ‘foreign agents’ in 
Russia, etc. 
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Firstly, given that the country is in a deep crisis stemming from the asymmetrical armed conflict in its 
territory, hostilities being reported by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (OSCE SMM) daily, there 
are two sorts of human rights at stake. The present conflict is not a frozen one and impacts the very 
basic human rights to life, peace and security. In this sense, the EU cannot do much more than stay 
aside834 provide humanitarian aid, material (including numerous armoured and non-armoured 
vehicles, medical equipment) in order to support the OSCE’s crisis management and tension diffusion 
efforts. 
Hence, the key factor determining the form and quality of cooperation is the current conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine, in which the EU per se is perceived as de facto a party to the conflict from the perspective of 
the wider regional geopolitical setting. That said, the role of EU Member States, internally, 
heterogeneity of their interests and externally, their ability to mediate within high-level diplomatic 
initiatives, such as the Normandy format,835 shall be taken into account when considering the overall 
impact on the human rights situation in Ukraine today. The same observation of relevance could also 
be made when it comes to the process of policy formation, internal and external institutional 
dynamics, i.e. within the EU and between EU and the OSCE. On the meso-level, the outcome is 
determined by available resources and the legitimacy of the EU to act in this field.836 Moreover, in this 
specific context, the impact in terms of EU effectiveness is determined not only by its bargaining 
power, but also by the role of other international actors,837 including Russia on the one side and the 
OSCE, Council of Europe or the United Nations on the other side. 
Secondly, beyond the conflict and on a more general level, there are human rights standards that both 
the EU and the OSCE have aimed to promote and improve in Ukraine for a long time, such as the 
freedom of media, the rights of national minorities, including Roma issues, and political and civic rights 
and freedoms. In this context the EU’s presence is more relevant and with hands-on implications for 
EU-OSCE cooperation, since it is not directly linked to the rights affected in the conflict.  
Another important question to be asked in the current crisis context is where the promotion and 
implementation of the EU’s external human rights policy ranks in bilateral relations. Despite the fact 
that human rights have been high on the EU’s agenda when it comes to Ukraine, they are not the 
number one priority at the moment838, inter alia given the limits of the EU’s engagement. This reality 
clearly reflects the specific and fragile situation on the ground, which has its implication on the timing 
of the EU’s present and future involvement with Ukraine in the field of human rights. The value added 
remains particularly in the Union’s indirect contribution to upholding and protecting human rights in 
Ukraine, which is channelled through the OSCE and its field presence by means of the resources the 
EU devotes to the mission.  
When it comes to other than the most basic human rights affected by the conflict, the EU cooperates 
with the OSCE actors in Ukraine, while applying a certain degree of conditionality to implement its 
external human rights goals. The role of informality in EU-OSCE cooperation on the ground is of utmost 
importance, given that in the current context informality makes the cooperation more possible and 
                                                          
834 Supra (fn 824), 76. 
835 Normandy format regroups the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France with the aim to put an end to ‘the conflict 
in and around Ukraine’. 
836 Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis ‘Struggling with Performance: An Analytical Framework for the EU 
International Interactions’ (Paper prepared for the EUSA Thirteenth Biennial Conference 2013) 21. 
837 Supra. 
838 Supra (fn 822). 
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effective, criticism of unsystematic relations being put aside. The following section sheds light on the 
practical implications of this particularly complex setting at different levels of engagement. The EU 
and the OSCE interact on different levels and in different settings, which shall be considered when 
evaluating their present cooperation in the field of human rights in Ukraine. 
 
a) Axis Brussels – Kyiv – Vienna: diplomatic and political 
dimension  
When it comes to the improvement of human rights standards in Ukraine, the EU and the OSCE are 
two complementary actors, conditioned by working in synergies, including with OSCE specialised 
agencies and autonomous institutions. Overall, the EU’s power stems from its capacity of providing 
funds and in combination with conditionality when it comes to legislative reforms, which shall 
stimulate the protection of human rights in Ukraine. The total amount of EU money has reached EUR 
12 billion in different forms since the beginning of the crisis.839 This feature of bilateral relations should 
be understood also in as closely linked to the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement that encompasses a 
human rights element840, regular high-level human rights dialogues between the EU and Ukraine, with 
some positive developments such as Ukraine’s adoption of a Human Rights Action Plan, recently 
applauded by the European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM).841 To sum up, the EU puts more 
general pressure on Ukraine to meet its human rights commitments and international standards. As 
for the OSCE, it has also contributed with technical advice on the draft of this plan, for instance 
concerning protection of national minorities, keeping the EU presence well informed. From the 
perspective of high-level political and diplomatic contacts between the EU and the OSCE regarding the 
conflict in and around Eastern Ukraine, regular staff meetings, including the Chief Monitor Apakan’s 
or his Deputy’s visits to Brussels,842 became the rule on the top of established exchanges between EU 
and OSCE staff. Those exchanges are based on information sharing and include visits in Ukraine and in 
Brussels, briefings and reporting from the inaccessible conflict zones.843 
 
b) ‘EUDEL’ in Vienna: raising its voice and EU ‘activism’ 
In line with the EU’s commitment to ‘effective multilateralism’, the Vienna context is characterised by 
the massive diplomatic activism and support that the EU Delegation (EUDEL) to the International 
Organisations in Vienna has constantly lent not only to the OSCE SMM, to the Observer Mission at the 
Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk and OSCE autonomous institutions, but also the initiatives 
of respective OSCE CiO, the Swiss and currently German CiO being particularly important. The growing 
frequency of EU statements related to the crisis in and around Ukraine at the weekly OSCE Permanent 
Councils formally illustrates the EU’s engagement (see Table 1).  
 
                                                          
839 Supra. 
840 Supra (fn 831). 
841 European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM) ’EUAM experts welcome human rights boost for Ukraine’, 
<http://www.euam-ukraine.eu/en/public_information/news/887/> last accessed on 1 March 2016. 
842 Supra (fn 822). 
843 Supra. 
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Table 11 EU statements in the OSCE Permanent Council (2014 – March 2016) 
Year No. of 
Plenary 
sessions 
No. of 
Statements 
No. of EU 
statements on 
Ukraine 
Average per 
session 
(Statements on 
UA/ sessions) 
Ratio (EU 
statements/ 
EU 
statements 
on UA) 
2014 47 198 64 1,36 32,32% 
2015 51 216 80 1,57 37,03% 
2016* 7 28 12844 1,74 42,86% 
Source: Delegation of the EU to the International Organisations in Vienna845846 
*Data collected up till 3 March 2016 
 
Considering the substance, the Union coordinated and delivered rather strong statements in the 
OSCE’s major human rights gatherings in Warsaw, the Human Dimension Implementation Meetings 
(HDIM), which takes place on a yearly basis and are accompanied by a considerable mobilisation of 
the EU Delegation and its coordination efforts. In its opening statement in 2015, the Union apparently 
prioritised the issue of human rights violations in Ukraine, particularly that of persons belonging to 
national minorities (e.g. Crimean Tatars), in separatist areas of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea.847 
Furthermore, the EU called for unhindered access of the OSCE to the destabilised areas, most 
importantly Donbas and Crimea.848 In its closing statement, the EU representative made a clear link 
between violations of human rights that occur when a State tackles threats to its security, which 
constitutes another significant source of instability.849 This idea is in line with current EU engagement 
with the Ukrainian elites: while human rights are not the ultimate priority at the moment, the conflict 
cannot infinitely justify inaction or even deterioration of the situation of human rights in the 
country.850 The EU prepares Ukraine ‘for good times’, which if a final deal is struck and fully 
implemented and the conflict is terminated and the situation normalises, shall come and the EU will 
assume the leading role in rebuilding of Eastern Ukraine, since nobody else would be willing to pay for 
it851. 
                                                          
844 The number includes ‘EU Statement in Response to Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Foreign Minister of Germany’ given the 
priority position it attributed to Ukraine in the statement and the extent of Ukraine related content as well as ‘Interpretative 
Statement under Paragraph IV.1 (A) 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the OSCE’ on the extension of the deployment of OSCE 
observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Ukrainian- Russian State border.  
845 Delegation of the European Union to the International Organisations in Vienna, OSCE and EU, EU statements in the 
OSCE, <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna/eu_osce/eu_statements_osce_meetings/index_en.htm> last 
accessed on 29 February 2016. 
846 See: Michaela Anna Šimáková ‘The European Union in the OSCE in the light of the Ukrainian crisis: trading actorness for 
effectiveness?’ Thesis presented for the Degree of MA in EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies (forthcoming EU 
Diplomacy Papers Series Spring 2016). 
847 European Union, ‘EU Statement – Opening Session’, OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Warsaw, 21 
September – 2 October 2015. 
848 Supra. 
849 European Union, ‘EU Statement – Closing Session’, OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Warsaw, 21 
September – 2 October 2015. 
850 Supra (fn 822). 
851 Supra (fn 827). 
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Moreover, a maintained level of political representation of the EU is also noteworthy. Unlike in 2013, 
the HR/VP attended the Ministerial Council both in Basel in 2014 and in Belgrade in 2015. In her 
statement at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Belgrade at the end of 2015, the HR/VP Mogherini 
devoted a significant time to Ukraine,852 making a strong reference to OSCE/ODIHR and the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) as a source of information when it comes to human 
rights violations in Crimea.853 Indeed, even though the latter do not have a genuine access to the 
Crimean Peninsula, they have established strong networks of local contacts, enabling them to meet 
with the representatives of the national minorities and gather scarce information from the cut-off 
parts of Ukraine.854 The HR/VP portrayed the EU was portrayed as a sponsor of ‘all efforts for a solution 
that respects Ukraine’s sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity’.855 Unlike the OSCE, 
for which discussing the situation of Crimea remains a taboo, the EU for its part pressures and speaks 
freely about the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia, since it is not involved in the crisis 
management. By contrast, the present OSCE structures must retain a balanced and neutral stance, 
especially in the view of potential local elections in certain areas of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. 
The key issue concerning the human rights situation in Ukraine in the Viennese context is first and 
foremost linked to the crisis management and conflict resolution effort, i.e. to the OSCE SMM and its 
continuation or for instance, the use of the OSCE’s substantial expertise and tools related to the 
UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security856, which has been blocked by Russia857. Even though the 
OSCE SMM mandate as adopted and prolonged by respective Decisions of the OSCE Permanent 
Council858 is today rather associated uniquely with its monitoring function, it also encompasses a tiny 
part on the protection of human rights and humanitarian aid delivery facilitation. What is often 
overlooked is that the Mission’s task is also to ‘[m]onitor and support respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities’859, which is 
where the interests of the EU presence and that of the OSCE converge also regarding the protection 
of human rights in the conflict torn areas of Ukraine. A simplified formula ‘the EU pays and the OSCE 
does’ seems to be at work; given the circumstances, for instance in case of the OSCE’s support of 
implementation of decisions on mine action and on the prohibition of live-fire exercises in Donetsk 
and Luhansk regions, as endorsed by the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG)860. The high-level 
political/bureaucratic track appears to be more noteworthy than a straightforward engagement in the 
field. In Vienna, since the outburst of the Ukraine crisis, there has not been almost single OSCE 
                                                          
852 Almost a one third of the entire statement.  
853 European Union, ‘Statement by Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy’, MC/DEL/64/15, 22 Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Belgrade, 3 December 2015. 
854 Supra (fn 831). 
855 Supra (fn 831). 
856 As the recent NATO-sponsored report ’The Role of Women and Gender Policies in Addressing the Military Conflict in 
Ukraine’ shows, the conflict in Ukraine has had an immense impact on the situation and exercise of the basic human rights 
of women and girls in Ukraine. See: Irene Fellin ‘The Role of Women and Gender Policies in Addressing the Military Conflict 
in Ukraine’ (Instituto Affari Internazionali 2015). 
857 Discussion with D. Baer, ‘OSCE’s Role in the Russia-Ukraine Crisis: A discussion with U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE, Daniel 
Baer’, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 16 April, 2016, Brussels. 
858 Namely OSCE Decisions No. 1117 (PC.DEC/1117) and attached interpretative statements, Decision No. 1129 
(PC.DEC/1129) and attached interpretative statements and Decision No. 1162 (PC.DEC/1162) and attached interpretative 
statements. 
859 OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 1117, supra. 
860 OSCE, ‘Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 2 
March 2016’, <http://us6.campaign-archive1.com/?u=b11aceda364f8f9afa6cadbbb&id=6d5acb082a&e=5c1ea2182e> last 
accssed on 2 March 2016. 
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Permanent Council where the EU did not deliver at least one statement dealing with the situation in 
Ukraine and its impact on the human rights status quo, in and around Ukraine. 
Furthermore, the EU Delegation in Vienna has been a vocal and consistent defender of the OSCE’s 
autonomous institutions (ODIHR, RFOM, HCNM), the presence of which in Ukraine is of utmost 
importance as well. The diplomatic and political support of the Union (including through the sanctions 
on Russia) has been markedly voiced on every occasion, including high-level reciprocal visits and key 
OSCE events. That said, the importance of the OSCE CiO’s initiatives in crisis management and conflict 
resolution in Ukraine, in particular that of the Swiss, Serbian and currently German CiO shall not be 
omitted when considering the EU’s aggregate impact. The EU Delegation in Vienna traditionally holds 
weekly meetings with the CiO, which in 2016 is performed by Germany. What is more, Germany is at 
the same time part of the Normandy format (together with France), OSCE CiO, and an EU Member 
State that engages in numerous coordination meetings in Vienna with other EU Member States. 
Besides, it is one of the few European countries with decent bilateral relations and communication 
channels with the Russian Federation. This apparent coincidence ensures solid communication links 
in terms of the politico-diplomatic track of the conflict resolution efforts in Ukraine. All things 
considered, on the high-level political engagement in the protection of human rights affected by the 
conflict in Ukraine, the Union has been rather ‘facilitating [emphasis added] engagement in various 
formats’861, while allowing other EU Member States to take the political lead in negotiations and the 
OSCE being the consensual forum to mediate the way forward. 
 
c) Ukraine: EU-OSCE informal and ad hoc cooperation 
The OSCE presence in Ukraine is rather dense and qualitatively diversified, comprising almost 10 
different institutions or actors acting under the OSCE umbrella, including the independent institutions, 
OSCE SMM, OSCE Project Coordinator and OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo 
and Donetsk, which is capacity the EU institutions cannot reach. Moreover, the OSCE has over the 
period of time of its presence in the field established important networks of grass-roots contacts with 
different sectors of Ukrainian society and authorities. Seen from this perspective, the OSCE has great 
potential as an important tool for strengthening the EU’s external human rights action and 
implementation of its policy objectives.  
One of the vital dimensions of the EU’s local support is both political and financial, via the use of its 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), to the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) and its Election Observation Missions (EOMs) in Ukraine, which also 
indirectly contribute to the normalisation of the situation in the country, rule of law and respect of 
human rights. The EU’s contribution to OSCE/ODIHR’s activities in Ukraine has been of an ‘exceptional 
nature […] in addition to the secondments provided by EU Member States, in the framework of a wider 
EU engagement’.862 
As for the EU Member States’ engagement, they have seconded altogether 410 OSCE SMM monitors 
out of the total number of 662, provided their training (also conducted by the OSCE/ODIHR863), which 
                                                          
861 European External Action Service (EEAS), ‘EU increases support for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine’, press 
release, Brussels 19 June 2015 [emphasis added]. 
862 EEAS, ‘Note to the EU Member States Delegations to the OSCE, Council Working Party on the OSCE and the Council of 
Europe (COSCE), Council Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST)’, 4 April 2014. 
863 OSCE, ‘ODIHR in Ukraine’, <www.osce.org/odihr/ukraine> last accessed on 30 April 2016.  
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counts for almost two thirds, or 62% of the total number of the Mission’s monitors864. The Union 
complements the OSCE with funding and sharing of its assets. As of mid-2015, the overall volume of 
European Commission funding to the SMM reached EUR 25 million,865 which together with satellite 
imagery and other monitoring tools made available to the SMM makes the EU the biggest contributor 
to the OSCE Mission. 
From the long-term perspective and protection of the basic human rights not directly affected by the 
conflict in Ukraine, the EU has stepped up its support through the European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR), giving Ukraine ‘a strengthened priority for 2013-2017’866 with a minimum 
of EUR 4.5 million allocated for this period. This scheme includes also small grants for Human Rights 
Defenders from Crimea867, which yet remains an inaccessible black box for the International 
Community. Furthermore, whilst deploying an inter-service mission to Ukraine, the European 
Commission acknowledged the importance of ‘full synergies/ division of labour with other instruments 
and other actors’868 including the OSCE executive structures in Ukraine. That said, the question of the 
EU’s monitoring of implementation as well as Ukraine’s absorption capacities869 emerge with the 
significant volume of financial resources devoted. Even though it is out of the scope of this case study 
to answer the question of the EU’s effectiveness in Ukraine in the field of human rights, clearly, options 
of effective implementation monitoring mechanisms in cooperation with other international actors 
should be further explored and improved. 
Again, the practical EU-OSCE cooperation has mostly been noticeable in the areas of human rights 
that are not directly related to the conflict, e.g. national minorities, Roma, freedom of religion, 
elections, etc. The EU Delegation has also been active at the highest political level and in dialogues 
with the Ukrainian authorities (e.g. EU’s Human Rights dialogue), while the OSCE and its structures 
were more relevant on the technical level and building of a democratic Ukrainian statehood. For 
instance, OSCE/ODIHR has proven to be irreplaceable in enhancing participation of and bringing 
together Ukrainian civil society with the Ukrainian state and its administrative structures. In this 
context, this is another example of division of labour between a more political and bureaucratic EU 
and an OSCE equipped with a technical expertise and local contacts, whilst making the best use of 
available resources and existing comparative advantages. Practical synergies between the work of the 
two can for instance be detected in the case of issuing reports, such as the one of the OSCE/ODIHR 
Human Rights Assessment Mission (HRAM) in March 2014870, sharing comments on those reports by 
relevant staff members and helping legislative reform in Ukraine. One of the EU’s triumphs in this 
sense was the introduction of anti-discrimination language in the Ukrainian labour code based on 
sexual orientation,871 which has not been covered by the OSCE that extensively as for instance national 
minorities. The EU undoubtedly leads where it has a stronger leverage over Ukraine, particularly on 
                                                          
864 OSCE, ‘OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine - Status Report as of 13 January 2016’. 
865 EEAS, ‘EU increases support for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine’, press release, Brussels 19 June 2015. 
866 European Commission, ‘EIDHR and Ukraine’, Information Note, March 2014. 
867 Supra. 
868 Supra. 
869 The absorption capacity refers to the overall ability of a country, its formal and informal structures, including its cultural 
specificities, to utilise foreign assistance in all different forms, e.g. in terms of financial and material assistance (available 
financial resources), humanitarian assistance, sharing of good practices, transfer of values and assistance in reforming 
existing (legislative) shortcomings.  
870 See supra (fn 863). 
871 Supra (fn 831). 
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the ministerial level,872 and in terms of higher standards that are not always agreed upon at the OSCE 
level. 
What must also be kept in mind is that the EU has its Delegation in Ukraine that shall ‘play a crucial 
role in ensuring that the recent institutional and policy developments on global human rights are 
effectively implemented’.873 The level and quality of cooperation among structures engaged in EU 
external human rights policy could be further improved with ‘a view to improving integration or 
“mainstreaming” – of human rights in all aspects’874 of EU polices in Ukraine and plausible synergies 
with the OSCE. The lack of human resources, particularly regarding staff working on human rights and 
in the political section, make this facet even more urgent, both in terms of human rights affected by 
the conflict and of human rights standards in Ukraine. The cooperation between the EU Delegation in 
Ukraine and OSCE presence is ad hoc but very frequent. The EU regularly asks for advice, since the 
OSCE has important local contacts, notes, evaluations and information are shared. 
To sum up, the role of informality is in the current politically sensitive context of paramount 
importance. The fact that EU-OSCE cooperation is for instance not that formalised and systematic as 
in the case of the OSCE and the Council of Europe seems to allow the two actors to be more flexible, 
efficient and go beyond existing political and geopolitical sensitivities in their practical cooperation in 
the field. The key variables of this comprehensive cooperation are the resources available, in particular 
human resources, and the ability to establish and maintain dynamic informal contacts and exchanges 
in a quickly changing, challenging and sensitive environment. The balance between informal contacts 
and cooperation per se has to be struck in the politically subtle atmosphere, while identifying 
possibilities of further cooperation. One of such areas could be the ability to better evaluate Ukraine’s 
implementation of commitments in the human dimension and follow-up, for which the EU is lacking 
a clear methodology for the moment, once it exercises its influence. A more elaborate, cost-efficient 
and integrated monitoring mechanism on the ground would prevent history to repeat in terms of lip 
service paid by the Ukrainian authorities to the EU related to their long-term human rights 
commitments. 
 
 Conclusions 
When asked how often reference to the EU or the OSCE comes up in their daily work, the interviewed 
EU officials confirmed a very frequent, daily reference made to the OSCE in their daily work. Yet, this 
was quite scarce in the case of reference made to the EU in the OSCE context, when dealing with the 
conflict in and around Ukraine. This example could be rather illustrative of the current status quo as 
the security considerations dominate other areas, whilst human rights are always in the background. 
The OSCE re-emerged as the ‘most appropriate framework to manage the crisis and prevent further 
escalation […], easing tensions between Russia and the West’.875 By facilitating negotiations on the 
implementation of the Minsk agreement as well as its massive presence on the ground, the OSCE de 
facto contributed to the protection of human rights directly impacted by the conflict, while the Union 
provided the inevitable funding and material, but kept its distance and silent pressure. This role is of 
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873 Rosa Balfour, ‘The Role of EU Delegations in the EU Human Rights Policy’, (European Parliament 2013) 5. 
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supreme importance since not many other entities would be in a position to support the OSCE SMM 
or ODIHR in their vital observing, facilitation and monitoring tasks. 
The EU engages though existing high-level channels and formats with the Ukrainian elites, applying 
conditionality, focusing on its long-term human rights agenda, i.e. upgrading human rights standards 
in Ukraine in general. In this sense, there is also an important frequent, informal and ad hoc 
cooperation between OSCE actors and EU ongoing in the field of human rights.  
The present situation in Ukraine, underlined by structural and geopolitical constraints, favours a 
division of labour between the EU and the OSCE, both from the perspective of human rights at stake 
and timing (conflict and post-conflict rebuilding). EU-OSCE interplay inclines towards convergences 
and even synergies, rather than overlaps, which are noticeable when studying current status quo on 
different levels. While the OSCE keeps a non-biased and neutral image, the EU sends strong political 
messages from Brussels and Vienna in support of Ukraine and stimulates the latter’s reform process 
and implementation of human rights commitments. While the EU remains more political and 
bureaucratic, applies conditionality and pushes for its human rights agenda in Ukraine on the 
ministerial level, where it is more efficient, the OSCE acts in a more technical way and does the physical 
work on the ground, backed by its well-developed network of local contacts.  
Looking cautiously into the future, the Union by its action ‘prepares for better times’, focusing on long-
term reforms of the Ukrainian legislature and human rights mainstreaming, while sustaining the 
OSCE’s presence ‘by its purse’. Assuming that the conflict comes to an end and the situation in Eastern 
Ukraine normalises, the EU will be an important (f)actor in rebuilding of the country, while pushing 
for human rights mainstreaming in every policy area, endorsed through its normative nature that is 
welcomed by both the OSCE and Ukraine.  
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IV. Conclusions  
1. The European Union is committed to seek the advancement of the principles of democracy, the 
rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms not only 
within its own framework but also in the wider world. While avowing itself to the concept of 
multilateralism, the EU recognizes regional organisations as partners with whom it strives to 
develop cooperation. The relevant policies and actions should inter alia focus on consolidating 
and supporting the implementation of the aforementioned principles; fostering the sustainable 
economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim 
of eradicating poverty; and promoting an international system based on stronger multilateral 
cooperation and good global governance.876 These objectives have been reaffirmed in the 2012 
Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy and 2015 Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy in which the Council of Europe and the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in 
Europe take a prominent place.  
2. The Strategic Framework states that the EU will continue its engagement with ‘the invaluable 
human rights work of the Council of Europe and the OSCE.’877 Accordingly, the Action Plan refers 
to cooperation with these organisations under several headings. This Report provides an analysis 
and critical assessment of various aspects of the relevant EU policies and their implementation, 
including problems already encountered and anticipated challenges. However, the Report also 
substantiates the view that the European actors mutually complement and enrich each other in 
their work for democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Moreover, the Report highlights that 
there is a considerable potential in this regard that has still to be further explored and exploited. 
3. While focusing on the EU perspective, the Report is based on the recognition of the multi-centred 
organisational setting in Europe. As a consequence, it is organized around two central threads, 
namely: a) the adequacy of the EU policies and activities from the perspective of its strategic goal 
to advance democracy, human rights and the rule of law, b) the need for a coherent and effective 
human rights protection framework for all people in Europe which would build on the different 
organisational settings and not suffer under differences, discrepancies and tensions.  
4. Specific conclusions concerning the analysis of the EU engagement with the CoE and the OSCE 
have been placed under the respective chapters of this Report. Therefore, remarks in this part 
focus on more general issues. 
5. The EU recognizes the partnership with the Council of Europe in the area of human rights and 
democracy as particularly important. From the EU policy documents the conclusion can be drawn 
that like the United Nations is the EU key partner at the multilateral level, the Council of Europe 
takes a similar position at the regional level. 
6. The EU’s thematic goals and objectives correspond largely to the core areas of work of the CoE. 
They have been expanded over time as the CoE’s human rights agenda broadened. At the same 
time, not all EU policy documents are consistent in their identification of thematic priorities of the 
CoE as a partner for the promotion of certain human rights issues. These gaps and inconsistencies 
risk that certain avenues of cooperation will be overlooked by the EU and EU Member States 
officials who are tasked with the implementation of EU human rights policy. Avoiding these blind 
                                                          
876 Art. 21 TEU. 
877 Council of the EU, ‘EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy’, 25 June 2012, Doc No 11855/12 4. 
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spots could enable the EU to realize untapped potential for cooperation and ultimately strengthen 
EU external human rights policy. The geographic priorities of the EU on the contrary are very 
broad. Here, it should be examined, whether a stronger country-specific focus, linking thematic 
issues to countries where violations are particularly prevalent, may be a useful strategy. 
7. The Council of Europe has a number of direct channels through which it can shape EU policy-
making. They include in particular the adoption of legal standards and the provision of information 
and expertise. The impact of the CoE is strongest when the EU ratifies its legal instruments, but 
even without ratification the EU has drawn on the conventions of the Council of Europe as a source 
of inspiration for its own legal framework, and as an indication for the guiding principles of EU 
law. So far, the EU has only acceded to a very few CoE conventions, although more than 50 are 
open to EU participation. The exclusive focus on the Union’s accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights has been partially redirected after the European Court of Justice 
issued its Opinion 2/13 on the matter. Now, accession to other conventions, in particular in the 
areas of trafficking of human beings, children’s rights, data protection and women’s rights is being 
considered. Unfortunately, this progress can above all be witnessed in the area of civil and political 
rights, while economic, social and cultural rights continue to take second place in the EU. 
Particularly the different treatment of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 
on the one hand, and of the European Social Committee, on the other hand, is striking. In this 
context, the EU may wish to see the ‘Turin process’ launched by the CoE in 2014878 as an 
opportunity to enter in closer cooperation with the CoE also in the area of social and economic 
rights.  
8. Furthermore, the CoE impacts on EU human rights law and policy by providing information and 
expertise. The European Commission relies heavily on knowledge provided by external sources. 
Next to the information made available by Fundamental Rights Agency, building on information 
provided by the CoE is often not only more convenient in terms of cost and time for the European 
Commission, it may also add legitimacy to its action. Close exchanges between officials of both 
institutions at all levels, training provided to EEAS staff by the Council of Europe, and the use of 
the recommendations made by the CoE’s monitoring bodies all contribute to strengthening the 
latter’s impact on the EU. 
9. One of the major challenges to the EU policy regarding the CoE is the compliance with its 
commitment agreed in the Treaty of Lisbon to accede to the European Convention on Human 
Rights.879 Therefore, legally speaking, there is no return for the EU from this commitment without 
an appropriate amendment of its primary law. It is also to be recalled that this EU step was 
accompanied by reform of the adoption of the Protocol 14 to ECHR allowing the Union by way of 
exception to become party to the Convention even though it is not a state. However, in 
accordance with same TUE provision such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as 
defined in the Treaties. Taking this into account, the Court of Justice in its Opinion 2/13 questioned 
the conditions of accession as negotiated between the EU and the CoE. The Court’s criticism is of 
                                                          
878 ‘The ‘Turin process’ aims at reinforcing the normative system of the Charter within the Council of Europe and in its 
relationship with the law of the European Union. Its key objective is to improve the implementation of social and economic 
rights at the continental level, in parallel to the civil and political rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Se: Council of Europe, ‘Turin Process’ <http://www.coe.int/en/web/turin-process/home> last accessed on 28 April 
2016. 
879 Art. 6(2) TEU.  
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fundamental character and covers a wide range of issues. It is to be noted that the present 
deadlock may negatively affect not only the further rapprochement of the EU and the CoE but also 
the functioning of the EU’ own system of the protection of fundamental rights. Therefore, the 
report elaborates in details on various aspects of the accession and related options. It underlines 
the need for the EU and its institutions to carefully examine the Opinion as well as to develop 
means of addressing the Court’s arguments in order to return the process of accession to the right 
tracks (including possible adjustments of the EU architecture, convincing the CoE partners, 
especially non-EU-member-states parties to the Convention, to get back to the negotiating table 
with a view to possible modifying the current draft agreement. 
10. Taking these recent developments into account, the prospects of having a unified, common 
standard of human rights across Europe appear today more complicated and less bright than some 
years ago. The CJEU is vociferously asserting its autonomy in the interpretation of human rights 
law. The scope for divergences between Strasbourg and Luxembourg on human rights issues also 
seems to be increasing as the influence of EU law spreads. In addition, the ECHR presumption of 
EU compliance with human rights law without properly checking its actual implementation may 
have a detrimental impact on human rights protection. In fact, once can claim that despite the 
good intention to facilitate the EU accession process to the ECHR, the Bosphorus approach in fact 
discourages detailed analysis of whether the EU is protecting human rights law in its actions. 
11. Despite these challenges or perhaps because of them, other than treaty accession forms of EU-
CoE cooperation such as Joint Programmes seem to gain additional importance. The achievements 
of this framework are undoubtedly a success story for both organisations. While the Joint 
Programmes should be continued as tools of EU’s external policy towards its close neighbourhood, 
it would be desirable to enhance their sustainability, predictability and thus effectiveness.  
12. The EU’s engagement with the OSCE and in particular with its autonomous institutions is an 
example of efficient partnership despite disparity in resources available to both partners. The EU 
continues to support OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities and the Representative on Freedom of the Media in their 
activities and engages in successful cooperation in furthering human rights on the ground. Despite 
these achievements, this partnership suffers from lack of an overarching agreement akin to the 
EU-CoE Memorandum of Understanding. While much can be attained through ad hoc cooperative 
projects and activities based on the converging interests, even a purely technical agreement 
between the EU and ODIHR would enhance cooperation towards greater efficiency and 
coherence.  
13. The EU’s engagement with the human dimension of the OSCE is primarily positioned within the 
external policies of the EU and focused on third countries. This arrangement results in lost 
opportunities regarding the possible synergy which the two organisations could attain while 
working in the context of internal policies of the EU and addressing human rights in EU Member 
States. While some progress has been made in form of OSCE’s cooperation with FRA or its 
involvement in the discussion on fundamental rights in the EU, much ground remains to be 
covered. One possible avenue to explore is the OSCE’s capability to deploy electoral observer 
missions to all EU Member States, if the necessary technical assistance could be provided by the 
EU towards facilitating an undertaking on such scale. A success in this field could pave the way 
towards a more extensive cooperation in the internal sphere of EU human rights policies. It could 
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also enhance the credibility of the EU by displaying readiness to embrace internally the same 
standards which the EU is frequently promoting externally. 
14. One can conclude that with its timely reaction to the crisis in Ukraine, the OSCE has returned to 
relevance and is once again an important actor in European security. Many scholars and 
policymakers have expressed hopes that this could lead to a revival of the OSCE as a whole, 
including ‘human dimension.’ Yet much work remains to be done in this regard, as political 
deadlocks continue to dodge the OSCE and impair its ability to reform. The EU has found itself in 
an exposed position, as it is seen by many as having taken a side in the Ukrainian conflict. An 
attempt to help the OSCE move forward and overcome some of its weaknesses would entail 
careful consideration of relations within the US-Russia-EU triangle. The ‘human dimension,’ which 
could greatly benefit from a reform of OSCE, should be at the core of any discussion on the future 
of this organisation. The EU, with human rights, democracy and rule of law at the heart of its 
external policy, is perhaps best suited to assume responsibility in this regard.  
15. The report in a case study related to Ukraine underlines that structural and geopolitical constraints 
in this country has favoured a division of labour between the EU and the OSCE. While the EU 
‘prepares Ukraine for better times’ when it comes to upgrading its human rights standards, the 
OSCE is directly involved in immediate upholding of human rights, including by means of its 
reinforced presence on the ground in the context of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The OSCE 
conducts the crisis management and facilitates the implementation of the Minsk agreement and 
the EU provides most of the funding, material and human resources and thus, indirectly 
contributes to the protection of human rights. It is to be stressed that no other actor than the EU 
would be able to sustain the OSCE Monitoring Mission Special Monitoring Mission or could be 
considered as relevant for the future post-conflict rebuilding of Eastern Ukraine. 
16. Despite this premises, the EU-OSCE cooperation in Ukraine in the field of human rights has been 
rather ad hoc and informal. On the one hand, this state of play provides a certain degree of 
flexibility and favours efficiency (i.e. synergies and avoidance of overlaps) in the current politically 
sensitive context but, on the other hand, involves a great deal of uncertainty. Perhaps, a more 
comprehensive monitoring mechanism of the progress achieved in the areas of democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law could be considered as a desirable cooperative endeavour of the 
country authorities, the OSCE and the EU? 
17. There are numerous examples of bilateral cooperation between EU, CoE and OSCE in various 
configurations. The interplay between the three organisations was so far subject to few academic 
studies.880 Nevertheless, closer multi-layered cooperation involving all three organisations might 
offer additional opportunities for the advancement of democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law, in particular in countries or sub-regions where deficits in this regard create structural 
obstacles to human development. The EU is well equipped to facilitate such cooperation and may 
wish to assume this responsibility. 
  
                                                          
880 See: Ugo Caruso, ‘Interplay between the Council of Europe, OSCE, EU and NATO’ FP6-MIRICO Report (European Academy 
Bozen-Bolzano 2007); Malte Brosig, ‘Governance between International Institutions: Analysing Interaction Modes between 
the EU, the Council of Europe and the OSCE’ in David Galbreath and Carmen Gebhardt (eds) Cooperation or Conflict? 
Problematizing Organizational Overlap in Europe. (Ashgate 2010). 
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